(Sent as a forwarded message,) On Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > > Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't been thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal. > > But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments against MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed. > > No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do something ridiculous. > > A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other standards. > > MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise unpreferredness. > > It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it does terribly, positionally. > > In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all. > > It certainly isn't a positional method > > MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where it does terribly by pairwise defeats. > > In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses to the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000. > > It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method. > > We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we tend, maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards. > > A "beats-diagram" shows > an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one. > > But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the other half bottom-end vote B. > > Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising cancel out, making both groups un-despised? > > But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you to believe. > > If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C. > > If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C. > > C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to eachother's candidates. > > Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie would be proud. > > Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as possible. > > I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think. > > It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it achieves the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma. > > Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness compromise, a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs an actual practical problem, one that will routinely > make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just aesthetically) bad results. > > When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of whatever size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to each, & their answers. ...& telling the advantages of each. > > It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique, powerful combination of strategy advantages. > > Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them. > > Michael Ossipoff