Which methods reduce to Approval when no ballot ranks any candidate lower than equal first?
Suppose that for some ballot B, the only candidates ranked on B are the
ones ranked Top or Equal Top. In that case we say that B has been voted
"approval style".
Suppose that every ballot in the entire ballot set is voted approval style.
Which of the following methods will elect the approval winner (the one
voted Top or Equal Top on the most ballots)?
Range/Score, Bucklin, Ranked Pairs, Copeland, Majority Judgment,
Kemeny-Young, STAR, Approval Sorted Margins, DMC, IRV, DAC, DSC, MMPO,
River, Schulze CSSD, Baldwin, Nanson, Black, MinMax(margins), SPE, Gross
Loser Elimination, BTR-IRV, Score Chain Climbing, List Based Banks, Benham?
I won't give away the answers until tomorrow ... so you can think about it.
Then, after some additional questions to explore, a new method ... a
natural outgrowth of our new understanding!
-Forest
6
Presumably ranking top means the highest possible score in the cardinal methods. Intuitively it seems that pretty much all of these methods should elect the approval winner. The Condorcet ones surely. I'm not sure what justification there would be for not doing so, so it sounds like the birth of a new criterion.
Toby
On Wednesday, 7 December 2022 at 02:15:19 GMT, Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
Suppose that for some ballot B, the only candidates ranked on B are the ones ranked Top or Equal Top. In that case we say that B has been voted "approval style".
Suppose that every ballot in the entire ballot set is voted approval style. Which of the following methods will elect the approval winner (the one voted Top or Equal Top on the most ballots)?
Range/Score, Bucklin, Ranked Pairs, Copeland, Majority Judgment, Kemeny-Young, STAR, Approval Sorted Margins, DMC, IRV, DAC, DSC, MMPO, River, Schulze CSSD, Baldwin, Nanson, Black, MinMax(margins), SPE, Gross Loser Elimination, BTR-IRV, Score Chain Climbing, List Based Banks, Benham?
I won't give away the answers until tomorrow ... so you can think about it.
Then, after some additional questions to explore, a new method ... a natural outgrowth of our new understanding!
-Forest
6----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Toby,
You are very close ... only one of these fails to elect the approval winner
when fed approval ballots.
I'm going to give everybody one more day to figure out which one, and what
about it makes the difference.
On Wed, Dec 7, 2022, 1:42 AM Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Presumably ranking top means the highest possible score in the cardinal
methods. Intuitively it seems that pretty much all of these methods should
elect the approval winner. The Condorcet ones surely. I'm not sure what
justification there would be for not doing so, so it sounds like the birth
of a new criterion.
Toby
On Wednesday, 7 December 2022 at 02:15:19 GMT, Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote:
Suppose that for some ballot B, the only candidates ranked on B are the
ones ranked Top or Equal Top. In that case we say that B has been voted
"approval style".
Suppose that every ballot in the entire ballot set is voted approval
style. Which of the following methods will elect the approval winner (the
one voted Top or Equal Top on the most ballots)?
Range/Score, Bucklin, Ranked Pairs, Copeland, Majority Judgment,
Kemeny-Young, STAR, Approval Sorted Margins, DMC, IRV, DAC, DSC, MMPO,
River, Schulze CSSD, Baldwin, Nanson, Black, MinMax(margins), SPE, Gross
Loser Elimination, BTR-IRV, Score Chain Climbing, List Based Banks, Benham?
I won't give away the answers until tomorrow ... so you can think about it.
Then, after some additional questions to explore, a new method ... a
natural outgrowth of our new understanding!
-Forest
6
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
Here's another hint.
Which of the listed methods elect the approval winner A for the following
ballot profile?
46 A
5 A=C
5 B=C
44 B
On Wed, Dec 7, 2022, 4:43 PM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com
wrote:
Toby,
You are very close ... only one of these fails to elect the approval
winner when fed approval ballots.
I'm going to give everybody one more day to figure out which one, and what
about it makes the difference.
On Wed, Dec 7, 2022, 1:42 AM Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Presumably ranking top means the highest possible score in the cardinal
methods. Intuitively it seems that pretty much all of these methods should
elect the approval winner. The Condorcet ones surely. I'm not sure what
justification there would be for not doing so, so it sounds like the birth
of a new criterion.
Toby
On Wednesday, 7 December 2022 at 02:15:19 GMT, Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote:
Suppose that for some ballot B, the only candidates ranked on B are the
ones ranked Top or Equal Top. In that case we say that B has been voted
"approval style".
Suppose that every ballot in the entire ballot set is voted approval
style. Which of the following methods will elect the approval winner (the
one voted Top or Equal Top on the most ballots)?
Range/Score, Bucklin, Ranked Pairs, Copeland, Majority Judgment,
Kemeny-Young, STAR, Approval Sorted Margins, DMC, IRV, DAC, DSC, MMPO,
River, Schulze CSSD, Baldwin, Nanson, Black, MinMax(margins), SPE, Gross
Loser Elimination, BTR-IRV, Score Chain Climbing, List Based Banks, Benham?
I won't give away the answers until tomorrow ... so you can think about
it.
Then, after some additional questions to explore, a new method ... a
natural outgrowth of our new understanding!
-Forest
6
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info