Of course I’m just guessing, but my guess is that “decapitation” is Closed’s new name for favorite-burial. Closed sometimes in invents new names without define them. IRV indeed shares Plurality’s need for favorite-burial defensive-strategy. I don’t like that, & wouldn’t propose IRV. There are a number of places where IRV is (the only electoral reform) up for enactment this year, In spite of that very unlikeable strategy-need, I wanted to help campaign for its enactment, in the hope that the voters who’ve enacted it didn’t do so because they intend to bury their favorite, & so so won’t do so. But, because IRV is being fraudulently sold to them, with intentional lies, we can’t count on how people will vote when they find out about what they’ve enacted…when they find out about the lie. Therefore, regrettably, we shouldn’t support “RCV”. On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 11:15 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > Limelike, > > Can you please define and explain the "decapitation" strategy? I haven't > heard of it. > > And can you elaborate a bit on this? : > > IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to strategy > (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most strategy-afflicted > methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some particularly-egregious > strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or difficult to explain > (pushover), and many strategies [that?] don't have a simple defensive > counterstrategy available (like truncation). > > > Chris B. > > On 29/04/2024 2:31 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote: > > Hi Kris, thanks for the results! They're definitely interesting. > > That said, I'm not sure how useful a metric raw probabilities provide; I > don't think they provide a very strong measure of how *severely* each > system is affected by strategy. Missing are: > 1. How much do voters have to distort their ballots? Is it just > truncation, compression (as with tied-at-the-top), or full decapitation? > 2. How hard is it to think of the strategy? Counterintuitive strategies > (e.g. randomized strategies or pushover) require large, organized parties > to educate their supporters about how to pull it off. This could be good or > bad depending on if you like institutionalized parties. Good: sometimes > people can't pull it off. Bad: this creates an incentive for strong parties > and partisanship. See the Alaska 2022 Senate race, where Democrats pulled > off a favorite-betrayal in support of Murkowski to avoid a center-squeeze. > 3. Is a counterstrategy available? > 4. How feasible is the strategy (does it involve many or few voters)? > 5. How bad would the effects of the strategy be? Borda is bad not just > because it's often susceptible to strategy, but because it gives turkeys a > solid chance of winning. > > IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to strategy > (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most strategy-afflicted > methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some particularly-egregious > strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or difficult to explain > (pushover), and many strategies don't have a simple defensive > counterstrategy available (like truncation). > > A low-probability but occasionally high-impact strategy might be the worst > of both worlds; voters get lulled into a false sense of security by a few > elections where strategy doesn't matter, then suddenly find a candidate > they dislike elected because they failed to execute the appropriate > defensive strategy. > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info > >

Unsubstantiated allegations of “fraud” and “lies”? Sounds like someone’s been hitting the “Trump-blogs” again :D On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:02 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Of course I’m just guessing, but my guess is that “decapitation” is > Closed’s new name for favorite-burial. > > Closed sometimes in invents new names without define them. > > IRV indeed shares Plurality’s need for favorite-burial defensive-strategy. > I don’t like that, & wouldn’t propose IRV. There are a number of places > where IRV is (the only electoral reform) up for enactment this year, In > spite of that very unlikeable strategy-need, I wanted to help campaign for > its enactment, in the hope that the voters who’ve enacted it didn’t do so > because they intend to bury their favorite, & so so won’t do so. > > But, because IRV is being fraudulently sold to them, with intentional > lies, we can’t count on how people will vote when they find out about what > they’ve enacted…when they find out about the lie. > > Therefore, regrettably, we shouldn’t support “RCV”. > > > On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 11:15 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > >> Limelike, >> >> Can you please define and explain the "decapitation" strategy? I >> haven't heard of it. >> >> And can you elaborate a bit on this? : >> >> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies [that?] don't have a >> simple defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >> >> >> Chris B. >> >> On 29/04/2024 2:31 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote: >> >> Hi Kris, thanks for the results! They're definitely interesting. >> >> That said, I'm not sure how useful a metric raw probabilities provide; I >> don't think they provide a very strong measure of how *severely* each >> system is affected by strategy. Missing are: >> 1. How much do voters have to distort their ballots? Is it just >> truncation, compression (as with tied-at-the-top), or full decapitation? >> 2. How hard is it to think of the strategy? Counterintuitive strategies >> (e.g. randomized strategies or pushover) require large, organized parties >> to educate their supporters about how to pull it off. This could be good or >> bad depending on if you like institutionalized parties. Good: sometimes >> people can't pull it off. Bad: this creates an incentive for strong parties >> and partisanship. See the Alaska 2022 Senate race, where Democrats pulled >> off a favorite-betrayal in support of Murkowski to avoid a center-squeeze. >> 3. Is a counterstrategy available? >> 4. How feasible is the strategy (does it involve many or few voters)? >> 5. How bad would the effects of the strategy be? Borda is bad not just >> because it's often susceptible to strategy, but because it gives turkeys a >> solid chance of winning. >> >> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies don't have a simple >> defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >> >> A low-probability but occasionally high-impact strategy might be the >> worst of both worlds; voters get lulled into a false sense of security by a >> few elections where strategy doesn't matter, then suddenly find a candidate >> they dislike elected because they failed to execute the appropriate >> defensive strategy. >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info >> >> ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

