Hi Rob—

…

You wrote:

…

[quote]

Oh Michael...where do I begin?  Your apparent move to the dark side
makes me sad.  I realize that this intro may sound condescending, but I
truly don't mean it that way.  I deeply respect your opinion. YOU were the
one who taught me about "center squeeze" in 1995 or so, and made me rethink
AV/PV/IRV/RCV (or whatever the name of the week is).

[/quote]

…

Yes, earlier I was quite critical of RCV (called IRV in those days,
before San Francisco insisted on RCV, because “instant” was misleading
people to expect an instantaneous count).

…

I was wrong.

…

You know that often the relative merits, advantages & disadvantages of
single-winner methods aren’t what they at first seem. Never be prematurely
sure that someone is wrong about such matters.

…

But I would like to remind you that I also continue to say that
Condorcet, in its best versions, is my favorite, because, always electing
the CW, it best gets rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem (LO2E) for any &
every  kind of voter, thereby accommodating even the most timid LO2E
giveaway voter.

…

As I said, RCV only works & has merit if the voters aren’t timid
overcomromising LO2E giveaway voters.

…

I don’t deny that Condorcet-failure is a disadvantage, but, with a good
electorate, it doesn’t matter. I used to say that Approval’s equal-givaway,
amounting to an abstention between Favorite & Lesser-Evil, is better than
RCV’s favorite-burial…but not if you have an electorate that won’t do the
burial !!!

…

Approval & STAR encourage Mr. Timid to do giveaway. RCV encourages
everyone to be frank, honest, ambitious, hopeful !!!

…

…because, as I said, that won’t be a problem, because an electorate that
has enacted RCV didn’t do so because they want & intend to vote a
hold-you-nose lesser-evil over their favorite (They can & do do that now,
in Plurality). If they enact RCV it’s because they want & intend to
sincerely rank the candidates, expressing & fully-supporting their favorite.

…

…& so THEY WILL DO SO !!!

…

So don’t worry about LO2E strategy in RCV voting.

…

Anti-RCVists often say that RCV doesn’t really honor majority.

…

But, as I’ve been saying, though RCV doesn’t meet the Condorcet
Criterion, it meets the Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC).  Let me state
an improved & expanded definition of MMC:

…

MMC:

…

If there are 1 or more sets of candidates such that a majority of the
voters prefer the candidates of that set to everyone outside the set, then
the winner should come from such a set.

…

(Then it goes without saying that, when there’s a Mutual-Majority
(defined below) the winner will come from that Mutual-Majority.)

…

[end of MMC definition]

…

A majority who all prefer some set of candidates to everyone outside
that set, I call an Agreeing-Majority.

…

A majority who all prefer the same set of candidates to everyone
outside that set, I call a  Mutual-Majority.

…

(Arguably a weaker definition of a Mutual-Majority would do: A majority
who all prefer all of their favorites to everyone outside the set of all
their favorites.)

…

When there are 1 or more Agreeing-Majorities, RCV always elects the
candidate of the largest faction of  an Agreeing-Majority.

…

i.e. under those conditions, RCV always elects the favorite of an
Agreeing-Majority.

…

RCV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the
Mutual-Majority.

…

i.e. RCV always elects the favorite of the Mutual-Majority.

…

That candidate isn’t an unpopular extremist, but instead has strong
genuine majority coalition support, as defined above.

…

[quote]

I just think you're incorrect about FairVote.

[/quote]

…

I didn’t say anything about FairVote.

…

Whether you like FairVote or not, that has no bearing on the merits of
RCV.

…

FairVote, from the start, has insisted on offering the traditional RCV.
We should respect that choice. RCV has about a century of precedent in
Australia & Ireland. Proposing a traditional method with long precedent is
a valid practical choice, & one that we should respect.

…

…& that proposal has been enormously successful, & is sweeping this
country. Maybe its century of traditional precedent has something to do
with its success.

…

When RCV was  initially being adopted, of course there were no
computers, & so Condorcet’s complete pairwise-count would be infeasible in
a large election. Sure, the Sequential-Pairwise (SP) pairwise-count only
needs about twice as much vote-counting as RCV.

…

(Approval, Score, STAR & RCV all need roughly the same amount of
vote-counting (they all vary greatly), & SP needs about twice as much.)

…

Maybe people didn’t want twice as much vote-counting. Or maybe they were
afraid that SP would be rejected because of its Pareto violation (which I
consider irrelevant, just like MinMax’s Condorcet-Loser violation).

…

Then there’s Coombs, which I guess would have about the same amount of
vote-counting as RCV. But maybe they didn’t like Coombs because things
could get ridiculous, like when I nominate Dracula in the primary, so that
we can bury the Democrat under Dracula.

…

…but of course there are worse things than ridiculous.  Maybe we
haven’t been fair to Coombs.

…

As I said, I prefer Condorcet, in its best versions, but it’s RCV that
has the activist movement, big well-funded national organization,
lobbyists, experienced & active campaign-managers, & big successes all
around this country.

…

…with (I’ve read) on the order of 60 municipalities & 2 states having
adopted RCV.

…

If RCV, & not Condorcet, is succeeding, we Condorcetists have nothing to
complain about. When the RCVists were doing the work, we weren’t out there
enacting anything.  Don’t blame the RCVists for that..

…

We should acknowledge, commend & appreciate what the RCV organization
has accomplished.

…

[quote]

RCV is already poorly understood.

[/quote]

…

RCV is enormously popular with progressives & progressive organizations
& parties, such as the GPUSA, the U.S. Greens.  …because they
understand that rank-balloting will allow them to express all of their
preferences among the candidates.

…

…& because they’ve been correctly informed that RCV has genuine strong
majority properties, when it coalesces the Mutual-Majority.  ..even if
they haven’t heard about the details of those properties.

…

As for RCV’s definition, RCV can be defined very briefly, in one
sentence:

…

Repeatedly eliminate the candidate who tops fewest rankings, till
someone tops most of them.

…

[end of brief RCV definition]

…

[quote]

When I moved to San Francisco in 2011, I expected to grudgingly like
voting in RCV elections, and I expected to enjoy ranking my choices  What
I found instead was that very few people here understand how votes are
counted

[/quote]

…

They would if they heard RCV’s brief definition.

…

[quote]

, and many folks in my lefty political tribe here take great pride in
their ignorance of math and the inner workings of their electoral system,
trusting that the powers-that-be will count things correctly.

[/quote]

…

…& they’re right, when the method is RCV.  (…& likewise would be, with
a good Condorcet version too.)

…

[quote]

As "exhibit A", I will point to the recent clown show in Alameda County
(i.e. just a few miles east of me, on the other side of a puddle known as
the "San Francisco Bay"):

…

https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Alameda-County-admits-tallying-error-in-17682520.php

…

It would seem that they had been counting RCV elections wrong for
DECADES, and only noticed the problem in 2022.  Simplicity and precinct
summability matters.

[/quote]

…

RCV’s brief definition is simple. RCV is simple, natural & obvious.

…

There’s a lot of mis-statement about “Precinct-Summability”, &
questionable-ness about what “Precinct Summability” is supposed to mean..

…

Plurality, Approval & Score:

…

Candidates’ vote totals are summed in each precinct & sent to a central
count-place, where there’s a central tabulation.

…

STAR:

…

Same, at first. Then the central counting place determines the two top
scorers, & then presumably sends that information to the precincts, which
still have the rankings, & the precincts each total the pairwise votes for
each of the finalists over the other, & they all send that back to the
central location, where the results are summed & the final winner reported.

…

Condorcet:

…

Each precinct counts the preference votes for A over B, & for B over A,
for each of the N(N-1)/2 pairs {A,B}.  …& those totals are sent in to
the central location, where the winner is determined according to the rules
of whatever Condorcet version is being used.

…

RCV:

…

Each precinct counts the top-count score of each candidate, & sends that
in to the central location.

…

The central location totals that count for each candidate, to determine
which has lowest top-score, & sends that information back to the precincts.

…

Each precinct eliminates that candidate from its rankings, & repeats the
first line above.

…

Repeat till the central location finds that one candidate tops most of
the rankings.

Notice something similar about those?  Every one of those procedures
requires counts at the precincts, & also at the central location, &
communication between the two.

…

How is RCV different?  It does such a procedure a number of times.
That’s it. That’s the difference.

…

So it’s questionable regarding what is this “Precinct Summability” that
Plurailty, Approval, Score, STAR & Condorcet all have, but RCV allegedly
doesn’t have.

…

The same security measures, precautions & audits can be done with RCV as
with any of the other methods whose procedures are described above.

…

[quote]

[quote]

Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has
proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect.

