How would you fix California's top two primary?
Since a 2010 ballot initiative [1], California uses a nonpartisan
blanket primary for non-presidential elections. This means that
candidates from all parties and independent ones run against each
other in a primary round, and the top two advance to the general
election.
Multiple candidates from the same party can run in the primary,
meaning that you may have vote splitting effects. Frequently, the top
two general election candidates are from the same party. This is by
design, though it remains to be seen how voters would respond to e.g.,
two gubernatorial choices from the same party. You can see some
example results here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_State_Assembly_election,_2016
An interesting effect you can see here is the large number of
candidates who make it to the general election on a fraction of
write-in votes. Some of these districts would likely have been
uncontested in prior elections. For example, Angela Rupert from
District 46 got 131 (!) write-in votes, and managed to get 43.9% /
60,658 votes in the general. Quite a jump!
There's a large turnout gap between primary and general, and the
electorate is different. [2] As a consequence, small parties have
generally feared a loss of visibility, and opposed such measures in
the states where they have been proposed. The change certainly hasn't
helped them in California so far -- only the Libertarians made a small
showing in the 2016 elections, without any seats.
Practical questions for this group:
- Do you think this system would benefit from iterative improvements?
- If so, what would those changes look like?
It almost goes without saying that I think proportional representation
voting is the most desirable long term change. But if there are
smaller changes that would improve this system in the near term, CA
may be a viable target for reform, by law or by ballot initiative.
Personally, I think the vote splitting and spoiler effects in the
primary stage are problematic, and having candidates from the same
party in the general is undesirable. The use of fractions of write-in
votes also seems hackish and suggests ballot access problems in the
primary stage. I can imagine multiple ways to address this, but I'd be
curious what this group thinks.
Warmly,
Erik
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Proposition_14_(2010)
[2] http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_514EMR.pdf
If Top Two is required, I would prefer Approval voting, then include the
Approval winner (AW1), plus the approval winner after all AW1-approving
ballots are removed. This would be clone independent and would generally
tend to include candidates from two different parties. It is basically a
2-person multiwinner election using Approval reweighted voting.
Frango ut patefaciam -- I break so that I may reveal
On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 6:03 AM, Erik Moeller eloquence@gmail.com wrote:
Since a 2010 ballot initiative [1], California uses a nonpartisan
blanket primary for non-presidential elections. This means that
candidates from all parties and independent ones run against each
other in a primary round, and the top two advance to the general
election.
Multiple candidates from the same party can run in the primary,
meaning that you may have vote splitting effects. Frequently, the top
two general election candidates are from the same party. This is by
design, though it remains to be seen how voters would respond to e.g.,
two gubernatorial choices from the same party. You can see some
example results here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_State_Assembly_election,_2016
An interesting effect you can see here is the large number of
candidates who make it to the general election on a fraction of
write-in votes. Some of these districts would likely have been
uncontested in prior elections. For example, Angela Rupert from
District 46 got 131 (!) write-in votes, and managed to get 43.9% /
60,658 votes in the general. Quite a jump!
There's a large turnout gap between primary and general, and the
electorate is different. [2] As a consequence, small parties have
generally feared a loss of visibility, and opposed such measures in
the states where they have been proposed. The change certainly hasn't
helped them in California so far -- only the Libertarians made a small
showing in the 2016 elections, without any seats.
Practical questions for this group:
- Do you think this system would benefit from iterative improvements?
- If so, what would those changes look like?
It almost goes without saying that I think proportional representation
voting is the most desirable long term change. But if there are
smaller changes that would improve this system in the near term, CA
may be a viable target for reform, by law or by ballot initiative.
Personally, I think the vote splitting and spoiler effects in the
primary stage are problematic, and having candidates from the same
party in the general is undesirable. The use of fractions of write-in
votes also seems hackish and suggests ballot access problems in the
primary stage. I can imagine multiple ways to address this, but I'd be
curious what this group thinks.
Warmly,
Erik
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Proposition_14_(2010)
[2] http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_514EMR.pdf
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 01/10/2017 09:13 PM, Monkey Puzzle wrote:
If Top Two is required, I would prefer Approval voting, then include the
Approval winner (AW1), plus the approval winner after all AW1-approving
ballots are removed. This would be clone independent and would
generally tend to include candidates from two different parties. It is
basically a 2-person multiwinner election using Approval reweighted voting.
That goes a bit too far in the other direction. Consider a profile like
this:
99: A B
1: C
It seems pretty clear that the candidates to go to the second round
should be A and B, but Approval-and-removal will pick either {A, C} or
{B, C}. Of course, the real world probably won't have this kind of
pathological election situation, but the bias is still there to a lesser
degree: it disproportionately picks "extremists" for the second seat
(i.e. candidates whose voters wouldn't vote for the first winner).
