On 17/02/2020 01.52, Forest Simmons wrote:
Here is a one parameter family of lotteries that encourage consensus:
the bigger the parameter N, the greater the encouragement, while in
every case allowing single minded minorities to have proportional
probability for representation:
-
The voters submit approval style ballots.
-
The approval totals are tallied.
-
After thorough mixing of ballots a set of N ballots are drawn at random.
-
If all N of the ballots approve one or more candidates in common,
then from among those the one with the greatest approval tally (from
step one) is elected.
-
Else the candidate approved on the first drawn ballot with the
greatest approval tally is elected.
I need suggestions for a democratic way of deciding on an appropriate
value of N. In other words, how to discern the potential max consensus
level.
You could vary N to fit an approximate supermajority requirement.
However, I think it would be better and easier (having less of a sloping
cutoff) to just make that requirement explicit:
- The voters submit approval style ballots.
- The approval totals are tallied.
- If there exists at least one candidate for which there exists a group
of x% of the whole electorate approving this candidate, then elect the
candidate among these with the greatest approval tally.
- Otherwise, choose a random ballot and pick the approved candidate with
the greatest tally.
You could use IBIFA/Relevant Ratings-type logic to reduce the problems
with a hard threshold just like those methods do.
-km
On 17/02/2020 01.52, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Here is a one parameter family of lotteries that encourage consensus:
> the bigger the parameter N, the greater the encouragement, while in
> every case allowing single minded minorities to have proportional
> probability for representation:
>
> 1. The voters submit approval style ballots.
>
> 2. The approval totals are tallied.
>
> 3. After thorough mixing of ballots a set of N ballots are drawn at random.
>
> 4. If all N of the ballots approve one or more candidates in common,
> then from among those the one with the greatest approval tally (from
> step one) is elected.
>
> 5. Else the candidate approved on the first drawn ballot with the
> greatest approval tally is elected.
>
> I need suggestions for a democratic way of deciding on an appropriate
> value of N. In other words, how to discern the potential max consensus
> level.
You could vary N to fit an approximate supermajority requirement.
However, I think it would be better and easier (having less of a sloping
cutoff) to just make that requirement explicit:
- The voters submit approval style ballots.
- The approval totals are tallied.
- If there exists at least one candidate for which there exists a group
of x% of the whole electorate approving this candidate, then elect the
candidate among these with the greatest approval tally.
- Otherwise, choose a random ballot and pick the approved candidate with
the greatest tally.
You could use IBIFA/Relevant Ratings-type logic to reduce the problems
with a hard threshold just like those methods do.
-km