[/quote]

…

This I will agree with. That is why I've hopped on the approval voting
bandwagon for single-winner reform.

[/quote]

…

That’s a bit hasty. Undeniably some of the pairwise-count
Condorcet-compliant methods thwart &/or deter offensive strategy so well
that it won’t be a problem, & the election of the sincere-CW will virtually
always be elected.

…

There’s the argument that there are so many good Condorcet versions that
choosing between them is prohibitively problematic, preventing the adoption
of any of them.

…

No, several of the best versions can be offered to a proposal-committee,
& it can discuss & evaluate them & then choose a proposal.

…

…& there are a few obviously simplest proposals, making the choice a lot
less complicated & difficult than antii-Condorcetists claim:

…

MinMax:

…

Elect the candidate whose greatest defeat is the least.

…

(…implying the election of an unbeaten candidate when there is one ( as
there nearly always is) ).

…

Condorcet//Approval:

…

Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. If no one is
pairwise-unbeaten, then elect the most approved candidate.

…

Majority-Defeat Disquaification//Approval (MDDA):

…

Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. Elect any
unbeaten candidate. If there are none, then every majority pairwise-beaten
candidate is disqualified, & the un-disqualified candidate with most
approvals is elected.

…

(I’ve added a Condorcet-winner electing clause, because I now feel that
Condorcet’s failure-betrayal scenario is so rare & unpredictable as to be
irrelevant to strategy.)

…

Sequential-Pairwise:

…

Order the candidates in a list such that the ones topping more rankings
are listed below the ones topping fewer rankings.

…

Find the pairwise-winner among the top 2 candidates in the ordering.
Then find the pairwise winner between that winner & the next candidate down
the list.  Condtinue until you’ve found the winner of the then-current
winner & the last candidate in the list. S/he wins.

I’d offer those 4 simple pairwise-count versions.

…

I’d also offer Approval, in case the jurisdiction either couldn’t
afford, or didn’t want to spend for, rank-balloting equipment & software.

…

I’d also offer RCV & STAR, because some proposal-committee members might
prefer them.

…

I’d personally propose & justify the choice of a Pairwise-Count, with
RCV as next choice, & of course Approval if rank-balloting is infeasible or
rejected.

…

If there were a ranked vote in the proposal committee, of course my
ranking would be:

…

1. Some ordering of the above-listed four Pairwise-Count methods

…

2. RCV

…

3. Approval if ranked-balloting is infeasible or rejected.

Yes, I like Approval. Under different conditions, normal conditions, it
would be my suggestion, though STAR would then be okay too.

…

But our voting-conditions are anything but normal.

…

We always have a sleazy & corrupt POS “lesser”-evil, & a
dramatically-horrifying greater-evil.  (…& some better candidates who,
our media insist, are unwinnable, minor, not-serious, candidates.)

…

We’re constantly told that the greater evil is the only bad result, & so
we have to support the “lesser-evil” against the greater-evil (…& against
our favorite).

…

Always.

…

It’s always this same discouraging, dismal & hopeless situation.

…

That isn’t normal.  It certainly isn’t natural.

…

So yes, I’d suggest Approval under normal conditions. But our highly,
bizarrely, abnormal & unnatural conditions require special methods to deal
with the (allegedly) hard choice between genuinely-wanted outcomes, &
odious dismal regrettable & deplorable “lesser” evils.

…

For these conditions, we need something more powerfully-discriminating:
a rank-method, to let everyone vote all their preferences among as many
candidates as they want to.  …to elicit & count genuine favoriteness  immediately.

…

(…not after several election-cycles, because a lot of harm can be done
in 4 years or 8 years.)

…

It’s like when, in The Godfather, Michael says to his attorney:

…

“No, you’re a peacetime consiglieri, but right now we need a wartime
consiglieri.”

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

Hi Rob—

…

You wrote:

…

[quote]

Oh Michael...where do I begin?  Your apparent move to the dark side
makes me sad.  I realize that this intro may sound condescending, but I
truly don't mean it that way.  I deeply respect your opinion. YOU were the
one who taught me about "center squeeze" in 1995 or so, and made me rethink
AV/PV/IRV/RCV (or whatever the name of the week is).

[/quote]

…

Yes, earlier I was quite critical of RCV (called IRV in those days,
before San Francisco insisted on RCV, because “instant” was misleading
people to expect an instantaneous count).

…

I was wrong.

