Hi, all.
My remark concerns Erik's on the susceptibility of STV to repeal.
I don't think STV is a bad system, just a complicated one. I do worry,
as I mentioned in my original post, that this helps make it very
susceptible to repeal, since it's been repealed in all US cities that
have used it except one:
http://www.jacksantucci.com/docs/papers/repeal_dec2016.pdf
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/
Brief%20History%20of%20PR.htm
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001157823
http://archive.fairvote.org/library/history/true_experiences.htm
The argument I make in "Exit from PR" above could apply to any voting
system with low effective thresholds. It may apply to any PR system,
period. Most (all?) of what we know about PR's repeal (or reduction) comes
from countries where disloyalty in a legislative coalition triggers
dissolution. Dissolution can reshuffle the parliamentary balance of power.
I suspect -- and this is a big hunch -- we see repeal/reductions in
parliamentary regimes when that reshuffling does not happen.
Erik pointed out elsewhere that Norway uses PR (candidate-based, no less)
without the possibility of snap elections. This could be a problem for my
argument. I guess it depends on what's been happening in Norway.
If anyone is attending the Southern Political Science Association meeting
in New Orleans next month, I'm presenting "Exit" on Thursday afternoon.
I don't want to speak for now on the relative merits of STV, MMP, OLPR, et
cetera. The reason Americans chose STV is itself interesting but too much
for one thread.
Best,
Jack
Jack Santucci
Ph.D. Candidate in Government
Georgetown University
http://www.jacksantucci.com
202-681-5225 (Google Voice)
My sense is that US debate is dominated by the IRV->STV path, even
though single-vote MMP is a pretty straightforward upgrade path for
legislatures, and super-easy for voters. I've found the Canadian
reports from their many aborted electoral reform efforts the most
useful in my exploration of the subject. I recommend checking out this
report by Louis Massicotte that came out of the Quebec reform
discussions, one of the most rigorous examinations of compensatory
voting systems, which also concluded with a recommendation for
single-vote MMP:
https://www.institutions-democratiques.gouv.qc.ca/
publications/mode_scrutin_rapport_en.pdf
Cheers,
Erik
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Cambridge resisted 6 referendums in 16 years. Massachusetts state
government quarantines STV, there, lest the politics of intelligent
compromise prove a catching disease.
New York took three referendums in quick succession, by that by-word for
corruption, Tammany Hall, with the money and the media on-side, to rid
the city of STV, and return the city to a one-party state that
eventually reduced New York to bankruptcy, and having to sell the city
to the corporations.
Campaigns for STV were motivated by its record for good government
against corruption, as in Cincinnati, under STV judged by Forbes
magazine the best run city in America.
STV is "a democracy -- if you can keep it." to coin a phrase of Benjamin
Franklin. (Ireland did keep STV thru 2 referendums.)
STV is order (in the vote) and proportion (in the count) without which
there would be no science and math (not to mention the arts) and without
which election methods are a blunder.
from
Richard Lung.
On 30/12/2016 20:43, Jack Santucci via Election-Methods wrote:
Hi, all.
My remark concerns Erik's on the susceptibility of STV to repeal.
I don't think STV is a bad system, just a complicated one. I do worry,
as I mentioned in my original post, that this helps make it very
susceptible to repeal, since it's been repealed in all US cities that
have used it except one:
http://www.jacksantucci.com/docs/papers/repeal_dec2016.pdf
<http://www.jacksantucci.com/docs/papers/repeal_dec2016.pdf>
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/Brief%20History%20of%20PR.htm
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/Brief%20History%20of%20PR.htm>
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001157823
<https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001157823>
http://archive.fairvote.org/library/history/true_experiences.htm
<http://archive.fairvote.org/library/history/true_experiences.htm>
The argument I make in "Exit from PR" above could apply to any voting
system with low effective thresholds. It may apply to any PR system,
period. Most (all?) of what we know about PR's repeal (or reduction)
comes from countries where disloyalty in a legislative coalition
triggers dissolution. Dissolution can reshuffle the parliamentary
balance of power. I suspect -- and this is a big hunch -- we see
repeal/reductions in parliamentary regimes when that reshuffling does
not happen.
