On 2024-01-13 00:15, Sass wrote: > I think you're overcomplicating it. The question to ask is about > incentives. In public elections, voters (and candidates) will follow the > incentives. For public elections under a Condorcet method, by far the > strongest incentive is to vote honestly. Do you think honest cycles could appear with time? -km

The question is frequency of cycles. From what I can tell, that will be low with scaled public elections. And I need to amend an earlier stat that I gave. It's actually 2 out of 88 RCV elections with a competitive third candidate that had a top cycle. Once I realized that, I got a bit more concerned. On Sat, Jan 13, 2024 at 5:36 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: > On 2024-01-13 00:15, Sass wrote: > > I think you're overcomplicating it. The question to ask is about > > incentives. In public elections, voters (and candidates) will follow the > > incentives. For public elections under a Condorcet method, by far the > > strongest incentive is to vote honestly. > > Do you think honest cycles could appear with time? > > -km >