…

You know that often the relative merits, advantages & disadvantages of
single-winner methods aren’t what they at first seem. Never be prematurely
sure that someone is wrong about such matters.

…

But I would like to remind you that I also continue to say that
Condorcet, in its best versions, is my favorite, because, always electing
the CW, it best gets rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem (LO2E) for any &
every  kind of voter, thereby accommodating even the most timid LO2E
giveaway voter.

…

As I said, RCV only works & has merit if the voters aren’t timid
overcomromising LO2E giveaway voters.

…

I don’t deny that Condorcet-failure is a disadvantage, but, with a good
electorate, it doesn’t matter. I used to say that Approval’s equal-givaway,
amounting to an abstention between Favorite & Lesser-Evil, is better than
RCV’s favorite-burial…but not if you have an electorate that won’t do the
burial !!!

…

Approval & STAR encourage Mr. Timid to do giveaway. RCV encourages
everyone to be frank, honest, ambitious, hopeful !!!

…

…because, as I said, that won’t be a problem, because an electorate that
has enacted RCV didn’t do so because they want & intend to vote a
hold-you-nose lesser-evil over their favorite (They can & do do that now,
in Plurality). If they enact RCV it’s because they want & intend to
sincerely rank the candidates, expressing & fully-supporting their favorite.

…

…& so THEY WILL DO SO !!!

…

So don’t worry about LO2E strategy in RCV voting.

…

Anti-RCVists often say that RCV doesn’t really honor majority.

…

But, as I’ve been saying, though RCV doesn’t meet the Condorcet
Criterion, it meets the Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC).  Let me state
an improved & expanded definition of MMC:

…

MMC:

…

If there are 1 or more sets of candidates such that a majority of the
voters prefer the candidates of that set to everyone outside the set, then
the winner should come from such a set.

…

(Then it goes without saying that, when there’s a Mutual-Majority
(defined below) the winner will come from that Mutual-Majority.)

…

[end of MMC definition]

…

A majority who all prefer some set of candidates to everyone outside
that set, I call an Agreeing-Majority.

…

A majority who all prefer the same set of candidates to everyone
outside that set, I call a  Mutual-Majority.

…

(Arguably a weaker definition of a Mutual-Majority would do: A majority
who all prefer all of their favorites to everyone outside the set of all
their favorites.)

…

When there are 1 or more Agreeing-Majorities, RCV always elects the
candidate of the largest faction of  an Agreeing-Majority.

…

i.e. under those conditions, RCV always elects the favorite of an
Agreeing-Majority.

…

RCV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the
Mutual-Majority.

…

i.e. RCV always elects the favorite of the Mutual-Majority.

…

That candidate isn’t an unpopular extremist, but instead has strong
genuine majority coalition support, as defined above.

…

[quote]

I just think you're incorrect about FairVote.

[/quote]

…

I didn’t say anything about FairVote.

…

Whether you like FairVote or not, that has no bearing on the merits of
RCV.

…

FairVote, from the start, has insisted on offering the traditional RCV.
We should respect that choice. RCV has about a century of precedent in
Australia & Ireland. Proposing a traditional method with long precedent is
a valid practical choice, & one that we should respect.

…

…& that proposal has been enormously successful, & is sweeping this
country. Maybe its century of traditional precedent has something to do
with its success.

…

When RCV was  initially being adopted, of course there were no
computers, & so Condorcet’s complete pairwise-count would be infeasible in
a large election. Sure, the Sequential-Pairwise (SP) pairwise-count only
needs about twice as much vote-counting as RCV.

…

(Approval, Score, STAR & RCV all need roughly the same amount of
vote-counting (they all vary greatly), & SP needs about twice as much.)

…

Maybe people didn’t want twice as much vote-counting. Or maybe they were
afraid that SP would be rejected because of its Pareto violation (which I
consider irrelevant, just like MinMax’s Condorcet-Loser violation).

…

Then there’s Coombs, which I guess would have about the same amount of
vote-counting as RCV. But maybe they didn’t like Coombs because things
could get ridiculous, like when I nominate Dracula in the primary, so that
we can bury the Democrat under Dracula.

…

…but of course there are worse things than ridiculous.  Maybe we
haven’t been fair to Coombs.

…

As I said, I prefer Condorcet, in its best versions, but it’s RCV that
has the activist movement, big well-funded national organization,
lobbyists, experienced & active campaign-managers, & big successes all
around this country.