FairVote’s intentional consistent lying about IRV’s properties was familiar & widely known & discussed in the single-winner reform community, long before Trump ran for president. In a recent discussion about FairVote’s big lie, Michael G. went through the most hilarious contortions to try to explain & justify the lie. It isn’t necessary to repeat that discussion. It’s in the archives, & most of us were here at the time. On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:07 Michael Garman <michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: > Unsubstantiated allegations of “fraud” and “lies”? Sounds like someone’s > been hitting the “Trump-blogs” again :D > > > On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:02 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Of course I’m just guessing, but my guess is that “decapitation” is >> Closed’s new name for favorite-burial. >> >> Closed sometimes in invents new names without define them. >> >> IRV indeed shares Plurality’s need for favorite-burial >> defensive-strategy. I don’t like that, & wouldn’t propose IRV. There are a >> number of places where IRV is (the only electoral reform) up for enactment >> this year, In spite of that very unlikeable strategy-need, I wanted to >> help campaign for its enactment, in the hope that the voters who’ve enacted >> it didn’t do so because they intend to bury their favorite, & so so won’t >> do so. >> >> But, because IRV is being fraudulently sold to them, with intentional >> lies, we can’t count on how people will vote when they find out about what >> they’ve enacted…when they find out about the lie. >> >> Therefore, regrettably, we shouldn’t support “RCV”. >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 11:15 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> >> wrote: >> >>> Limelike, >>> >>> Can you please define and explain the "decapitation" strategy? I >>> haven't heard of it. >>> >>> And can you elaborate a bit on this? : >>> >>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies [that?] don't have a >>> simple defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>> >>> >>> Chris B. >>> >>> On 29/04/2024 2:31 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote: >>> >>> Hi Kris, thanks for the results! They're definitely interesting. >>> >>> That said, I'm not sure how useful a metric raw probabilities provide; I >>> don't think they provide a very strong measure of how *severely* each >>> system is affected by strategy. Missing are: >>> 1. How much do voters have to distort their ballots? Is it just >>> truncation, compression (as with tied-at-the-top), or full decapitation? >>> 2. How hard is it to think of the strategy? Counterintuitive strategies >>> (e.g. randomized strategies or pushover) require large, organized parties >>> to educate their supporters about how to pull it off. This could be good or >>> bad depending on if you like institutionalized parties. Good: sometimes >>> people can't pull it off. Bad: this creates an incentive for strong parties >>> and partisanship. See the Alaska 2022 Senate race, where Democrats pulled >>> off a favorite-betrayal in support of Murkowski to avoid a center-squeeze. >>> 3. Is a counterstrategy available? >>> 4. How feasible is the strategy (does it involve many or few voters)? >>> 5. How bad would the effects of the strategy be? Borda is bad not just >>> because it's often susceptible to strategy, but because it gives turkeys a >>> solid chance of winning. >>> >>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies don't have a simple >>> defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>> >>> A low-probability but occasionally high-impact strategy might be the >>> worst of both worlds; voters get lulled into a false sense of security by a >>> few elections where strategy doesn't matter, then suddenly find a candidate >>> they dislike elected because they failed to execute the appropriate >>> defensive strategy. >>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info >>> >>> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >

The Big Lie is used to refer to the justification for the Holocaust. It’s absolutely despicable of you to apply the same term to an electoral reform organization — especially one against whom your case boils down to “Rob Richie was mean to me at a conference in 2019.” You lie about candidates’ favorability to make your points about approval. You’re a liar. You’re no better than what you claim without evidence Rob Richie did at that mystical conference. On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:15 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > FairVote’s intentional consistent lying about IRV’s properties was > familiar & widely known & discussed in the single-winner reform community, > long before Trump ran for president. > > In a recent discussion about FairVote’s big lie, Michael G. went through > the most hilarious contortions to try to explain & justify the lie. > > It isn’t necessary to repeat that discussion. It’s in the archives, & most > of us were here at the time. > > On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:07 Michael Garman < > michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: > >> Unsubstantiated allegations of “fraud” and “lies”? Sounds like someone’s >> been hitting the “Trump-blogs” again :D >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:02 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Of course I’m just guessing, but my guess is that “decapitation” is >>> Closed’s new name for favorite-burial. >>> >>> Closed sometimes in invents new names without define them. >>> >>> IRV indeed shares Plurality’s need for favorite-burial >>> defensive-strategy. I don’t like that, & wouldn’t propose IRV. There are a >>> number of places where IRV is (the only electoral reform) up for enactment >>> this year, In spite of that very unlikeable strategy-need, I wanted to >>> help campaign for its enactment, in the hope that the voters who’ve enacted >>> it didn’t do so because they intend to bury their favorite, & so so won’t >>> do so. >>> >>> But, because IRV is being fraudulently sold to them, with intentional >>> lies, we can’t count on how people will vote when they find out about what >>> they’ve enacted…when they find out about the lie. >>> >>> Therefore, regrettably, we shouldn’t support “RCV”. >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 11:15 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Limelike, >>>> >>>> Can you please define and explain the "decapitation" strategy? I >>>> haven't heard of it. >>>> >>>> And can you elaborate a bit on this? : >>>> >>>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies [that?] don't have a >>>> simple defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>>> >>>> >>>> Chris B. >>>> >>>> On 29/04/2024 2:31 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Kris, thanks for the results! They're definitely interesting. >>>> >>>> That said, I'm not sure how useful a metric raw probabilities provide; >>>> I don't think they provide a very strong measure of how *severely* each >>>> system is affected by strategy. Missing are: >>>> 1. How much do voters have to distort their ballots? Is it just >>>> truncation, compression (as with tied-at-the-top), or full decapitation? >>>> 2. How hard is it to think of the strategy? Counterintuitive strategies >>>> (e.g. randomized strategies or pushover) require large, organized parties >>>> to educate their supporters about how to pull it off. This could be good or >>>> bad depending on if you like institutionalized parties. Good: sometimes >>>> people can't pull it off. Bad: this creates an incentive for strong parties >>>> and partisanship. See the Alaska 2022 Senate race, where Democrats pulled >>>> off a favorite-betrayal in support of Murkowski to avoid a center-squeeze. >>>> 3. Is a counterstrategy available? >>>> 4. How feasible is the strategy (does it involve many or few voters)? >>>> 5. How bad would the effects of the strategy be? Borda is bad not just >>>> because it's often susceptible to strategy, but because it gives turkeys a >>>> solid chance of winning. >>>> >>>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies don't have a simple >>>> defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>>> >>>> A low-probability but occasionally high-impact strategy might be the >>>> worst of both worlds; voters get lulled into a false sense of security by a >>>> few elections where strategy doesn't matter, then suddenly find a candidate >>>> they dislike elected because they failed to execute the appropriate >>>> defensive strategy. >>>> >>>> ---- >>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info >>>> >>>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >>

On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:18 Michael Garman <michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: > The Big Lie is used to refer to the justification for the Holocaust. > Incorrect. No one has a monopoly on big lies. “Rob Richie was mean to me at a conference in 2019.” > I’ve never been to a conference with Rob Richie. :-) > You lie about candidates’ favorability. > I reported the results of a currently ongoing poll at CIVS (google: Condorcet Internet Voting Service) poll titled “2024 presidential election.” …& no, I didn’t lie about the results. Michael G. says he has polls showing Trump with 45% approval. 1/3 is the estimate that I’ve often heard. Without wading into a thorough search, I’ll just say that maybe Michael G’s poll is more accurate than the estimates that I’ve heard. Michael G. says that his polls ask people to compare Trump & Biden to the “3rd-party” candidates. Fine. I’ve just never been asked such a poll-question, or encountered one in the mass media, or distributed by email, or asked on the web, to people who haven’t intentionally visited a polling website. Nor have I ever encountered a poll anywhere in which that question was asked without the Republican finishing last…losing to everyone else. But, hey, maybe Michael G. has discovered a better & more accurate poll that is widely publicly distributed & asked, but I’ve just never encountered it. Anything’s possible, right? to make your points about approval. You’re a liar. You’re no better than > what you claim without evidence Rob Richie did at that mystical conference. > > > On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:15 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> FairVote’s intentional consistent lying about IRV’s properties was >> familiar & widely known & discussed in the single-winner reform community, >> long before Trump ran for president. >> >> In a recent discussion about FairVote’s big lie, Michael G. went through >> the most hilarious contortions to try to explain & justify the lie. >> >> It isn’t necessary to repeat that discussion. It’s in the archives, & >> most of us were here at the time. >> >> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:07 Michael Garman < >> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: >> >>> Unsubstantiated allegations of “fraud” and “lies”? Sounds like someone’s >>> been hitting the “Trump-blogs” again :D >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:02 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Of course I’m just guessing, but my guess is that “decapitation” is >>>> Closed’s new name for favorite-burial. >>>> >>>> Closed sometimes in invents new names without define them. >>>> >>>> IRV indeed shares Plurality’s need for favorite-burial >>>> defensive-strategy. I don’t like that, & wouldn’t propose IRV. There are a >>>> number of places where IRV is (the only electoral reform) up for enactment >>>> this year, In spite of that very unlikeable strategy-need, I wanted to >>>> help campaign for its enactment, in the hope that the voters who’ve enacted >>>> it didn’t do so because they intend to bury their favorite, & so so won’t >>>> do so. >>>> >>>> But, because IRV is being fraudulently sold to them, with intentional >>>> lies, we can’t count on how people will vote when they find out about what >>>> they’ve enacted…when they find out about the lie. >>>> >>>> Therefore, regrettably, we shouldn’t support “RCV”. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 11:15 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Limelike, >>>>> >>>>> Can you please define and explain the "decapitation" strategy? I >>>>> haven't heard of it. >>>>> >>>>> And can you elaborate a bit on this? : >>>>> >>>>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>>>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>>>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>>>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>>>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies [that?] don't have a >>>>> simple defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Chris B. >>>>> >>>>> On 29/04/2024 2:31 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Kris, thanks for the results! They're definitely interesting. >>>>> >>>>> That said, I'm not sure how useful a metric raw probabilities provide; >>>>> I don't think they provide a very strong measure of how *severely* each >>>>> system is affected by strategy. Missing are: >>>>> 1. How much do voters have to distort their ballots? Is it just >>>>> truncation, compression (as with tied-at-the-top), or full decapitation? >>>>> 2. How hard is it to think of the strategy? Counterintuitive >>>>> strategies (e.g. randomized strategies or pushover) require large, >>>>> organized parties to educate their supporters about how to pull it >>>>> off. This could be good or bad depending on if you like institutionalized >>>>> parties. Good: sometimes people can't pull it off. Bad: this creates an >>>>> incentive for strong parties and partisanship. See the Alaska >>>>> 2022 Senate race, where Democrats pulled off a favorite-betrayal in support >>>>> of Murkowski to avoid a center-squeeze. >>>>> 3. Is a counterstrategy available? >>>>> 4. How feasible is the strategy (does it involve many or few voters)? >>>>> 5. How bad would the effects of the strategy be? Borda is bad not just >>>>> because it's often susceptible to strategy, but because it gives turkeys a >>>>> solid chance of winning. >>>>> >>>>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>>>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>>>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>>>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>>>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies don't have a simple >>>>> defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>>>> >>>>> A low-probability but occasionally high-impact strategy might be the >>>>> worst of both worlds; voters get lulled into a false sense of security by a >>>>> few elections where strategy doesn't matter, then suddenly find a candidate >>>>> they dislike elected because they failed to execute the appropriate >>>>> defensive strategy. >>>>> >>>>> ---- >>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info >>>>> >>>>> ---- >>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>>> info >>>> >>>

