Michael Ossipoffemail9648742 at gmail.com
mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20My%20CTE%20post%20to%20EM&In-Reply-To=%3CCAOKDY5CU-zc3Y%3DC%3DrFWagy3zVw5Px6KPaULqW89gHdxshRZh8A%40mail.gmail.com%3E
/Fri Oct 6 14:33:40 PDT 2023/

When I said:

"There’s no offensive strategy for changing the CW to one’s own favorite."

I meant, there's no offensive strategy for changing the winner from the CW
to one's own favorite.

On Fri, Oct 6, 2023 at 5:21 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com  http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com>
wrote:

additionally />/anyone who is pair-beaten by that candidate. …& additionally any />/candidate beaten by that 2nd candidate. />//>/… />//>/That’s takedown & secondary takedown. />//>/… />//>/4) If anyone becomes un-pairbeaten due to elimination of who beats hir, />/s/he wins. />//>/… />//>/5) Continue till only one candidate remains uneliminated. />//>/… />//>/[end of count-rule definition] />//>/… />//>/Though it was Forest who introduced the unprecedentedly gamechanging />/Takedown, & applied it to Coombs & Baldwin, the bombast in this post
is all />/mine. />//>/… />//>/Obviously a CW wins if voting is sincere. />//>/… />//>/There’s no offensive strategy for changing the CW to one’s own favorite. />//>/… />//>/There’s no need for defensive strategy to protect the win of a CW. />//>/… />//>/While MinMax(wv), Schulze, RP(wv) & Smith//MinMax(wv) require defensive />/truncation to deter burial strategy against the CW, the above-defined />/method requires no such defensive strategy, & voters can rank all the
way />/down to the bottom if they want to. />//>//>/PS. I added a statement that, for the purposes of takedown & secondary />/takedown, "pair-beaten" should probably mean "pairbeaten according to
the />/rankings before any eliminations." />//>/… />//>/Michael Ossipoff/

Michael,

... there's no offensive strategy for changing the winner from the CW
to one's own favorite,

Say sincere is

46 A
44 B
10 C

A is the CW (as well as being every other type of winner).

Now suppose the B voters all decide to bury against A by ranking C second:

46 A
44 B>C
10 C

Now  C has the lowest Borda score and the lowest "top count", so if we are
using
IRV/RCV or Baldwin  C is eliminated, "taking down" A and leaving B elected.

The "offensive strategy" has succeeded. This is the same outrageous
failure of
the Later-no-Help and Plurality criteria that we see with Margins.

I'm not clear how Coombs (or your preferred version of it) handles
truncation.

Is the "bottom count" Fractional (in other words based on the
symmetrically completed ballots)
or Whole (so that truncated ballots give a whole vote to each of the
bottom-counts of the truncated
candidates)?

In this case neither version eliminates C, but I'd be surprised if
examples couldn't be made of
them also failing those criteria.

You implied that you are a fan of Later-no-Harm.  If that is the case I
don't think you will find a better
method than plain IRV/RCV

Chris B.

Here are 3 elimination-methods that eliminate 1 candidate at a time:

…

RCV/IRV:  Eliminates lowest topcount

…

Coombs: Eliminates highest bottomcount

…

Baldwin; Eliminates lowest Borda-score.

…

Any one of those can be the “base-method” .

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
<election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20My%20CTE%20post%20to%20EM&In-Reply-To=%3CCAOKDY5CU-zc3Y%3DC%3DrFWagy3zVw5Px6KPaULqW89gHdxshRZh8A%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
Fri Oct 6 14:33:40 PDT 2023

When I said:

"There’s no offensive strategy for changing the CW to one’s own favorite."

I meant, there's no offensive strategy for changing the winner from the CW
to one's own favorite.

