> On 05 Mar 2019, at 16:04, Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au [ApprovalVoting] <ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com> wrote: >> Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval cutoff after the ranked candidates. What if the votes are sincere and there is no implicit approval cutoff? >> > No, I'm only "assuming" that positional information is more meaningful than which candidate is "closer" to being the Condorcet winner > according to Margins or which candidate needs the fewest additional bullet-votes to become the CW. If the added implicit information is not approval of all the ranked candidates, does the "positional information" maybe refer to some Borda like rating information? (or maybe implicit ratings) (I don't really like Borda ratings as additional information either because of the associated nomination related problems.) > > Given that Margins is very vulnerable to Burial strategy the argument that it's worth putting up with that because with sincere votes B > in this scenario is the best (or a good or even acceptable) candidate is .. what?? > > Or to put it another way, assuming the votes are sincere, you arguments against electing A or C are what? I just thought that B might be ok if we take the votes to be plain rankings (= pairwise preferences) with no additional approval or positional information assumed. The mentioned votes are of course very extreme (only three kind if voters), so they are not a typical set of votes form a real life election. 46 A 44 B>C 10 C One could think that A is a left wing candidate, C is moderate right, and B is far right (because there are 44 voters that rank them in such linear order). A voters don't seem to care which one of the right wing candidates wins (they are tied in every single vote). The B voters have a clear and understandable position, with full rankings. The C voters have not ranked B. Maybe they are so centrist that A and B are equally good to them. Condorcet methods can be said to elect a compromise candidate that is not too bad for anyone (sometimes the Condorcet winner might have no first preference votes). I therefore try to find an explanation to why B might win, from this point of view (= elect he best compromise (that is not very disliked)). Since the A voters did not rank C above B, we must assume that they are perfectly ok with electing B, if A does not win. Same with C voters. B voters have a clear preference C>A (if B can not win). If A wins, B and C supporters (54, majority) clearly think that C would have been a better choice (and 44 voters would prefer B). If C wins, 46 voters would prefer A, and 44 voters would prefer B. If B wins, 46 voters would prefer A, and 10 voters would prefer C. B doesn't look too bad in this comparison. B might be a better compromise than A or C. I.e. less complaints and rebellions after the election. (I tried to avoid the "few votes short of being a Condorcet winner" argument since you might not appreciate it.) > >> One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than with strategic voting. >> >> First preferences could be as follows. >> >> 30: far-left >> 21: left >> 19: right >> 30: far-right >> >> If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left, the natural approval limit would be between the left wing and right wing parties. We would get mostly votes that rank only left wing or only right wing candidates. And the winner would be with good probability the far-left candidate, not the expected Condorcet winner (left). > > That doesn't bother me much because (a) far-left may be higher "Social Utility" than left I don't know what "Social Utility" means here. I guess any of the candidates could have that. It might not show up in rankings nor in approvals. > and (b) probably enough right voters would > be aware that the result is unlikely to be decided by Approval and so they would not be taking a huge risk by sincerely ranking left > over far-left. I guess this depends on the method. I can't tell if all "ranking + implicit approval" methods would behave well in this respect. I also don't like very much the idea of voters having to cast strategic votes instead of sincere votes (i.e. implicit approvals in the ballots would not mean that the voter would approve the candidate, but something strategic instead). > > But having said that, Smith//Approval using ballots that� allow voters to rank among candidates they don't approve would not be > in my book too bad (and much better than Margins). > >> P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong. > That method doesn't have good criterion compliances. It's just a gimmick to smuggle Condorcet compliance past IRV enthusiasts. > The alternative of just checking for a CW (among remaining candidates) before each elimination is much better. I'm not a big believer in criterion compliance in real life election methods. In theoretical studies different criteria are excellent measurement tools, but in real life elections nobody cares if the method performs well in some theoretical situations. Often slightly modified (heuristic style, not necessarily "mathematically clean") methods are close enough to meeting those criteria on practice anyway. Also my theoretically ideal "maximally strategy resistant method" might be one that fails to meet most of the named criteria, but does so intentionally in order to violate each one (or many) of them just a little bit, so that it can maximise resistance against all