MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Apr 11, 2024 7:57 AM
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates are
viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
Realism??
You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only choices??
It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
Republocratic policies.
Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive than
the Republicrats & their policies.
Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
shows that people want.
Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican.
That must be a very tight squeeze.
But Approval favors the voter-median.
That is what I meant.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
I hope you are right.
But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that they
can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
…if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that out,
when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
when sincerity is regretted.
Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another progressive.
But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good enough. One
should maximally protect the acceptables. …often that requires
favorite-burial.
I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed. It
illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW because
you ranked sincerely. Not good.
They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
elections or polls.
IRV isn’t Hare. It’s FairVote Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes it
effectively a different method.
And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their vote
other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
candidate will win.
Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
giveaway-suckers.
Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
There was a novel called I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to me.
Sad.
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
candidates too.
But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
with most non wv Condorcet.)
So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
…& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
known clear front-runners
If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality) would
work fine.
and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which
are not.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
(admittedly worse in VF1.).
But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
complex count & its consequences.
and benefit from the method's compliance with
Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist on
voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
candidate you
would in FPP.
Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
lower.
Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
insecurity & vulnerability.
You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I don’t
propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll, in
which I’ve just now voted.
I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
even simpler than RP.
Michael
On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
Michael wrote:
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
I said “some”, not “all”.
e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror of
STAR.
The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
sincere favourite as low as possible.
Yes,, & isn’t that true with any runoff? It occurred to me too, I
don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence or
common sense because STAR is obviously
so silly and arbitrary.
Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable Vote
with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions) and
Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to suggest
that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
Chris Benham
On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
intermediate point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
(somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
count-fraud security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
according to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV
only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which requires
that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler
Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
(more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
of Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 00:19 Michael Garman <michael.garman@rankthevote.us>
wrote:
> > The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>
> You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates are
> viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
>
Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
Realism??
You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only choices??
It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
Republocratic policies.
Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive than
the Republicrats & their policies.
Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
shows that people want.
Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:29 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>
>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>> Republican.
>>>
>>>
>>> That must be a very tight squeeze.
>>>
>>
>> :-D
>>
>>
>>>
>>> But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>
>>>
>>> That is what I meant.
>>>
>>>
>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I hope you are right.
>>>
>>
>> But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
>>> set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>
>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>
>>>
>>> I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that they
>>> can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
>>>
>>
>> …if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that out,
>> when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
>> candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
>>
>> A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
>> when sincerity is regretted.
>>
>> Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another progressive.
>> But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good enough. One
>> should *maximally* protect the acceptables. …often that requires
>> favorite-burial.
>>
>> I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed. It
>> illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW because
>> you ranked sincerely. Not good.
>>
>> They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
>> circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
>>
>> I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
>> elections or polls.
>>
>> IRV isn’t Hare. It’s *FairVote* Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes it
>> effectively a different method.
>>
>>
>>
>>> And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their vote
>>> other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
>>> candidate will win.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
>> giveaway-suckers.
>>
>> Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
>>
>> There was a novel called _I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to me_.
>>
>> Sad.
>>
>> The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Michael
>>>
>> On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
>>> candidates too.
>>>
>>> But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
>>> there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
>>> with most non wv Condorcet.)
>>>
>>> So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
>>>
>>> …& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
>>> vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
>>>
>>> So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
>>>
>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>
>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>> Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>
>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>
>>> As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
>>> voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>> acceptables.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
>>>> known clear front-runners
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality) would
>>> work fine.
>>>
>>>>
>>> and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
>>>> fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which
>>>> are not.
>>>>
>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
>>>> set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>
>>>
>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>
>>> But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
>>> (admittedly worse in VF1.).
>>>
>>> But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
>>> complex count & its consequences.
>>>
>>>
>>> and benefit from the method's compliance with
>>>> Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist on
>>>> voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
>>>> candidate you
>>>> would in FPP.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
>>>> nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
>>>> lower.
>>>>
>>> Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
>>> including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
>>>
>>> But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
>>> insecurity & vulnerability.
>>>
>>> You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I don’t
>>> propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll, in
>>> which I’ve just now voted.
>>>
>>> I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
>>> one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
>>> even simpler than RP.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Michael
>>>>
>>>> On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Michael wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>
>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
>>>>> STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I said “some”, not “all”.
>>>>
>>>> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
>>>> acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>>>>
>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>> acceptables.
>>>>
>>>> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror of
>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>
>>>>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>>>>>
>>>>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
>>>>> sincere favourite as low as possible*.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I
>>>> don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
>>>> with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>>>>
>>>> I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence or
>>>>> common sense because STAR is obviously
>>>>> so silly and arbitrary.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> See above.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable Vote
>>>>> with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
>>>>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
>>>>> Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
>>>>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions) and
>>>>> Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>>>>>
>>>>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
>>>>> It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
>>>>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to suggest
>>>>> that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> [quote]
>>>>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>
>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>
>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>
>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>
>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>
>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>
>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>
>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>
>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>
>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>
>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>>>> insist on one.
>>>>>
>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>
>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>
>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
>>>>>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
>>>>>> in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
>>>>>> It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>>>>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>>>>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>>>>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>>>>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>>>>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
>>>>>> If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>>>>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
>>>>>> to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>>>>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>>>> might
>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>>>> supporting
>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>> incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>> -
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>> worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>> -
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>>>>>> race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
MG
Michael Garman
Thu, Apr 11, 2024 8:00 AM
I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
support this conclusion.
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:57 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates
are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
Realism??
You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only choices??
It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
Republocratic policies.
Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
than the Republicrats & their policies.
Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
shows that people want.
Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican.
That must be a very tight squeeze.
But Approval favors the voter-median.
That is what I meant.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
I hope you are right.
But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that they
can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
…if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that out,
when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
when sincerity is regretted.
Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another progressive.
But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good enough. One
should maximally protect the acceptables. …often that requires
favorite-burial.
I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed. It
illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW because
you ranked sincerely. Not good.
They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
elections or polls.
IRV isn’t Hare. It’s FairVote Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes it
effectively a different method.
And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
candidate will win.
Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
giveaway-suckers.
Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
There was a novel called I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to
me.
Sad.
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
candidates too.
But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
with most non wv Condorcet.)
So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
…& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
known clear front-runners
If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality) would
work fine.
and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which
are not.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
(admittedly worse in VF1.).
But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
complex count & its consequences.
and benefit from the method's compliance with
Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist on
voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
candidate you
would in FPP.
Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
lower.
Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
insecurity & vulnerability.
You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I don’t
propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll, in
which I’ve just now voted.
I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
even simpler than RP.
Michael
On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
Michael wrote:
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
I said “some”, not “all”.
e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror
of STAR.
The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
sincere favourite as low as possible.
Yes,, & isn’t that true with any runoff? It occurred to me too, I
don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence or
common sense because STAR is obviously
so silly and arbitrary.
Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable Vote
with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions) and
Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to suggest
that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
Chris Benham
On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
intermediate point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
(somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
count-fraud security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
(automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
according to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV
only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which
requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler
Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
(more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
of Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
support this conclusion.
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:57 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 00:19 Michael Garman <
> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:
>
>> > The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>
>> You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates
>> are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
>>
>
> Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
>
> Realism??
>
> You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only choices??
>
> It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
>
> People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
> Republocratic policies.
>
> Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
> than the Republicrats & their policies.
>
> Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
> shows that people want.
>
> Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:29 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>
>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>> Republican.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That must be a very tight squeeze.
>>>>
>>>
>>> :-D
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is what I meant.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I hope you are right.
>>>>
>>>
>>> But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
>>>> set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>
>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that they
>>>> can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
>>>>
>>>
>>> …if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that out,
>>> when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
>>> candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
>>>
>>> A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
>>> when sincerity is regretted.
>>>
>>> Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another progressive.
>>> But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good enough. One
>>> should *maximally* protect the acceptables. …often that requires
>>> favorite-burial.
>>>
>>> I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed. It
>>> illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW because
>>> you ranked sincerely. Not good.
>>>
>>> They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
>>> circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
>>>
>>> I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
>>> elections or polls.
>>>
>>> IRV isn’t Hare. It’s *FairVote* Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes it
>>> effectively a different method.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
>>>> vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
>>>> candidate will win.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
>>> giveaway-suckers.
>>>
>>> Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
>>>
>>> There was a novel called _I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to
>>> me_.
>>>
>>> Sad.
>>>
>>> The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Michael
>>>>
>>> On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
>>>> candidates too.
>>>>
>>>> But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
>>>> there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
>>>> with most non wv Condorcet.)
>>>>
>>>> So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
>>>>
>>>> …& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
>>>> vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
>>>>
>>>> So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
>>>>
>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>
>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>> Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>
>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>
>>>> As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
>>>> voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
>>>>> known clear front-runners
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality) would
>>>> work fine.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
>>>>> fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which
>>>>> are not.
