MO
Michael Ossipoff
Fri, Apr 26, 2024 6:59 PM
Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
(I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
Who is EVC?
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
to be strategically irrelevant.
But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more problematic way.
Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; & CW,Top-2-Runoff.
WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
resistant to offensive strategy.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if you
use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give non-overlapping
scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a digit in base
k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with options for
quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through F, with +/-
options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique scores for up
to 18 (!) candidates.
(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular
is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules.
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked
candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
same
four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as
I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules.
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote,
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com>
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>
(I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
Who is EVC?
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
to be strategically irrelevant.
But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more problematic way.
Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; & CW,Top-2-Runoff.
WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
resistant to offensive strategy.
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>
>>
>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
>>>>>> per
>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if you
>>>>> use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give non-overlapping
>>>>> scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a digit in base
>>>>> k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with options for
>>>>> quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through F, with +/-
>>>>> options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique scores for up
>>>>> to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>
>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>> electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
>>>>>> car
>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on
>>>>>> it
>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>> designed
>>>>>> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed car.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>> strict
>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>> benign
>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules.
>>>>>> In
>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
>>>>>> per
>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>> stops
>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>> > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
>>>>>> work
>>>>>> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
>>>>>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
>>>>>> same
>>>>>> four candidates highest. Etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>> you
>>>>>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>>>>>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as
>>>>>> I'd
>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
>>>>>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
>>>>>> an
>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>> you from
>>>>>> >> > giving them names? ...
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>>>>>> media
>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking
>>>>>> about
>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
>>>>>> here.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read
>>>>>> my
>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>> complex
>>>>>> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>> >> > strategy.
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>> strict
>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>> benign
>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules.
>>>>>> In
>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>>>>> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
>>>>>> votes
>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>>>>>> third
>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
>>>>>> fine for
>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the
>>>>>> ones
>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>> order.
>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
>>>>>> higher
>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>>>>>> think
>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>> there
>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
>>>>>> were
>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>>>>>> fail
>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>> precise
>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
>>>>>> car
>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on
>>>>>> it
>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>> > > ...
>>>>>> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>>>>> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>> you from
>>>>>> > > giving them names? ...
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote,
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
>>>>>> avoid it.
>>>>>> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> > > FPP. ...
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>>>>>> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>>>>>> point.
>>>>>> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>> complex
>>>>>> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>> > > strategy.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>>>>>> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
>>>>>> "Let's
>>>>>> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
>>>>>> we can
>>>>>> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV
>>>>>> so that
>>>>>> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
>>>>>> were
>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>> others.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Fri, Apr 26, 2024 7:20 PM
Okay, EVC is the EqualVote Coalition
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
(I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
Who is EVC?
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
to be strategically irrelevant.
But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more problematic way.
Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; & CW,Top-2-Runoff.
WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
resistant to offensive strategy.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular
is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two
or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked
candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
same
four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as
I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules.
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote,
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying"
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
Okay, EVC is the EqualVote Coalition
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>>
>
> (I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
>
> Who is EVC?
>
> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
> to be strategically irrelevant.
>
> But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more problematic way.
> Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; & CW,Top-2-Runoff.
>
> WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
> Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
> resistant to offensive strategy.
>
>
>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
>>>>>>> per
>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
>>>>>> you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
>>>>>> non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
>>>>>> digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
>>>>>> options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
>>>>>> F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
>>>>>> scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>>> electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
>>>>>>> a car
>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
>>>>>>> doors,
>>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>>> designed
>>>>>>> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
>>>>>>> car.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
>>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>>> benign
>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
>>>>>>> per
>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two
>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>>> stops
>>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>> > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
>>>>>>> work
>>>>>>> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
>>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>> four candidates highest. Etc.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>>>>>>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as
>>>>>>> I'd
>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
>>>>>>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it
>>>>>>> is an
>>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>> you from
>>>>>>> >> > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>>>>>>> media
>>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking
>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
>>>>>>> here.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read
>>>>>>> my
>>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
>>>>>>> FPP).