On Fri, Oct 6, 2023 at 5:21 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com>
wrote:

>> …
>> CW,Takedown-Elimination (CTE)
>> …
>> or
>> …
>> Simmons-Ossipoff  Method
>> …
>> Okay yes, I like the 2nd one.
>> …
>> It adds an enhancement to any of several already-existing
> elimination-methods.
>> …
>> Here are 3 elimination-methods that eliminate 1 candidate at a time:
>> …
>> RCV/IRV:  Eliminates lowest topcount
>> …
>> Coombs: Eliminates highest bottomcount
>> …
>> Baldwin; Eliminates lowest Borda-score.
>> …
>> Any one of those can be the “base-method” .
>> …
>> Method rule:
>> …
>> Ranked balloting. Equal-rankng & truncation allowed.
>> …
>> 1)  Check for a CW & elect hir.
>> …
>> 2) If none, do the base-method.
>> …
>> 3) During the doing of the base-method:
>> …
>> When the base-method’s rule eliminates a candidate, eliminate additionally
> anyone who is pair-beaten by that candidate.  …& additionally any
> candidate beaten by that 2nd candidate.
>> …
>> That’s takedown & secondary takedown.
>> …
>> 4) If anyone becomes un-pairbeaten due to elimination of who beats hir,
> s/he wins.
>> …
>> 5) Continue till only one candidate remains uneliminated.
>> …
>> [end of count-rule definition]
>> …
>> Though it was Forest who introduced the unprecedentedly gamechanging
> Takedown, & applied it to Coombs & Baldwin, the bombast in this post is all
> mine.
>> …
>> Obviously a CW wins if voting is sincere.
>> …
>> There’s no offensive strategy for changing the CW to one’s own favorite.
>> …
>> There’s no need for defensive strategy to protect the win of a CW.
>> …
>> While MinMax(wv), Schulze, RP(wv) & Smith//MinMax(wv) require defensive
> truncation to deter burial strategy against the CW, the above-defined
> method requires no such defensive strategy, & voters can rank all the way
> down to the bottom if they want to.
>>> PS. I added a statement that, for the purposes of takedown & secondary
> takedown, "pair-beaten" should probably mean "pairbeaten according to the
> rankings before any eliminations."
>> …
>> Michael Ossipoff*

There’s good reason to choose Coombs as the “base-method”, the
elimination-method to which to apply CT-.

The use of Coombs maximizes the lowering of the base-method count-score
for the buried CW.  (We haven’t discussed fractional vs whole, but my first
impression is that whole would best deter & thwart burial.)

…making the CW more likely to get eliminated 1st.  …thereby taking-down
the buriers’ favorite (BF), & electing the less-liked candidate whom under
whom the buriers buried CW.

(Let’s call that candidate “Bus”, because the buriers are throwing CW
under the bus.)

That wasn’t the scenario in your example, but BF still lost.

When there’s only one Bus, which of course is the case in all 3-candidate
cases, then whether or not BF wins, & the burial succeeds, depends on who
is eliminated 1st.

Could there be a 1-Bus example in which Bus gets eliminated 1st, thereby
taking down CW & electing BF? Yes, but, with Coombs as base-method, the
burial of CW is particularly likely to give CW the worst base-method
count-score.  …& thereby the  1st elimination.  …thereby taking down BF &
electing Bus.

So the burial is likely deterred, unless the buriers have very detailed &
reliable predictive information.

I’m not a fan of LNHa, but when speaking of advantages of STE (Successive
Topcount Elimination), one of course mentions LNHa among them.

But, though we need rank-balloting, & STE is a rank-method, & obviously
people who enact STE don’t want or intend to bury their favorite under a
disgusting lesser evil, & though I’d accept STE’s top-end defensive
strategy-need in order for people to have rank balloting so that they won’t
elect despicable POS lesser evils…

…I’m not going to defend STE anymore…or vote for its enactment…or
participate in its enactment campaign…

…because we do such things for principle…

…&, if principle means anything, we don’t condone lying & dishonesty.

FairVote is still using the lie that STE don’t have a spoiler problem.

…using that lie not only with voters, but also to get money from donors.