Erik pointed out elsewhere that Norway uses PR (candidate-based, no
less) without the possibility of snap elections. This could be a
problem for my argument. I guess it depends on what's been happening
in Norway.
If anyone is attending the Southern Political Science Association
meeting in New Orleans next month, I'm presenting "Exit" on Thursday
afternoon.
I don't want to speak for now on the relative merits of STV, MMP,
OLPR, et cetera. The reason Americans chose STV is itself interesting
but too much for one thread.
Best,
Jack
Jack Santucci
Ph.D. Candidate in Government
Georgetown University
http://www.jacksantucci.com http://www.jacksantucci.com/
202-681-5225 (Google Voice)
My sense is that US debate is dominated by the IRV->STV path, even
though single-vote MMP is a pretty straightforward upgrade path for
legislatures, and super-easy for voters. I've found the Canadian
reports from their many aborted electoral reform efforts the most
useful in my exploration of the subject. I recommend checking out this
report by Louis Massicotte that came out of the Quebec reform
discussions, one of the most rigorous examinations of compensatory
voting systems, which also concluded with a recommendation for
single-vote MMP:
https://www.institutions-democratiques.gouv.qc.ca/publications/mode_scrutin_rapport_en.pdf
<https://www.institutions-democratiques.gouv.qc.ca/publications/mode_scrutin_rapport_en.pdf>
Cheers,
Erik
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--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
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E-books in epub format:
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On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 12:43 PM, Jack Santucci via Election-Methods
election-methods@lists.electorama.com wrote:
The argument I make in "Exit from PR" above could apply to
any voting system with low effective thresholds. It may apply to
any PR system, period.
Agreed. The STV repeal example is also unusual in that a new voting
system was introduced at the city-level in a country with a long and
deeply entrenched history of FPTP. In the US, more than in many other
countries, the electoral system is also associated with the American
revolution and a sense of American exceptionalism.
The literature indicates that this, too, was used as an argument in
the campaign, and it could be brought against any PR system (basically
decrying anything other than single-winner plurality as
"un-American").
It's difficult to estimate just how much the complexity of STV (across
dimensions like voting, counting, explaining results, visualizing
results, etc.) contributes to the success or failure of repeal
efforts. I do find it interesting that the one place where STV
persists is a voting system (Cambridge, MA) is perhaps also one of the
places least susceptible to anti-intellectual arguments (home of
Harvard+MIT), and most likely to embrace a nerdy voting system
alternative. ;)
If anyone is aware of "perception of complexity" of different voting
systems, I'd love pointers -- I haven't found any good literature on
this yet.
Cheers,
Erik
Good Morning, Jack Santucci
Have you had an opportunity to read the 2014 study by Martin Gilens at
Princeton University and Benjamin I. Page at Northwestern University[1]?
They concluded that "America's claims to being a democratic society
are seriously threatened." They point out:
"... the nearly total failure of 'median voter' and other
Majoritarian Electoral Democracy theories. When the
preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized
interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the
average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero,
statistically non-significant impact upon public policy."
Is that not a natural and inevitable result of party politics?
It certainly bears out Robert Michels finding, described in his 1911
book, Political Parties[2], that "... the oligarchical and bureaucratic
tendency of party organization ... serves to conceal from the mass a
danger which really threatens democracy."
You note on your site that you care about all levels of American
government and are broadly interested in party and institutional change.
Would your interests include consideration of non-partisan
alternatives to party-based systems? Ought not the discussion on an
Electoral Methods site include thoughts on a democratic bottom-up
political process that lets the people actively participate in the
conduct of, and impress their moral sense on, their government? Should
we consider the rejection of the established political parties in the
2015 elections in Frome in the U.K. an indication that non-partisans
need the ability to limit the excesses of party-based systems?