If your complexity budget is so that you can't do anything more complex
than approval-and-remove, go with approval-and-remove because it's
better than just picking two Approval winners right out. But if you can,
the following might be better:
A little bit more complex: First pick the Approval winner. Then randomly
remove ballots that approved of this winner until you've either removed
every ballot that approves of the winner, or 1/3 of the total number of
ballots. Then pick the Approval winner by the remaining ballots (ignore
the first winner if he's still number one).
This is closer to Droop-proportional, but has a vote management
incentive. The following mitigates the vote management incentive, but is
more complex still:
First pick the Approval winner W.
For each other candidate X:
Until you have removed 1/3 of the total number of ballots or every
ballot that approves W, first remove ballots that approve W but not X,
then ballots that approve both W and X. Count X's approval according to
the remaining ballots after removal, then put the ballots you removed
back in the pile so you can repeat for the next candidate.
The candidate with the greatest thus counted approval score gets the
second seat in the runoff. (This is essentially the constraint method
with two seats and Approval.)
�
i would ditch it. �i actually think that political parties serve a purpose. �but i think that it should be easier for an independent candidate or a third-party candidate to run on a LEVEL PLAYING FIELD with whoever the two major parties prop up to run for office.
the
Primary election is not the "primary" place to fix these (lack of) multiple-choice issues. �it's the General.
we can use RCV (that's Condorcet compliant) in the primaries, too, within each party. �but i really don't like the idea that the top two of one party end up
eclipsing the offerings of any of the other parties. �in fact i hate that idea. �i think California screwed up with this top two thing.
--
r b-j � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] How would you fix California's top two primary?
From: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" km_elmet@t-online.de
Date: Tue, January 10, 2017 6:56 pm
To: "Monkey Puzzle" araucaria.araucana@gmail.com
"Erik Moeller" eloquence@gmail.com
Cc: "EM" election-methods@lists.electorama.com
On 01/10/2017 09:13 PM, Monkey Puzzle wrote:
If Top Two is required, I would prefer Approval voting, then include the
Approval winner (AW1), plus the approval winner after all AW1-approving
ballots are removed. This would be clone independent and would
generally tend to include candidates from two different parties. It is
basically a 2-person multiwinner election using Approval reweighted voting.
That goes a bit too far in the other direction. Consider a profile like
this:
99: A B
1: C
It seems pretty clear that the candidates to go to the second round
should be A and B, but Approval-and-removal will pick either {A, C} or
{B, C}. Of course, the real world probably won't have this kind of
pathological election situation, but the bias is still there to a lesser
degree: it disproportionately picks "extremists" for the second seat
(i.e. candidates whose voters wouldn't vote for the first winner).
If your complexity budget is so that you can't do anything more complex
than approval-and-remove, go with approval-and-remove because it's
better than just picking two Approval winners right out. But if you can,
the following might be better:
A little bit more complex: First pick the Approval winner. Then randomly
remove ballots that approved of this winner until you've either removed
every ballot that approves of the winner, or 1/3 of the total number of
ballots. Then pick the Approval winner by the remaining ballots (ignore
the first winner if he's still number one).
This is closer to Droop-proportional, but has a vote management
incentive. The following mitigates the vote management incentive, but is
more complex still:
First pick the Approval winner W.
For each other candidate X:
Until you have removed 1/3 of the total number of ballots or every
ballot that approves W, first remove ballots that approve W but not X,
then ballots that approve both W and X. Count X's approval according to
the remaining ballots after removal, then put the ballots you removed
back in the pile so you can repeat for the next candidate.
The candidate with the greatest thus counted approval score gets the
second seat in the runoff. (This is essentially the constraint method
with two seats and Approval.)
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
�
On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 3:56 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet@t-online.de wrote:
That goes a bit too far in the other direction. Consider a profile like
this:
99: A B
1: C
It seems pretty clear that the candidates to go to the second round
should be A and B, but Approval-and-removal will pick either {A, C} or
{B, C}. Of course, the real world probably won't have this kind of
pathological election situation
In the last decades, the US has degenerated into increasing
uncontested single-party rule at the district level [1]. The
introduction of top two has led to many "pathological" situations
where one of the top two candidates in the primary only has a fraction
of support [2], because these races might not have been contested at
all previously.
Interestingly, these fraction supports translate into double-digit
support in the general election, showing that even in previously
uncontested races, thousands of voters are hungry for an alternative.