>>>>>
>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>
>>>> But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
>>>> (admittedly worse in VF1.).
>>>>
>>>> But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
>>>> complex count & its consequences.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> and benefit from the method's compliance with
>>>>> Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist on
>>>>> voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
>>>>> candidate you
>>>>> would in FPP.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
>>>>> nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
>>>>> lower.
>>>>>
>>>> Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
>>>> including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
>>>>
>>>> But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
>>>> insecurity & vulnerability.
>>>>
>>>> You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I don’t
>>>> propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll, in
>>>> which I’ve just now voted.
>>>>
>>>> I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
>>>> one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
>>>> even simpler than RP.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Michael wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
>>>>>> STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I said “some”, not “all”.
>>>>>
>>>>> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
>>>>> acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>>>>>
>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>
>>>>> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror
>>>>>> of STAR.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
>>>>>> sincere favourite as low as possible*.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I
>>>>> don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
>>>>> with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>>>>>
>>>>> I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence or
>>>>>> common sense because STAR is obviously
>>>>>> so silly and arbitrary.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> See above.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable Vote
>>>>>> with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
>>>>>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
>>>>>> Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
>>>>>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions) and
>>>>>> Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
>>>>>> It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
>>>>>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to suggest
>>>>>> that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [quote]
>>>>>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>>>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>>>>> insist on one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
>>>>>>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
>>>>>>> (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
>>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
>>>>>>> It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
>>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which
>>>>>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
>>>>>>> is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
>>>>>>> and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
>>>>>>> Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
>>>>>>> If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
>>>>>>> Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
>>>>>>> to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
>>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
>>>>>>> that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>>>>> might
>>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>>>>> supporting
>>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>>>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>> incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>>> worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
>>>>>>> the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Apr 11, 2024 8:31 AM
I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
support this conclusion.
You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky & many
other expert commentators looked at.
Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
top of the finishing order.
Sure when election like the upcoming on approaches people start topvoting
Biden, & he starts topping the finishing-order. But guess what: The
Republican remains at BOTTOM.
Polls always indicate that people want better than what the Republocrats
allow. …& more & different parties.
Polls in the mass-media never ask people to choose between Democrat &
Green. …or their policies. Everything your TV spoonfeeds you is about
Democrats & Republicans.. with the implication that they’re all there is.
That’s true of NPR too.
The two choices. Bullshit.
Yes, the Republicrats are the only ones who have a chance of winning the
upcoming election…if that’s all you vote for. :-)
Neither evil (lesser nor greater) is liked. So why the hell is everyone
voting for one of them??
When you’re told that two odious & unliked liars are the two choices…what’s
wrong with this picture??? It’s nonsense.
Yes, one of those two will win…because everyone believes that they must
vote for them.
…sometimes with a little help from count-fraud? Sure. Check the Harpers
issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about count-fraud.
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates
are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
Realism??
You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only choices??
It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
Republocratic policies.
Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
than the Republicrats & their policies.
Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
shows that people want.
Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican.
That must be a very tight squeeze.
But Approval favors the voter-median.
That is what I meant.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
I hope you are right.
But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that
they can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
…if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that out,
when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
when sincerity is regretted.
Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another progressive.
But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good enough. One
should maximally protect the acceptables. …often that requires
favorite-burial.
I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed. It
illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW because
you ranked sincerely. Not good.
They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
elections or polls.
IRV isn’t Hare. It’s FairVote Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes
it effectively a different method.
And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
candidate will win.
Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
giveaway-suckers.
Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
There was a novel called I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to
me.
Sad.
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
candidates too.
But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
with most non wv Condorcet.)
So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
…& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
known clear front-runners
If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality) would
work fine.
and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which
are not.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
(admittedly worse in VF1.).
But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
complex count & its consequences.
and benefit from the method's compliance with
Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist on
voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
candidate you
would in FPP.
Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
lower.
Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
insecurity & vulnerability.
You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I
don’t propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll,
in which I’ve just now voted.
I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
even simpler than RP.
Michael
On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
Michael wrote:
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
I said “some”, not “all”.
e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror
of STAR.
The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
sincere favourite as low as possible.
Yes,, & isn’t that true with any runoff? It occurred to me too, I
don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence
or common sense because STAR is obviously
so silly and arbitrary.
Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable Vote
with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions) and
Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
Chris Benham
On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
intermediate point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
(somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions
might insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
count-fraud security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
(automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
according to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a
serious issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and
RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which
requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler
Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy
the Equal Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
favourite). If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader
and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has
said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying
on you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then
you might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on
their favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
votes supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
(more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
of Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 01:00 Michael Garman <michael.garman@rankthevote.us>
wrote:
> I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
> think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
> this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
> support this conclusion.
>
You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky & many
other expert commentators looked at.
Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
top of the finishing order.
Sure when election like the upcoming on approaches people start topvoting
Biden, & he starts topping the finishing-order. But guess what: The
Republican remains at BOTTOM.
Polls always indicate that people want better than what the Republocrats
allow. …& more & different parties.
Polls in the mass-media never ask people to choose between Democrat &
Green. …or their policies. Everything your TV spoonfeeds you is about
Democrats & Republicans.. with the implication that they’re all there is.
That’s true of NPR too.
The two choices. Bullshit.
Yes, the Republicrats are the only ones who have a chance of winning the
upcoming election…if that’s all you vote for. :-)
Neither evil (lesser nor greater) is liked. So why the hell is everyone
voting for one of them??
When you’re told that two odious & unliked liars are the two choices…what’s
wrong with this picture??? It’s nonsense.
Yes, one of those two will win…because everyone believes that they must
vote for them.
…sometimes with a little help from count-fraud? Sure. Check the Harpers
issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about count-fraud.
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:57 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 00:19 Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>> > The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>
>>> You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates
>>> are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
>>>
>>
>> Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
>>
>> Realism??
>>
>> You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only choices??
>>
>> It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
>>
>> People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
>> Republocratic policies.
>>
>> Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
>> than the Republicrats & their policies.
>>
>> Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
>> shows that people want.
>>
>> Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:29 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>>
>>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>>> Republican.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That must be a very tight squeeze.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> :-D
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That is what I meant.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I hope you are right.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>
>>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that
>>>>> they can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> …if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that out,
>>>> when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
>>>> candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
>>>>
>>>> A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
>>>> when sincerity is regretted.
>>>>
>>>> Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another progressive.
>>>> But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good enough. One
>>>> should *maximally* protect the acceptables. …often that requires
>>>> favorite-burial.
>>>>
>>>> I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed. It
>>>> illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW because
>>>> you ranked sincerely. Not good.
>>>>
>>>> They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
>>>> circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
>>>>
>>>> I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
>>>> elections or polls.
>>>>
>>>> IRV isn’t Hare. It’s *FairVote* Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes
>>>> it effectively a different method.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
>>>>> vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
>>>>> candidate will win.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
>>>> giveaway-suckers.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
>>>>
>>>> There was a novel called _I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to
>>>> me_.
>>>>
>>>> Sad.
>>>>
>>>> The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael
>>>>>
>>>> On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
>>>>> candidates too.
>>>>>
>>>>> But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
>>>>> there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
>>>>> with most non wv Condorcet.)
>>>>>
>>>>> So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
>>>>>
>>>>> …& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
>>>>> vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
>>>>>
>>>>> So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
>>>>>
>>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>>
>>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>>> Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>>
>>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>>
>>>>> As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
>>>>> voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
>>>>>> known clear front-runners
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality) would
>>>>> work fine.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
>>>>>> fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which
>>>>>> are not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>>
>>>>> But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
>>>>> (admittedly worse in VF1.).
>>>>>
>>>>> But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
>>>>> complex count & its consequences.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> and benefit from the method's compliance with
>>>>>> Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist on
>>>>>> voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
>>>>>> candidate you
>>>>>> would in FPP.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
>>>>>> nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
>>>>>> lower.
>>>>>>
>>>>> Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
>>>>> including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
>>>>> insecurity & vulnerability.
>>>>>
>>>>> You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I
>>>>> don’t propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll,
>>>>> in which I’ve just now voted.
