Yes, I too wrote some explanation with the ballot that I posted about 10
hours ago.

I posted my ballot about 1 minute after the start of the voting-period.

I told why I equal-ranked at least half of the alternatives.

I told why I added an approval-set.

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 14:53 Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:

It’s probably a good principle for collective projects that procedural
issues should be kept to a minimum.

When such an issue is felt necessary, then it should be promptly raised.
Most can be resolved by consensus-discussion, because there’s usually an
alternative that everyone can accept.

When not, then, as a last resort, someone can call for a vote.

My inclination is to make as few issues as possible, with the actual doing
of the project as the priority.

So let’s now express our preference-ordering among the nominees.

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 15:15 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

On 2024-04-11 23:52, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:

Good idea. Here are some links and brief descriptions. I've tried to be
neutral; I may post later with my thoughts about the methods, and what
notable criteria they pass and fail that I know of.

I've only done the methods that have a wiki page. At the bottom is a
list of those methods that don't. Their proposers have already described
them, but they might need a more clear description; in any case, I'll
leave that to them :-)

Smith//Score:
This is a composite method.
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods
It takes rated ballots.
It first eliminates every candidate not in the Smith set, and then
does
Range voting (Score voting) on the remaining candidates. No
normalization is done after the elimination, so a vote A: 10, B: 7, C: 0
still gives B 7 points and C 0 even if A isn't in the Smith set.
In Daniel Carrera's words: "The ballot would look like a Score
ballot.
To process the ballots, the scores are converted into rankings (equal
rankings allowed), and the highest scoring candidate inside the Smith
set is elected." See also Toby's last post.

Approval with manual runoff:
First do a round of Approval voting. Determine the top two
candidates,
then hold a later second round to determine who of the two wins. This is
like STAR, but spacing the rounds apart makes it possible to hold
debates, discuss the differences between the finalists, and so on. On
the other hand, it's more expensive.

Smith//Approval (explicit - specified approval cutoff):
This is a composite method. It takes a ranked ballot with an
approval
cutoff marked.
Every voter approves of (gives a point to) every candidate ranked
above
his approval cutoff. The Smith set member with the most points wins.

Smith//Approval (implicit):
Like Smith//Approval, except the voter can't specify an approval
cutoff. Instead, every candidate ranked is counted as approved, and
every candidate not ranked as not approved. The intent is to deter burial.

Woodall:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Woodall%27s_method
This method takes ranked ballots. First make a note of the initial
Smith set. Then keep doing IRV until only one candidate of the initial
Smith set remains. Elect that candidate. Note: This is not Benham - the
initial Smith set never changes.

Schwartz-Woodall:
The same as Woodall, but with the Schwartz set. The Schwartz set
is
slightly less prone to ties.

Copeland//Borda:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Robin
This method takes ranked ballots.
First eliminate every candidate not in the Copeland set. Then
calculate
the Borda scores of the remaining candidates and elect its winner. This
can be done by using the Condorcet matrix alone.

Minmax(wv):
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method
This method takes ranked ballots.
Based on the ballots, consider each one-on-one matchups between
candidates. Elect the candidate who has the most comfortable lead
against the candidate who does best against him, one on one.

Plurality:
You know this one. Choose-one ballots, equal rank not allowed,
most
first preferences wins.

Majority Judgement (category):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_judgment
Various tiebreakers exist, e.g.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highest_median_voting_rules#Tiebreaking_procedures

     This takes graded ballots. The candidates give each candidate a

grade,
usually one of Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject.
For each candidate, calculate the highest grade so that a majority gives
that candidate at least that grade. The candidate with the highest such
majority grade wins.
The method is often indecisive, which means a tiebreaker has to be
used. There are many, but they all try to preserve the dynamics of MJ.

IRV:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting
This should also be familiar to everybody here. It takes ranked
ballots. Repeatedly eliminate the Plurality loser until a candidate
obtains a majority of the non-exhausted first preferences.