kind of strategies (and keep its worst vulnerability least bad). > >> P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, or to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them with the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal, but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be much better than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all. > > Limiting the number of candidates the voter is allowed to rank makes no sense. What has happened to your concern > about "removing information" on who the sincere/ "expected" CW is? Typically the intention is not to limit the number of candidates that can be ranked (when compared to the situation before he change) but to make that number higher, while allowing it not to be very high. I am still worried about removing information, but I can accept some limitations sometimes (when full ranking is not feasible, or when most voters would not rank all candidates anyway, or when other solutions are not politically possible). The limits should be such that they probably do not lead to not electing the sincere Condorcet winner (or the best candidate when there is no Condorcet winner). It is for example possible that there is an election with 5 serious candidates (based on some good polling information) and 50 other candidates with no chances to win. In that situation it would not be a big problem to limit the number of ranked candidates to say 7. The ballots could be simpler that way, and voting would not be too tedious. I would not mind someone starting even from 3, if that is an improvement e.g. to the earlier FPTP. > > There would be nothing "frightening" about ranking all the candidates if doing so is purely optional. But voters who wish > to vote a full ranking should be allowed to. That is possible, and a positive thing to do, but I do understand that sometimes also less perfect methods can be "perfect" or "sufficient" for the current real life situation. Juho > > Chris� Benham > > > On 5/03/2019 6:42 pm, Juho Laatu wrote: >>> On 05 Mar 2019, at 07:45, Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au <mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> [ApprovalVoting] <ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com <mailto:ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com>> wrote: >> >>> Robert, >>> >> >>> >>>> in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate?� all unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot.� is any candidate that is ranked at all "approved"? >>> Yes. >>> >>>> that would change and complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot. >>> >>> Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly) "complicate". Allowing voters to rank among unapproved >>> candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot more complicated. >> One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than with strategic voting. >> >> First preferences could be as follows. >> >> 30: far-left >> 21: left >> 19: right >> 30: far-right >> >> If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left, the natural approval limit would be between the left wing and right wing parties. We would get mostly votes that rank only left wing or only right wing candidates. And the winner would be with good probability the far-left candidate, not the expected Condorcet winner (left). >> >> The problem with "implicit approval cutoff after the ranked candidates" is that voters would be encouraged not to rank all the major candidates. Not good for Condorcet. That would remove some important information. In this example the sincere Condorcet winner could not be identified anymore. >> >>> 46 A >>> 44 B>C >>> 10 C >>> A>B 46-44 (margin=2)���� B>C 44-10 (margin=34)�� C>A 54-46 (margin=8) >>> >>> Now Margins elects B,� rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy. >>> >>> I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this scenario. Even assuming that all the votes are sincere, >>> B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten >>> by A.) >> Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval cutoff after the ranked candidates. What if the votes are sincere and there is no implicit approval cutoff? >> >> Juho >> >> >> P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong. >> >> P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, or to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them with the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal, but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be much better than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all. >> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em <https://electorama.com/em> for list info > > > <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient> Virus-free. www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient> <x-msg://6/#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > > __._,_.___ > Posted by: Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> > > > VISIT YOUR GROUP <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/ApprovalVoting/info;_ylc=X3oDMTJlOXRlcmhjBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzg3MDEzOTUEZ3Jwc3BJZAMxNzA1MDYwMzc2BHNlYwN2dGwEc2xrA3ZnaHAEc3RpbWUDMTU1MTc5NTE3Ng--> > <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo;_ylc=X3oDMTJkbGZmZnQ5BF9TAzk3NDc2NTkwBGdycElkAzg3MDEzOTUEZ3Jwc3BJZAMxNzA1MDYwMzc2BHNlYwNmdHIEc2xrA2dmcARzdGltZQMxNTUxNzk1MTc2>• Privacy <https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/groups/details.html> • Unsubscribe <mailto:ApprovalVoting-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com?subject=Unsubscribe> • Terms of Use <https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/> > __,_._,___