…

…with (I’ve read) on the order of 60 municipalities & 2 states having
adopted RCV.

…

If RCV, & not Condorcet, is succeeding, we Condorcetists have nothing to
complain about. When the RCVists were doing the work, we weren’t out there
enacting anything.  Don’t blame the RCVists for that..

…

We should acknowledge, commend & appreciate what the RCV organization
has accomplished.

…

[quote]

RCV is already poorly understood.

[/quote]

…

RCV is enormously popular with progressives & progressive organizations
& parties, such as the GPUSA, the U.S. Greens.  …because they
understand that rank-balloting will allow them to express all of their
preferences among the candidates.

…

…& because they’ve been correctly informed that RCV has genuine strong
majority properties, when it coalesces the Mutual-Majority.  ..even if
they haven’t heard about the details of those properties.

…

As for RCV’s definition, RCV can be defined very briefly, in one
sentence:

…

Repeatedly eliminate the candidate who tops fewest rankings, till
someone tops most of them.

…

[end of brief RCV definition]

…

[quote]

When I moved to San Francisco in 2011, I expected to grudgingly like
voting in RCV elections, and I expected to enjoy ranking my choices  What
I found instead was that very few people here understand how votes are
counted

[/quote]

…

They would if they heard RCV’s brief definition.

…

[quote]

, and many folks in my lefty political tribe here take great pride in
their ignorance of math and the inner workings of their electoral system,
trusting that the powers-that-be will count things correctly.

[/quote]

…

…& they’re right, when the method is RCV.  (…& likewise would be, with
a good Condorcet version too.)

…

[quote]

As "exhibit A", I will point to the recent clown show in Alameda County
(i.e. just a few miles east of me, on the other side of a puddle known as
the "San Francisco Bay"):

…

https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Alameda-County-admits-tallying-error-in-17682520.php

…

It would seem that they had been counting RCV elections wrong for
DECADES, and only noticed the problem in 2022.  Simplicity and precinct
summability matters.

[/quote]

…

RCV’s brief definition is simple. RCV is simple, natural & obvious.

…

There’s a lot of mis-statement about “Precinct-Summability”, &
questionable-ness about what “Precinct Summability” is supposed to mean..

…

Plurality, Approval & Score:

…

Candidates’ vote totals are summed in each precinct & sent to a central
count-place, where there’s a central tabulation.

…

STAR:

…

Same, at first. Then the central counting place determines the two top
scorers, & then presumably sends that information to the precincts, which
still have the rankings, & the precincts each total the pairwise votes for
each of the finalists over the other, & they all send that back to the
central location, where the results are summed & the final winner reported.

…

Condorcet:

…

Each precinct counts the preference votes for A over B, & for B over A,
for each of the N(N-1)/2 pairs {A,B}.  …& those totals are sent in to
the central location, where the winner is determined according to the rules
of whatever Condorcet version is being used.

…

RCV:

…

Each precinct counts the top-count score of each candidate, & sends that
in to the central location.

…

The central location totals that count for each candidate, to determine
which has lowest top-score, & sends that information back to the precincts.

…

Each precinct eliminates that candidate from its rankings, & repeats the
first line above.

…

Repeat till the central location finds that one candidate tops most of
the rankings.

Notice something similar about those?  Every one of those procedures
requires counts at the precincts, & also at the central location, &
communication between the two.

…

How is RCV different?  It does such a procedure a number of times.
That’s it. That’s the difference.

…

So it’s questionable regarding what is this “Precinct Summability” that
Plurailty, Approval, Score, STAR & Condorcet all have, but RCV allegedly
doesn’t have.

…

The same security measures, precautions & audits can be done with RCV as
with any of the other methods whose procedures are described above.

…

[quote]

[quote]

Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has
proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect.

[/quote]

…

This I will agree with. That is why I've hopped on the approval voting
bandwagon for single-winner reform.

[/quote]

…

That’s a bit hasty. Undeniably some of the pairwise-count
Condorcet-compliant methods thwart &/or deter offensive strategy so well
that it won’t be a problem, & the election of the sincere-CW will virtually
always be elected.

…

There’s the argument that there are so many good Condorcet versions that
choosing between them is prohibitively problematic, preventing the adoption
of any of them.

…

No, several of the best versions can be offered to a proposal-committee,
& it can discuss & evaluate them & then choose a proposal.