Michael—you're right that it means favorite-burial (cutting the "head" off a ballot). The term is quite old, though (older than "favorite betrayal" or "favorite burial" I believe) <https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055400194481/type/journal_article> . On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:02 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Of course I’m just guessing, but my guess is that “decapitation” is > Closed’s new name for favorite-burial. > > Closed sometimes in invents new names without define them. > > IRV indeed shares Plurality’s need for favorite-burial defensive-strategy. > I don’t like that, & wouldn’t propose IRV. There are a number of places > where IRV is (the only electoral reform) up for enactment this year, In > spite of that very unlikeable strategy-need, I wanted to help campaign for > its enactment, in the hope that the voters who’ve enacted it didn’t do so > because they intend to bury their favorite, & so so won’t do so. > > But, because IRV is being fraudulently sold to them, with intentional > lies, we can’t count on how people will vote when they find out about what > they’ve enacted…when they find out about the lie. > > Therefore, regrettably, we shouldn’t support “RCV”. > > > On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 11:15 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > >> Limelike, >> >> Can you please define and explain the "decapitation" strategy? I >> haven't heard of it. >> >> And can you elaborate a bit on this? : >> >> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies [that?] don't have a >> simple defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >> >> >> Chris B. >> >> On 29/04/2024 2:31 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote: >> >> Hi Kris, thanks for the results! They're definitely interesting. >> >> That said, I'm not sure how useful a metric raw probabilities provide; I >> don't think they provide a very strong measure of how *severely* each >> system is affected by strategy. Missing are: >> 1. How much do voters have to distort their ballots? Is it just >> truncation, compression (as with tied-at-the-top), or full decapitation? >> 2. How hard is it to think of the strategy? Counterintuitive strategies >> (e.g. randomized strategies or pushover) require large, organized parties >> to educate their supporters about how to pull it off. This could be good or >> bad depending on if you like institutionalized parties. Good: sometimes >> people can't pull it off. Bad: this creates an incentive for strong parties >> and partisanship. See the Alaska 2022 Senate race, where Democrats pulled >> off a favorite-betrayal in support of Murkowski to avoid a center-squeeze. >> 3. Is a counterstrategy available? >> 4. How feasible is the strategy (does it involve many or few voters)? >> 5. How bad would the effects of the strategy be? Borda is bad not just >> because it's often susceptible to strategy, but because it gives turkeys a >> solid chance of winning. >> >> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies don't have a simple >> defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >> >> A low-probability but occasionally high-impact strategy might be the >> worst of both worlds; voters get lulled into a false sense of security by a >> few elections where strategy doesn't matter, then suddenly find a candidate >> they dislike elected because they failed to execute the appropriate >> defensive strategy. >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info >> >>

>> Incorrect. No one has a monopoly on big lies. Well, that's how the term is used. That's what it's associated with. And it's incredibly disrespectful of you to cheapen the term by using it to refer to reformers you dislike. >> I’ve never been to a conference with Rob Richie. :-) So your claims about what he may or may not have said at a conference have even less weight! >> But, hey, maybe Michael G. has discovered a better & more accurate poll that is widely publicly distributed & asked, but I’ve just never encountered it. Indeed, I have! I've shared the results on this link multiple times. Take your head out of the sand! On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:38 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:18 Michael Garman < > michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: > >> The Big Lie is used to refer to the justification for the Holocaust. >> > > Incorrect. No one has a monopoly on big lies. > > > “Rob Richie was mean to me at a conference in 2019.” >> > > I’ve never been to a conference with Rob Richie. :-) > > > >> You lie about candidates’ favorability. >> > > I reported the results of a currently ongoing poll at CIVS (google: > Condorcet Internet Voting Service) poll titled “2024 presidential election.” > > …& no, I didn’t lie about the results. > > Michael G. says he has polls showing Trump with 45% approval. 1/3 is the > estimate that I’ve often heard. Without wading into a thorough search, I’ll > just say that maybe Michael G’s poll is more accurate than the estimates > that I’ve heard. > > Michael G. says that his polls ask people to compare Trump & Biden to the > “3rd-party” candidates. Fine. I’ve just never been asked such a > poll-question, or encountered one in the mass media, or distributed by > email, or asked on the web, to people who haven’t intentionally visited a > polling website. Nor have I ever encountered a poll anywhere in which that > question was asked without the Republican finishing last…losing to everyone > else. > > But, hey, maybe Michael G. has discovered a better & more accurate poll > that is widely publicly distributed & asked, but I’ve just never > encountered it. > > Anything’s possible, right? > > > to make your points about approval. You’re a liar. You’re no better than >> what you claim without evidence Rob Richie did at that mystical conference. >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:15 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> FairVote’s intentional consistent lying about IRV’s properties was >>> familiar & widely known & discussed in the single-winner reform community, >>> long before Trump ran for president. >>> >>> In a recent discussion about FairVote’s big lie, Michael G. went through >>> the most hilarious contortions to try to explain & justify the lie. >>> >>> It isn’t necessary to repeat that discussion. It’s in the archives, & >>> most of us were here at the time. >>> >>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:07 Michael Garman < >>> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: >>> >>>> Unsubstantiated allegations of “fraud” and “lies”? Sounds like >>>> someone’s been hitting the “Trump-blogs” again :D >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:02 PM Michael Ossipoff < >>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Of course I’m just guessing, but my guess is that “decapitation” is >>>>> Closed’s new name for favorite-burial. >>>>> >>>>> Closed sometimes in invents new names without define them. >>>>> >>>>> IRV indeed shares Plurality’s need for favorite-burial >>>>> defensive-strategy. I don’t like that, & wouldn’t propose IRV. There are a >>>>> number of places where IRV is (the only electoral reform) up for enactment >>>>> this year, In spite of that very unlikeable strategy-need, I wanted to >>>>> help campaign for its enactment, in the hope that the voters who’ve enacted >>>>> it didn’t do so because they intend to bury their favorite, & so so won’t >>>>> do so. >>>>> >>>>> But, because IRV is being fraudulently sold to them, with intentional >>>>> lies, we can’t count on how people will vote when they find out about what >>>>> they’ve enacted…when they find out about the lie. >>>>> >>>>> Therefore, regrettably, we shouldn’t support “RCV”. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 11:15 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Limelike, >>>>>> >>>>>> Can you please define and explain the "decapitation" strategy? I >>>>>> haven't heard of it. >>>>>> >>>>>> And can you elaborate a bit on this? : >>>>>> >>>>>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>>>>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>>>>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>>>>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>>>>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies [that?] don't have a >>>>>> simple defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Chris B. >>>>>> >>>>>> On 29/04/2024 2:31 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Kris, thanks for the results! They're definitely interesting. >>>>>> >>>>>> That said, I'm not sure how useful a metric raw >>>>>> probabilities provide; I don't think they provide a very strong measure of >>>>>> how *severely* each system is affected by strategy. Missing are: >>>>>> 1. How much do voters have to distort their ballots? Is it just >>>>>> truncation, compression (as with tied-at-the-top), or full decapitation? >>>>>> 2. How hard is it to think of the strategy? Counterintuitive >>>>>> strategies (e.g. randomized strategies or pushover) require large, >>>>>> organized parties to educate their supporters about how to pull it >>>>>> off. This could be good or bad depending on if you like institutionalized >>>>>> parties. Good: sometimes people can't pull it off. Bad: this creates an >>>>>> incentive for strong parties and partisanship. See the Alaska >>>>>> 2022 Senate race, where Democrats pulled off a favorite-betrayal in support >>>>>> of Murkowski to avoid a center-squeeze. >>>>>> 3. Is a counterstrategy available? >>>>>> 4. How feasible is the strategy (does it involve many or few voters)? >>>>>> 5. How bad would the effects of the strategy be? Borda is bad not >>>>>> just because it's often susceptible to strategy, but because it gives >>>>>> turkeys a solid chance of winning. >>>>>> >>>>>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>>>>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>>>>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>>>>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>>>>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies don't have a simple >>>>>> defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>>>>> >>>>>> A low-probability but occasionally high-impact strategy might be the >>>>>> worst of both worlds; voters get lulled into a false sense of security by a >>>>>> few elections where strategy doesn't matter, then suddenly find a candidate >>>>>> they dislike elected because they failed to execute the appropriate >>>>>> defensive strategy. >>>>>> >>>>>> ---- >>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info >>>>>> >>>>>> ---- >>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for >>>>> list info >>>>> >>>>

@Michael Garman <michael.garman@rankthevote.us> — I believe you two may be talking about different things (voting intention and honest preferences). In polls asking people who they plan to vote for, most people say they plan to vote for one of the major-party candidates. On the other hand, polls asking about favorability and thermometer scores have different results depending on the year and candidates. I believe in 2016, Gary Johnson was the Condorcet and/or score winner according to thermometer polls. Similarly, in 2020, I think Elizabeth Warren had the highest average rating if you asked Democrats to give a score on a scale, but lots of her supporters switched to either Sanders or Biden after both pulled ahead of her. (So basically a center squeeze). On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:38 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:18 Michael Garman < > michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: > >> The Big Lie is used to refer to the justification for the Holocaust. >> > > Incorrect. No one has a monopoly on big lies. > > > “Rob Richie was mean to me at a conference in 2019.” >> > > I’ve never been to a conference with Rob Richie. :-) > > > >> You lie about candidates’ favorability. >> > > I reported the results of a currently ongoing poll at CIVS (google: > Condorcet Internet Voting Service) poll titled “2024 presidential election.” > > …& no, I didn’t lie about the results. > > Michael G. says he has polls showing Trump with 45% approval. 1/3 is the > estimate that I’ve often heard. Without wading into a thorough search, I’ll > just say that maybe Michael G’s poll is more accurate than the estimates > that I’ve heard. > > Michael G. says that his polls ask people to compare Trump & Biden to the > “3rd-party” candidates. Fine. I’ve just never been asked such a > poll-question, or encountered one in the mass media, or distributed by > email, or asked on the web, to people who haven’t intentionally visited a > polling website. Nor have I ever encountered a poll anywhere in which that > question was asked without the Republican finishing last…losing to everyone > else. > > But, hey, maybe Michael G. has discovered a better & more accurate poll > that is widely publicly distributed & asked, but I’ve just never > encountered it. > > Anything’s possible, right? > > > to make your points about approval. You’re a liar. You’re no better than >> what you claim without evidence Rob Richie did at that mystical conference. >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:15 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> FairVote’s intentional consistent lying about IRV’s properties was >>> familiar & widely known & discussed in the single-winner reform community, >>> long before Trump ran for president. >>> >>> In a recent discussion about FairVote’s big lie, Michael G. went through >>> the most hilarious contortions to try to explain & justify the lie. >>> >>> It isn’t necessary to repeat that discussion. It’s in the archives, & >>> most of us were here at the time. >>> >>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:07 Michael Garman < >>> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: >>> >>>> Unsubstantiated allegations of “fraud” and “lies”? Sounds like >>>> someone’s been hitting the “Trump-blogs” again :D >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:02 PM Michael Ossipoff < >>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Of course I’m just guessing, but my guess is that “decapitation” is >>>>> Closed’s new name for favorite-burial. >>>>> >>>>> Closed sometimes in invents new names without define them. >>>>> >>>>> IRV indeed shares Plurality’s need for favorite-burial >>>>> defensive-strategy. I don’t like that, & wouldn’t propose IRV. There are a >>>>> number of places where IRV is (the only electoral reform) up for enactment >>>>> this year, In spite of that very unlikeable strategy-need, I wanted to >>>>> help campaign for its enactment, in the hope that the voters who’ve enacted >>>>> it didn’t do so because they intend to bury their favorite, & so so won’t >>>>> do so. >>>>> >>>>> But, because IRV is being fraudulently sold to them, with intentional >>>>> lies, we can’t count on how people will vote when they find out about what >>>>> they’ve enacted…when they find out about the lie. >>>>> >>>>> Therefore, regrettably, we shouldn’t support “RCV”. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 11:15 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Limelike, >>>>>> >>>>>> Can you please define and explain the "decapitation" strategy? I >>>>>> haven't heard of it. >>>>>> >>>>>> And can you elaborate a bit on this? : >>>>>> >>>>>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>>>>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>>>>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>>>>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>>>>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies [that?] don't have a >>>>>> simple defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Chris B. >>>>>> >>>>>> On 29/04/2024 2:31 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Kris, thanks for the results! They're definitely interesting. >>>>>> >>>>>> That said, I'm not sure how useful a metric raw >>>>>> probabilities provide; I don't think they provide a very strong measure of >>>>>> how *severely* each system is affected by strategy. Missing are: >>>>>> 1. How much do voters have to distort their ballots? Is it just >>>>>> truncation, compression (as with tied-at-the-top), or full decapitation? >>>>>> 2. How hard is it to think of the strategy? Counterintuitive >>>>>> strategies (e.g. randomized strategies or pushover) require large, >>>>>> organized parties to educate their supporters about how to pull it >>>>>> off. This could be good or bad depending on if you like institutionalized >>>>>> parties. Good: sometimes people can't pull it off. Bad: this creates an >>>>>> incentive for strong parties and partisanship. See the Alaska >>>>>> 2022 Senate race, where Democrats pulled off a favorite-betrayal in support >>>>>> of Murkowski to avoid a center-squeeze. >>>>>> 3. Is a counterstrategy available? >>>>>> 4. How feasible is the strategy (does it involve many or few voters)? >>>>>> 5. How bad would the effects of the strategy be? Borda is bad not >>>>>> just because it's often susceptible to strategy, but because it gives >>>>>> turkeys a solid chance of winning. >>>>>> >>>>>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>>>>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>>>>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>>>>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>>>>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies don't have a simple >>>>>> defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>>>>> >>>>>> A low-probability but occasionally high-impact strategy might be the >>>>>> worst of both worlds; voters get lulled into a false sense of security by a >>>>>> few elections where strategy doesn't matter, then suddenly find a candidate >>>>>> they dislike elected because they failed to execute the appropriate >>>>>> defensive strategy. >>>>>> >>>>>> ---- >>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info >>>>>> >>>>>> ---- >>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for >>>>> list info >>>>> >>>> ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