46 A 44 B>C 10 C The positional information is on the ballots.� You can throw it away by refusing to look at anything but a pairwise matrix, in this case� A>B 46-44,� B>C 44-10, C>A 54-46 and then say "oh well, I suppose we just have to break this cycle at its weakest link". A is voted in top position, which in the case of ranked ballots I would interpret as being ranked below no other candidate, in this case strictly above all other candidates, on more ballots than B is ranked above bottom on any ballots. Plus of course A pairwise beats B.�� Given that A is so obviously dominant over B, the contention that "B might be an ok winner" is absurd and not serious.� What shred of sane common-sense explanation could you possibly give to the post-election complaining A supporters as to why their candidate should have been beaten by B ??! > does the "positional information" maybe refer to some Borda like > rating information? (or maybe implicit ratings) I infer some rating from rankings thus: candidates ranked above at least one candidate and below no candidate are voted in the "top (or first) position", candidates not in the top position but also ranked above at least one other candidate and below no candidate except those in top position are voted in the "second-from-the-top position" and so on down to those candidates who are voted above no other candidate are in the "bottom position". I consider that A "positionally dominates" B if A� has more first position votes and more first plus second position votes and so on down to more above bottom votes. > If A wins, B and C supporters (54, majority) clearly think that C > would have been a better choice (and 44 voters would prefer B). In the scenario as I described it the B voters don't really care about C, they were just using C to benefit from Margins' gross failure of the Later-no-Help criterion. The A supporters have an undeniable complaint against B but not C. The B supporters also have no reasonable complaint against C. They all voted (above bottom) for C and C is voted above bottom on more ballots than B (or A) and C� has a beatpath to B.� They can't claim to have been stung by a failure of Later-no-Harm because clearly if they had� truncated then A would have won. The C supporters have some� possible (relatively weak) complaint against A. But you want to elect the only candidate whose supporters can have no remotely reasonable complaint against the election of either of the other candidates. > It is for example possible that there is an election with 5 serious > candidates (based on some good polling information) and 50 other > candidates with no chances to win. In that situation it would not be a > big problem to limit the number of ranked candidates to say 7 If I sincerely prefer 7 minor candidates before any of the "serious" ones, how is this method better for me than plurality? I will either have to vote insincerely or put up with my vote having no effect on the result. If Ireland and Australia have no problem allowing voters to fully rank then why should the US? Chris Benham On 6/03/2019 4:31 am, Juho Laatu wrote: >> On 05 Mar 2019, at 16:04, Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au >> <mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> [ApprovalVoting] >> <ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com >> <mailto:ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com>> wrote: > >>> Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval cutoff after >>> the ranked candidates. What if the votes are sincere and there is no >>> implicit approval cutoff? >>> >> No, I'm only "assuming" that positional information is more >> meaningful than which candidate is "closer" to being the Condorcet winner >> according to Margins or which candidate needs the fewest additional >> bullet-votes to become the CW. > > If the added implicit information is not approval of all the ranked > candidates, does the "positional information" maybe refer to some > Borda like rating information? (or maybe implicit ratings) (I don't > really like Borda ratings as additional information either because of > the associated nomination related problems.) > > >> >> Given that Margins is very vulnerable to Burial strategy the argument >> that it's worth putting up with that because with sincere votes B >> in this scenario is the best (or a good or even acceptable) candidate >> is .. what?? >> >> Or to put it another way, assuming the votes are sincere, you >> arguments against electing A or C are what? > > I just thought that B might be ok if we take the votes to be plain > rankings (= pairwise preferences) with no additional approval or > positional information assumed. The mentioned votes are of course very > extreme (only three kind if voters), so they are not a typical set of > votes form a real life election. > > 46 A > 44 B>C > 10 C > > One could think that A is a left wing candidate, C is moderate right, > and B is far right (because there are 44 voters that rank them in such > linear order). A voters don't seem to care which one of the right wing > candidates wins (they are tied in every single vote). The B voters > have a clear and understandable position, with full rankings. The C > voters have not ranked B. Maybe they are so centrist that A and B are > equally good to them. > > Condorcet methods can be said to elect a compromise candidate that is > not too bad for anyone (sometimes the Condorcet winner might have no > first preference votes). I therefore try to find an explanation to why > B might win, from this point of view (= elect he best compromise (that > is not very disliked)). > > Since the A voters did not rank C above B, we must assume that they > are perfectly ok with electing B, if A does not win. Same with C > voters. B voters have a clear preference C>A (if B can not win). > > If A wins, B and C supporters (54, majority) clearly think that C > would have been a better choice (and 44 voters would prefer B). If C > wins, 46 voters would prefer A, and 44 voters would prefer B. If B > wins, 46 voters would prefer A, and 10 voters would prefer C. B > doesn't look too bad in this comparison. B might be a better > compromise than A or C. I.e. less complaints and rebellions after the > election. > > (I tried to avoid the "few votes short of being a Condorcet winner" > argument since you might not appreciate it.) > >> >>> One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than with >>> strategic voting. >>> >>> First preferences could be as follows. >>> >>> 30: far-left >>> 21: left >>> 19: right >>> 30: far-right >>> >>> If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left, the >>> natural approval limit would be between the left wing and right wing >>> parties. We would get mostly votes that rank only left wing or only >>> right wing candidates. And the winner would be with good probability >>> the far-left candidate, not the expected Condorcet winner (left). >> >> That doesn't bother me much because (a) far-left may be higher >> "Social Utility" than left > > I don't know what "Social Utility" means here. I guess any of the > candidates could have that. It might not show up in rankings nor in > approvals. > >> and (b) probably enough right voters would >> be aware that the result is unlikely to be decided by Approval and so >> they would not be taking a huge risk by sincerely ranking left >> over far-left. > > I guess this depends on the method. I can't tell if all "ranking + > implicit approval" methods would behave well in this respect. I also > don't like very much the idea of voters having to cast strategic votes > instead of sincere votes (i.e. implicit approvals in the ballots would > not mean that the voter would approve the candidate, but something > strategic instead). > >> >> But having said that, Smith//Approval using ballots that� allow >> voters to rank among candidates they don't approve would not be >> in my book too bad (and much better than Margins). >> >>> P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a >>> lot of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong. >> That method doesn't have good criterion compliances. It's just a >> gimmick to smuggle Condorcet compliance past IRV enthusiasts. >> The alternative of just checking for a CW (among remaining >> candidates) before each elimination is much better. > > I'm not a big believer in criterion compliance in real life election > methods. In theoretical studies different criteria are excellent > measurement tools, but in real life elections nobody cares if the > method performs well in some theoretical situations. Often slightly > modified (heuristic style, not necessarily "mathematically clean") > methods are close enough to meeting those criteria on practice anyway. > Also my theoretically ideal "maximally strategy resistant method" > might be one that fails to meet most of the named criteria, but does > so intentionally in order to violate each one (or many) of them just a > little bit, so that it can maximise resistance against all kind of > strategies (and keep its worst vulnerability least bad). > >> >>> P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked >>> candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very >>> high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, >>> or to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them >>> with the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically >>> ideal, but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be >>> much better than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all. >> >> Limiting the number of candidates the voter is allowed to rank makes >> no sense. What has happened to your concern >> about "removing information" on who the sincere/ "expected" CW is? > > Typically the intention is not to limit the number of candidates that > can be ranked (when compared to the situation before he change) but to > make that number higher, while allowing it not to be very high. I am > still worried about removing information, but I can accept some > limitations sometimes (when full ranking is not feasible, or when most > voters would not rank all candidates anyway, or when other solutions > are not politically possible). The limits should be such that they > probably do not lead to not electing the sincere Condorcet winner (or > the best candidate when there is no Condorcet winner). > > It is for example possible that there is an election with 5 serious > candidates (based on some good polling information) and 50 other > candidates with no chances to win. In that situation it would not be a > big problem to limit the number of ranked candidates to say 7. The > ballots could be simpler that way, and voting would not be too > tedious. I would not mind someone starting even from 3, if that is an > improvement e.g. to the earlier FPTP. > >> >> There would be nothing "frightening" about ranking all the candidates >> if doing so is purely optional. But voters who wish >> to vote a full ranking should be allowed to. > > That is possible, and a positive thing to do, but I do understand that > sometimes also less perfect methods can be "perfect" or "sufficient" > for the current real life situation. > > Juho > > >> >> Chris� Benham >> >> >> On 5/03/2019 6:42 pm, Juho Laatu wrote: >>>> On 05 Mar 2019, at 07:45, Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au >>>> <mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> [ApprovalVoting] >>>> <ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com >>>> <mailto:ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com>> wrote: >>> >>>> Robert, >>>> >>> >>>> >>>>> in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate?� all >>>>> unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot.� is any >>>>> candidate that is ranked at all "approved"? >>>> Yes. >>>> >>>>> that would change and complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot. >>>> >>>> Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly) >>>> "complicate". Allowing voters to rank among unapproved >>>> candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot >>>> more complicated. >>>> >>> One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than with >>> strategic voting. >>> >>> First preferences could be as follows. >>> >>> 30: far-left >>> 21: left >>> 19: right >>> 30: far-right >>> >>> If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left, the >>> natural approval limit would be between the left wing and right wing >>> parties. We would get mostly votes that rank only left wing or only >>> right wing candidates. And the winner would be with good probability >>> the far-left candidate, not the expected Condorcet winner (left). >>> >>> The problem with "implicit approval cutoff after the ranked >>> candidates" is that voters would be encouraged not to rank all the >>> major candidates. Not good for Condorcet. That would remove some >>> important information. In this example the sincere Condorcet winner >>> could not be identified anymore. >>> >>>> 46 A >>>> 44 B>C >>>> 10 C >>>> >>>> A>B 46-44 (margin=2)���� B>C 44-10 (margin=34)�� C>A >>>> 54-46 (margin=8) >>>> >>>> Now Margins elects B,� rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy. >>>> >>>> I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this scenario. Even >>>> assuming that all the votes are sincere, >>>> B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and >>>> positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten >>>> by A.) >>>> >>> Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval cutoff after >>> the ranked candidates. What if the votes are sincere and there is no >>> implicit approval cutoff? >>> >>> Juho >>> >>> >>> P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a >>> lot of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong. >>> >>> P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked >>> candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very >>> high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, >>> or to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them >>> with the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically >>> ideal, but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be >>> much better than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all. >>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info >> >> <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient> >> Virus-free. www.avg.com >> <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient> >> >> >> <x-msg://6/#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> >> >> >> __._,_.___ >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> Posted by: Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au >> <mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> >> Visit Your Group >> <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/ApprovalVoting/info;_ylc=X3oDMTJlOXRlcmhjBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzg3MDEzOTUEZ3Jwc3BJZAMxNzA1MDYwMzc2BHNlYwN2dGwEc2xrA3ZnaHAEc3RpbWUDMTU1MTc5NTE3Ng--> >> >> >> Yahoo! Groups >> <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo;_ylc=X3oDMTJkbGZmZnQ5BF9TAzk3NDc2NTkwBGdycElkAzg3MDEzOTUEZ3Jwc3BJZAMxNzA1MDYwMzc2BHNlYwNmdHIEc2xrA2dmcARzdGltZQMxNTUxNzk1MTc2> >> >> � Privacy >> <https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/groups/details.html> � >> Unsubscribe >> <mailto:ApprovalVoting-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com?subject=Unsubscribe> >> � Terms of Use <https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/> >> >> __,_._,___ > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info --- This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. https://www.avg.com