STAR:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting
This takes rated ballots. The ballot typically has six ratings
(zero to
five inclusive), but the method could work with any number. The method
counts the total number of points for each candidate. The pairwise
winner of the two candidates with the most points wins.

Schulze:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Schulze_method
This takes ranked ballots. The method is complex but basically
amounts
to a cloneproof Smith generalization of Minmax.
Let a beatpath from a candidate A to another candidate Z be a
series of
pairwise defeats A beats B beats C beats... beats Y beats Z. The
strength of the path is measured by the strength of its weakest
individual pairwise contest. Let "the" beatpath from A to Z be the
beatpath of strongest strength.
The Schulze winner is the candidate whose beatpath to anybody else
is
at least as strong as their beatpath back to him.

Baldwin:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Baldwin%27s_method
This takes ranked ballots.
Baldwin is the Borda analog of IRV. In each round, the candidate
with
the lowest Borda count is eliminated. The last man standing wins. Also
called Total Vote Runoff by Foley and Maskin.

Black:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Black%27s_method
This takes ranked ballots.
If there is a Condorcet winner, elect that CW. Otherwise elect the
Borda winner.

Approval:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_voting
This takes an Approval ballot: vote for one or more. The candidate
with
the most marks wins.

Benham:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Benham%27s_method
This method takes ranked ballots. Repeatedly eliminate the
Plurality
loser until there's a Condorcet winner among the remaining candidates.
Elect the Condorcet winner when that happens.

Smith//DAC:
This is a composite method.
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Descending_Acquiescing_Coalitions
It takes ranked ballots.
First eliminate every candidate not in the Smith set. Then perform
the
DAC algorithm to determine the winner.
The DAC algorithm is complex, with the result being a cloneproof
method
otherwise close to Plurality.
Essentially, the DAC algorithm works like this: For each ballot,
for
each set of candidates a voter acquiesces to, increase that set's count
by one. Then sort the sets in order of count, descending. Starting at
the top with the current viable set being every candidate, eliminate
from the viable set every candidate who is not in the set at the list's
current position, unless that would eliminate everybody. The candidate/s
remaining once you've traversed the whole list is/are the winner/s.
A voter acquiesces to a set if he doesn't rank any candidate
outside
the set strictly above a candidate within the set.

RCIPE:

https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Choice_Including_Pairwise_Elimination
This takes ranked ballots.
Modify IRV to, instead of eliminating the Plurality loser,
eliminate
the current Condorcet loser among the remaining (uneliminated)
candidates. Only eliminate the Plurality loser if there is no Plurality
loser. Once a candidate has a majority of the non-exhausted first
preference votes, elect that candidate.

RP(wv):
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Pairs
This takes ranked ballots.
First count the pairwise matrix. Create a sorted list of every
pairwise
victory, sorted by its strength. Break ties by random ballot.
Proceed from the top down the list, locking in a pairwise relation
unless it would create a cycle.
At the end, the locked-in contests give an order of candidates.
This is
the election order: the candidate on top is the winner.
Strictly speaking, the tiebreaking is by random voter hierarchy,
but
I've skipped the details about how that is constructed.

I think that should be correct, but if I forgot something or described
them incorrectly, let me know.

The methods not described are:
Margins-Sorted Approval
Double Defeat, Hare
Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal-rated whole)
Gross Loser Elimination
Max Strength Transitive Beatpath

-km

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

This seems like far more methods than anyone could rank, and all of them
are starting to blend together for me. I think we're just splitting Hares
at this point.

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 9:20 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote:

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

On 2024-04-11 23:52, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:

Good idea. Here are some links and brief descriptions. I've tried to be
neutral; I may post later with my thoughts about the methods, and what
notable criteria they pass and fail that I know of.

I've only done the methods that have a wiki page. At the bottom is a
list of those methods that don't. Their proposers have already described
them, but they might need a more clear description; in any case, I'll
leave that to them :-)

Smith//Score:
    This is a composite method.
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods
    It takes rated ballots.
    It first eliminates every candidate not in the Smith set, and then
does Range voting (Score voting) on the remaining candidates. No
normalization is done after the elimination, so a vote A: 10, B: 7, C: 0
still gives B 7 points and C 0 even if A isn't in the Smith set.
    In Daniel Carrera's words: "The ballot would look like a Score
ballot. To process the ballots, the scores are converted into rankings
(equal rankings allowed), and the highest scoring candidate inside the
Smith set is elected." See also Toby's last post.

Approval with manual runoff:
    First do a round of Approval voting. Determine the top two
candidates, then hold a later second round to determine who of the two
wins. This is like STAR, but spacing the rounds apart makes it possible
to hold debates, discuss the differences between the finalists, and so
on. On the other hand, it's more expensive.

Smith//Approval (explicit - specified approval cutoff):
    This is a composite method. It takes a ranked ballot with an
approval cutoff marked.
    Every voter approves of (gives a point to) every candidate ranked
above his approval cutoff. The Smith set member with the most points wins.

Smith//Approval (implicit):
    Like Smith//Approval, except the voter can't specify an approval
cutoff. Instead, every candidate ranked is counted as approved, and
every candidate not ranked as not approved. The intent is to deter burial.

Woodall:
    https://electowiki.org/wiki/Woodall%27s_method
    This method takes ranked ballots. First make a note of the initial
Smith set. Then keep doing IRV until only one candidate of the initial
Smith set remains. Elect that candidate. Note: This is not Benham - the
initial Smith set never changes.

Schwartz-Woodall:
    The same as Woodall, but with the Schwartz set. The Schwartz set is
slightly less prone to ties.

Copeland//Borda:
    https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Robin
    This method takes ranked ballots.
    First eliminate every candidate not in the Copeland set. Then
calculate the Borda scores of the remaining candidates and elect its
winner. This can be done by using the Condorcet matrix alone.

Minmax(wv):
    https://electowiki.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method
    This method takes ranked ballots.
    Based on the ballots, consider each one-on-one matchups between
candidates. Elect the candidate who has the most comfortable lead
against the candidate who does best against him, one on one.

Plurality:
    You know this one. Choose-one ballots, equal rank not allowed, most
first preferences wins.

Majority Judgement (category):
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_judgment
    Various tiebreakers exist, e.g.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highest_median_voting_rules#Tiebreaking_procedures

    This takes graded ballots. The candidates give each candidate a
grade, usually one of Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or
Reject. For each candidate, calculate the highest grade so that a
majority gives that candidate at least that grade. The candidate with
the highest such majority grade wins.
    The method is often indecisive, which means a tiebreaker has to be
used. There are many, but they all try to preserve the dynamics of MJ.

IRV:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting
    This should also be familiar to everybody here. It takes ranked
ballots. Repeatedly eliminate the Plurality loser until a candidate
obtains a majority of the non-exhausted first preferences.

STAR:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting
    This takes rated ballots. The ballot typically has six ratings
(zero to five inclusive), but the method could work with any number. The
method counts the total number of points for each candidate. The
pairwise winner of the two candidates with the most points wins.

Schulze:
    https://electowiki.org/wiki/Schulze_method
    This takes ranked ballots. The method is complex but basically
amounts to a cloneproof Smith generalization of Minmax.
    Let a beatpath from a candidate A to another candidate Z be a
series of pairwise defeats A beats B beats C beats... beats Y beats Z.
The strength of the path is measured by the strength of its weakest
individual pairwise contest. Let "the" beatpath from A to Z be the
beatpath of strongest strength.
    The Schulze winner is the candidate whose beatpath to anybody else
is at least as strong as their beatpath back to him.

Baldwin:
    https://electowiki.org/wiki/Baldwin%27s_method
    This takes ranked ballots.
    Baldwin is the Borda analog of IRV. In each round, the candidate
with the lowest Borda count is eliminated. The last man standing wins.
Also called Total Vote Runoff by Foley and Maskin.

Black:
    https://electowiki.org/wiki/Black%27s_method
    This takes ranked ballots.
    If there is a Condorcet winner, elect that CW. Otherwise elect the
Borda winner.

Approval:
    https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_voting
    This takes an Approval ballot: vote for one or more. The candidate
with the most marks wins.

Benham:
    https://electowiki.org/wiki/Benham%27s_method
    This method takes ranked ballots. Repeatedly eliminate the
Plurality loser until there's a Condorcet winner among the remaining
candidates. Elect the Condorcet winner when that happens.

Smith//DAC:
    This is a composite method.
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods
    https://electowiki.org/wiki/Descending_Acquiescing_Coalitions
    It takes ranked ballots.
    First eliminate every candidate not in the Smith set. Then perform
the DAC algorithm to determine the winner.
    The DAC algorithm is complex, with the result being a cloneproof
method otherwise close to Plurality.
     Essentially, the DAC algorithm works like this: For each ballot,
for each set of candidates a voter acquiesces to, increase that set's
count by one. Then sort the sets in order of count, descending. Starting
at the top with the current viable set being every candidate, eliminate
from the viable set every candidate who is not in the set at the list's
current position, unless that would eliminate everybody. The candidate/s
remaining once you've traversed the whole list is/are the winner/s.
    A voter acquiesces to a set if he doesn't rank any candidate
outside the set strictly above a candidate within the set.

RCIPE:
    https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Choice_Including_Pairwise_Elimination
    This takes ranked ballots.
    Modify IRV to, instead of eliminating the Plurality loser,
eliminate the current Condorcet loser among the remaining (uneliminated)
candidates. Only eliminate the Plurality loser if there is no Plurality
loser. Once a candidate has a majority of the non-exhausted first
preference votes, elect that candidate.

RP(wv):
    https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Pairs
    This takes ranked ballots.
    First count the pairwise matrix. Create a sorted list of every
pairwise victory, sorted by its strength. Break ties by random ballot.
    Proceed from the top down the list, locking in a pairwise relation
unless it would create a cycle.
    At the end, the locked-in contests give an order of candidates.
This is the election order: the candidate on top is the winner.
    Strictly speaking, the tiebreaking is by random voter hierarchy,
but I've skipped the details about how that is constructed.

I think that should be correct, but if I forgot something or described
them incorrectly, let me know.

The methods not described are:
    Margins-Sorted Approval
    Double Defeat, Hare
    Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal-rated whole)
    Gross Loser Elimination
    Max Strength Transitive Beatpath

-km

Agreed. If the purpose of this is to inform the public, we’ve also lost
the plot — how many of these methods have a chance of being widely
understood, let alone implemented, anywhere outside this bubble?

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 7:38 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

On 2024-04-12 22:37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

I would prefer that the merit question for the poll stays the same:
"which voting methods do you prefer to which others?", i.e. ranking them
in preference.

Then it would be up to the individual voter to consider what aspects of
the method are most important; and anyone who wants to use it to guide
reform can just screen away the unproposable methods.

After all, we have to do that anyway, because it's pretty much
impossible to collapse disparate concerns into a single order without
making some assumptions about which concerns are most important. Would I
recommend Benham ahead of Schulze? Well, that depends on whether there's
tons of strategy in the place in question and whether they (and I) can
accept the nonmonotonicity.

In the absence of any such situational information, any order will be
imperfect. In any case, if the poll's output ranking ends up being like

Extrinsic Borda-Weighted Landau Intersection > Iterative Refinement
Keener + Sinkhorn (mean) > Schulze > RP > Approval > IRV,

then it's a simple matter for reformers to just discard everything above
Schulze (or RP) for a public proposal. In practice, I doubt the exotic
methods will rank that high anyway.

-km