Remember that candidate Y is an enemy of X iff Y beats X pairwise.
Elect the candidate X whose least favorable enemy on the agenda is more
favorable than any other candidate's least favorable enemy.
We could call this the MaxminFE method.
Here's my question: if C is the MaxminFE winner when applied to agenda
alpha ... and alpha' is created from alpha by intercalating a clone set K
in C's place ... will the new MaxminFE winner come from K?
In other words, does MmFE satisfy "clone winner"?
How about "clone loser?"
Thanks!
-Forest
Remember that candidate Y is an enemy of X iff Y beats X pairwise.
Elect the candidate X whose least favorable enemy on the agenda is more
favorable than any other candidate's least favorable enemy.
We could call this the MaxminFE method.
Here's my question: if C is the MaxminFE winner when applied to agenda
alpha ... and alpha' is created from alpha by intercalating a clone set K
in C's place ... will the new MaxminFE winner come from K?
In other words, does MmFE satisfy "clone winner"?
How about "clone loser?"
Thanks!
-Forest