I couldn’t bring myself to help that lie-based project or its proposal.

Did you know that FairVote is claiming that it’s Condorcet that has the
spoiler problem?

I guess, to borrow from a famous statement, that proves that there’s no
such thing as an unutterably blatant lie.

So, as I said, I won’t defend STE or in any way support its enactment
campaigns.

On Sat, Oct 7, 2023 at 23:16 C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:

Oops!! I think I list-replied to an individual e-mail. I appreciate
the consideration, not posting a proposal-debunk, but I don’t consider
the proposal debunked.

Anyway, I’d mistakenly assumed that I was replying to a posting, but
now that I’ve sent my reply to the list, I might as well leave it
there, when there’s more to add.

Even if randomness determines which of the 3 candidates gets
eliminated 1st, there’s a 2/3 probability that BF loses.

…backfire is equally likely as success.

But it isn’t random:

You’ve insincerely  bottom-ranked CW.

…thereby increasing hir probability of being the 1st eliminated.

…&, with 3 candidates, you’ve upranked Bus from bottom, decreasing hir
chance of being 1st eliminated.

An optional added rule could specify that the 1st elimination is of
whichever of the 2 candidates with worst base-method count-score is
pair-beaten by the other.

What if there are more candidates? What if there’s an additional Bus?

Then BF loses, no matter who is eliminated.

That’s fact obtains when there are more than 1 Bus, but no candidates
who aren’t CW, BF or a Bus.

I’ll collectively refer to CW, BF & Bus(es) as “the principals”.

Any candidates who aren’t  principals, I  refer to as “other candidates”.

If there’s an other candidate who pair-beats the Bus, & gets
eliminated 1st, of course that takes down the Bus. But the same thing
could happen to any one of the principals.

The possibility the takedown of a principal by 1st elimination of an
other somewhat dilutes the greater likelihood of CW being the 1st
eliminated principal, & of Bus not being the 1st eliminated principal.

Because of the burial-thwarting effect of having more than 1 Bus,
then, with many candidates, the buriers have the problem of burying CW
to make the strategic cycle, without creating more than 1 Bus.

Could the buriers get lucky & succeed? Sure.

But then you’re raising the philosophical question:

If a strategy doesn’t have a positive result-change expectation, is it
really a strategy?

Michael Ossipoff

On Sun, Oct 8, 2023 at 01:14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

 There’s good reason to choose Coombs as the “base-method”, the
 elimination-method to which to apply CT-.

 The use of Coombs maximizes the lowering of the base-method
 count-score for the buried CW.  (We haven’t discussed fractional
 vs whole, but my first impression is that whole would best deter &
 thwart burial.)


 …making the CW more likely to get eliminated 1st.  …thereby
 taking-down the buriers’ favorite (BF), & electing the less-liked
 candidate whom under whom the buriers buried CW.

 (Let’s call that candidate “Bus”, because the buriers are throwing
 CW under the bus.)

 That wasn’t the scenario in your example, but BF still lost.

 When there’s only one Bus, which of course is the case in all
 3-candidate cases, then whether or not BF wins, & the burial
 succeeds, depends on who is eliminated 1st.

  Could there be a 1-Bus example in which Bus gets eliminated 1st,
 thereby taking down CW & electing BF? Yes, but, with Coombs as
 base-method, the burial of CW is particularly likely to give CW
 the worst base-method count-score.  …& thereby the  1st
 elimination.  …thereby taking down BF & electing Bus.

 So the burial is likely deterred, unless the buriers have very
 detailed & reliable predictive information.

 I’m not a fan of LNHa, but when speaking of advantages of STE
 (Successive Topcount Elimination), one of course mentions LNHa
 among them.