(Shocking, I know.) Never mind the fact that without PR, their vote is
likely to go to waste.
In that context, I'm not sure the change would really be disruptive.
Probably you'd see fewer Dem-Dem races and more Dem-Libertarian or
Dem-Green races. So I do like this suggestion overall, and it strikes
me as a lot more straightforward than the "top four" approach Fairvote
proposed:
http://www.fairvote.org/fixing-top-two-with-open-general-elections-the-colorado-innovation
(The "Colorado innovation" they refer to did not even make it onto the
ballot. [3])
Thanks for responses so far. I'll wait for more, and will reach out to
some CA groups with a summary next week.
Cheers,
Erik
[1] https://ballotpedia.org/Competitiveness_in_State_Legislative_Elections:_1972-2014#Uncontested_elections
[2] Ctrl+F for "write-in" in
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_State_Assembly_election,2016
[3] https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Two-Stage_Election_System_Initiative(2014)
On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 6:56 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
because it's
better than just picking two Approval winners right out.
You should pick the top two Approval (or Score) winners to go to the
run-off. This isn't proportional representation. The goal of a
single-winner election is to find the candidate who most closely matches
(the entirety of) the population. If there has to be a runoff, then it
should be between the two people who are most liked, because they are
closest to the centroid of the population. This means they will likely be
moderates from the same party, and that's a good thing because that's where
the average voter leans, too. Then voters can then choose between the two
based on hairstyle or whatever.
On 01/11/2017 06:43 AM, fdpk69p6uq@snkmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 6:56 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
because it's
better than just picking two Approval winners right out.
You should pick the top two Approval (or Score) winners to go to the
run-off. This isn't proportional representation. The goal of a
single-winner election is to find the candidate who most closely matches
(the entirety of) the population. If there has to be a runoff, then it
should be between the two people who are most liked, because they are
closest to the centroid of the population. This means they will likely
be moderates from the same party, and that's a good thing because that's
where the average voter leans, too. Then voters can then choose between
the two based on hairstyle or whatever.
But if you do that, then cloning is easy and rewards the party with the
most disciplined voters. Each party simply fields two candidates who are
as close as possible to each other, and then the runoff becomes pretty
much redundant.
Not a good outcome, I'd say!
On 01/11/2017 01:37 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i would ditch it. i actually think that political parties serve a
purpose. but i think that it should be easier for an independent
candidate or a third-party candidate to run on a LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
with whoever the two major parties prop up to run for office.
the Primary election is not the "primary" place to fix these (lack of)
multiple-choice issues. it's the General.
we can use RCV (that's Condorcet compliant) in the primaries, too,
within each party. but i really don't like the idea that the top
two of one party end up eclipsing the offerings of any of the other
parties. in fact i hate that idea. i think California screwed up with
this top two thing.
If you have the complexity budget to go right to Condorcet, yes. The
impression I got from Erik's post was that he was looking for small
changes as it'd be hard to change the system entirely.
But I agree. If you can get Condorcet, get Condorcet.
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] How would you fix California's top two primary?
From: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" km_elmet@t-online.de
Date: Wed, January 11, 2017 3:34 am
"EM" election-methods@lists.electorama.com
On 01/11/2017 06:43 AM, fdpk69p6uq@snkmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 6:56 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
because it's
better than just picking two Approval winners right out.
You should pick the top two Approval (or Score) winners to go to the
run-off. This isn't proportional representation. The goal of a
single-winner election is to find the candidate who most closely matches
(the entirety of) the population. If there has to be a runoff, then it
should be between the two people who are most liked, because they are
closest to the centroid of the population.
no. �that is decidedly not true.
whether the runoff be delay or instant the candidate most preferred by voters is not necessarily one of the two highest vote getters.
again (just because it's easy for me) the Burlington 2009
mayoral election (decided by IRV). �neither of the two top vote-getters (counting first-choice votes when there were three candidates left in the runoff) were preferred over the Condorcet winner who did not get into the final runoff. �they (or "we", but not me) repealed IRV
anyway, but a delayed runoff would have done no better. �it would still have been a runoff between the two candidates who where less preferred (if the voters are asked) than the Condorcet winner we had that year who was also the most centrist candidate.
This means they will
likely
be moderates from the same party, and that's a good thing because that's
where the average voter leans, too. Then voters can then choose between
the two based on hairstyle or whatever.
�
But if you do that, then cloning is easy and rewards the party with the
most disciplined voters. Each party simply fields two candidates who are
as close as possible to each other, and then the runoff becomes pretty
much redundant.
