On 03/12/2020 14:01, Richard Lung wrote: > > > Droop proportionality fails, because it is the minimally proportional > election. That means that candidates may be elected on statistically > insignificant majorities -- whether single member majorities (like 51 > out of 100) or multi-member majorities, (like two winners with 34 > votes each out of 100). The Droop quota superseded the Hare quota for > historical reasons. But there is also logical reason for its > democratic short-comings: in the most extreme case, a single member > requires all the votes, to be elected, which could only be achieved by > a completely deferential electorate. That is why the first of my four > averages, in FAB STV, is (my innovation of) the harmonic mean quota, > V/(S + 1/2), as the harmonic mean of the Hare and Droop quotas. The > use of the HM quota does imply multi-member constituencies, of at > least 4 or 5 members, but that is what democratic diversity requires. > > Your last paragraph of democratic skepticism is in contrast to the > view that there is a right and a wrong way to do voting method. In > this respect, I follow the tradition of Hare, Mill, Wells, Hoag and > Hallett, and Lakeman. and many other estimable people, up against > "current constraints." > > Richard L. > > > On 03/12/2020 10:20, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: >> On 03/12/2020 08.31, Richard Lung wrote: >>> Of course, all that learning won't alter what John Stuart Mill knew over >>> 150 years ago that maiorocracy is not democracy. The fixation on single >>> winner methods, (the monarchism hang-over) is candidate-centred not >>> voter-centered or politician-based not people-based. >> I have a hunch that anything that passes Droop proportionality must fail >> strong summability: that it's impossible to find a Droop-proportional >> multiwinner method where you can construct an array of numbers >> polynomial in the number of candidates, and then later use that array to >> find the outcome for any number of seats. The same approach could >> possibly be used to prove this, although it would be a lot harder. >> >> Proving multiwinner STV non-summable would not be too much harder than >> what I did in the post you replied to. There's nothing there that has to >> necessarily be single-winner. It's not clear whether the corresponding >> regions should be of candidates, or councils, though. (E.g. do we >> consider the region "A is on the council" as some analog of a win-or-tie >> region for A, or should the region be "the two-seat council is AB"?) >> >> If told to create something democratic without concern to current >> constraints, I'd probably just skip right to sortition. This would not >> just invalidate single-winner methods, but voting altogether; except, >> possibly, the method the assembly itself uses to decide. >> >> -km