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>> >> > strategy.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>>> benign
>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules.
>>>>>>> In
>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>>> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>>> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>>> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>>>>>> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>>> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>>> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>>> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>>> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
>>>>>>> votes
>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
>>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>>>>>>> third
>>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
>>>>>>> fine for
>>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>>> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
>>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
>>>>>>> the ones
>>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>>> order.
>>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
>>>>>>> higher
>>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
>>>>>>> were
>>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>>>>>>> fail
>>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>>> precise
>>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
>>>>>>> car
>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on
>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>>> > > ...
>>>>>>> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>>> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>>>>>> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>> you from
>>>>>>> > > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote,
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way
>>>>>>> to avoid it.
>>>>>>> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>> > > FPP. ...
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>>> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>>>>>>> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>> > > strategy.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying"
>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>>> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>>> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
>>>>>>> "Let's
>>>>>>> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>>>>>> that we can
>>>>>>> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>>> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV
>>>>>>> so that
>>>>>>> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
>>>>>>> were
>>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
>>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
>>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>
>>>>>
CL
Closed Limelike Curves
Fri, Apr 26, 2024 8:42 PM
EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
to be strategically irrelevant.
Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
simple-Condorcet criterion.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
(I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
Who is EVC?
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
to be strategically irrelevant.
But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more problematic way.
Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; & CW,Top-2-Runoff.
WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
resistant to offensive strategy.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular
is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two
or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked
candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
same
four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as
I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules.
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote,
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying"
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
> to be strategically irrelevant.
Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
simple-Condorcet criterion.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>>
>
> (I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
>
> Who is EVC?
>
> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
> to be strategically irrelevant.
>
> But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more problematic way.
> Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; & CW,Top-2-Runoff.
>
> WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
> Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
> resistant to offensive strategy.
>
>
>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
>>>>>>> per
>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
>>>>>> you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
>>>>>> non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
>>>>>> digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
>>>>>> options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
>>>>>> F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
>>>>>> scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>>> electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
>>>>>>> a car
>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
>>>>>>> doors,
>>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>>> designed
>>>>>>> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
>>>>>>> car.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
>>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>>> benign
>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval
>>>>>>> per
>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two
>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>>> stops
>>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>> > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
>>>>>>> work
>>>>>>> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
>>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>> four candidates highest. Etc.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>>>>>>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as
>>>>>>> I'd
>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes
>>>>>>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it
>>>>>>> is an
>>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>> you from
>>>>>>> >> > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>>>>>>> media
>>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking
>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
>>>>>>> here.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read
>>>>>>> my
>>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
>>>>>>> FPP).
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>> >> > strategy.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>>> benign
>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules.
>>>>>>> In
>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>>> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>>> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>>> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>>>>>> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>>> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>>> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>>> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>>> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
>>>>>>> votes
>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
>>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>>>>>>> third
>>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
>>>>>>> fine for
>>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>>> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
>>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
>>>>>>> the ones
>>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>>> order.
>>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
>>>>>>> higher
>>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
>>>>>>> were
>>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>>>>>>> fail
>>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>>> precise
>>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
>>>>>>> car
>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on
>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>>> > > ...
>>>>>>> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>>> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>>>>>> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>> you from
>>>>>>> > > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote,
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way
>>>>>>> to avoid it.
>>>>>>> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>> > > FPP. ...
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>>> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>>>>>>> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>> > > strategy.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying"
>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>>> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>>> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
>>>>>>> "Let's
>>>>>>> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>>>>>> that we can
>>>>>>> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>>> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV
>>>>>>> so that
>>>>>>> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
>>>>>>> were
>>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
>>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
>>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>
>>>>> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Fri, Apr 26, 2024 10:24 PM
EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
to be strategically irrelevant.
Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
simple-Condorcet criterion.
Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more complicated
to propose.
Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
(I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
Who is EVC?
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
as to be strategically irrelevant.
But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more problematic way.
Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; & CW,Top-2-Runoff.
WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
resistant to offensive strategy.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
popular is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
candidate) in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two
or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked
candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots
that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
same
four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as
I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That
makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying"
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 13:43 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
> EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
>
> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
>> to be strategically irrelevant.
>
>
Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
> simple-Condorcet criterion.
>
Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more complicated
to propose.
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>>>
>>
>> (I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
>>
>> Who is EVC?
>>
>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>
>> But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more problematic way.
>> Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; & CW,Top-2-Runoff.
>>
>> WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
>> Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
>> resistant to offensive strategy.
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
>>>>>>> you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
>>>>>>> non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
>>>>>>> digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
>>>>>>> options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
>>>>>>> F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
>>>>>>> scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>>>> electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
>>>>>>>> a car
>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
>>>>>>>> doors,
>>>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>>>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>>>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>>>> designed
>>>>>>>> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
>>>>>>>> car.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>>>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
>>>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
>>>>>>>> popular is
>>>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
>>>>>>>> candidate) in
>>>>>>>> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two
>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>>>> stops
>>>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
>>>>>>>> work
>>>>>>>> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>>>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>> four candidates highest. Etc.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>>>>>>>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>>> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as
>>>>>>>> I'd
>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That
>>>>>>>> makes
>>>>>>>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>>>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it
>>>>>>>> is an
>>>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>>> you from
>>>>>>>> >> > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>>>>>>>> media
>>>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking
>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
>>>>>>>> here.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
>>>>>>>> read my
>>>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
>>>>>>>> FPP).
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>> >> > strategy.
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>>>> benign
>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>>>> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>>>> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>>>> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>>>>>>> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>>>> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>>>> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>>>> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>>>> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
>>>>>>>> someone votes
>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>>>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
>>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>>>>>>>> third
>>>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
>>>>>>>> fine for
>>>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>>>> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
>>>>>>>> candidates)
>>>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
>>>>>>>> the ones
>>>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>>>> order.
>>>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
>>>>>>>> higher
>>>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>>>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>>>>>>>> fail
>>>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>>>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>>>> precise
>>>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
>>>>>>>> a car
>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>>>> > > ...
>>>>>>>> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>>>> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>>>>>>> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when
>>>>>>>> voting is
>>>>>>>> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>> > > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
>>>>>>>> FairVote, and
>>>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way
>>>>>>>> to avoid it.
>>>>>>>> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
>>>>>>>> than with
>>>>>>>> > > FPP. ...
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
>>>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>>>> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>>>>>>>> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>>> > > strategy.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying"
>>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>>> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>>>> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>>>> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
>>>>>>>> "Let's
>>>>>>>> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>>>>>>> that we can
>>>>>>>> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>>>> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
>>>>>>>> IRV so that
>>>>>>>> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
>>>>>>>> were
>>>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
>>>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that
>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
CL
Closed Limelike Curves
Fri, Apr 26, 2024 11:13 PM
I agree; you can simplify it by just taking "beats" to mean
"majority-beats" and then describing the Smith set. I think this might
restore later-no-help as well, if you use Majority-Smith//Score? It might
even satisfy all of Generalized Strategy-Free, No Lesser Evils, minimal
defense, and later-no-help.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 3:25 PM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
as to be strategically irrelevant.
Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
simple-Condorcet criterion.
Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more complicated
to propose.
Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
(I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
Who is EVC?
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
as to be strategically irrelevant.
But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more
problematic way. Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; &
CW,Top-2-Runoff.
WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
resistant to offensive strategy.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes,
new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using
ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
popular is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
candidate) in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two
or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked
candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal
numbers work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots
that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
same
four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here
as I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That
makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
I agree; you can simplify it by just taking "beats" to mean
"majority-beats" and then describing the Smith set. I think this *might*
restore later-no-help as well, if you use Majority-Smith//Score? It might
even satisfy all of Generalized Strategy-Free, No Lesser Evils, minimal
defense, and later-no-help.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 3:25 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 13:43 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
>>
>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>
>>
> Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
>> simple-Condorcet criterion.
>>
>
> Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more complicated
> to propose.
>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>>> Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
>>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>>>>
>>>
>>> (I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
>>>
>>> Who is EVC?
>>>
>>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>>
>>> But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more
>>> problematic way. Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; &
>>> CW,Top-2-Runoff.
>>>
>>> WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
>>> Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
>>> resistant to offensive strategy.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
>>>>>>>> you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
>>>>>>>> non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
>>>>>>>> digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
>>>>>>>> options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
>>>>>>>> F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
>>>>>>>> scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>>>>> electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
>>>>>>>>> of a car
>>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
>>>>>>>>> doors,
>>>>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>>>>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes,
>>>>>>>>> new
>>>>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>>>>> designed
>>>>>>>>> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
>>>>>>>>> car.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using
>>>>>>>>> ranked
>>>>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
>>>>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
>>>>>>>>> popular is
>>>>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
>>>>>>>>> unlimited strict
>>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
>>>>>>>>> candidate) in
>>>>>>>>> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
>>>>>>>>> many
>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two
>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>>>>> stops
>>>>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal
>>>>>>>>> numbers work
>>>>>>>>> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>>>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>>>>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>> four candidates highest. Etc.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>> stopping you
>>>>>>>>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>>>>>>>>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>>>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>>>> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here
>>>>>>>>> as I'd
>>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That
>>>>>>>>> makes
>>>>>>>>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to
>>>>>>>>> improve
>>>>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it
>>>>>>>>> is an
>>>>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>>>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>> >> > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>> mass media
>>>>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
>>>>>>>>> talking about
>>>>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
>>>>>>>>> here.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
>>>>>>>>> read my
>>>>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places
>>>>>>>>> on the
>>>>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
>>>>>>>>> FPP).
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>>> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>>> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>>> >> > strategy.
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>>>>> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>>>>> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>>>>> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>>>>>>>> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>>>>> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>>>>> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>>>>> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>>>>> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
>>>>>>>>> someone votes
>>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>>>>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
>>>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>>>>>>>>> third
>>>>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
>>>>>>>>> fine for
>>>>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>>>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>>>>> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
>>>>>>>>> candidates)
>>>>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
>>>>>>>>> the ones
>>>>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>>>>> order.
>>>>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
>>>>>>>>> higher
>>>>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but
>>>>>>>>> I think
>>>>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>>>>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>>>>>>>>> fail
>>>>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>>>>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>>>>> precise
>>>>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
>>>>>>>>> a car
>>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>>>>> > > ...
>>>>>>>>> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>>>>> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>>>>>>>> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when
>>>>>>>>> voting is
>>>>>>>>> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be
>>>>>>>>> hidden.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>> > > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
>>>>>>>>> FairVote, and
>>>>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way
>>>>>>>>> to avoid it.
>>>>>>>>> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
>>>>>>>>> than with
>>>>>>>>> > > FPP. ...
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>>>>>>>>> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>>> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>>> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>>> > > strategy.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm
>>>>>>>>> "buying" by
>>>>>>>>> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>>>>> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>>>>> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the
>>>>>>>>> argument "Let's
>>>>>>>>> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>>>>>>>> that we can
>>>>>>>>> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>>>>> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
>>>>>>>>> IRV so that
>>>>>>>>> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
>>>>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that
>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Sat, Apr 27, 2024 5:10 AM
I agree; you can simplify it by just taking "beats" to mean
"majority-beats" and then describing the Smith set. I think this might
restore later-no-help as well, if you use Majority-Smith//Score? It might
even satisfy all of Generalized Strategy-Free, No Lesser Evils, minimal
defense, and later-no-help.