> On 05 Mar 2019, at 23:07, Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au [RangeVoting] <RangeVoting@yahoogroups.com> wrote: > > > > 46 A > 44 B>C > 10 C > > The positional information is on the ballots.� You can throw it away by refusing to look at anything but a pairwise > matrix, in this case� A>B 46-44,� B>C 44-10, C>A 54-46 and then say "oh well, I suppose we just have to break this > cycle at its weakest link". > I guess the basic assumption is that ranked methods are based on rankings. I used also the actual ballots when trying to explain what would be a natural outcome with those votes (although the method was expected to use only rankings / the matrix). I didn't assume any approvals or positional information to be extracted from the ballots. I btw don't favour the approach of "breaking a cycle" since that approach seems to assume that there is something wrong with having a cycle, and that they should be eliminated to form a preference order without cycles. I rather tend to think that one should just elect the best candidate (no need to assume that cycles should be somehow broken or removed in the process). > > A is voted in top position, which in the case of ranked ballots I would interpret as being ranked below no other > candidate, in this case strictly above all other candidates, on more ballots than B is ranked above bottom on any > ballots. > Ok, that's some additional "positional information" that you may extract from the ballots. My default assumption in ranked methods is that vote X>A>B>C (where A is not in top position) would be the same as A>B>C if X is a totally irrelevant candidate. But of course, also additional information (other than rankings) can be included in the method if one so wants. > > Plus of course A pairwise beats B.�� Given that A is so obviously dominant over B, the contention that "B might be > an ok winner" is absurd and not serious.� What shred of sane common-sense explanation could you possibly give > to the post-election complaining A supporters as to why their candidate should have been beaten by B ??! > I tried to address this from one point of view in my previous post. > >> does the "positional information" maybe refer to some Borda like rating information? (or maybe implicit ratings) > > I infer some rating from rankings thus: candidates ranked above at least one candidate and below no candidate are > voted in the "top (or first) position", candidates not in the top position but also ranked above at least one other candidate > and below no candidate except those in top position are voted in the "second-from-the-top position" and so on > down to those candidates who are voted above no other candidate are in the "bottom position". > > I consider that A "positionally dominates" B if A� has more first position votes and more first plus second position votes > and so on down to more above bottom votes. > >> If A wins, B and C supporters (54, majority) clearly think that C would have been a better choice (and 44 voters would prefer B). > In the scenario as I described it the B voters don't really care about C, they were just using C to benefit from Margins' gross failure > of the Later-no-Help criterion. Yes, you presented a strategic scenario, but my question was, what should we do if those same votes were sincere votes. In that case the method should pick the best candidate under the assumption that the votes are sincere. There could thus be another election with exactly similar votes, but where the votes are sincere. > > The A supporters have an undeniable complaint against B but not C.� > > The B supporters also have no reasonable complaint against C. They all voted (above bottom) for C and C is voted above bottom > on more ballots than B (or A) and C� has a beatpath to B.� They can't claim to have been stung by a failure of Later-no-Harm > because clearly if they had� truncated then A would have won. > > The C supporters have some� possible (relatively weak) complaint against A. But you want to elect the only candidate whose > supporters can have no remotely reasonable complaint against the election of either of the other candidates. > >> It is for example possible that there is an election with 5 serious candidates (based on some good polling information) and 50 other candidates with no chances to win. In that situation it would not be a big problem to limit the number of ranked candidates to say 7 > If I sincerely prefer 7 minor candidates before any of the "serious" ones, how is this method better for me than plurality?� I will either > have to vote insincerely or put up with my vote having no effect on the result. In that case you should understand that ranking only the 7 minor candidates is not a good idea in that method. You should satisfy with ranking only 3 minor candidates. > > If Ireland and Australia have no problem allowing voters to fully rank then why should the US? Yes, I'm sure there are many elections where allowing full rankings is the best approach. (I have no knowledge of the US scenario.) Juho > > Chris Benham > > On 6/03/2019 4:31 am, Juho Laatu wrote: >>> On 05 Mar 2019, at 16:04, Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au <mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> [ApprovalVoting] <ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com <mailto:ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com>> wrote: >> >>>> Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval cutoff after the ranked candidates. What if the votes are sincere and there is no implicit approval cutoff? >>>> >>> No, I'm only "assuming" that positional information is more meaningful than which candidate is "closer" to being the Condorcet winner >>> according to Margins or which candidate needs the fewest additional bullet-votes to become the CW. >> >> If the added implicit information is not approval of all the ranked candidates, does the "positional information" maybe refer to some Borda like rating