Fred Gohlke
[1] Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest
Groups, and Average Citizens. Martin Gilens and Benjamin
I. Page
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_page_2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf
[2] Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical
Tendencies of Modern Democracy
http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/michels/polipart.pdf
Hi Fred,
The Gilens and Page study is compelling.
I am trying to account for the adoption, use, and repeal of PR in American
cities. In that project, I have found that partisanship and party
factionalism are useful frames for organizing facts.
Elsewhere I have found that partisanship explains outcomes in other
contexts (https://fruitsandvotes.wordpress.com/2016/11/17/
voter-choice-or-partisan-interest-the-case-of-ranked-choice-voting-in-maine/
).
I make no claims about whether this is good or bad.
Regards,
Jack
Jack Santucci
Ph.D. Candidate in Government
Georgetown University
http://www.jacksantucci.com
202-681-5225 (Google Voice)
On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 11:40 AM, Fred Gohlke fredgohlke@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Jack Santucci
Have you had an opportunity to read the 2014 study by Martin Gilens at
Princeton University and Benjamin I. Page at Northwestern University[1]?
They concluded that "America's claims to being a democratic society are
seriously threatened." They point out:
"... the nearly total failure of 'median voter' and other
Majoritarian Electoral Democracy theories. When the
preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized
interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the
average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero,
statistically non-significant impact upon public policy."
Is that not a natural and inevitable result of party politics?
It certainly bears out Robert Michels finding, described in his 1911 book,
Political Parties[2], that "... the oligarchical and bureaucratic tendency
of party organization ... serves to conceal from the mass a danger which
really threatens democracy."
You note on your site that you care about all levels of American
government and are broadly interested in party and institutional change.
Would your interests include consideration of non-partisan alternatives to
party-based systems? Ought not the discussion on an Electoral Methods site
include thoughts on a democratic bottom-up political process that lets the
people actively participate in the conduct of, and impress their moral
sense on, their government? Should we consider the rejection of the
established political parties in the 2015 elections in Frome in the U.K. an
indication that non-partisans need the ability to limit the excesses of
party-based systems?
Fred Gohlke
[1] Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest
Groups, and Average Citizens. Martin Gilens and Benjamin
I. Page
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/fi
les/gilens_and_page_2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Good Morning, Jack
The difficulty arises because partisanship is a vital part of society.
Unfortunately, it's a double-edged sword. On the good side, it is at
the heart of all progress; on the not-so-good side, it provides a
natural platform for power-seekers.
The big problem, in politics, is that party-based systems do not let the
mellowing voice of non-partisans temper their excesses. Instead,
non-partisans are disenfranchised. Pew Research, for example,
constantly refers to 'leaners', people who vote with a party but are not
members. What should stand out, but doesn't, is that leaners lean
because they have no other choice. They are forced to choose the (for
them) lesser of two evils.
Sennet Williams asked, "What is the goal of a 'better' election method?"
and answered himself by saying, "Personally, I want 'better govt.'"
I suggest that, if we want better government, we should start by
recognizing that our government cannot be better than the people we
elect to provide it. If we are dissatisfied with our government, the
first step in improving it is to elect better people. That cannot
happen as long as political parties are allowed to select the candidates
for public office because "Those who control the options, control the
outcome."
When thinking about better election methods, the biggest issue is not
how the votes are counted, it is who the people can vote for. If we
want better candidates, we must change the way they are selected. As
Jane Mansbridge told us in "A 'Selection Model' of Political
Representation"[1]:
"Another possible --- and sometimes conflicting -- approach is
based primarily on selection. This approach works only when
the principal and agent would have similar objectives even in
the absence of specific incentives and sanctions. That is,
the agent is already internally motivated to pursue certain
goals -- goals that in politics include both a general
political direction and specific policies. If the
representative's desired direction and policies are the ones
the constituent desires, and if the representative also has a
verifiable reputation of being both competent and honest, then
it makes sense for a constituent to put that representative in
office and subsequently spend relatively little effort on
monitoring and sanctioning. As a general rule, the higher the
probability that the objectives of principal and agent may be
aligned, the more efficient it is for the principal to invest
resources ex ante, in selecting the required type, rather than
ex post, in monitoring and sanctioning."