Write definition & rules for it, & test it for those compliances. If it
does all that, plus the Condorcet Criterion that’s pretty good. …if No
Lesser Evils means FBC.
BTW, It would be a good idea to always tell people that, by “No Lesser
Evils”, you mean FBC.
EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
as to be strategically irrelevant.
Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
simple-Condorcet criterion.
Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more complicated
to propose.
Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
(I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
Who is EVC?
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
as to be strategically irrelevant.
But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more
problematic way. Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; &
CW,Top-2-Runoff.
WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
resistant to offensive strategy.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
choice columns as candidates.
Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another
designed to only guard against another crash just like the
most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine,
drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes,
new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using
ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
popular is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
candidate) in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting
two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked
candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal
numbers work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots
that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking
the same
four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here
as I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That
makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable
IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 16:13 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
> I agree; you can simplify it by just taking "beats" to mean
> "majority-beats" and then describing the Smith set. I think this *might*
> restore later-no-help as well, if you use Majority-Smith//Score? It might
> even satisfy all of Generalized Strategy-Free, No Lesser Evils, minimal
> defense, and later-no-help.
>
Write definition & rules for it, & test it for those compliances. If it
does all that, plus the Condorcet Criterion that’s pretty good. …if No
Lesser Evils means FBC.
BTW, It would be a good idea to always tell people that, by “No Lesser
Evils”, you mean FBC.
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 3:25 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 13:43 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
>>>
>>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>>>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>>
>>>
>> Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
>>> simple-Condorcet criterion.
>>>
>>
>> Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more complicated
>> to propose.
>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>>>> Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
>>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
>>>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> (I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
>>>>
>>>> Who is EVC?
>>>>
>>>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>>>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>>>
>>>> But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more
>>>> problematic way. Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; &
>>>> CW,Top-2-Runoff.
>>>>
>>>> WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
>>>> Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
>>>> resistant to offensive strategy.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
>>>>>>>>> you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
>>>>>>>>> non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
>>>>>>>>> digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
>>>>>>>>> options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
>>>>>>>>> F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
>>>>>>>>> scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>>>>>> electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
>>>>>>>>>> of a car
>>>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another
>>>>>>>>>> kludge on it
>>>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the
>>>>>>>>>> most
>>>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
>>>>>>>>>> doors,
>>>>>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine,
>>>>>>>>>> drive
>>>>>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes,
>>>>>>>>>> new
>>>>>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>>>>>> designed
>>>>>>>>>> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
>>>>>>>>>> car.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using
>>>>>>>>>> ranked
>>>>>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
>>>>>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
>>>>>>>>>> popular is
>>>>>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
>>>>>>>>>> unlimited strict
>>>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you
>>>>>>>>>> from ranking
>>>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
>>>>>>>>>> candidate) in
>>>>>>>>>> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
>>>>>>>>>> many
>>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting
>>>>>>>>>> two or
>>>>>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>>>>>> stops
>>>>>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal
>>>>>>>>>> numbers work
>>>>>>>>>> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>>>>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>>>>>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking
>>>>>>>>>> the same
>>>>>>>>>> four candidates highest. Etc.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>> stopping you
>>>>>>>>>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>>>>>>>>>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>>>>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>>>>> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here
>>>>>>>>>> as I'd
>>>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That
>>>>>>>>>> makes
>>>>>>>>>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to
>>>>>>>>>> improve
>>>>>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If
>>>>>>>>>> it is an
>>>>>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great
>>>>>>>>>> difficulty
>>>>>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>>> >> > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>>> mass media
>>>>>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
>>>>>>>>>> talking about
>>>>>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
>>>>>>>>>> discussion here.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting
>>>>>>>>>> limitations of
>>>>>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
>>>>>>>>>> read my
>>>>>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places
>>>>>>>>>> on the
>>>>>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
>>>>>>>>>> FPP).
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>>>> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>>>> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>>>> >> > strategy.
