Michael wrote:
  
  
    But STAR is better than Hare because:
    
    
    It retains some amount Score’s merit.
  
  
  No it doesn't.   Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation. 
  STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser. I said “some”, not “all”.e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying & hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your acceptables.Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
  
  I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the
  horror of STAR.
  
  The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
  
  *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
  sincere favourite as low as possible*.
  Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR.  … completely reject runoff with Approval.  …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.I much prefer Approval to Score,  for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
  Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence
  or common sense because STAR is obviously
  so silly and arbitrary.See above.
  
  Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable
  Vote with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
  with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
  Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain 
  Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions)
  and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
  
  It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties". 
  It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some
  criterion
  compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
  suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
  
  Chris Benham
  
  

On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff
  wrote:


  
  
  
  
    
      On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31
        Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
        wrote:
      
      
      [quote]
      Score is Approval with a  "I
        wish to weaken the effect of my vote for the sake of being
        more sincere/expressive" box/button.
      [/quote]
      
      
      If that’s how you want to
        vote in Score, then suit yourself.
      
      
      The right use of Score:
      
      
      Use only min & max
        ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
      
      
      …with the difference that,
        when it’s uncertain whether or not a candidate deserves
        approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
        intermediate point-rating.
      
      
      Nice, sometimes convenient,
        because, otherwise, the only way to give someone partial
        approval would be probabilistically.
      
      
      But Score loses Approval’s
        absolute minimalness, & unique unarbitrariness.
      
      
      Much better to let the
        voters deal with such things for themselves with the
        absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary
        & (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule
        & count. …with the consequent expense & count-fraud
        vulnerability.
      
      
      
        
          
             So it is strategically equivalent to
              Approval while being more complicated and less fair.
          
        
      
      More complicated, yes.
      
      
      I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but
        some jurisdictions might insist on one. 
      
      
      …likewise Score. 
      
      
      It’s true that it somewhat increases
         Condorcet-efficiency & Social-Utility (SU), but it
        brings great strategy-complication, including the loss of
        FBC compliance.
      
      
      But STAR is better than Hare because:
      
      
      It retains some amount Score’s merit.
      
      
      It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting
        in much better count-fraud security.
      
      
      It’s much less expensive to administer &
        implement than Hare.
      
      
      It’s much simpler to describe its workings
        when proposing it.
      
      
      
        
          
            
              
              And Approval has a quite good reputation here because
              it meets Favorite Betrayal  (aka FBC) and compared
              with FPP the winner
              will strongly tend to have higher social utility and 
              be much more likely  a sincere Condorcet winner. 
              Also, and not unrelatedly, 
              it has a bias toward centrists that some people think
              is wonderful.
              
              But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two
              Runoff (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to
              make STAR) is just
              a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method
              "a bit more accurate", brings it into compliance with
              Condorcet Loser
              and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".  
              ("Sky-high" according to CLC here).
              
              But actually it makes the method profoundly different
              and very bad. It seems to me that the inventors of
              STAR must have been 
              motivated by three priorities:
              
              (1) the method isn't  Hare,  
              
              (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely
              useless way, apparently meets Mono-raise (aka
              Monotonicity).
              
              (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by 
              not-so-deep thinkers, the method be as bad as
              possible.
              
              From the "equal-vote" website:    https://www.equal.vote/
              
            
            Ranked
                Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order
                of preference has been lauded as a solution, but in
                elections where the third candidate is actually
                competitive, vote-splitting
                remains a serious issue and
                RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a
                primary and  general election with Choose-One
                Plurality voting.
             
            Luckily,
                many voting methods are can effectively prevent
                vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can
                weigh in on each candidate individually, when all
                ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
                show equal preference, vote-splitting can be
                eliminated. All voting methods which do this pass
                the Equal Vote
                Criterion,
                including STAR Voting,...
            
            The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just  propaganda
            nonsense:   https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
            The
                Equal Vote Criterion or Equality
                Criterion is a voting method
                criterion which
                requires that a voting method ensure that every
                voter may cast a vote which is as powerful as a vote
                cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
                the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting or the
                "Spoiler Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast
                an equally
                weighted vote.
            Choose-One
                Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
                Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice
                Voting) do not satisfy the Equal Vote Criterion.
            
            This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this
            very vague and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare)
            certainly does.  
            
            The classic scenario that motivated some people get
            negative about Hare (and also methods like Min-Max
            Margins):
            
            49 Bush
            24 Gore
            27 Nader>Gore
            Gore>Bush 51-49,   Bush>Nader 49-27,
              Nader>Gore 27-24.
              
              Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader
              voters whose Gore> Bush preference was strong had
              incentive to use the Compromise 
              strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their
              sincere favourite).  If the method was Approval they
              could have approved both Nader and
              Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having
              to vote their sincere favorite below equal-top.
              
              But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than
              Hare. The Nader voters would have incentive to give
              Nader zero points.
              
              "Traditionally" Hare's  vulnerability to Push-over
              strategy has said to be a result of it's failure of
              Mono-raise.  But STAR is much more vulnerable
              to Push-over.
              
              Say you are sure that your favourite will make the
              final two. In that case then you have incentive to
              give every candidate that you are sure your
              favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.  If 5 stars then you
              are relying on you favourite winning the runoff
              without your help, but if 4 stars then you might
              fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys
              into the final.
              
              In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists
              rely on their favourite winning the runoff against
              their own votes, i.e. with their votes supporting
              the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much
              more risky (more likely to backfire) and difficult to
              coordinate than is the case with STAR.
              
              The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on
              the Favorite Betrayal Criterion.  I find that weird
              and misleading, because STAR badly fails FBC.
              https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
              
              From https://www.starvoting.org/
            
            
              Why
                STAR Voting? 
              Voting
                  reform is the keystone. A single cause with the
                  potential to empower us to be more effective on
                  every other issue we care about. 
              
                
                  Honesty
                      is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
                      incentivized.
                
                
                  Even if
                      your favorite can’t win, your vote helps
                      prevent your worst case scenario.
                
                
                  Highly
                      accurate, no matter how many
                      candidates/parties are in the race.
                
              
            
            
            I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to
            mean, but I refute the suggestion that these claims are
            more true of STAR than they are of Hare.
            
            In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and
            all the Condorcet methods.
        
        
          
            Chris
              
              
            
          
        
      
    
  

I guess this is evidence that Michael has plonked me.Powered by Cricket Wireless------ Original message------From: Michael OssipoffDate: Wed, Apr 10, 2024 21:42To: Chris Benham;Cc: Forest Simmons;Greg Dennis;James Gilmour;Kevin Venzke;Kristofer Munsterhjelm;Toby Pereira;election-methods@lists.electorama.com;robert bristow-johnson;Subject:Re: Hare (aka IRV) versus STAROr is the problem of that an acceptable runoff-loser knocking the acceptable runoff-winner out of the runoff there in STAR too? That hadn’t occurred to me. If it’s so, it’s another pitfall of STAR’s runoff.On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:26 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote: Michael wrote: But STAR is better than Hare because: It retains some amount Score’s merit. No it doesn't.   Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.  STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser. I said “some”, not “all”.e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying & hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your acceptables.Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass. I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror of STAR. The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion: *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their sincere favourite as low as possible*. Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR.  … completely reject runoff with Approval.  …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.I much prefer Approval to Score,  for minimalness & unarbitrariness. Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence or common sense because STAR is obviously so silly and arbitrary.See above. Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable Vote with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions) and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner. It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".  It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable. Chris Benham On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote: On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote: [quote] Score is Approval with a  "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button. [/quote] If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself. The right use of Score: Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval. …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an intermediate point-rating. Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give someone partial approval would be probabilistically. But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique unarbitrariness. Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability. So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more complicated and less fair. More complicated, yes. I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might insist on one.  …likewise Score.  It’s true that it somewhat increases  Condorcet-efficiency & Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including the loss of FBC compliance. But STAR is better than Hare because: It retains some amount Score’s merit. It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud security. It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare. It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it. And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite Betrayal  (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner will strongly tend to have higher social utility and  be much more likely  a sincere Condorcet winner.  Also, and not unrelatedly, it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful. But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".   ("Sky-high" according to CLC here). But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been motivated by three priorities: (1) the method isn't  Hare,  (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way, apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity). (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by  not-so-deep thinkers, the method be as bad as possible. From the "equal-vote" website:    https://www.equal.vote/ Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious issue and RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and  general election with Choose-One Plurality voting. Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion, including STAR Voting,... The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just  propaganda nonsense:   https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion is a voting method criterion which requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting or the "Spoiler Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote. Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal Vote Criterion. This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.  The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins): 49 Bush 24 Gore 27 Nader>Gore Gore>Bush 51-49,   Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24. Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).  If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their sincere favorite below equal-top. But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points. "Traditionally" Hare's  vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise.  But STAR is much more vulnerable to Push-over. Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.  If 5 stars then you are relying on you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you might fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final. In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes supporting the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR. The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite Betrayal Criterion.  I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly fails FBC. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ From https://www.starvoting.org/ Why STAR Voting?  Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.  Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized. Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst case scenario. Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the race. I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of Hare. In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the Condorcet methods. Chris