Consideration of electoral methods should include thought about ways to
select candidates whose goals are in line with the public interest.
Instead of letting political parties tell us who we can vote for, we
need a method that integrates the goals of partisans and non-partisans.
It's not difficult, it's just different.
Fred Gohlke
[1]
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=5548&type=WPN
Hi Fred,
STV with nomination by petition is anything but a party-based system. Yet I
find that party organization helps explain even the adoption of that
(supposedly) party-weakening voting rule.
I have little to add to a normative debate about the place of parties in
democracy. I am somewhat familiar with what it takes to win an election
reform. This paper by Jack Nagel is pretty good:
https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/ingredients-for-reform-success
Regards,
Jack
Jack Santucci
Ph.D. Candidate in Government
Georgetown University
http://www.jacksantucci.com
202-681-5225 (Google Voice)
On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 1:36 PM, Fred Gohlke fredgohlke@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Jack
The difficulty arises because partisanship is a vital part of society.
Unfortunately, it's a double-edged sword. On the good side, it is at the
heart of all progress; on the not-so-good side, it provides a natural
platform for power-seekers.
The big problem, in politics, is that party-based systems do not let the
mellowing voice of non-partisans temper their excesses. Instead,
non-partisans are disenfranchised. Pew Research, for example, constantly
refers to 'leaners', people who vote with a party but are not members.
What should stand out, but doesn't, is that leaners lean because they have
no other choice. They are forced to choose the (for them) lesser of two
evils.
Sennet Williams asked, "What is the goal of a 'better' election method?"
and answered himself by saying, "Personally, I want 'better govt.'"
I suggest that, if we want better government, we should start by
recognizing that our government cannot be better than the people we elect
to provide it. If we are dissatisfied with our government, the first step
in improving it is to elect better people. That cannot happen as long as
political parties are allowed to select the candidates for public office
because "Those who control the options, control the outcome."
When thinking about better election methods, the biggest issue is not how
the votes are counted, it is who the people can vote for. If we want
better candidates, we must change the way they are selected. As Jane
Mansbridge told us in "A 'Selection Model' of Political Representation"[1]:
"Another possible --- and sometimes conflicting -- approach is
based primarily on selection. This approach works only when
the principal and agent would have similar objectives even in
the absence of specific incentives and sanctions. That is,
the agent is already internally motivated to pursue certain
goals -- goals that in politics include both a general
political direction and specific policies. If the
representative's desired direction and policies are the ones
the constituent desires, and if the representative also has a
verifiable reputation of being both competent and honest, then
it makes sense for a constituent to put that representative in
office and subsequently spend relatively little effort on
monitoring and sanctioning. As a general rule, the higher the
probability that the objectives of principal and agent may be
aligned, the more efficient it is for the principal to invest
resources ex ante, in selecting the required type, rather than
ex post, in monitoring and sanctioning."
Consideration of electoral methods should include thought about ways to
select candidates whose goals are in line with the public interest. Instead
of letting political parties tell us who we can vote for, we need a method
that integrates the goals of partisans and non-partisans. It's not
difficult, it's just different.
Fred Gohlke
[1] https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/
citation.aspx?PubId=5548&type=WPN
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Good Afternoon, Jack
Nomination by petition may give the petitioners a voice in the selection
of the people's representatives, but how does the housewife or taxi
driver express their preference? If the process is to be democratic,
everyone must have a voice.
Thanks for the link to Jack Nagel's paper. I've spent a good portion of
the day reading it. It examines political reform on a state-wide or
nation-wide basis and, in describing the necessary ingredients in a
Recipe for Reform, it outlines some of the obstructions raised by
established parties. Widespread reform, when opposed by the existing
order, is difficult. Would we not be better served by a reform that can
be implemented locally, from where it can take root and spread?
Incidentally, I enjoyed the reference to Sir Geoffrey Palmer's work. He
clearly understands the shortcomings of party politics. Such people are
rare.
Fred Gohlke