 But, though we need rank-balloting, & STE is a rank-method, &
 obviously people who enact STE don’t want or intend to bury their
 favorite under a disgusting lesser evil, & though I’d accept STE’s
 top-end defensive strategy-need in order for people to have rank
 balloting so that they won’t elect despicable POS lesser evils…

 …I’m not going to defend STE anymore…or vote for its enactment…or
 participate in its enactment campaign…

 …because we do such things for principle…

 …&, if principle means anything, we don’t condone lying & dishonesty.

 FairVote is still using the lie that STE don’t have a spoiler problem.

 …using that lie not only with voters, but also to get money from
 donors.

 I couldn’t bring myself to help that lie-based project or its
 proposal.

 Did you know that FairVote is claiming that it’s Condorcet that
 has the spoiler problem?

 I guess, to borrow from a famous statement, that proves that
 there’s no such thing as an unutterably blatant lie.

 So, as I said, I won’t defend STE or in any way support its
 enactment campaigns.



 On Sat, Oct 7, 2023 at 23:16 C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:


     Michael,

     Say sincere is

     46 A
     44 B
     10 C

     A is the CW (as well as being every other type of winner).

     Now suppose the B voters all decide to bury against A by
     ranking C second:

     46 A
     44 B>C
     10 C

     Now  C has the lowest Borda score and the lowest "top count",
     so if we are using
     IRV/RCV or Baldwin  C is eliminated, "taking down" A and
     leaving B elected.

     The "offensive strategy" has succeeded. This is the same
     outrageous failure of
     the Later-no-Help and Plurality criteria that we see with Margins.

     I'm not clear how Coombs (or your preferred version of it)
     handles truncation.

     Is the "bottom count" Fractional (in other words based on the
     symmetrically completed ballots)
     or Whole (so that truncated ballots give a whole vote to each
     of the bottom-counts of the truncated
     candidates)?

     In this case neither version eliminates C, but I'd be
     surprised if examples couldn't be made of
     them also failing those criteria.

     You implied that you are a fan of Later-no-Harm.  If that is
     the case I don't think you will find a better
     method than plain IRV/RCV

     Chris B.

Chris

On 9/10/2023 8:13 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

Oops!! I think I list-replied to an individual e-mail. I appreciate the
consideration, not posting a proposal-debunk, but I don’t consider the
proposal debunked.

Anyway, I’d mistakenly assumed that I was replying to a posting, but now
that I’ve sent my reply to the list, I might as well leave it there, when
there’s more to add.

Even if randomness determines which of the 3 candidates gets eliminated
1st, there’s a 2/3 probability that BF loses.

…backfire is equally likely as success.

But it isn’t random:

You’ve insincerely  bottom-ranked CW.

…thereby increasing hir probability of being the 1st eliminated.

…&, with 3 candidates, you’ve upranked Bus from bottom, decreasing hir
chance of being 1st eliminated.

An optional added rule could specify that the 1st elimination is of
whichever of the 2 candidates with worst base-method count-score is
pair-beaten by the other.

What if there are more candidates? What if there’s an additional Bus?

Then BF loses, no matter who is eliminated.

That’s fact obtains when there are more than 1 Bus, but no candidates who
aren’t CW, BF or a Bus.

I’ll collectively refer to CW, BF & Bus(es) as “the principals”.

Any candidates who aren’t  principals, I  refer to as “other candidates”.

If there’s an other candidate who pair-beats the Bus, & gets eliminated
1st, of course that takes down the Bus. But the same thing could happen to
any one of the principals.

The possibility the takedown of a principal by 1st elimination of an other
somewhat dilutes the greater likelihood of CW being the 1st eliminated
principal, & of Bus not being the 1st eliminated principal.

Because of the burial-thwarting effect of having more than 1 Bus, then,
with many candidates, the buriers have the problem of burying CW to make
the strategic cycle, without creating more than 1 Bus.

Could the buriers get lucky & succeed? Sure.

But then you’re raising the philosophical question:

If a strategy doesn’t have a positive result-change expectation, is it
really a strategy?

Michael Ossipoff

On Sun, Oct 8, 2023 at 01:14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote: