Etjon, you didn't say why you think hand-counting is important.  If your
goal is to allow an election to be counted by a society that can't even
afford a cheap smartphone, I don't think this cost is a show-stopping
barrier, since smartphones are ubiquitous.  So why settle for an inferior
tallying algorithm?

Given a smartphone or pc, a person could type the contents of ranked
ballots into text files, one ballot per row.  (The names of the candidates
or parties or propositions can be abbreviated using agreed initials, to
reduce labor.)  Given multiple phones, the labor could be shared among
multiple typists.  If the group is small, one typist (the group's
secretary) should suffice.  The text file(s) can be pasted into tallying
software installed once (in advance) on the phone or pc (or at a website,
given an internet connection).

It's probably quicker & less error-prone to type the ballots into text
files and verify by eye that the text files accurately represent the paper
ballots than to count by hand and verify by hand the accuracy of the
counting.  Typing & verifying text file copies wouldn't require any
experience with or understanding of the tallying algorithm.  And it would
allow tallying by multiple algorithms at no extra labor cost, for the
purpose of comparing different algorithms.

--Steve Eppley

On 5/22/2025 6:40 AM, Etjon Basha via Election-Methods wrote:

disagrees with me on the practicality of pairwise matrices, so couldn't
help a lot.

counted election would be very time consuming, and quite prone to errors
and challenges from all parties.

Condorcet method can can be hand counted?

log(candidates,2) counting rounds, and each of those rounds require sending
a matrix of how many times each candidate was ranked in which position to a
central location, so quite the bother indeed.

timeframes with an acceptable error rate by most volunteers.

Nanson, which I disagree with)

shortcomings such a method might have?

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Hi Steve,

I skipped the justification for seeking a hand count as I fear the broader discussion may derail beyond the scope of the mailing list.

But in brief, I have little faith in electronic voting as a social (as opposed to an actual) technology. 

You absolutely can make an electronic count foolproof (vote on a machine, which prints your vote for you to review, which vote you then deposit in a box, the algorithm meanwhile counts within seconds of the polling close and any box can be opened by any party to check the system inputs, etc).

But in practice, if it ever starts as foolproof, it ceases to be so in time, given the high stakes. Systems deteriorate, and social system more than any. Eventually this or that guarantee is removed or left to become obsolete, and after enough time there's little stopping a popular loosing candidate from calling the whole thing into question.

Given that we vote so we don't fight, it is imperative that this shouldn't happen.

Hence why I have a special interest in what improvements one can make given what I perceive to be a key limitation: you have to believe it.

Also doesn't hurt that hand countable methods tend to be simpler to explain, but this is secondary.

Regards,
Etjon

On Thu, 22 May 2025, 10:07 pm Steve Eppley via Election-Methods, election-methods@lists.electorama.com wrote:

 Etjon, you didn't say why you think hand-counting is important.  If your goal is to allow an election to be counted by a society that can't even afford a cheap smartphone, I don't think this cost is a show-stopping barrier, since smartphones are ubiquitous.  So why settle for an inferior tallying algorithm?

 Given a smartphone or pc, a person could type the contents of ranked ballots into text files, one ballot per row.  (The names of the candidates or parties or propositions can be abbreviated using agreed initials, to reduce labor.)  Given multiple phones, the labor could be shared among multiple typists.  If the group is small, one typist (the group's secretary) should suffice.  The text file(s) can be pasted into tallying software installed once (in advance) on the phone or pc (or at a website, given an internet connection).

 It's probably quicker & less error-prone to type the ballots into text files and verify by eye that the text files accurately represent the paper ballots than to count by hand and verify by hand the accuracy of the counting.  Typing & verifying text file copies wouldn't require any experience with or understanding of the tallying algorithm.  And it would allow tallying by multiple algorithms at no extra labor cost, for the purpose of comparing different algorithms.

 --Steve Eppley


 On 5/22/2025 6:40 AM, Etjon Basha via Election-Methods wrote:

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Hi Etjon,

Because of the high stakes, there's also an opposite incentive, to keep an
initially foolproof election system foolproof.

Nearly anyone could verify the result of a disputed machine count in which
a copy of the ballots verified by independent or multi-partisan observers
is published online in a downloadable format.  I'm assuming the tallying
software is open source, available for free installation on smartphones,
and has been audited by some public interest groups you trust.  If you're
really paranoid, you could shuffle the downloaded ballots and globally
replace the candidate IDs with dummy IDs, to check whether this changes the
result.  People you trust could publish examples and their expected
results, to test your software.

If you can't trust independent or multi-partisan observers to verify the
accuracy of a copy of the ballots, I don't understand how could you have
more trust in a hand-count.

Regarding simplicity of explanation... The voting system that I believe is
best (Maximize Affirmed Majorities) on the criterion I think is most
important (create a strong incentive for politicians to support
majority-preferred policies) seems simple enough to explain with the aid of
two simple examples: "Count all the head-to-head majorities.  Then process
the head-to-head majorities one at a time, from largest majority to
smallest majority, placing each majority's more-preferred candidate ahead
of their less-preferred candidate in the order of finish." (To my eye,
Nanson isn't simpler.)  The first example would have 3 candidates (perhaps
named Left, Center and Right) and a Condorcet winner (Center).  The second
example would have 3 candidates (perhaps named Rock, Scissors and Paper)
and a majority cycle.