>>>>>
>>>>> I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
>>>>> one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
>>>>> even simpler than RP.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Michael wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
>>>>>>> STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I said “some”, not “all”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
>>>>>> acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror
>>>>>>> of STAR.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
>>>>>>> sincere favourite as low as possible*.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I
>>>>>> don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
>>>>>> with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence
>>>>>>> or common sense because STAR is obviously
>>>>>>> so silly and arbitrary.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> See above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable Vote
>>>>>>> with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
>>>>>>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
>>>>>>> Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
>>>>>>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions) and
>>>>>>> Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
>>>>>>> It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
>>>>>>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
>>>>>>> suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [quote]
>>>>>>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
>>>>>>> for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions
>>>>>>> might insist on one.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
>>>>>>>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
>>>>>>>> (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
>>>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
>>>>>>>> It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a
>>>>>>>> serious issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and
>>>>>>>> RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
>>>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which
>>>>>>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
>>>>>>>> is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
>>>>>>>> Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy
>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
>>>>>>>> and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
>>>>>>>> Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
>>>>>>>> favourite). If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
>>>>>>>> Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has
>>>>>>>> said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
>>>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
>>>>>>>> that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying
>>>>>>>> on you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then
>>>>>>>> you might
>>>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on
>>>>>>>> their favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
>>>>>>>> votes supporting
>>>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>>>>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>>> incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>>>> worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
>>>>>>>> the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>
MG
Michael Garman
Thu, Apr 11, 2024 8:43 AM
Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
top of the finishing order.
Because the population taking a STAR or Condorcet internet poll is in no
way representative of the overall electorate, much as I’d like for those
findings to be true.
You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky & many
other expert commentators looked at.
I must be! In every poll I’ve seen for this cycle, third party candidates
(other than the lunatic Kennedy Jr) don’t even crack double digits! Care to
provide the polls you’re talking about?
Polls always indicate that people want better than what the Republocrats
allow. …& more & different parties.
Agreed! Like you, I want a leftist party. That doesn’t mean one has any
chance of winning the 2024 election.
Check the Harpers issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about
count-fraud.
The alleged fraud would have tipped the election from R to D, which I
suspect you’d argue wouldn’t make any difference if you subscribe to the
notion that the two major parties are the same. It didn’t cost Ralph Nader
the presidency!
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 10:32 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
support this conclusion.
You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky & many
other expert commentators looked at.
Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
top of the finishing order.
Sure when election like the upcoming on approaches people start topvoting
Biden, & he starts topping the finishing-order. But guess what: The
Republican remains at BOTTOM.
Polls always indicate that people want better than what the Republocrats
allow. …& more & different parties.
Polls in the mass-media never ask people to choose between Democrat &
Green. …or their policies. Everything your TV spoonfeeds you is about
Democrats & Republicans.. with the implication that they’re all there is.
That’s true of NPR too.
The two choices. Bullshit.
Yes, the Republicrats are the only ones who have a chance of winning the
upcoming election…if that’s all you vote for. :-)
Neither evil (lesser nor greater) is liked. So why the hell is everyone
voting for one of them??
When you’re told that two odious & unliked liars are the two
choices…what’s wrong with this picture??? It’s nonsense.
Yes, one of those two will win…because everyone believes that they must
vote for them.
…sometimes with a little help from count-fraud? Sure. Check the Harpers
issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about count-fraud.
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates
are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
Realism??
You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only
choices??
It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
Republocratic policies.
Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
than the Republicrats & their policies.
Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
shows that people want.
Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican.
That must be a very tight squeeze.
But Approval favors the voter-median.
That is what I meant.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
I hope you are right.
But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that
they can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
…if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that
out, when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
when sincerity is regretted.
Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another
progressive. But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good
enough. One should maximally protect the acceptables. …often that
requires favorite-burial.
I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed.
It illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW
because you ranked sincerely. Not good.
They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
elections or polls.
IRV isn’t Hare. It’s FairVote Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes
it effectively a different method.
And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
candidate will win.
Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
giveaway-suckers.
Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
There was a novel called I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to
me.
Sad.
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
candidates too.
But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
with most non wv Condorcet.)
So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
…& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
known clear front-runners
If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality)
would work fine.
and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which
are not.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
(admittedly worse in VF1.).
But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
complex count & its consequences.
and benefit from the method's compliance with
Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist
on voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
candidate you
would in FPP.
Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
lower.
Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
insecurity & vulnerability.
You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I
don’t propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll,
in which I’ve just now voted.
I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
even simpler than RP.
Michael
On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
Michael wrote:
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
I said “some”, not “all”.
e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror
of STAR.
The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
sincere favourite as low as possible.
Yes,, & isn’t that true with any runoff? It occurred to me too, I
don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence
or common sense because STAR is obviously
so silly and arbitrary.
Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable
Vote with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions)
and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
Chris Benham
On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
intermediate point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to
give someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
(somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions
might insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
count-fraud security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
(automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
according to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very
bad. It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a
serious issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s
and RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary
and general election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which
requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler
Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted
vote https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy
the Equal Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
favourite). If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader
and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has
said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying
on you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then
you might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on
their favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
votes supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
(more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential
to empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
of Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
>> Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
top of the finishing order.
Because the population taking a STAR or Condorcet internet poll is in no
way representative of the overall electorate, much as I’d like for those
findings to be true.
>> You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky & many
other expert commentators looked at.
I must be! In every poll I’ve seen for this cycle, third party candidates
(other than the lunatic Kennedy Jr) don’t even crack double digits! Care to
provide the polls you’re talking about?
>> Polls always indicate that people want better than what the Republocrats
allow. …& more & different parties.
Agreed! Like you, I want a leftist party. That doesn’t mean one has any
chance of winning the 2024 election.
>> Check the Harpers issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about
count-fraud.
The alleged fraud would have tipped the election from R to D, which I
suspect you’d argue wouldn’t make any difference if you subscribe to the
notion that the two major parties are the same. It didn’t cost Ralph Nader
the presidency!
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 10:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 01:00 Michael Garman <
> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:
>
>> I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
>> think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
>> this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
>> support this conclusion.
>>
>
> You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky & many
other expert commentators looked at.
Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
> finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
> top of the finishing order.
>
> Sure when election like the upcoming on approaches people start topvoting
> Biden, & he starts topping the finishing-order. But guess what: The
> Republican remains at BOTTOM.
>
> Polls always indicate that people want better than what the Republocrats
> allow. …& more & different parties.
>
> Polls in the mass-media never ask people to choose between Democrat &
> Green. …or their policies. Everything your TV spoonfeeds you is about
> Democrats & Republicans.. with the implication that they’re all there is.
> That’s true of NPR too.
>
> The two choices. Bullshit.
>
> Yes, the Republicrats are the only ones who have a chance of winning the
> upcoming election…if that’s all you vote for. :-)
>
> Neither evil (lesser nor greater) is liked. So why the hell is everyone
> voting for one of them??
>
> When you’re told that two odious & unliked liars are the two
> choices…what’s wrong with this picture??? It’s nonsense.
>
> Yes, one of those two will win…because everyone believes that they must
> vote for them.
>
> …sometimes with a little help from count-fraud? Sure. Check the Harpers
> issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about count-fraud.
>
>
>
>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:57 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 00:19 Michael Garman <
>>> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>
>>>> > The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>>
>>>> You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates
>>>> are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
>>>
>>> Realism??
>>>
>>> You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only
>>> choices??
>>>
>>> It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
>>>
>>> People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
>>> Republocratic policies.
>>>
>>> Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
>>> than the Republicrats & their policies.
>>>
>>> Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
>>> shows that people want.
>>>
>>> Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:29 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>>>> Republican.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That must be a very tight squeeze.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> :-D
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is what I meant.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I hope you are right.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that
>>>>>> they can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> …if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that
>>>>> out, when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
>>>>> candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
>>>>>
>>>>> A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
>>>>> when sincerity is regretted.
>>>>>
>>>>> Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another
>>>>> progressive. But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good
>>>>> enough. One should *maximally* protect the acceptables. …often that
>>>>> requires favorite-burial.
>>>>>
>>>>> I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed.
>>>>> It illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW
>>>>> because you ranked sincerely. Not good.
>>>>>
>>>>> They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
>>>>> circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
>>>>>
>>>>> I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
>>>>> elections or polls.
>>>>>
>>>>> IRV isn’t Hare. It’s *FairVote* Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes
>>>>> it effectively a different method.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
>>>>>> vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
>>>>>> candidate will win.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
>>>>> giveaway-suckers.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
>>>>>
>>>>> There was a novel called _I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to
>>>>> me_.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sad.
>>>>>
>>>>> The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>
>>>>> On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
>>>>>> candidates too.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
>>>>>> there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
>>>>>> with most non wv Condorcet.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
>>>>>> vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>>>> Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
>>>>>> voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
>>>>>>> known clear front-runners
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality)
>>>>>> would work fine.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
>>>>>>> fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which
>>>>>>> are not.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
>>>>>> (admittedly worse in VF1.).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
>>>>>> complex count & its consequences.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> and benefit from the method's compliance with
>>>>>>> Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist
>>>>>>> on voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
>>>>>>> candidate you
>>>>>>> would in FPP.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
>>>>>>> nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
>>>>>>> lower.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
>>>>>> including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
>>>>>> insecurity & vulnerability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I
>>>>>> don’t propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll,
>>>>>> in which I’ve just now voted.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
>>>>>> one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
>>>>>> even simpler than RP.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Michael wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
>>>>>>>> STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I said “some”, not “all”.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
>>>>>>> acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror
>>>>>>>> of STAR.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
>>>>>>>> sincere favourite as low as possible*.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I
>>>>>>> don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
>>>>>>> with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence
>>>>>>>> or common sense because STAR is obviously
>>>>>>>> so silly and arbitrary.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> See above.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable
>>>>>>>> Vote with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
>>>>>>>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
>>>>>>>> Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
>>>>>>>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions)
>>>>>>>> and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
>>>>>>>> It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
>>>>>>>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
>>>>>>>> suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [quote]
>>>>>>>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
>>>>>>>> for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to
>>>>>>>> give someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions
>>>>>>>> might insist on one.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
>>>>>>>>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
>>>>>>>>> (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
>>>>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very
>>>>>>>>> bad. It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>>>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a
>>>>>>>>> serious issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s>
>>>>>>>>> and RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary
>>>>>>>>> and general election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which
>>>>>>>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
>>>>>>>>> is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
>>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted
>>>>>>>>> vote <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
>>>>>>>>> Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy
>>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
>>>>>>>>> and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
>>>>>>>>> Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
>>>>>>>>> favourite). If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
>>>>>>>>> Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has
>>>>>>>>> said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
>>>>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
>>>>>>>>> that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
>>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying
>>>>>>>>> on you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then
>>>>>>>>> you might
>>>>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on
>>>>>>>>> their favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
>>>>>>>>> votes supporting
>>>>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>>>>>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential
>>>>>>>>> to empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>>>> incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>>>>> worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
>>>>>>>>> the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Apr 11, 2024 9:44 AM
Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
top of the finishing order.
Because the population taking a STAR or Condorcet internet poll is in no
way representative of the overall electorate, much as I’d like for those
findings to be true.
Ah yes, it’s always those other people :-)
Greens & Bernie nearly always CW. Republicans consistently, always,
finishing at the very bottom. That would take a lot of sampling bias.
You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky &
many other expert commentators looked at.
I must be! In every poll I’ve seen for this cycle, third party candidates
(other than the lunatic Kennedy Jr) don’t even crack double digits! Care to
provide the polls you’re talking about?
I’ve never, ever, been asked or invited to vote in a mass-media poll that
allowed a Green as a choice. …& nearly all mass media polls ask whom you’d
vote for it were today.
The only polls that ask me whom I like more are when the Democrats ask
which of Biden or Trump I prefer.
I’ve never received any that mention Jill.
You’re probably referring to vote %. Right, because you’re going to vote
for Joe. ..& then say it means something when Greens get few votes. :-)
Polls always indicate that people want better than what the
Republocrats allow. …& more & different parties.
Agreed! Like you, I want a leftist party. That doesn’t mean one has any
chance of winning the 2024 election.
… because you’re voting for Biden.
Check the Harpers issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about
count-fraud.
The alleged fraud would have tipped the election from R to D
How very odd, then, that it was reported as doing the opposite :-) Harpers
reported mountains of evidence of large-scale count-fraud in Bush’s favor.
You mention Nader. He pointed that the vote isn’t split by the honest
voters. It’s split by the dishonest voters who hold their noses & vote for
someone they don’t like or want.
which I suspect you’d argue wouldn’t make any difference if you subscribe
to the notion that the two major parties are the same. It didn’t cost Ralph
Nader the presidency!
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 10:32 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
support this conclusion.
You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky & many
other expert commentators looked at.
Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
top of the finishing order.
Sure when election like the upcoming on approaches people start topvoting
Biden, & he starts topping the finishing-order. But guess what: The
Republican remains at BOTTOM.
Polls always indicate that people want better than what the Republocrats
allow. …& more & different parties.
Polls in the mass-media never ask people to choose between Democrat &
Green. …or their policies. Everything your TV spoonfeeds you is about
Democrats & Republicans.. with the implication that they’re all there is.
That’s true of NPR too.
The two choices. Bullshit.
Yes, the Republicrats are the only ones who have a chance of winning the
upcoming election…if that’s all you vote for. :-)
Neither evil (lesser nor greater) is liked. So why the hell is everyone
voting for one of them??
When you’re told that two odious & unliked liars are the two
choices…what’s wrong with this picture??? It’s nonsense.
Yes, one of those two will win…because everyone believes that they must
vote for them.
…sometimes with a little help from count-fraud? Sure. Check the Harpers
issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about count-fraud.
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates
are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
Realism??
You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only
choices??
It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
Republocratic policies.
Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
than the Republicrats & their policies.
Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
shows that people want.
Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican.
That must be a very tight squeeze.
But Approval favors the voter-median.
That is what I meant.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
I hope you are right.
But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that
they can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
…if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that
out, when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
when sincerity is regretted.
Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another
progressive. But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good
enough. One should maximally protect the acceptables. …often that
requires favorite-burial.
I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed.
It illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW
because you ranked sincerely. Not good.
They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
elections or polls.
IRV isn’t Hare. It’s FairVote Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes
it effectively a different method.
And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
candidate will win.
Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
giveaway-suckers.
Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
There was a novel called I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to
me.
Sad.
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
candidates too.
But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
with most non wv Condorcet.)
So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
…& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
known clear front-runners
If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality)
would work fine.
and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and
which are not.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
(admittedly worse in VF1.).
But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
complex count & its consequences.
and benefit from the method's compliance with
Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist
on voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
candidate you
would in FPP.
Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
lower.
Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other
methods, including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive
count-fraud insecurity & vulnerability.
You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I
don’t propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll,
in which I’ve just now voted.
I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
even simpler than RP.
Michael
On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
Michael wrote:
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
I said “some”, not “all”.
e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to
the acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the
horror of STAR.
The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
sincere favourite as low as possible.
Yes,, & isn’t that true with any runoff? It occurred to me too, I
don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence
or common sense because STAR is obviously
so silly and arbitrary.
Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable
Vote with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions)
and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
Chris Benham
On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
intermediate point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to
give someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
(somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions
might insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
count-fraud security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much
more likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is
wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
(automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
according to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very
bad. It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a
serious issue
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV
only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method
criterion https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which
requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler
Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted
vote https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy
the Equal Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative
about Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
favourite). If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader
and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote
their sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has
said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying
on you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then
you might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the
final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on
their favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
votes supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
(more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the
Favorite Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because
STAR badly fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential
to empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
of Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 01:43 Michael Garman <michael.garman@rankthevote.us>
wrote:
> >> Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
> finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
> top of the finishing order.
>
> Because the population taking a STAR or Condorcet internet poll is in no
> way representative of the overall electorate, much as I’d like for those
> findings to be true.
>
Ah yes, it’s always those other people :-)
Greens & Bernie nearly always CW. Republicans consistently, always,
finishing at the very bottom. That would take a lot of sampling bias.
> >> You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky &
> many other expert commentators looked at.
>
> I must be! In every poll I’ve seen for this cycle, third party candidates
> (other than the lunatic Kennedy Jr) don’t even crack double digits! Care to
> provide the polls you’re talking about?
>
I’ve never, ever, been asked or invited to vote in a mass-media poll that
allowed a Green as a choice. …& nearly all mass media polls ask whom you’d
vote for it were today.
The only polls that ask me whom I like more are when the Democrats ask
which of Biden or Trump I prefer.
I’ve never received any that mention Jill.
You’re probably referring to vote %. Right, because you’re going to vote
for Joe. ..& then say it means something when Greens get few votes. :-)
> >> Polls always indicate that people want better than what the
> Republocrats allow. …& more & different parties.
>
> Agreed! Like you, I want a leftist party. That doesn’t mean one has any
> chance of winning the 2024 election.
>
… because you’re voting for Biden.
> >> Check the Harpers issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about
> count-fraud.
>
> The alleged fraud would have tipped the election from R to D
>
How very odd, then, that it was reported as doing the opposite :-) Harpers
reported mountains of evidence of large-scale count-fraud in Bush’s favor.
>
You mention Nader. He pointed that the vote isn’t split by the honest
voters. It’s split by the dishonest voters who hold their noses & vote for
someone they don’t like or want.
which I suspect you’d argue wouldn’t make any difference if you subscribe
> to the notion that the two major parties are the same. It didn’t cost Ralph
> Nader the presidency!
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 10:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 01:00 Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>> I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
>>> think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
>>> this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
>>> support this conclusion.
>>>
>>
>> You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky & many
> other expert commentators looked at.
>
> Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
>> finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
>> top of the finishing order.
>>
>> Sure when election like the upcoming on approaches people start topvoting
>> Biden, & he starts topping the finishing-order. But guess what: The
>> Republican remains at BOTTOM.
>>
>> Polls always indicate that people want better than what the Republocrats
>> allow. …& more & different parties.
>>
>> Polls in the mass-media never ask people to choose between Democrat &
>> Green. …or their policies. Everything your TV spoonfeeds you is about
>> Democrats & Republicans.. with the implication that they’re all there is.
>> That’s true of NPR too.
>>
>> The two choices. Bullshit.
>>
>> Yes, the Republicrats are the only ones who have a chance of winning the
>> upcoming election…if that’s all you vote for. :-)
>>
>> Neither evil (lesser nor greater) is liked. So why the hell is everyone
>> voting for one of them??
>>
>> When you’re told that two odious & unliked liars are the two
>> choices…what’s wrong with this picture??? It’s nonsense.
>>
>> Yes, one of those two will win…because everyone believes that they must
>> vote for them.
>>
>> …sometimes with a little help from count-fraud? Sure. Check the Harpers
>> issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about count-fraud.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:57 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 00:19 Michael Garman <
>>>> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> > The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>>>
>>>>> You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates
>>>>> are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
>>>>
>>>> Realism??
>>>>
>>>> You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only
>>>> choices??
>>>>
>>>> It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
>>>>
>>>> People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
>>>> Republocratic policies.
>>>>
>>>> Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
>>>> than the Republicrats & their policies.
>>>>
>>>> Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
>>>> shows that people want.
>>>>
>>>> Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:29 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>>>>> Republican.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That must be a very tight squeeze.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is what I meant.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>>>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I hope you are right.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that
>>>>>>> they can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that
>>>>>> out, when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
>>>>>> candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
>>>>>> when sincerity is regretted.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another
>>>>>> progressive. But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good
>>>>>> enough. One should *maximally* protect the acceptables. …often that
>>>>>> requires favorite-burial.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed.
>>>>>> It illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW
>>>>>> because you ranked sincerely. Not good.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
>>>>>> circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
>>>>>> elections or polls.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> IRV isn’t Hare. It’s *FairVote* Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes
>>>>>> it effectively a different method.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
>>>>>>> vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
>>>>>>> candidate will win.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
>>>>>> giveaway-suckers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There was a novel called _I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to
>>>>>> me_.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sad.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
>>>>>>> candidates too.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
>>>>>>> there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
>>>>>>> with most non wv Condorcet.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> …& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
>>>>>>> vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>>>>> Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>>>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
>>>>>>> voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
>>>>>>>> known clear front-runners
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality)
>>>>>>> would work fine.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
>>>>>>>> fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and
>>>>>>>> which are not.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
>>>>>>> (admittedly worse in VF1.).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
>>>>>>> complex count & its consequences.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and benefit from the method's compliance with
>>>>>>>> Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist
>>>>>>>> on voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
>>>>>>>> candidate you
>>>>>>>> would in FPP.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
>>>>>>>> nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
>>>>>>>> lower.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other
>>>>>>> methods, including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive
>>>>>>> count-fraud insecurity & vulnerability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I
>>>>>>> don’t propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll,
>>>>>>> in which I’ve just now voted.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
>>>>>>> one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
>>>>>>> even simpler than RP.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Michael wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
>>>>>>>>> STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I said “some”, not “all”.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to
>>>>>>>> the acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the
>>>>>>>>> horror of STAR.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
>>>>>>>>> sincere favourite as low as possible*.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I
>>>>>>>> don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
>>>>>>>> with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence
>>>>>>>>> or common sense because STAR is obviously
>>>>>>>>> so silly and arbitrary.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> See above.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable
>>>>>>>>> Vote with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
>>>>>>>>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
>>>>>>>>> Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
>>>>>>>>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions)
>>>>>>>>> and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
>>>>>>>>> It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
>>>>>>>>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
>>>>>>>>> suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> [quote]
>>>>>>>>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
>>>>>>>>> for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to
>>>>>>>>> give someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions
>>>>>>>>> might insist on one.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much
>>>>>>>>>> more likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is
>>>>>>>>>> wonderful.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
>>>>>>>>>> (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
>>>>>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very
>>>>>>>>>> bad. It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>>>>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a
>>>>>>>>>> serious issue
>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>>>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
>>>>>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method
>>>>>>>>>> criterion <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which
>>>>>>>>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
>>>>>>>>>> is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
>>>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted
>>>>>>>>>> vote <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
>>>>>>>>>> Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy
>>>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
>>>>>>>>>> and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative
>>>>>>>>>> about Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
>>>>>>>>>> Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
>>>>>>>>>> favourite). If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote
>>>>>>>>>> their sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
>>>>>>>>>> Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has
>>>>>>>>>> said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
>>>>>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
>>>>>>>>>> that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
>>>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying
>>>>>>>>>> on you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then
>>>>>>>>>> you might
>>>>>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the
>>>>>>>>>> final.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on
>>>>>>>>>> their favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
>>>>>>>>>> votes supporting
>>>>>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the
>>>>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because
>>>>>>>>>> STAR badly fails FBC.
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential
>>>>>>>>>> to empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>>>>> incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>>>>>> worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
>>>>>>>>>> the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>
>>>>>
MG
Michael Garman
Thu, Apr 11, 2024 9:57 AM
Greens & Bernie nearly always CW. Republicans consistently, always,
finishing at the very bottom. That would take a lot of sampling bias.
And I'm willing to bet there's a lot of sampling bias in who takes an
online STAR poll.
I’ve never, ever, been asked or invited to vote in a mass-media poll
that allowed a Green as a choice. …& nearly all mass media polls ask whom
you’d vote for it were today.
Of the polls conducted in the last three weeks (per the FiveThirtyEight
aggregator https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/)
17 of 28 ask about third-party candidates (all but three of those including
West and all but four including Stein).
Not one shows Stein or West cracking double digits. Even the nutcase
Kennedy doesn't get above 15% or so anywhere.
You’re probably referring to vote %. Right, because you’re going to vote
for Joe. ..& then say it means something when Greens get few votes. :-)
Correct. I'm not going to vote for someone who has no chance of winning.
I'm aware that it's a collective action problem, but it's not one I can
solve singlehandedly -- or one that can be resolved within the existing
electoral system, which isn't going to change in time for the 2024
election.
How very odd, then, that it was reported as doing the opposite :-)
I misspoke. You're right. Point is that it didn't cost Nader the election.
… because you’re voting for Biden.
Because the candidates who have qualified for the ballot in my state are
Biden and Trump. That's it. I didn't vote for Joe in the primary.
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 11:44 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the
Republican finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the
CW, at the top of the finishing order.
Because the population taking a STAR or Condorcet internet poll is in no
way representative of the overall electorate, much as I’d like for those
findings to be true.
Ah yes, it’s always those other people :-)
Greens & Bernie nearly always CW. Republicans consistently, always,
finishing at the very bottom. That would take a lot of sampling bias.
You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky &
many other expert commentators looked at.
I must be! In every poll I’ve seen for this cycle, third party candidates
(other than the lunatic Kennedy Jr) don’t even crack double digits! Care to
provide the polls you’re talking about?
I’ve never, ever, been asked or invited to vote in a mass-media poll that
allowed a Green as a choice. …& nearly all mass media polls ask whom you’d
vote for it were today.
The only polls that ask me whom I like more are when the Democrats ask
which of Biden or Trump I prefer.
I’ve never received any that mention Jill.
You’re probably referring to vote %. Right, because you’re going to vote
for Joe. ..& then say it means something when Greens get few votes. :-)
Polls always indicate that people want better than what the
Republocrats allow. …& more & different parties.
Agreed! Like you, I want a leftist party. That doesn’t mean one has any
chance of winning the 2024 election.
… because you’re voting for Biden.
Check the Harpers issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about
count-fraud.
The alleged fraud would have tipped the election from R to D
How very odd, then, that it was reported as doing the opposite :-) Harpers
reported mountains of evidence of large-scale count-fraud in Bush’s favor.
You mention Nader. He pointed that the vote isn’t split by the honest
voters. It’s split by the dishonest voters who hold their noses & vote for
someone they don’t like or want.
which I suspect you’d argue wouldn’t make any difference if you subscribe
to the notion that the two major parties are the same. It didn’t cost Ralph
Nader the presidency!
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 10:32 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
support this conclusion.
You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky & many
other expert commentators looked at.
Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
top of the finishing order.
Sure when election like the upcoming on approaches people start
topvoting Biden, & he starts topping the finishing-order. But guess what:
The Republican remains at BOTTOM.
Polls always indicate that people want better than what the Republocrats
allow. …& more & different parties.
Polls in the mass-media never ask people to choose between Democrat &
Green. …or their policies. Everything your TV spoonfeeds you is about
Democrats & Republicans.. with the implication that they’re all there is.
That’s true of NPR too.
The two choices. Bullshit.
Yes, the Republicrats are the only ones who have a chance of winning the
upcoming election…if that’s all you vote for. :-)
Neither evil (lesser nor greater) is liked. So why the hell is everyone
voting for one of them??
When you’re told that two odious & unliked liars are the two
choices…what’s wrong with this picture??? It’s nonsense.
Yes, one of those two will win…because everyone believes that they must
vote for them.
…sometimes with a little help from count-fraud? Sure. Check the Harpers
issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about count-fraud.
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable
candidates are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable
one.
Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
Realism??
You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only
choices??
It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
Republocratic policies.
Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
than the Republicrats & their policies.
Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
shows that people want.
Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend
to favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican.
That must be a very tight squeeze.
But Approval favors the voter-median.
That is what I meant.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
I hope you are right.
But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate
to combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that
they can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
…if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that
out, when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…&
that’s when sincerity is regretted.
Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another
progressive. But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good
enough. One should maximally protect the acceptables. …often that
requires favorite-burial.
I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed.
It illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW
because you ranked sincerely. Not good.
They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
elections or polls.
IRV isn’t Hare. It’s FairVote Hare. Their dishonest promotion
makes it effectively a different method.
And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
candidate will win.
Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
giveaway-suckers.
Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
There was a novel called I’ve been down so long, it looks like up
to me.
Sad.
The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
candidates too.
But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
with most non wv Condorcet.)
So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
…& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend
to favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
voter-median, which is Progressive.
As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying
& hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are
no known clear front-runners
If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality)
would work fine.
and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and
which are not.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate
to combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
(admittedly worse in VF1.).
But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
complex count & its consequences.
and benefit from the method's compliance with
Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist
on voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
candidate you
would in FPP.
Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
lower.
Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other
methods, including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive
count-fraud insecurity & vulnerability.
You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I
don’t propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll,
in which I’ve just now voted.
I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted
on one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted
something even simpler than RP.
Michael
On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
Michael wrote:
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and
Participation. STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
I said “some”, not “all”.
e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to
the acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying
& hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
acceptables.
Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the
horror of STAR.
The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
sincere favourite as low as possible.
Yes,, & isn’t that true with any runoff? It occurred to me too,
I don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness &
unarbitrariness.
Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any
intelligence or common sense because STAR is obviously
so silly and arbitrary.
Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable
Vote with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm
and Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions)
and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of
properties". It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some
criterion
compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
Chris Benham
On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
intermediate point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to
give someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for
themselves with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary
& (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions
might insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
count-fraud security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much
more likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is
wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
(automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
according to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very
bad. It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless
way, apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a
serious issue
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV
only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method
criterion https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which
requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler
Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted
vote https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy
the Equal Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very
vague and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative
about Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
favourite). If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader
and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote
their sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has
said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are
relying on you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4
stars then you might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the
final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on
their favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
votes supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more
risky (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the
case with STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the
Favorite Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because
STAR badly fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential
to empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent
your worst case scenario.
<https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are
in the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
of Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
>> Greens & Bernie nearly always CW. Republicans consistently, always,
finishing at the very bottom. That would take a lot of sampling bias.
And I'm willing to bet there's a lot of sampling bias in who takes an
online STAR poll.
>> I’ve never, ever, been asked or invited to vote in a mass-media poll
that allowed a Green as a choice. …& nearly all mass media polls ask whom
you’d vote for it were today.
Of the polls conducted in the last three weeks (per the FiveThirtyEight
aggregator <https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/>)
17 of 28 ask about third-party candidates (all but three of those including
West and all but four including Stein).
Not one shows Stein or West cracking double digits. Even the nutcase
Kennedy doesn't get above 15% or so anywhere.
>> You’re probably referring to vote %. Right, because you’re going to vote
for Joe. ..& then say it means something when Greens get few votes. :-)
Correct. I'm not going to vote for someone who has no chance of winning.
I'm aware that it's a collective action problem, but it's not one I can
solve singlehandedly -- or one that can be resolved within the existing
electoral system, which isn't going to change in time for the 2024
election.
>> How very odd, then, that it was reported as doing the opposite :-)
I misspoke. You're right. Point is that it didn't cost Nader the election.
>> … because you’re voting for Biden.
Because the candidates who have qualified for the ballot in my state are
Biden and Trump. That's it. I didn't vote for Joe in the primary.
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 11:44 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 01:43 Michael Garman <
> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:
>
>> >> Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the
>> Republican finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the
>> CW, at the top of the finishing order.
>>
>> Because the population taking a STAR or Condorcet internet poll is in no
>> way representative of the overall electorate, much as I’d like for those
>> findings to be true.
>>
>
> Ah yes, it’s always those other people :-)
>
> Greens & Bernie nearly always CW. Republicans consistently, always,
> finishing at the very bottom. That would take a lot of sampling bias.
>
>
>
>> >> You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky &
>> many other expert commentators looked at.
>>
>> I must be! In every poll I’ve seen for this cycle, third party candidates
>> (other than the lunatic Kennedy Jr) don’t even crack double digits! Care to
>> provide the polls you’re talking about?
>>
>
> I’ve never, ever, been asked or invited to vote in a mass-media poll that
> allowed a Green as a choice. …& nearly all mass media polls ask whom you’d
> vote for it were today.
>
> The only polls that ask me whom I like more are when the Democrats ask
> which of Biden or Trump I prefer.
>
> I’ve never received any that mention Jill.
>
> You’re probably referring to vote %. Right, because you’re going to vote
> for Joe. ..& then say it means something when Greens get few votes. :-)
>
>
>
>> >> Polls always indicate that people want better than what the
>> Republocrats allow. …& more & different parties.
>>
>> Agreed! Like you, I want a leftist party. That doesn’t mean one has any
>> chance of winning the 2024 election.
>>
>
> … because you’re voting for Biden.
>
>
>
>> >> Check the Harpers issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about
>> count-fraud.
>>
>> The alleged fraud would have tipped the election from R to D
>>
>
> How very odd, then, that it was reported as doing the opposite :-) Harpers
> reported mountains of evidence of large-scale count-fraud in Bush’s favor.
>
>>
> You mention Nader. He pointed that the vote isn’t split by the honest
> voters. It’s split by the dishonest voters who hold their noses & vote for
> someone they don’t like or want.
>
>
>
> which I suspect you’d argue wouldn’t make any difference if you subscribe
>> to the notion that the two major parties are the same. It didn’t cost Ralph
>> Nader the presidency!
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 10:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 01:00 Michael Garman <
>>> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
>>>> think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
>>>> this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
>>>> support this conclusion.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky & many
>> other expert commentators looked at.
>>
>> Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
>>> finishes LAST. Every time. The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
>>> top of the finishing order.
>>>
>>> Sure when election like the upcoming on approaches people start
>>> topvoting Biden, & he starts topping the finishing-order. But guess what:
>>> The Republican remains at BOTTOM.
>>>
>>> Polls always indicate that people want better than what the Republocrats
>>> allow. …& more & different parties.
>>>
>>> Polls in the mass-media never ask people to choose between Democrat &
>>> Green. …or their policies. Everything your TV spoonfeeds you is about
>>> Democrats & Republicans.. with the implication that they’re all there is.
>>> That’s true of NPR too.
>>>
>>> The two choices. Bullshit.
>>>
>>> Yes, the Republicrats are the only ones who have a chance of winning the
>>> upcoming election…if that’s all you vote for. :-)
>>>
>>> Neither evil (lesser nor greater) is liked. So why the hell is everyone
>>> voting for one of them??
>>>
>>> When you’re told that two odious & unliked liars are the two
>>> choices…what’s wrong with this picture??? It’s nonsense.
>>>
>>> Yes, one of those two will win…because everyone believes that they must
>>> vote for them.
>>>
>>> …sometimes with a little help from count-fraud? Sure. Check the Harpers
>>> issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about count-fraud.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:57 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 00:19 Michael Garman <
>>>>> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> > The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable
>>>>>> candidates are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable
>>>>>> one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
>>>>>
>>>>> Realism??
>>>>>
>>>>> You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only
>>>>> choices??
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s nonsense. You think most voters want an an evil?
>>>>>
>>>>> People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
>>>>> Republocratic policies.
>>>>>
>>>>> Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
>>>>> than the Republicrats & their policies.
>>>>>
>>>>> Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
>>>>> shows that people want.
>>>>>
>>>>> Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:29 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend
>>>>>>>> to favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>>>>>> Republican.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That must be a very tight squeeze.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That is what I meant.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>>>>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I hope you are right.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate
>>>>>>>> to combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that
>>>>>>>> they can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> …if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that
>>>>>>> out, when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
>>>>>>> candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…&
>>>>>>> that’s when sincerity is regretted.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another
>>>>>>> progressive. But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good
>>>>>>> enough. One should *maximally* protect the acceptables. …often that
>>>>>>> requires favorite-burial.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed.
>>>>>>> It illustrated that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW
>>>>>>> because you ranked sincerely. Not good.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
>>>>>>> circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
>>>>>>> elections or polls.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> IRV isn’t Hare. It’s *FairVote* Hare. Their dishonest promotion
>>>>>>> makes it effectively a different method.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
>>>>>>>> vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
>>>>>>>> candidate will win.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
>>>>>>> giveaway-suckers.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There was a novel called _I’ve been down so long, it looks like up
>>>>>>> to me_.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sad.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
>>>>>>>> candidates too.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
>>>>>>>> there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
>>>>>>>> with most non wv Condorcet.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> …& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
>>>>>>>> vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend
>>>>>>>> to favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>>>>>> Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
>>>>>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
>>>>>>>> voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying
>>>>>>>>> & hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are
>>>>>>>>> no known clear front-runners
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality)
>>>>>>>> would work fine.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
>>>>>>>>> fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and
>>>>>>>>> which are not.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate
>>>>>>>> to combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
>>>>>>>> (admittedly worse in VF1.).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
>>>>>>>> complex count & its consequences.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and benefit from the method's compliance with
>>>>>>>>> Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist
>>>>>>>>> on voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
>>>>>>>>> candidate you
>>>>>>>>> would in FPP.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
>>>>>>>>> nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
>>>>>>>>> lower.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other
>>>>>>>> methods, including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive
>>>>>>>> count-fraud insecurity & vulnerability.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I
>>>>>>>> don’t propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll,
>>>>>>>> in which I’ve just now voted.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted
>>>>>>>> on one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted
>>>>>>>> something even simpler than RP.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Michael wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>>>>>> Participation. STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I said “some”, not “all”.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to
>>>>>>>>> the acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying
>>>>>>>>> & hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the
>>>>>>>>>> horror of STAR.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
>>>>>>>>>> sincere favourite as low as possible*.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too,
>>>>>>>>> I don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff
>>>>>>>>> with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness &
>>>>>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any
>>>>>>>>>> intelligence or common sense because STAR is obviously
>>>>>>>>>> so silly and arbitrary.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> See above.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable
>>>>>>>>>> Vote with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
>>>>>>>>>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm
>>>>>>>>>> and Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
>>>>>>>>>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions)
>>>>>>>>>> and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of
>>>>>>>>>> properties". It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some
>>>>>>>>>> criterion
>>>>>>>>>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
>>>>>>>>>> suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> [quote]
>>>>>>>>>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
>>>>>>>>>> for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>>>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>>>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>>>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to
>>>>>>>>>> give someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>>>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for
>>>>>>>>>> themselves with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary
>>>>>>>>>> & (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>>>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions
>>>>>>>>>> might insist on one.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>>>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>>>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>>>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much
>>>>>>>>>>> more likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is
>>>>>>>>>>> wonderful.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
>>>>>>>>>>> (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
>>>>>>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very
>>>>>>>>>>> bad. It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless
>>>>>>>>>>> way, apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>>>>>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a
>>>>>>>>>>> serious issue
>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>>>>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
>>>>>>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method
>>>>>>>>>>> criterion <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which
>>>>>>>>>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
>>>>>>>>>>> is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
>>>>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted
>>>>>>>>>>> vote <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
>>>>>>>>>>> Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy
>>>>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very
>>>>>>>>>>> vague and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative
>>>>>>>>>>> about Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
>>>>>>>>>>> Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
>>>>>>>>>>> favourite). If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote
>>>>>>>>>>> their sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
>>>>>>>>>>> Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has
>>>>>>>>>>> said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
>>>>>>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
>>>>>>>>>>> that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
>>>>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are
>>>>>>>>>>> relying on you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4
>>>>>>>>>>> stars then you might
>>>>>>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the
>>>>>>>>>>> final.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on
>>>>>>>>>>> their favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
>>>>>>>>>>> votes supporting
>>>>>>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more
>>>>>>>>>>> risky (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the
>>>>>>>>>>> case with STAR.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the
>>>>>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because
>>>>>>>>>>> STAR badly fails FBC.
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential
>>>>>>>>>>> to empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>>>>>> incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent
>>>>>>>>>>> your worst case scenario.
>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are
>>>>>>>>>>> in the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Thu, Apr 11, 2024 12:53 PM
On 2024-04-11 11:57, Michael Garman wrote:
Greens & Bernie nearly always CW. Republicans consistently, always,
finishing at the very bottom. That would take a lot of sampling bias.
And I'm willing to bet there's a lot of sampling bias in who takes an
online STAR poll.
The Condorcet winner, if one existed, could have been either Johnson
or Clinton—not Stein—with the evidence slightly favoring Johnson,
but not with anything approaching statistical significance.
The same paper says that Johnson is to the right of Trump, so this seems
a bit strange if politics are one-dimensional. But they also say, about
trying to fit an 1D model to the data:
Easily the highest percentages in the table are those for CSJT/TJSC,
which are all above 70%. That spatial ordering has Clinton at one end,
Trump at the other end, with Stein (next to Clinton) and Johnson (next
to Trump) in the middle. (...) Thus, based on this analysis, the
centrists seem to be Johnson and Stein, not Clinton and Trump.
and more generally, about the suitability of a 1D perspective:
Corresponding values for our PCA of the ANES policy questions show a
much lower effect of the first dimension, and thus suggest greater
dimensionality, or perhaps a fracturing of the shared understanding
of the political space, for voters compared to legislators. The
percentage of total variability accounted for by the first dimension is
only 27.7, and the ratio of the second eigenvalue to the first is 0.29.
Table 12 furthermore suggests that if Johnson were the CW, IRV would
have denied him victory.
I know too little about third party candidates to comment further, but
it's an interesting indication of things not being clear cut.
-km
On 2024-04-11 11:57, Michael Garman wrote:
> >> Greens & Bernie nearly always CW. Republicans consistently, always,
> finishing at the very bottom. That would take a lot of sampling bias.
>
> And I'm willing to bet there's a lot of sampling bias in who takes an
> online STAR poll.
For what it's worth, this paper argues that the Condorcet loser in 2016
was Trump and, while the error margins are greater, the winner might
have been Gary Johnson.
https://journals.sagepub.com/eprint/G2XRIJW6VSQA9PHDGSRC/full
To quote:
> The Condorcet winner, if one existed, could have been either Johnson
> or Clinton—not Stein—with the evidence slightly favoring Johnson,
> but not with anything approaching statistical significance.
The same paper says that Johnson is to the right of Trump, so this seems
a bit strange if politics are one-dimensional. But they also say, about
trying to fit an 1D model to the data:
> Easily the highest percentages in the table are those for CSJT/TJSC,
> which are all above 70%. That spatial ordering has Clinton at one end,
> Trump at the other end, with Stein (next to Clinton) and Johnson (next
> to Trump) in the middle. (...) Thus, based on this analysis, the
> centrists seem to be Johnson and Stein, not Clinton and Trump.
and more generally, about the suitability of a 1D perspective:
> Corresponding values for our PCA of the ANES policy questions show a
> much lower effect of the first dimension, and thus suggest greater
> dimensionality, or perhaps a fracturing of the shared understanding
> of the political space, for voters compared to legislators. The
> percentage of total variability accounted for by the first dimension is
> only 27.7, and the ratio of the second eigenvalue to the first is 0.29.
Table 12 furthermore suggests that if Johnson *were* the CW, IRV would
have denied him victory.
I know too little about third party candidates to comment further, but
it's an interesting indication of things not being clear cut.
-km
K
KenB
Thu, Apr 11, 2024 11:10 PM
On 4/11/2024 7:53 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
= = = = =
[KB] Thank you for the link.
Early in the article, the authors wrote, "We demonstrate that the
current electoral system for American presidents can, and in 2016
possibly did, select the least-preferred of a set of four candidates."
This suggests to me that the article is in a different universe than we
are. It's interesting but it's irrelevant to election reform.
We all know that the "current electoral system" in the U.S. ignores the
national popular vote totals for President. The President is "elected"
by the so-called Electoral College (EC) rules in the U.S. Constitution,
state by state. I suspect we all know that those rules are skewed
toward small-population states via counting the number of senators (2)
for each state, a number established by a kind of 18th century
gerrymandering at the Constitutional Convention.
I fail to see the non-academic relevance to the real world of deeply
analyzing the national popular vote. Some could argue that this article
adds weight to arguments against the electoral College -- as if any is
needed. But realistically the possibility of amending the Constitution
to change or get rid of the EC is zero.
Thanks again for posting the link. The only workaround I've seen with a
chance of obviating the EC is the National Popular Vote Interstate
Compact. (https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation) But
that's a topic for a different discussion list.
- Ken Bearman, Minneapolis MN
On 4/11/2024 7:53 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> For what it's worth, this paper argues that the Condorcet loser in
> 2016 was Trump and, while the error margins are greater, the winner
> might have been Gary Johnson.
>
> https://journals.sagepub.com/eprint/G2XRIJW6VSQA9PHDGSRC/full
= = = = =
[KB] Thank you for the link.
Early in the article, the authors wrote, "We demonstrate that the
current electoral system for American presidents can, and in 2016
possibly did, select the least-preferred of a set of four candidates."
This suggests to me that the article is in a different universe than we
are. It's interesting but it's irrelevant to election reform.
We all know that the "current electoral system" in the U.S. ignores the
national popular vote totals for President. The President is "elected"
by the so-called Electoral College (EC) rules in the U.S. Constitution,
state by state. I suspect we all know that those rules are skewed
toward small-population states via counting the number of senators (2)
for each state, a number established by a kind of 18th century
gerrymandering at the Constitutional Convention.
I fail to see the non-academic relevance to the real world of deeply
analyzing the national popular vote. Some could argue that this article
adds weight to arguments against the electoral College -- as if any is
needed. But realistically the possibility of amending the Constitution
to change or get rid of the EC is zero.
Thanks again for posting the link. The only workaround I've seen with a
chance of obviating the EC is the National Popular Vote Interstate
Compact. (https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation) But
that's a topic for a different discussion list.
- Ken Bearman, Minneapolis MN
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Fri, Apr 12, 2024 9:49 AM
On 2024-04-12 01:10, KenB wrote:
On 4/11/2024 7:53 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
= = = = =
[KB] Thank you for the link.
Early in the article, the authors wrote, "We demonstrate that the
current electoral system for American presidents can, and in 2016
possibly did, select the least-preferred of a set of four candidates."
This suggests to me that the article is in a different universe than we
are. It's interesting but it's irrelevant to election reform.
Mike said that every STAR poll shows Stein as the CW. My point was to
give a paper whose data suggests that Stein wasn't the CW in that
particular election.
(In addition, that Johnson seems to have been center squeezed in the
hypotherical Hare election based on the poll data might also be of
interest.)
I agree that the conclusion the authors are making, that the Electoral
College can fail Condorcet loser, isn't relevant in my context.
-km
On 2024-04-12 01:10, KenB wrote:
> On 4/11/2024 7:53 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>> For what it's worth, this paper argues that the Condorcet loser in
>> 2016 was Trump and, while the error margins are greater, the winner
>> might have been Gary Johnson.
>>
>> https://journals.sagepub.com/eprint/G2XRIJW6VSQA9PHDGSRC/full
> = = = = =
> [KB] Thank you for the link.
>
> Early in the article, the authors wrote, "We demonstrate that the
> current electoral system for American presidents can, and in 2016
> possibly did, select the least-preferred of a set of four candidates."
> This suggests to me that the article is in a different universe than we
> are. It's interesting but it's irrelevant to election reform.
Mike said that every STAR poll shows Stein as the CW. My point was to
give a paper whose data suggests that Stein wasn't the CW in that
particular election.
(In addition, that Johnson seems to have been center squeezed in the
hypotherical Hare election based on the poll data might also be of
interest.)
I agree that the conclusion the authors are making, that the Electoral
College can fail Condorcet loser, isn't relevant in my context.
-km
CL
Closed Limelike Curves
Fri, Apr 12, 2024 6:25 PM
Also worth noting STAR is good because it makes strategy require
more-than-zero thinking. Anyone with a pulse can figure out the best
strategy for score within 5 seconds, but the strategy for STAR isn't
immediately obvious, so people fall back on giving their honest
preferences. (For example, in Alaska Republicans failed to work out their
best strategic vote was Begich > Palin >Peltola.)
The biggest issue with score is that the drop-dead obviousness of the
strategy (despite being a good thing) turns most people off the idea.
People who hear about IRV and then later learn about score think that score
sounds just a little bit too simple. There must be something wrong with
it. Example here, where someone says they'd vote Score < IRV < STAR
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFqV2OtJOOg... somehow?
Also, the name is cool
https://bternarytau.github.io/2022/04/01/why-i-like-star-voting-branding.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 1:55 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
Chris: by "more accurate" I meant higher Condorcet-efficiency (although
personally I prefer Score or utilitarian winners to Condorcet winners).
You're completely correct that STAR's criterion compliance is abysmal. All
of these would be huge problems if STAR were a traditional method and would
lead me to scrap it. But STAR's not supposed to be a traditional method;
the goal is just to add more choice to score. The reason STAR is better
than Hare in practice is because:
- Cloning every candidate turns STAR into score.
- The optimal strategy for STAR is to always nominate candidates in pairs
(to make sure both runoff slots are locked-up).
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher. Right
now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race; on a simple
left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly enthusiastic about
an 82-year old president. (Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other
candidate in the race...) With STAR, every voter has at least two
candidates they consider tolerable.
I think of STAR as just reversing the primary-then-general order: we have
a general election to choose the best party (the score round), and then a
"primary" where we pick the best nominee by a simple majority.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for the
sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a candidate
deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an intermediate
point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
& count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV only
offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general election
with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent vote-splitting.
As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate individually,
when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to show equal
preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods which do
this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which requires
that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler Effect,"
ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
(and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
<https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
Also worth noting STAR is good because it makes strategy require
more-than-zero thinking. Anyone with a pulse can figure out the best
strategy for score within 5 seconds, but the strategy for STAR isn't
immediately obvious, so people fall back on giving their honest
preferences. (For example, in Alaska Republicans failed to work out their
best strategic vote was Begich > Palin >Peltola.)
The biggest issue with score is that the drop-dead obviousness of the
strategy (despite being a good thing) turns most people off the idea.
People who hear about IRV and then later learn about score think that score
sounds just a little bit *too* simple. There must be something wrong with
it. Example here, where someone says they'd vote Score < IRV < STAR
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFqV2OtJOOg>... somehow?
Also, the name is cool
<https://bternarytau.github.io/2022/04/01/why-i-like-star-voting-branding>.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 1:55 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
> Chris: by "more accurate" I meant higher Condorcet-efficiency (although
> personally I prefer Score or utilitarian winners to Condorcet winners).
>
> You're completely correct that STAR's criterion compliance is abysmal. All
> of these would be huge problems if STAR were a traditional method and would
> lead me to scrap it. But STAR's not supposed to be a traditional method;
> the goal is just to add more choice to score. The reason STAR is better
> than Hare in practice is because:
> 1. Cloning every candidate turns STAR into score.
> 2. The optimal strategy for STAR is to always nominate candidates in pairs
> (to make sure both runoff slots are locked-up).
>
> As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
> opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher. Right
> now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race; on a simple
> left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly enthusiastic about
> an 82-year old president. (Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other
> candidate in the race...) With STAR, every voter has at least two
> candidates they consider tolerable.
>
> I think of STAR as just reversing the primary-then-general order: we have
> a general election to choose the best party (the score round), and then a
> "primary" where we pick the best nominee by a simple majority.
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>>
>> [quote]
>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for the
>> sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>> [/quote]
>>
>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>
>> The right use of Score:
>>
>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>
>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a candidate
>> deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an intermediate
>> point-rating.
>>
>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>
>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique unarbitrariness.
>>
>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
>> the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
>> greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
>> & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>
>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>
>> More complicated, yes.
>>
>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>> insist on one.
>>
>> …likewise Score.
>>
>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>
>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>
>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>
>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
>> security.
>>
>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>
>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
>>> Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
>>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>
>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
>>> the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
>>> to CLC here).
>>>
>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
>>> seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>
>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>
>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>
>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>
>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>
>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV only
>>> offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general election
>>> with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>
>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent vote-splitting.
>>> As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate individually,
>>> when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to show equal
>>> preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods which do
>>> this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>
>>>
>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>
>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler Effect,"
>>> ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>
>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>
>>>
>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>
>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
>>> (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>
>>> 49 Bush
>>> 24 Gore
>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>
>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>
>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
>>> the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>
>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>
>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
>>> be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
>>> to Push-over.
>>>
>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
>>> favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>> might
>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>
>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>> supporting
>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
>>> likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
>>>
>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>> fails FBC.
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>
>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>
>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>
>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>
>>> -
>>>
>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
>>> <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>> -
>>>
>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
>>> case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>> -
>>>
>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>>> race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
>>> the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
>>> Hare.
>>>
>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>
>>> Chris
>>>
>>>
>>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