I was referencing the latest batch of favorability polls, which (mind-bogglingly, in my view) have Trump at about 42% favorable. Definitely agree that voting intention isn't the most instructive here. On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 10:40 PM Closed Limelike Curves < closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote: > @Michael Garman <michael.garman@rankthevote.us> — I believe you two may > be talking about different things (voting intention and honest > preferences). In polls asking people who they plan to vote for, most people > say they plan to vote for one of the major-party candidates. On the other > hand, polls asking about favorability and thermometer scores have different > results depending on the year and candidates. > > I believe in 2016, Gary Johnson was the Condorcet and/or score winner > according to thermometer polls. Similarly, in 2020, I think Elizabeth > Warren had the highest average rating if you asked Democrats to give a > score on a scale, but lots of her supporters switched to either Sanders or > Biden after both pulled ahead of her. (So basically a center squeeze). > > On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:38 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:18 Michael Garman < >> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: >> >>> The Big Lie is used to refer to the justification for the Holocaust. >>> >> >> Incorrect. No one has a monopoly on big lies. >> >> >> “Rob Richie was mean to me at a conference in 2019.” >>> >> >> I’ve never been to a conference with Rob Richie. :-) >> >> >> >>> You lie about candidates’ favorability. >>> >> >> I reported the results of a currently ongoing poll at CIVS (google: >> Condorcet Internet Voting Service) poll titled “2024 presidential election.” >> >> …& no, I didn’t lie about the results. >> >> Michael G. says he has polls showing Trump with 45% approval. 1/3 is the >> estimate that I’ve often heard. Without wading into a thorough search, I’ll >> just say that maybe Michael G’s poll is more accurate than the estimates >> that I’ve heard. >> >> Michael G. says that his polls ask people to compare Trump & Biden to the >> “3rd-party” candidates. Fine. I’ve just never been asked such a >> poll-question, or encountered one in the mass media, or distributed by >> email, or asked on the web, to people who haven’t intentionally visited a >> polling website. Nor have I ever encountered a poll anywhere in which that >> question was asked without the Republican finishing last…losing to everyone >> else. >> >> But, hey, maybe Michael G. has discovered a better & more accurate poll >> that is widely publicly distributed & asked, but I’ve just never >> encountered it. >> >> Anything’s possible, right? >> >> >> to make your points about approval. You’re a liar. You’re no better than >>> what you claim without evidence Rob Richie did at that mystical conference. >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:15 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> FairVote’s intentional consistent lying about IRV’s properties was >>>> familiar & widely known & discussed in the single-winner reform community, >>>> long before Trump ran for president. >>>> >>>> In a recent discussion about FairVote’s big lie, Michael G. went >>>> through the most hilarious contortions to try to explain & justify the lie. >>>> >>>> It isn’t necessary to repeat that discussion. It’s in the archives, & >>>> most of us were here at the time. >>>> >>>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:07 Michael Garman < >>>> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Unsubstantiated allegations of “fraud” and “lies”? Sounds like >>>>> someone’s been hitting the “Trump-blogs” again :D >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 9:02 PM Michael Ossipoff < >>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Of course I’m just guessing, but my guess is that “decapitation” is >>>>>> Closed’s new name for favorite-burial. >>>>>> >>>>>> Closed sometimes in invents new names without define them. >>>>>> >>>>>> IRV indeed shares Plurality’s need for favorite-burial >>>>>> defensive-strategy. I don’t like that, & wouldn’t propose IRV. There are a >>>>>> number of places where IRV is (the only electoral reform) up for enactment >>>>>> this year, In spite of that very unlikeable strategy-need, I wanted to >>>>>> help campaign for its enactment, in the hope that the voters who’ve enacted >>>>>> it didn’t do so because they intend to bury their favorite, & so so won’t >>>>>> do so. >>>>>> >>>>>> But, because IRV is being fraudulently sold to them, with intentional >>>>>> lies, we can’t count on how people will vote when they find out about what >>>>>> they’ve enacted…when they find out about the lie. >>>>>> >>>>>> Therefore, regrettably, we shouldn’t support “RCV”. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 11:15 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Limelike, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Can you please define and explain the "decapitation" strategy? I >>>>>>> haven't heard of it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And can you elaborate a bit on this? : >>>>>>> >>>>>>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>>>>>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>>>>>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>>>>>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>>>>>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies [that?] don't have a >>>>>>> simple defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Chris B. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 29/04/2024 2:31 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Kris, thanks for the results! They're definitely interesting. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That said, I'm not sure how useful a metric raw >>>>>>> probabilities provide; I don't think they provide a very strong measure of >>>>>>> how *severely* each system is affected by strategy. Missing are: >>>>>>> 1. How much do voters have to distort their ballots? Is it just >>>>>>> truncation, compression (as with tied-at-the-top), or full decapitation? >>>>>>> 2. How hard is it to think of the strategy? Counterintuitive >>>>>>> strategies (e.g. randomized strategies or pushover) require large, >>>>>>> organized parties to educate their supporters about how to pull it >>>>>>> off. This could be good or bad depending on if you like institutionalized >>>>>>> parties. Good: sometimes people can't pull it off. Bad: this creates an >>>>>>> incentive for strong parties and partisanship. See the Alaska >>>>>>> 2022 Senate race, where Democrats pulled off a favorite-betrayal in support >>>>>>> of Murkowski to avoid a center-squeeze. >>>>>>> 3. Is a counterstrategy available? >>>>>>> 4. How feasible is the strategy (does it involve many or few voters)? >>>>>>> 5. How bad would the effects of the strategy be? Borda is bad not >>>>>>> just because it's often susceptible to strategy, but because it gives >>>>>>> turkeys a solid chance of winning. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> IRV is a good example of this. It's *usually* not susceptible to >>>>>>> strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of the most >>>>>>> strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's vulnerable to some >>>>>>> particularly-egregious strategies (decapitation), ones that are complex or >>>>>>> difficult to explain (pushover), and many strategies don't have a simple >>>>>>> defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A low-probability but occasionally high-impact strategy might be the >>>>>>> worst of both worlds; voters get lulled into a false sense of security by a >>>>>>> few elections where strategy doesn't matter, then suddenly find a candidate >>>>>>> they dislike elected because they failed to execute the appropriate >>>>>>> defensive strategy. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ---- >>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ---- >>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for >>>>>> list info >>>>>> >>>>> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >

 Of course I’m just guessing, but my guess is that “decapitation”
 is Closed’s new name for favorite-burial.

 Closed sometimes in invents new names without define them.

 IRV indeed shares Plurality’s need for favorite-burial
 defensive-strategy. I don’t like that, & wouldn’t propose IRV.
 There are a number of places where IRV is (the only electoral
 reform) up for enactment this year, In spite of that very
  unlikeable strategy-need, I wanted to help campaign for its
 enactment, in the hope that the voters who’ve enacted it didn’t do
 so because they intend to bury their favorite, & so so won’t do so.

 But, because IRV is being fraudulently sold to them, with
 intentional lies, we can’t count on how people will vote when they
 find out about what they’ve enacted…when they find out about the lie.

 Therefore, regrettably, we shouldn’t support “RCV”.


 On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 11:15 Chris Benham
 <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote:

     Limelike,

     Can you please define and explain the "decapitation"
     strategy?   I haven't heard of it.

     And can you elaborate a bit on this? :

     IRV is a good example of this. It's /usually/ not susceptible
     to strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of
     the most strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's
     vulnerable to some particularly-egregious strategies
     (decapitation), ones that are complex or difficult to explain
     (pushover), and many strategies [that?] don't have a simple
     defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation).

     Chris B.

     On 29/04/2024 2:31 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:

     Hi Kris, thanks for the results! They're definitely interesting.

     That said, I'm not sure how useful a metric raw
     probabilities provide; I don't think they provide a very
     strong measure of how /severely/ each system is affected by
     strategy. Missing are:
     1. How much do voters have to distort their ballots? Is it
     just truncation, compression (as with tied-at-the-top), or
     full decapitation?
     2. How hard is it to think of the strategy? Counterintuitive
     strategies (e.g. randomized strategies or pushover) require
     large, organized parties to educate their supporters about
     how to pull it off. This could be good or bad depending on if
     you like institutionalized parties. Good: sometimes people
     can't pull it off. Bad: this creates an incentive for strong
     parties and partisanship. See the Alaska 2022 Senate race,
     where Democrats pulled off a favorite-betrayal in support of
     Murkowski to avoid a center-squeeze.
     3. Is a counterstrategy available?
     4. How feasible is the strategy (does it involve many or few
     voters)?
     5. How bad would the effects of the strategy be? Borda is bad
     not just because it's often susceptible to strategy, but
     because it gives turkeys a solid chance of winning.

     IRV is a good example of this. It's /usually/ not susceptible
     to strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of
     the most strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's
     vulnerable to some particularly-egregious strategies
     (decapitation), ones that are complex or difficult to explain
     (pushover), and many strategies don't have a simple defensive
     counterstrategy available (like truncation).

     A low-probability but occasionally high-impact strategy might
     be the worst of both worlds; voters get lulled into a false
     sense of security by a few elections where strategy doesn't
     matter, then suddenly find a candidate they dislike elected
     because they failed to execute the appropriate defensive
     strategy.

