Dear Kristofer, I was thinking of multi-winner election methods that have some dose of proportionality. In this case, I believe that it is inevitable that an additional clone D2 could create a cycle like {A,B,C,D1,E} > {A,B,C,D1,G} > {A,B,C,D1,D2} > {A,B,C,D1,E} that will finally be resolved in favour of {A,B,C,D1,G}. In other words: I believe that the sheer existence of winning sets with more than one clone could act as a spoiler. Markus Schulze

On 2025-10-25 22:14, Markus Schulze via Election-Methods wrote: > Dear Kristofer, > > I was thinking of multi-winner election methods > that have some dose of proportionality. In this > case, I believe that it is inevitable that an > additional clone D2 could create a cycle like > {A,B,C,D1,E} > {A,B,C,D1,G} > {A,B,C,D1,D2} > > {A,B,C,D1,E} that will finally be resolved in > favour of {A,B,C,D1,G}. > > In other words: I believe that the sheer existence > of winning sets with more than one clone could act > as a spoiler. I think I understand what you're saying. Since you mention cycles, do you think that the independence of such spoilers are incompatible with reasonable proportionality criteria like the DPC, or just with multiwinner generalizations of Condorcet? -km