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
>>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
>>>>>>>>>> unlimited strict
>>>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called
>>>>>>>>>> "overvotes." It's not
>>>>>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>>> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>>>>>> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>>>>>> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>>>>>> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>>>>>>>>> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>>>>>> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>>>>>> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>>>>>> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>>>>>> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
>>>>>>>>>> someone votes
>>>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>>>>>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
>>>>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as
>>>>>>>>>> a third
>>>>>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
>>>>>>>>>> fine for
>>>>>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>>>>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>>>>>> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
>>>>>>>>>> candidates)
>>>>>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
>>>>>>>>>> the ones
>>>>>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>>>>>> order.
>>>>>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B
>>>>>>>>>> was higher
>>>>>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but
>>>>>>>>>> I think
>>>>>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I
>>>>>>>>>> don't
>>>>>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
>>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable
>>>>>>>>>> methods fail
>>>>>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>>>>>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>>>>>> precise
>>>>>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
>>>>>>>>>> of a car
>>>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>>>>>> > > ...
>>>>>>>>>> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>>>>>> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to
>>>>>>>>>> improve
>>>>>>>>>> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when
>>>>>>>>>> voting is
>>>>>>>>>> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be
>>>>>>>>>> hidden.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>>> > > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
>>>>>>>>>> FairVote, and
>>>>>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no
>>>>>>>>>> way to avoid it.
>>>>>>>>>> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
>>>>>>>>>> than with
>>>>>>>>>> > > FPP. ...
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>>> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>>>>>>>>>> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>>>> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>>>> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>>>> > > strategy.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
>>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm
>>>>>>>>>> "buying" by
>>>>>>>>>> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>>>>>> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>>>>>> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the
>>>>>>>>>> argument "Let's
>>>>>>>>>> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>>>>>>>>> that we can
>>>>>>>>>> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>>>>>> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
>>>>>>>>>> IRV so that
>>>>>>>>>> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
>>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
>>>>>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that
>>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Sat, Apr 27, 2024 8:23 AM
Meeting FBC means you never have incentive or need to bury your favorite.
It doesn’t mean that there are no lesser evils. Evils are still evil’s, &
some are still lesser than others.
A voter who thinks that he has to support a lesser evil still can & will
with an FBC-complying method. He just won’t need to bury his favorite under
it.
Approval has the voter-median as its Myerson-Weber equilibrium. & so,
hopefully lesser evils voters would soon stop being one.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:10 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
I agree; you can simplify it by just taking "beats" to mean
"majority-beats" and then describing the Smith set. I think this might
restore later-no-help as well, if you use Majority-Smith//Score? It might
even satisfy all of Generalized Strategy-Free, No Lesser Evils, minimal
defense, and later-no-help.
Write definition & rules for it, & test it for those compliances. If it
does all that, plus the Condorcet Criterion that’s pretty good. …if No
Lesser Evils means FBC.
BTW, It would be a good idea to always tell people that, by “No Lesser
Evils”, you mean FBC.
EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
as to be strategically irrelevant.
Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
simple-Condorcet criterion.
Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more
complicated to propose.
Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
(I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
Who is EVC?
Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare &
unpredictable as to be strategically irrelevant.
But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more
problematic way. Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; &
CW,Top-2-Runoff.
WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
resistant to offensive strategy.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
many
choice columns as candidates.
Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially
if you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another
designed to only guard against another crash just like the
most
recent one.
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
doors,
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine,
drive
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes,
new
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
designed
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
well-designed car.
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using
ranked
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
assuming
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
popular is
the "body" that isn't well designed.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
candidate) in
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
ballot.
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
paper
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
oval per
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
and
sometimes there are two ballot pages.
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
many
choice columns as candidates.
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting
two or
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
stops
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
most-disliked
candidate.
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal
numbers work
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand
math.
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers
to the
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots
that
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking
the same
four candidates highest. Etc.