-

Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
<https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-

Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-

Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>

I unblocked you. On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 05:33 robert bristow-johnson < rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote: > > I guess this is evidence that Michael has plonked me. > > > *Powered by Cricket Wireless* > > ------ Original message------ > *From: *Michael Ossipoff > *Date: *Wed, Apr 10, 2024 21:42 > *To: *Chris Benham; > *Cc: *Forest Simmons;Greg Dennis;James Gilmour;Kevin Venzke;Kristofer > Munsterhjelm;Toby Pereira;election-methods@lists.electorama.com;robert > bristow-johnson; > *Subject:*Re: Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR > > Or is the prob lem of that an acceptable runoff-loser knocking the > acceptable runoff-winner out of the runoff there in STAR too? That hadn’t > occurred to me. If it’s so, it’s another pitfall of STAR’s runoff. > > On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:26 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> >> wrote: >> >>> Michael wrote: >>> >>> But STAR is better than Hare because: >>> >>> It retains some amount Score’s merit. >>> >>> >>> No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation. STAR >>> trashes those just for Condorcet Loser. >>> >> >> I said “some”, not “all”. >> >> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the >> acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables. >> >> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying & >> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your >> acceptables. >> >> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass. >> >> >> >>> >>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror of >>> STAR. >>> >>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion: >>> >>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their sincere >>> favourite as low as possible*. >>> >> >> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I don’t >> like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff with >> Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it. >> >> I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness. >> >>> >>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence or >>> common sense because STAR is obviously >>> so silly and arbitrary. >>> >> >> See above. >> >>> >>> >>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable Vote >>> with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance >>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and >>> Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain >>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions) and >>> Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner. >>> >>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties". It's >>> ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion >>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to suggest >>> that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable. >>> >>> >>> >>> Chris Benham >>> >>> >>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> >>> wrote: >>> >>> [quote] >>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for >>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button. >>> [/quote] >>> >>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself. >>> >>> The right use of Score: >>> >>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval. >>> >>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a >>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an >>> intermediate point-rating. >>> >>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give >>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically. >>> >>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique >>> unarbitrariness. >>> >>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with >>> the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or >>> greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense >>> & count-fraud vulnerability. >>> >>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more >>>> complicated and less fair. >>>> >>> More complicated, yes. >>> >>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might >>> insist on one. >>> >>> …likewise Score. >>> >>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency & >>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including >>> the loss of FBC compliance. >>> >>> But STAR is better than Hare because: >>> >>> It retains some amount Score’s merit. >>> >>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud >>> security. >>> >>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare. >>> >>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite >>>> Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner >>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more >>>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly, >>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful. >>>> >>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated >>>> in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just >>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more >>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser >>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according >>>> to CLC here). >>>> >>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It >>>> seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been >>>> motivated by three priorities: >>>> >>>> (1) the method isn't Hare, >>>> >>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way, >>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity). >>>> >>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep >>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible. >>>> >>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/ >>>> >>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of >>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third >>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious >>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV >>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general >>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting. >>>> >>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent >>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate >>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to >>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods >>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion >>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR >>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,... >>>> >>>> >>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense: >>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion >>>> >>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion >>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion >>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires >>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as >>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the >>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting >>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler Effect," >>>> ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote >>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>. >>>> >>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff >>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal >>>> Vote Criterion. >>>> >>>> >>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and >>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does. >>>> >>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare >>>> (and also methods like Min-Max Margins): >>>> >>>> 49 Bush >>>> 24 Gore >>>> 27 Nader>Gore >>>> >>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24. >>>> >>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore> >>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise >>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If >>>> the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and >>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their >>>> sincere favorite below equal-top. >>>> >>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader >>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points. >>>> >>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to >>>> be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable >>>> to Push-over. >>>> >>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that >>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your >>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on >>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you >>>> might >>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final. >>>> >>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their >>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes >>>> supporting >>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more >>>> likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR. >>>> >>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite >>>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly >>>> fails FBC. >>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ >>>> >>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/ >>>> >>>> Why STAR Voting? >>>> >>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to >>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about. >>>> >>>> - >>>> >>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized. >>>> <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting> >>>> - >>>> >>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst >>>> case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote> >>>> - >>>> >>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the >>>> race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy> >>>> >>>> >>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute >>>> the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of >>>> Hare. >>>> >>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the >>>> Condorcet methods. >>>> >>>> Chris >>>> >>>> >>>> ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >