I called MMPO the best method for current-conditions electorates in this country, if they want or need ranking. That might call for a better answer to some of the objections to MMPO. "Current conditions" refers to dishonest, intentionally disinformational, agenda-driven mass media, and a public who believe them. I'm only talking about voting here, & I make no claims about what voters elsewhere need. Referring to Kevin's MMPO bad-example, I asked who is wronged in that example. Chris gave the best answer. He said that, because the winner should be A or B (& I agree that would make more sense),... ...then the A voters are wronged, because they have a right for A to win with 50% probability. For now, let's assume that's so. The word "outrage" or "outrageous" was used. How outrageously are they wronged? Well, all of the A voters said that C is at least as good as the other candidate whom they'd like to win with 50% probability. That doesn't make it very outrageous if C wins. Yes, C might be a write-in, and might be Donald Duck, or someone widely disliked, like Hillary Clinton. But, if write-in are allowed, then the A voters, by not voting a 2nd choice, are saying that _any_ write-in would be as good as A. Astonishingly irresponsible voting? Sure. The method's fault? No. Another thing: Surely the badness of a bad-example depends on its plausibility. This bad-example is highly implausible. Yes, MMPO can fail to elect a CW. But, if there is no indifference, a CWv (voted CW) will win. If the CWv loses because of large-scale indifference, well that just doesn't sound very complainable. When MMPO avoids chicken dilemma, it does so by electing A. Some complain that that violates the Plurality Criterion. But A is the most favorite candidate who doesn't have majority pairwise opposition. C has about twice the pairwise opposition. As I said, if Plurality says A shouldn't win, then Plurality is mistaken. Yes, examples can be contrived in which MMPO does terribly by the positional standard, of the pairwise defeats standard. But how surprising is it if a method that doesn't use a standard does pooorly by that standard in an example contrived to achieve that? It's _because_ MMPO doesn't use those standards that it has its remarkable combination of properties. FBC, Weak CD, MAM-like strategy. I suggest that a voting-system proposal should offer a list of methods. ...ordered by how much you recommend them. The public &/or the initiative proposal committee could then make their own choice. Of course, if you include Plain MMPO in the list, then you must include pages to tell & answer the objections that have been expressed against it. That could greatly multiply the length of your proposal. But, if feasible, I suggest that Plain MMPO be included because of its properties. Michael Ossipoff