information? (or maybe implicit ratings) (I don't really like Borda ratings as additional information either because of the associated nomination related problems.) >> >> >>> >>> Given that Margins is very vulnerable to Burial strategy the argument that it's worth putting up with that because with sincere votes B >>> in this scenario is the best (or a good or even acceptable) candidate is .. what?? >>> >>> Or to put it another way, assuming the votes are sincere, you arguments against electing A or C are what? >> >> I just thought that B might be ok if we take the votes to be plain rankings (= pairwise preferences) with no additional approval or positional information assumed. The mentioned votes are of course very extreme (only three kind if voters), so they are not a typical set of votes form a real life election. >> >> 46 A >> 44 B>C >> 10 C >> >> One could think that A is a left wing candidate, C is moderate right, and B is far right (because there are 44 voters that rank them in such linear order). A voters don't seem to care which one of the right wing candidates wins (they are tied in every single vote). The B voters have a clear and understandable position, with full rankings. The C voters have not ranked B. Maybe they are so centrist that A and B are equally good to them. >> >> Condorcet methods can be said to elect a compromise candidate that is not too bad for anyone (sometimes the Condorcet winner might have no first preference votes). I therefore try to find an explanation to why B might win, from this point of view (= elect he best compromise (that is not very disliked)). >> >> Since the A voters did not rank C above B, we must assume that they are perfectly ok with electing B, if A does not win. Same with C voters. B voters have a clear preference C>A (if B can not win). >> >> If A wins, B and C supporters (54, majority) clearly think that C would have been a better choice (and 44 voters would prefer B). If C wins, 46 voters would prefer A, and 44 voters would prefer B. If B wins, 46 voters would prefer A, and 10 voters would prefer C. B doesn't look too bad in this comparison. B might be a better compromise than A or C. I.e. less complaints and rebellions after the election. >> >> (I tried to avoid the "few votes short of being a Condorcet winner" argument since you might not appreciate it.) >> >>> >>>> One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than with strategic voting. >>>> >>>> First preferences could be as follows. >>>> >>>> 30: far-left >>>> 21: left >>>> 19: right >>>> 30: far-right >>>> >>>> If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left, the natural approval limit would be between the left wing and right wing parties. We would get mostly votes that rank only left wing or only right wing candidates. And the winner would be with good probability the far-left candidate, not the expected Condorcet winner (left). >>> >>> That doesn't bother me much because (a) far-left may be higher "Social Utility" than left >> >> I don't know what "Social Utility" means here. I guess any of the candidates could have that. It might not show up in rankings nor in approvals. >> >>> and (b) probably enough right voters would >>> be aware that the result is unlikely to be decided by Approval and so they would not be taking a huge risk by sincerely ranking left >>> over far-left. >> >> I guess this depends on the method. I can't tell if all "ranking + implicit approval" methods would behave well in this respect. I also don't like very much the idea of voters having to cast strategic votes instead of sincere votes (i.e. implicit approvals in the ballots would not mean that the voter would approve the candidate, but something strategic instead). >> >>> >>> But having said that, Smith//Approval using ballots that� allow voters to rank among candidates they don't approve would not be >>> in my book too bad (and much better than Margins). >>> >>>> P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong. >>> That method doesn't have good criterion compliances. It's just a gimmick to smuggle Condorcet compliance past IRV enthusiasts. >>> The alternative of just checking for a CW (among remaining candidates) before each elimination is much better. >> >> I'm not a big believer in criterion compliance in real life election methods. In theoretical studies different criteria are excellent measurement tools, but in real life elections nobody cares if the method performs well in some theoretical situations. Often slightly modified (heuristic style, not necessarily "mathematically clean") methods are close enough to meeting those criteria on practice anyway. Also my theoretically ideal "maximally strategy resistant method" might be one that fails to meet most of the named criteria, but does so intentionally in order to violate each one (or many) of them just a little bit, so that it can maximise resistance against all kind of strategies (and keep its worst vulnerability least bad). >> >>> >>>> P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, or to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them with the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal, but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be much better than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all. >>> >>> Limiting the number of candidates the voter is allowed to rank makes no sense. What has happened to your concern >>> about "removing information" on who the sincere/ "expected" CW is? >> >> Typically