High Resolution Inferred Approval version of ASM
Richard L,
Can you please expand a bit on the meaning and relevance of your
profound observation?
What is your working definition of a "points system"??? (I can perhaps
guess from your reference to the Borda method.)
How is your reference to some variants of the multi-winner?? Single
Transferable Vote algorithm relevant to the discussion of a
single-winner method?
Chris Benham
On 23/06/2019 11:54 pm, Richard Lung wrote:
Points systems (Borda method is the archetype) are an assumed
weighting of preferences. Gregory method transfer value or Meek method
keep values are a real weighting of preferences.
Richard L.
On 20/06/2019 21:03, Forest Simmons wrote:
Chris, I like it especially the part about naive voters voting
sincerely being at no appreciable disadvantage while resisting burial
and complying with?? the CD criterion.
From your experience in Australia where full rankings are required
(as I understand it) what do you think about the practicality of
rating on a scale of zero to 99, as compared with ranking a long list
of candidates??? Is it a big obstacle?
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
Thankyou for asking.
It's standard statistics. I refered to it occasionally over the years.
To give a more representative summary of classes of data, they may be
weighted. If no accurate information is available, the weights to
respective classes may be assumed. Hence Borda method fits the
statistical description, weighting in arithmetic progression. JFS Ross,
Elections and Electors, 1955, suggested that the weighting would be more
realistic using the geometric mean. This would be weighting in geometric
progression. The British broadcaster Robin Day favored weighting in
harmonic progression!
But the point is they are all assumptions. This is the basic drawback to
score voting systems.
The other standard statistical phrase is weighting in arithmetic
proportion, which applies when statisticians have the weighting data for
the proportionate importance of the classes of data. An example of this
well-defined count is the Gregory weighting of the total transferable
vote or alternatively, and more consistently, the Meek method keep values.
Of course, this accurate count does not apply to deficit votes, as well
as surplus votes for candidates. That is, until FAB STV.
By the way, as far as method of counting is concerned, FAB STV is unlike
traditional STV in that it does not distinguish between AV and STV,
because only the latter is PR with potential surplus transfers.
Consequently, there is no special "single winner method" with FAB STV.
But there is a but, which, without going into details, essentially is JS
Mill distinction between democracy and maiorocracy.
Richard L.
On 24/06/2019 15:58, Chris Benham wrote:
Richard L,
Can you please expand a bit on the meaning and relevance of your
profound observation?
What is your working definition of a "points system"??? (I can perhaps
guess from your reference to the Borda method.)
How is your reference to some variants of the multi-winner?? Single
Transferable Vote algorithm relevant to the discussion of a
single-winner method?
Chris Benham
On 23/06/2019 11:54 pm, Richard Lung wrote:
Points systems (Borda method is the archetype) are an assumed
weighting of preferences. Gregory method transfer value or Meek
method keep values are a real weighting of preferences.
Richard L.
On 20/06/2019 21:03, Forest Simmons wrote:
Chris, I like it especially the part about naive voters voting
sincerely being at no appreciable disadvantage while resisting
burial and complying with?? the CD criterion.??
From your experience in Australia where full rankings are required
(as I understand it) what do you think about the practicality of
rating on a scale of zero to 99, as compared with ranking a long
list of candidates??? Is it a big obstacle?
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient&utm_term=oa-4885-b
Virus-free. www.avg.com
http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient&utm_term=oa-4885-b
<#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Richard L,
You didn't exactly answer my question (What is your working definition
of a "points system"?).
I infer from what you write that you are talking about methods that use
ranking ballots and just award points according
to some predetermined fixed schedule of so many points for being ranked
first and so many for being ranked second and
so on and then just elects the candidate with highest (or as with one
version of Borda I've heard of, the lowest) total score.
Why do you think that is relevant to my suggested VIASME method? To
refresh your memory:
This is my favourite Condorcet method that uses high-intensity Score
ballots (say 0-100):
*Voters fill out high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100) with many
more available distinct scores
(or rating slots) than there are candidates. Default score is zero.
-
Inferring ranking from scores, if there is a pairwise beats-all
candidate that candidate wins. -
Otherwise infer approval from score by interpreting each ballot as
showing approval for the
candidates it scores above the average (mean) of the scores it gives.
Then use Approval Sorted Margins to order the candidates and eliminate
the lowest-ordered
candidate. -
Among remaining candidates, ignoring eliminated candidates, repeat
steps 1 and 2 until
there is a winner.*
To save time we can start by eliminating all the non-members of the
Smith set and stop when
we have ordered the last 3 candidates and then elect the
highest-ordered one.
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins
In simple 3-candidate case this is the same as Approval Sorted Margins
where the voters signal
their approval cut-offs just by having a large gap in the scores they
give.
It could be that you have misunderstood what I mean by "high intensity
Score ballots". It has nothing to
do with anything Borda-like. The voter assign however many points to
each candidate that they wish.
In the US, "Score Voting" (formerly and also called "Range Voting") is a
version of Average Ratings where
the voters give candidates any score they like in the 0-99 inclusive range.
Actually since in VIASME the scores are only used to infer ranking and
sometimes approval, the individual voters
can in theory use any range of scores they like.
Chris Benham
On 25/06/2019 4:09 am, Richard Lung wrote:
Thankyou for asking.
It's standard statistics. I refered to it occasionally over the years.
To give a more representative summary of classes of data, they may be
weighted. If no accurate information is available, the weights to
respective classes may be assumed. Hence Borda method fits the
statistical description, weighting in arithmetic progression. JFS
Ross, Elections and Electors, 1955, suggested that the weighting would
be more realistic using the geometric mean. This would be weighting in
geometric progression. The British broadcaster Robin Day favored
weighting in harmonic progression!
But the point is they are all assumptions. This is the basic drawback
to score voting systems.
The other standard statistical phrase is weighting in arithmetic
proportion, which applies when statisticians have the weighting data
for the proportionate importance of the classes of data. An example of
this well-defined count is the Gregory weighting of the total
transferable vote or alternatively, and more consistently, the Meek
method keep values.
Of course, this accurate count does not apply to deficit votes, as
well as surplus votes for candidates. That is, until FAB STV.
By the way, as far as method of counting is concerned, FAB STV is
unlike traditional STV in that it does not distinguish between AV and
STV, because only the latter is PR with potential surplus transfers.
Consequently, there is no special "single winner method" with FAB STV.
But there is a but, which, without going into details, essentially is
JS Mill distinction between democracy and maiorocracy.
Richard L.
On 24/06/2019 15:58, Chris Benham wrote:
Richard L,
Can you please expand a bit on the meaning and relevance of your
profound observation?
What is your working definition of a "points system"? (I can perhaps
guess from your reference to the Borda method.)
How is your reference to some variants of the multi-winner? Single
Transferable Vote algorithm relevant to the discussion of a
single-winner method?
Chris Benham
On 23/06/2019 11:54 pm, Richard Lung wrote:
Points systems (Borda method is the archetype) are an assumed
weighting of preferences. Gregory method transfer value or Meek
method keep values are a real weighting of preferences.
Richard L.
On 20/06/2019 21:03, Forest Simmons wrote:
Chris, I like it especially the part about naive voters voting
sincerely being at no appreciable disadvantage while resisting
burial and complying with the CD criterion.
From your experience in Australia where full rankings are required
(as I understand it) what do you think about the practicality of
rating on a scale of zero to 99, as compared with ranking a long
list of candidates? Is it a big obstacle?
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient&utm_term=oa-4885-b
Virus-free. www.avg.com
http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient&utm_term=oa-4885-b
<#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The Problem with Score Voting and Approval Voting
From: "Richard Lung" voting@ukscientists.com
Date: Sun, June 23, 2019 7:26 am
To: "EM" election-methods@lists.electorama.com
I agree with all this.
It was said long ago, with regard to many votes per seats and cumulative
voting, as by Enid Lakeman: Multiple votes count against each other.
Single transferable voting is the way to go.
Richard, do you mean specifically "[IRV] is the way to go" or that the use of the ordinal ranked-ballot is the way to go?
Single transferable vote [STV] means "IRV" to me and at one time I thought it would make little difference in outcome in comparison to Condorcet. But 10 years ago, in my very own town, I found out differently.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Borda method, I take to be just the archetype of points systems.
Typically, I am talking about all those systems that assign or allow
some count of the vote to the voters, instead of allowing the count to
come from counting the votes. These systems tend to treat the voters
like their own returning officers. VIASME appears to be a case in point.
I don't see its decisive difference in principle from the score voting
family.)
A noticable tendency, I put it no stronger than that, of points systems
or score voting is to promote single stage counts, without appreciating
that their primitive example, simple plurality (FPTP) is just an
abandoned count, after one stage of election.
As to Condorcet pairing, it discards the information of the over-all
ranking of the candidates. This is the stock criticism first made by
Laplace, in favor of Borda. But since the count in stages, of JB
Gregory, we don't need to assume the relative weight of support for a
range of candidates, so far as surplus transfer of votes is concerned.
(FAB STV introduces real relative weighting of preference for
quota-deficit as well as surplus voted candidates.)
Richard L.
On 24/06/2019 20:29, C.Benham wrote:
Richard L,
You didn't exactly answer my question (What is your working definition
of a "points system"?).
I infer from what you write that you are talking about methods that
use ranking ballots and just award points according
to some predetermined fixed schedule of so many points for being
ranked first and so many for being ranked second and
so on and then just elects the candidate with highest (or as with one
version of Borda I've heard of, the lowest) total score.
Why do you think that is relevant to my suggested VIASME method? To
refresh your memory:
This is my favourite Condorcet method that uses high-intensity Score
ballots (say 0-100):
*Voters fill out high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100) with many
more available distinct scores
(or rating slots) than there are candidates. Default score is zero.
-
Inferring ranking from scores, if there is a pairwise beats-all
candidate that candidate wins. -
Otherwise infer approval from score by interpreting each ballot as
showing approval for the
candidates it scores above the average (mean) of the scores it gives.
Then use Approval Sorted Margins to order the candidates and
eliminate the lowest-ordered
candidate. -
Among remaining candidates, ignoring eliminated candidates, repeat
steps 1 and 2 until
there is a winner.*
To save time we can start by eliminating all the non-members of the
Smith set and stop when
we have ordered the last 3 candidates and then elect the
highest-ordered one.
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins
In simple 3-candidate case this is the same as Approval Sorted
Margins where the voters signal
their approval cut-offs just by having a large gap in the scores
they give.
It could be that you have misunderstood what I mean by "high intensity
Score ballots". It has nothing to
do with anything Borda-like. The voter assign however many points to
each candidate that they wish.
In the US, "Score Voting" (formerly and also called "Range Voting") is
a version of Average Ratings where
the voters give candidates any score they like in the 0-99 inclusive
range.
Actually since in VIASME the scores are only used to infer ranking and
sometimes approval, the individual voters
can in theory use any range of scores they like.
Chris Benham
On 25/06/2019 4:09 am, Richard Lung wrote:
Thankyou for asking.
It's standard statistics. I refered to it occasionally over the years.
To give a more representative summary of classes of data, they may be
weighted. If no accurate information is available, the weights to
respective classes may be assumed. Hence Borda method fits the
statistical description, weighting in arithmetic progression. JFS
Ross, Elections and Electors, 1955, suggested that the weighting
would be more realistic using the geometric mean. This would be
weighting in geometric progression. The British broadcaster Robin Day
favored weighting in harmonic progression!
But the point is they are all assumptions. This is the basic drawback
to score voting systems.
The other standard statistical phrase is weighting in arithmetic
proportion, which applies when statisticians have the weighting data
for the proportionate importance of the classes of data. An example
of this well-defined count is the Gregory weighting of the total
transferable vote or alternatively, and more consistently, the Meek
method keep values.
Of course, this accurate count does not apply to deficit votes, as
well as surplus votes for candidates. That is, until FAB STV.
By the way, as far as method of counting is concerned, FAB STV is
unlike traditional STV in that it does not distinguish between AV and
STV, because only the latter is PR with potential surplus transfers.
Consequently, there is no special "single winner method" with FAB STV.
But there is a but, which, without going into details, essentially is
JS Mill distinction between democracy and maiorocracy.
Richard L.
On 24/06/2019 15:58, Chris Benham wrote:
Richard L,
Can you please expand a bit on the meaning and relevance of your
profound observation?
What is your working definition of a "points system"? (I can perhaps
guess from your reference to the Borda method.)
How is your reference to some variants of the multi-winner? Single
Transferable Vote algorithm relevant to the discussion of a
single-winner method?
Chris Benham
On 23/06/2019 11:54 pm, Richard Lung wrote:
Points systems (Borda method is the archetype) are an assumed
weighting of preferences. Gregory method transfer value or Meek
method keep values are a real weighting of preferences.
Richard L.
On 20/06/2019 21:03, Forest Simmons wrote:
Chris, I like it especially the part about naive voters voting
sincerely being at no appreciable disadvantage while resisting
burial and complying with the CD criterion.
From your experience in Australia where full rankings are required
(as I understand it) what do you think about the practicality of
rating on a scale of zero to 99, as compared with ranking a long
list of candidates? Is it a big obstacle?
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient&utm_term=oa-4885-b
Virus-free. www.avg.com
http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient&utm_term=oa-4885-b
<#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
In Canada, and perhaps the USA, in some parts, STV included IRV. Neither
(nor indeed any official election in the world) has a rational exclusion
count, and I think the consequences of that omission is what you are
getting at. The system of transferable voting, I developed, has both a
rational election count and a rational exclusion count, but it is still
a single transferable vote. It is just counted both as an order of
preference and as an order of reverse preference, to extract more
information from the voting data.
A crucial point here is that (with FAB STV) no candidates are excluded
during the stages of the count, thus prematurely excluding available
information. Likewise no candidates are elected till all the stages of
the count have run their course.
Richard L.
On 24/06/2019 20:52, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The Problem with Score Voting and Approval Voting
From: "Richard Lung" voting@ukscientists.com
Date: Sun, June 23, 2019 7:26 am
To: "EM" election-methods@lists.electorama.com
I agree with all this.
It was said long ago, with regard to many votes per seats and cumulative
voting, as by Enid Lakeman: Multiple votes count against each other.
Single transferable voting is the way to go.
Richard, do you mean specifically "[IRV] is the way to go" or that the
use of the ordinal ranked-ballot is the way to go?
Single transferable vote [STV] means "IRV" to me and at one time I
thought it would make little difference in outcome in comparison to
Condorcet. But 10 years ago, in my very own town, I found out
differently.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Richard
The drawback you talk about applies to ranked-ballot systems that convert ranks into points, such as Borda because of the assumptions made about what a voter's positional rank of a candidate means. However, it is not relevant to score/range voting where the voters pick the scores for each candidate themselves. There is no such assumption made in score voting.
Score voting may have other drawbacks, but they are not the same as the drawbacks of Borda. They are completely different methods with different philosophies and should not be conflated.
"But the point is they are all assumptions. This is the basic drawback to score voting systems" is a statement made as a result of such a conflation and is wrong.
Toby
On Mon, 24 Jun 2019 at 19:39, Richard Lungvoting@ukscientists.com wrote:
Thankyou for asking. It's standard statistics. I refered to it occasionally over the years.
To give a more representative summary of classes of data, they may be weighted. If no accurate information is available, the weights to respective classes may be assumed. Hence Borda method fits the statistical description, weighting in arithmetic progression. JFS Ross, Elections and Electors, 1955, suggested that the weighting would be more realistic using the geometric mean. This would be weighting in geometric progression. The British broadcaster Robin Day favored weighting in harmonic progression!
But the point is they are all assumptions. This is the basic drawback to score voting systems.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
| | Virus-free. www.avg.com |
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Hello Toby,
Give me a little credit. I am well aware of the distinction you make.
Which implies I think it is irrelevant. Whether the voters control the
distribution of weighting among the candidates, those scores, like in a
points system, will still count against each other. Something to do with
Occams razor.
R. L.
On 25/06/2019 08:21, Toby Pereira wrote:
Richard
The drawback you talk about applies to ranked-ballot systems that
convert ranks into points, such as Borda because of the assumptions
made about what a voter's positional rank of a candidate means.
However, it is not relevant to score/range voting where the voters
pick the scores for each candidate themselves. There is no such
assumption made in score voting.
Score voting may have other drawbacks, but they are not the same as
the drawbacks of Borda. They are completely different methods with
different philosophies and should not be conflated.
"But the point is they are all assumptions. This is the basic drawback
to score voting systems" is a statement made as a result of such a
conflation and is wrong.
Toby
On Mon, 24 Jun 2019 at 19:39, Richard Lung
<voting@ukscientists.com> wrote:
Thankyou for asking.
It's standard statistics. I refered to it occasionally over the
years.
To give a more representative summary of classes of data, they may
be weighted. If no accurate information is available, the weights
to respective classes may be assumed. Hence Borda method fits the
statistical description, weighting in arithmetic progression. JFS
Ross, Elections and Electors, 1955, suggested that the weighting
would be more realistic using the geometric mean. This would be
weighting in geometric progression. The British broadcaster Robin
Day favored weighting in harmonic progression!
But the point is they are all assumptions. This is the basic
drawback to score voting systems.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
<http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient&utm_term=oa-4885-b>
Virus-free. www.avg.com
<http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient&utm_term=oa-4885-b>
<#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>
----
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
list info