     ----
     Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em  for list info

> Michael—you're right that it means favorite-burial (cutting the "head" > off a ballot). The term is quite old, though (older than "favorite > betrayal" or "favorite burial" I believe) > <https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055400194481/type/journal_article>. I don't like either term.  For me, "burial" refers to something a voter does to a candidate in the hope that will cause that candidate to lose to a candidate the voter prefers, and not just to any insincere down-ranking.  So "favorite-burial" is  an oxymoron that Mike O. likes to use. "Favorite Betrayal" meaning to insincerely down-rank one's favourite, is ok, but that could either be Compromise strategy (insincerely up-ranking X  to decrease the chance that X will lose to a candidate you like less) or Push-over (insincerely up-ranking X to increase the chance that X will lose to say F that you like better, instead of F losing to some Y that you like less). An attempt was made to standardise the terminology here quite a while ago: http://condorcet.org/emr/defn.shtml > *burying* > Insincerely ranking an alternative lower in the hope of defeating it. > *compromising* > Insincerely ranking an alternative higher in the hope of getting it > elected. > *push-over* > The strategy of ranking a weak alternative higher than one's preferred > alternative, which may be useful in a method that violatesmonotonicity > <https://web.archive.org/web/20090613041320/http://condorcet.org/emr/defn.shtml#monotonicity> > > *monotonicity* > The property of a method where an alternative can never be made to > succeed by being ranked lower on some ballots.  Doing this is using > the "push-over > <https://web.archive.org/web/20090613041320/http://condorcet.org/emr/defn.shtml#push-over>" > strategy. > > The genius of  STAR Voting is that it apparently technically doesn't "violate monotonicity", but it is vastly more vulnerable to Push-over than IRV which does, as I've explained previously. I find the question of whether there have been mistakes or exaggerations or false claims made by the IRV promoters to be completely irrelevant to, and separate question from, whether its adoption in the US should be supported. Of more concern to me are the details of the ballot rules and restrictions. I think it is more democratic for it to be relatively easy to get on the ballot so as to allow the voters a wider choice of candidates. I understand that typically voters are limited to 7 different "ranking levels".  Well say there are 9 candidates and my two least-preferred candidates are the two front-runners and I have a preference between them. If I vote sincerely my vote is just as wasted as if I had voted sincerely in FPP. IRV then doesn't have Clone Independence.  One of the main points of ranked-ballot versus FPP is to reduce the involuntarily wasted vote as much as possible. If such restrictive ballot rules are unavoidable, then I lose my enthusiasm for IRV or Benham in favour of something with a truncation incentive (and that is happy with equal-ranking if that isn't a problem for the ballot rules) such as Smith//Approval (implicit). Properly implemented Hare's  Compromise incentive is practically nothing by comparison with that of FPP, and no-one in Australia notices it.  I estimate it is also quite a bit weaker than that of STAR.  Pushover strategy in Hare is relatively difficult and risky in Hare and as far as I know it's never been tried in Australia. Whereas STAR is a "festival of Push-over" farce/nightmare. And while (like STAR) it fails Condorcet, it has a solid set of "representativeness" criterion compliances that together can be thought of as weakened Condorcet and are worth quite a lot. They are Dominant Coalition (a better stronger version of Mutual Majority that so of course implies it) and Dominant Mutual Third and Condorcet Loser.   STAR only meets the last of those, the weakest. Chris B. On 29/04/2024 5:08 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote: > Michael—you're right that it means favorite-burial (cutting the "head" > off a ballot). The term is quite old, though (older than "favorite > betrayal" or "favorite burial" I believe) > <https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055400194481/type/journal_article>. > > On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:02 PM Michael Ossipoff > <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > > Of course I’m just guessing, but my guess is that “decapitation” > is Closed’s new name for favorite-burial. > > Closed sometimes in invents new names without define them. > > IRV indeed shares Plurality’s need for favorite-burial > defensive-strategy. I don’t like that, & wouldn’t propose IRV. > There are a number of places where IRV is (the only electoral > reform) up for enactment this year, In spite of that very >  unlikeable strategy-need, I wanted to help campaign for its > enactment, in the hope that the voters who’ve enacted it didn’t do > so because they intend to bury their favorite, & so so won’t do so. > > But, because IRV is being fraudulently sold to them, with > intentional lies, we can’t count on how people will vote when they > find out about what they’ve enacted…when they find out about the lie. > > Therefore, regrettably, we shouldn’t support “RCV”. > > > On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 11:15 Chris Benham > <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > > Limelike, > > Can you please define and explain the "decapitation" > strategy?   I haven't heard of it. > > And can you elaborate a bit on this? : > >> IRV is a good example of this. It's /usually/ not susceptible >> to strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of >> the most strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's >> vulnerable to some particularly-egregious strategies >> (decapitation), ones that are complex or difficult to explain >> (pushover), and many strategies [that?] don't have a simple >> defensive counterstrategy available (like truncation). > > Chris B. > > On 29/04/2024 2:31 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote: >> Hi Kris, thanks for the results! They're definitely interesting. >> >> That said, I'm not sure how useful a metric raw >> probabilities provide; I don't think they provide a very >> strong measure of how /severely/ each system is affected by >> strategy. Missing are: >> 1. How much do voters have to distort their ballots? Is it >> just truncation, compression (as with tied-at-the-top), or >> full decapitation? >> 2. How hard is it to think of the strategy? Counterintuitive >> strategies (e.g. randomized strategies or pushover) require >> large, organized parties to educate their supporters about >> how to pull it off. This could be good or bad depending on if >> you like institutionalized parties. Good: sometimes people >> can't pull it off. Bad: this creates an incentive for strong >> parties and partisanship. See the Alaska 2022 Senate race, >> where Democrats pulled off a favorite-betrayal in support of >> Murkowski to avoid a center-squeeze. >> 3. Is a counterstrategy available? >> 4. How feasible is the strategy (does it involve many or few >> voters)? >> 5. How bad would the effects of the strategy be? Borda is bad >> not just because it's often susceptible to strategy, but >> because it gives turkeys a solid chance of winning. >> >> IRV is a good example of this. It's /usually/ not susceptible >> to strategy (in the IAC model), but I think of it as one of >> the most strategy-afflicted methods on this list. It's >> vulnerable to some particularly-egregious strategies >> (decapitation), ones that are complex or difficult to explain >> (pushover), and many strategies don't have a simple defensive >> counterstrategy available (like truncation). >> >> A low-probability but occasionally high-impact strategy might >> be the worst of both worlds; voters get lulled into a false >> sense of security by a few elections where strategy doesn't >> matter, then suddenly find a candidate they dislike elected >> because they failed to execute the appropriate defensive >> strategy. >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info >