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
from giving them names? ...
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I
just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
projects.
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here
as I'd
like.
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That
makes
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
clearly!
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to
single-winner score voting.
It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal
Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If
attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great
believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places
voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
"informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you
the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called
When shared preference levels are encountered,
// the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
// not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
// decimal portions. For example, during a
// counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
// rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
// highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
// transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
// will transfer to candidate 2.
//
Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as
of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would
this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever
they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
(So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B
in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote
you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I
advocate allowing it for those methods.
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable
IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another
designed to only guard against another crash just like the
Chris B.
Richard, the VoteFair guyelectionmethods at votefair.org
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
40votefair.org%3E>
/Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
... It is not garbage like STAR.
...
... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to
single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when
not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be
If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
election-method reform.
Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no
The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting
plurality is unnecessary.
Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against
rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
I've written code that correctly counts so-called
Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm
advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the
lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
"Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
center-squeeze failures, etc.
I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate
really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
Meeting FBC means you never have incentive or need to bury your favorite.
It doesn’t mean that there are no lesser evils. Evils are still evil’s, &
some are still lesser than others.
A voter who thinks that he has to support a lesser evil still can & will
with an FBC-complying method. He just won’t need to bury his favorite under
it.
Approval has the voter-median as its Myerson-Weber equilibrium. & so,
hopefully lesser evils voters would soon stop being one.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:10 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 16:13 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I agree; you can simplify it by just taking "beats" to mean
>> "majority-beats" and then describing the Smith set. I think this *might*
>> restore later-no-help as well, if you use Majority-Smith//Score? It might
>> even satisfy all of Generalized Strategy-Free, No Lesser Evils, minimal
>> defense, and later-no-help.
>>
>
> Write definition & rules for it, & test it for those compliances. If it
> does all that, plus the Condorcet Criterion that’s pretty good. …if No
> Lesser Evils means FBC.
>
> BTW, It would be a good idea to always tell people that, by “No Lesser
> Evils”, you mean FBC.
>
>
>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 3:25 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 13:43 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
>>>>
>>>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>>>>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
>>>> simple-Condorcet criterion.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more
>>> complicated to propose.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>>>>> Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
>>>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
>>>>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> (I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
>>>>>
>>>>> Who is EVC?
>>>>>
>>>>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare &
>>>>> unpredictable as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>>>>
>>>>> But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more
>>>>> problematic way. Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; &
>>>>> CW,Top-2-Runoff.
>>>>>
>>>>> WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
>>>>> Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
>>>>> resistant to offensive strategy.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
>>>>>>>>>>> many
>>>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially
>>>>>>>>>> if you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
>>>>>>>>>> non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
>>>>>>>>>> digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
>>>>>>>>>> options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
>>>>>>>>>> F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
>>>>>>>>>> scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>>>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>>>>>>> electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
>>>>>>>>>>> of a car
>>>>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another
>>>>>>>>>>> kludge on it
>>>>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the
>>>>>>>>>>> most
>>>>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
>>>>>>>>>>> doors,
>>>>>>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine,
>>>>>>>>>>> drive
>>>>>>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes,
>>>>>>>>>>> new
>>>>>>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>>>>>>> designed
>>>>>>>>>>> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a
>>>>>>>>>>> well-designed car.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using
>>>>>>>>>>> ranked
>>>>>>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
>>>>>>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
>>>>>>>>>>> popular is
>>>>>>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
>>>>>>>>>>> unlimited strict
>>>>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you
>>>>>>>>>>> from ranking
>>>>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
>>>>>>>>>>> candidate) in
>>>>>>>>>>> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
>>>>>>>>>>> many
>>>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting
>>>>>>>>>>> two or
>>>>>>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>>>>>>> stops
>>>>>>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in
>>>>>>>>>>> this way, this
>>>>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal
>>>>>>>>>>> numbers work
>>>>>>>>>>> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand
>>>>>>>>>>> math.
>>>>>>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers
>>>>>>>>>>> to the
>>>>>>>>>>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>>>>>>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking
>>>>>>>>>>> the same
>>>>>>>>>>> four candidates highest. Etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>>> stopping you
>>>>>>>>>>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>>>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I
>>>>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>>>>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>>>>>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>>>>>> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here
>>>>>>>>>>> as I'd
>>>>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That
>>>>>>>>>>> makes
>>>>>>>>>>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to
>>>>>>>>>>> improve
>>>>>>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If
>>>>>>>>>>> it is an
>>>>>>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great
>>>>>>>>>>> difficulty
>>>>>>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>>>> >> > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>>>> mass media
>>>>>>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
>>>>>>>>>>> talking about
>>>>>>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
>>>>>>>>>>> discussion here.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting
>>>>>>>>>>> limitations of
>>>>>>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
>>>>>>>>>>> read my
>>>>>>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places
>>>>>>>>>>> on the
>>>>>>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
>>>>>>>>>>> FPP).
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>>>>> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated
>>>>>>>>>>> at that point.
>>>>>>>>>>> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>>> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more
>>>>>>>>>>> vulnerable to Push-over
>>>>>>>>>>> >> > strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate
>>>>>>>>>>> -- Gollum,
>>>>>>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
>>>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
>>>>>>>>>>> unlimited strict
>>>>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you
>>>>>>>>>>> from ranking
>>>>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called
>>>>>>>>>>> "overvotes." It's not
>>>>>>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>>>> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>>>>>>> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>>>>>>> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>>>>>>> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>>>>>>>>>> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>>>>>>> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>>>>>>> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>>>>>>> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>>>>>>> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
>>>>>>>>>>> someone votes
>>>>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>>>>>>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
>>>>>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as
>>>>>>>>>>> a third
>>>>>>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would
>>>>>>>>>>> be fine for
>>>>>>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
>>>>>>>>>>> next
>>>>>>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>>>>>>> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
>>>>>>>>>>> candidates)
>>>>>>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever
>>>>>>>>>>> of the ones
>>>>>>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>>>>>>> order.
>>>>>>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B
>>>>>>>>>>> was higher
>>>>>>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote
>>>>>>>>>>> but I think
>>>>>>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I
>>>>>>>>>>> don't
>>>>>>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
>>>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable
>>>>>>>>>>> methods fail
>>>>>>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>>>>>>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>>>>>>> precise
>>>>>>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
>>>>>>>>>>> of a car
>>>>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another
>>>>>>>>>>> kludge on it
>>>>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the
>>>>>>>>>>> most recent one.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>>>>>>> > > ...
>>>>>>>>>>> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>>>>>>> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to
>>>>>>>>>>> improve
>>>>>>>>>>> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when
>>>>>>>>>>> voting is
>>>>>>>>>>> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be
>>>>>>>>>>> hidden.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>>>> > > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
>>>>>>>>>>> FairVote, and
>>>>>>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no
>>>>>>>>>>> way to avoid it.
>>>>>>>>>>> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
>>>>>>>>>>> than with
>>>>>>>>>>> > > FPP. ...
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting
>>>>>>>>>>> limitations of
>>>>>>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>>>> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>>>>>>>>>>> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against
>>>>>>>>>>> the ballot
>>>>>>>>>>> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>>>>> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>>> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>>>>> > > strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
>>>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called
>>>>>>>>>>> "overvotes." It's not
>>>>>>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm
>>>>>>>>>>> "buying" by
>>>>>>>>>>> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>>>>>>> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>>>>>>> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the
>>>>>>>>>>> argument "Let's
>>>>>>>>>>> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>>>>>>>>>> that we can
>>>>>>>>>>> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>>>>>>> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
>>>>>>>>>>> IRV so that
>>>>>>>>>>> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
>>>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
>>>>>>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate
>>>>>>>>>>> that you
>>>>>>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>>