Not a good outcome, I'd say!
me neither.
what i don't get is all of this interest in Approval (or Score) over Ranked-Choice Voting anyway. �asking voters (like they are judges at the Olympics) to score candidates is really silly. and Approval, while simple in concept, also
directly confronts voters with the tactical burden of deciding whether or not to Approve of their second choice. �No one has been able to address that concern simply.
Ranked ballot with Condorcet-compliant tabulation of the votes and deciding the winner. �No one here has been
particularly successful at demonstrating why another method is simpler overall and works better. �Instructions to voters are simple. Sincere voting is clear (voters know exactly how to rank their second choice). �Transparent and precinct-summable. �And, unless there is a cycle (which
I am convinced will be uncommon) there is a simple refutation to any challenge claiming the wrong candidate was elected or that a spoiler spoiled the election. �Like a tie or any very close election, a Condorcet cycle is indicative that it was close and any of the candidates (in the Smith set)
have strong voter support and are a plausible winner.
i think political parties have a useful political purpose. �i just don't think it should be limited to two parties, and while i don't exactly mind that there are two dominant parties and, like competing products or companies, i
expect the dominance of the major parties to (in a self-fulfilling manner) continue to support their dominance, like the major parties will have more supporters and more money. �But what I don't want is Duverger's Law giving the two dominant parties an additional edge in the election by
scaring most voters from voting for a third-party candidate they might like better out of fear that the candidate they hate gets elected.
I think California's primary system is crap. �Each candidate, whether major or minor party or independent, should pass a ballot access requirement
(number of valid signatures) to get on the ballot. �Let each party have their own slugfest to decide who they will prop up. �Even losing candidates in the primary or caucus fight should be able to run as an independent as long as that candidate gets enough signatures. �And then
let voters decide in the General (among two or three or five or six candidates) who should get elected. �The ballot access requirements should be tough enough to normally limit (to a single winner seat) the number of candidates on the ballot to a reasonable number (i think less than ten, even
less than eight).
�
unrelated: I am still just sick and mad-as-hell about what happened on November 8. �9 more days until doomsday. �i can't believe how the media is trying to "normalize" Cap'n Combover. �i wish someone would off that motherfucker and his
VP. �(that's so Christian and tolerant of me.)
�
r b-j � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
�
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] How would you fix California's top two primary?
From: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" km_elmet@t-online.de
Date: Wed, January 11, 2017 4:44 am
"EM" election-methods@lists.electorama.com
On 01/11/2017 01:37 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i would ditch it. i actually think that political parties serve a
purpose. but i think that it should be easier for an independent
candidate or a third-party candidate to run on a LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
with whoever the two major parties prop up to run for office.
the Primary election is not the "primary" place to fix these (lack of)
multiple-choice issues. it's the General.
we can use RCV (that's Condorcet compliant) in the primaries, too,
within each party. but i really don't like the idea that the top
two of one party end up eclipsing the offerings of any of the other
parties. in fact i hate that idea. i think California screwed up with
this top two thing.
If you have the complexity budget to go right to Condorcet, yes. The
impression I got from Erik's post was that he was looking for small
changes as it'd be hard to change the system entirely.
But I agree. If you can get Condorcet, get Condorcet.
from an infrastructure POV (like voting machines and software), it's no worse than IRV. �just different (and better) tabulation rules. �and IRV has been used and is currently in use in a few places. �with optical-scan ballots, it's just a matter of software (or firmware).
�not hardware.
in fact, it's better than IRV regarding complexity in infrastructure because Condorcet is precinct summable.
but convincing simple people (who don't consider third parties) and craven or selfish politicians to change the ballot is hard enough. �and then with
FairVote being disingenuous by equating voting reform and Ranked Choice with IRV (not they are appropriating the term "RCV" for IRV because they think it sells better, that is really dishonest), only confuses more.
and Rob Richie argued (to me) that IRV could be viewed as an
"incremental change". �problem is that voting and elections is such a sensitive thing that one screwup result from the incremental change sets back voting reform to square 1. �when doing voting system reform, we need to do it right, as best as we know how, from the
start.
if Vermont ever reconsiders Ranked Choice, I will be in the state house plugging one simple mantra:
"If more voters mark their ballots that they prefer Candidate A over Candidate B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not
elected."
That is the simple rule and the simple goal. �And who can argue with that?
�
((grrrr. �still pissed as hell. �this is worse than it was 16 years ago and THAT was really bad. �mendacious narcissistic demagogue. �but what can go wrong?
1933, but this time they give him nuclear codes. �"peaceful transfer of power" my ass. �i wish someone would off that motherfucker.))
--
r b-j � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."