the intention is not to limit the number of candidates that can be ranked (when compared to the situation before he change) but to make that number higher, while allowing it not to be very high. I am still worried about removing information, but I can accept some limitations sometimes (when full ranking is not feasible, or when most voters would not rank all candidates anyway, or when other solutions are not politically possible). The limits should be such that they probably do not lead to not electing the sincere Condorcet winner (or the best candidate when there is no Condorcet winner). >> >> It is for example possible that there is an election with 5 serious candidates (based on some good polling information) and 50 other candidates with no chances to win. In that situation it would not be a big problem to limit the number of ranked candidates to say 7. The ballots could be simpler that way, and voting would not be too tedious. I would not mind someone starting even from 3, if that is an improvement e.g. to the earlier FPTP. >> >>> >>> There would be nothing "frightening" about ranking all the candidates if doing so is purely optional. But voters who wish >>> to vote a full ranking should be allowed to. >> >> That is possible, and a positive thing to do, but I do understand that sometimes also less perfect methods can be "perfect" or "sufficient" for the current real life situation. >> >> Juho >> >> >>> >>> Chris� Benham >>> >>> >>> On 5/03/2019 6:42 pm, Juho Laatu wrote: >>>>> On 05 Mar 2019, at 07:45, Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au <mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> [ApprovalVoting] <ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com <mailto:ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Robert, >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate?� all unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot.� is any candidate that is ranked at all "approved"? >>>>> Yes. >>>>> >>>>>> that would change and complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot. >>>>> >>>>> Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly) "complicate". Allowing voters to rank among unapproved >>>>> candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot more complicated. >>>> One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than with strategic voting. >>>> >>>> First preferences could be as follows. >>>> >>>> 30: far-left >>>> 21: left >>>> 19: right >>>> 30: far-right >>>> >>>> If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left, the natural approval limit would be between the left wing and right wing parties. We would get mostly votes that rank only left wing or only right wing candidates. And the winner would be with good probability the far-left candidate, not the expected Condorcet winner (left). >>>> >>>> The problem with "implicit approval cutoff after the ranked candidates" is that voters would be encouraged not to rank all the major candidates. Not good for Condorcet. That would remove some important information. In this example the sincere Condorcet winner could not be identified anymore. >>>> >>>>> 46 A >>>>> 44 B>C >>>>> 10 C >>>>> A>B 46-44 (margin=2)���� B>C 44-10 (margin=34)�� C>A 54-46 (margin=8) >>>>> >>>>> Now Margins elects B,� rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy. >>>>> >>>>> I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this scenario. Even assuming that all the votes are sincere, >>>>> B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten >>>>> by A.) >>>> Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval cutoff after the ranked candidates. What if the votes are sincere and there is no implicit approval cutoff? >>>> >>>> Juho >>>> >>>> >>>> P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong. >>>> >>>> P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, or to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them with the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal, but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be much better than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all. >>>> >>>> >>>> ---- >>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em <https://electorama.com/em> for list info >>> >>> >>> <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient> Virus-free. www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient> <x-msg://6/#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> >> >> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em <https://electorama.com/em> for list info > > > __._,_.___ > Posted by: Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> > > > VISIT YOUR GROUP <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/RangeVoting/info;_ylc=X3oDMTJmZmRnc20wBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzE1ODE5MjQyBGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTA2MDY4MgRzZWMDdnRsBHNsawN2Z2hwBHN0aW1lAzE1NTE4MjE4MDE-> > <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo;_ylc=X3oDMTJlYnNxdDFmBF9TAzk3NDc2NTkwBGdycElkAzE1ODE5MjQyBGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTA2MDY4MgRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNnZnAEc3RpbWUDMTU1MTgyMTgwMQ-->• Privacy <https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/groups/details.html> • Unsubscribe <mailto:RangeVoting-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com?subject=Unsubscribe> • Terms of Use <https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/> > __,_._,___