--Steve Eppley

On 5/22/2025 8:59 AM, Etjon Basha wrote:

Hi Steve,

I skipped the justification for seeking a hand count as I fear the broader
discussion may derail beyond the scope of the mailing list.

But in brief, I have little faith in electronic voting as a social (as
opposed to an actual) technology.

You absolutely can make an electronic count foolproof (vote on a machine,
which prints your vote for you to review, which vote you then deposit in a
box, the algorithm meanwhile counts within seconds of the polling close and
any box can be opened by any party to check the system inputs, etc).

But in practice, if it ever starts as foolproof, it ceases to be so in
time, given the high stakes. Systems deteriorate, and social system more
than any. Eventually this or that guarantee is removed or left to become
obsolete, and after enough time there's little stopping a popular loosing
candidate from calling the whole thing into question.

Given that we vote so we don't fight, it is imperative that this shouldn't
happen.

Hence why I have a special interest in what improvements one can make
given what I perceive to be a key limitation: you have to believe it.

Also doesn't hurt that hand countable methods tend to be simpler to
explain, but this is secondary.

Regards,
Etjon

On Thu, 22 May 2025, 10:07 pm Steve Eppley via Election-Methods, <
election-methods@lists.electorama.com> wrote:

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info

Etjon,

My favourite Condorcet method,  Margins Sorted Approval, would be
relatively easy to hand count because it would only very rarely need the
full pairwise matrix.

First just count the approvals to determine each candidate's approval
score. Those scores give us our initial order, from highest to least
approved.  Now we are only interested in the pairwise results between
pairs of candidates which are adjacent to each other in this order.

(Our goal is to arrange the candidates in a chain where the candidate at
the head beats the candidate that is second who in turn beats the
candidate that is third, and so on. Ranked Pairs also does that.)

Next we do the pairwise comparison between the adjacent pair of
candidates with the smallest difference in their approval scores. (If
there is a tie for this, then the tied pair lowest in the order.)  If
they are pairwise out of order (i.e. if the less approved of the two
pairwise beats the more approved) then the candidates change places in
the order to give us our new provisional ordering.

We repeat this process to the end.  (The order always stabilises.)
Then the candidate at the top of the final order is the winner.

There are two versions of this method, MSA (explicit) and MSA
(implicit).  I prefer the more expressive (and more in the Condorcet
spirit) explicit version which allows voters to rank among candidates
they don't want to approve, versus the somewhat simpler (and possibly a
bit higher SU) implicit version which asks the voters to rank only those
candidates they approve.

Benham meets Unburiable Mutual Dominant Third and I think this doesn't,
but Benham does need the full pairwise matrix (just the win-loss-tie
results) and overall isn't as good. So why put up with relative
"shortcomings" ?

Chris

On 22/05/2025 8:10 pm, Etjon Basha via Election-Methods wrote:

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Hi Chris,

am I correct in understanding that, under this count, we might need as
few as two passes (after the initial count) to finalise? If the
seeding order is A>B>C****"", and we check pairwise between A and B
with A winning, and between B and C with B winning, we might be
confident in electing A right there and then.

Yes, in theory the very next candidate could overtake C, and then B
and then A but how likely could this be? Unlikely enough to stop the
count at the second count, Id say.

If so, this does appear to be the simplest hand count so far between
Nanson and IRV-BTR. Probably not so if it requires as many passes as
there are candidates less one though.

Regards,

Etjon

On Thu, 22 May 2025, 11:59 pm Chris Benham via Election-Methods,
election-methods@lists.electorama.com wrote:

 Etjon,

 My favourite Condorcet method,  Margins Sorted Approval, would be
 relatively easy to hand count because it would only very rarely
 need the
 full pairwise matrix.

 First just count the approvals to determine each candidate's approval
 score. Those scores give us our initial order, from highest to least
 approved.  Now we are only interested in the pairwise results between
 pairs of candidates which are adjacent to each other in this order.

 (Our goal is to arrange the candidates in a chain where the
 candidate at
 the head beats the candidate that is second who in turn beats the
 candidate that is third, and so on. Ranked Pairs also does that.)

 Next we do the pairwise comparison between the adjacent pair of
 candidates with the smallest difference in their approval scores. (If
 there is a tie for this, then the tied pair lowest in the order.)  If
 they are pairwise out of order (i.e. if the less approved of the two
 pairwise beats the more approved) then the candidates change
 places in
 the order to give us our new provisional ordering.

 We repeat this process to the end.  (The order always stabilises.)
 Then the candidate at the top of the final order is the winner.

 There are two versions of this method, MSA (explicit) and MSA
 (implicit).  I prefer the more expressive (and more in the Condorcet
 spirit) explicit version which allows voters to rank among candidates
 they don't want to approve, versus the somewhat simpler (and
 possibly a
 bit higher SU) implicit version which asks the voters to rank only
 those
 candidates they approve.

 Benham meets Unburiable Mutual Dominant Third and I think this
 doesn't,
 but Benham does need the full pairwise matrix (just the win-loss-tie
 results) and overall isn't as good. So why put up with relative
 "shortcomings" ?

 Chris

 On 22/05/2025 8:10 pm, Etjon Basha via Election-Methods wrote:

 Gemini who

 practical

 which

 acceptable

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