…

…& there are a few obviously simplest proposals, making the choice a lot
less complicated & difficult than antii-Condorcetists claim:

…

MinMax:

…

Elect the candidate whose greatest defeat is the least.

…

(…implying the election of an unbeaten candidate when there is one ( as
there nearly always is) ).

…

Condorcet//Approval:

…

Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. If no one is
pairwise-unbeaten, then elect the most approved candidate.

…

Majority-Defeat Disquaification//Approval (MDDA):

…

Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. Elect any
unbeaten candidate. If there are none, then every majority pairwise-beaten
candidate is disqualified, & the un-disqualified candidate with most
approvals is elected.

…

(I’ve added a Condorcet-winner electing clause, because I now feel that
Condorcet’s failure-betrayal scenario is so rare & unpredictable as to be
irrelevant to strategy.)

…

Sequential-Pairwise:

…

Order the candidates in a list such that the ones topping more rankings
are listed below the ones topping fewer rankings.

…

Find the pairwise-winner among the top 2 candidates in the ordering.
Then find the pairwise winner between that winner & the next candidate down
the list.  Condtinue until you’ve found the winner of the then-current
winner & the last candidate in the list. S/he wins.

I’d offer those 4 simple pairwise-count versions.

…

I’d also offer Approval, in case the jurisdiction either couldn’t
afford, or didn’t want to spend for, rank-balloting equipment & software.

…

I’d also offer RCV & STAR, because some proposal-committee members might
prefer them.

…

I’d personally propose & justify the choice of a Pairwise-Count, with
RCV as next choice, & of course Approval if rank-balloting is infeasible or
rejected.

…

If there were a ranked vote in the proposal committee, of course my
ranking would be:

…

1. Some ordering of the above-listed four Pairwise-Count methods

…

2. RCV

…

3. Approval if ranked-balloting is infeasible or rejected.

Yes, I like Approval. Under different conditions, normal conditions, it
would be my suggestion, though STAR would then be okay too.

…

But our voting-conditions are anything but normal.

…

We always have a sleazy & corrupt POS “lesser”-evil, & a
dramatically-horrifying greater-evil.  (…& some better candidates who,
our media insist, are unwinnable, minor, not-serious, candidates.)

…

We’re constantly told that the greater evil is the only bad result, & so
we have to support the “lesser-evil” against the greater-evil (…& against
our favorite).

…

Always.

…

It’s always this same discouraging, dismal & hopeless situation.

…

That isn’t normal.  It certainly isn’t natural.

…

So yes, I’d suggest Approval under normal conditions. But our highly,
bizarrely, abnormal & unnatural conditions require special methods to deal
with the (allegedly) hard choice between genuinely-wanted outcomes, &
odious dismal regrettable & deplorable “lesser” evils.

…

For these conditions, we need something more powerfully-discriminating:
a rank-method, to let everyone vote all their preferences among as many
candidates as they want to.  …to elicit & count genuine favoriteness  immediately.

…

(…not after several election-cycles, because a lot of harm can be done
in 4 years or 8 years.)

…

It’s like when, in The Godfather, Michael says to his attorney:

…

“No, you’re a peacetime consiglieri, but right now we need a wartime
consiglieri.”

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

Hi Rob—

…

You wrote:

…

[quote]

Oh Michael...where do I begin?  Your apparent move to the dark side
makes me sad.  I realize that this intro may sound condescending, but I
truly don't mean it that way.  I deeply respect your opinion. YOU were the
one who taught me about "center squeeze" in 1995 or so, and made me rethink
AV/PV/IRV/RCV (or whatever the name of the week is).

[/quote]

…

Yes, earlier I was quite critical of RCV (called IRV in those days,
before San Francisco insisted on RCV, because “instant” was misleading
people to expect an instantaneous count).

…

I was wrong.

…

You know that often the relative merits, advantages & disadvantages of
single-winner methods aren’t what they at first seem. Never be prematurely
sure that someone is wrong about such matters.

…

But I would like to remind you that I also continue to say that
Condorcet, in its best versions, is my favorite, because, always electing
the CW, it best gets rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem (LO2E) for any &
every  kind of voter, thereby accommodating even the most timid LO2E
giveaway voter.

…

As I said, RCV only works & has merit if the voters aren’t timid
overcomromising LO2E giveaway voters.

…

I don’t deny that Condorcet-failure is a disadvantage, but, with a good
electorate, it doesn’t matter. I used to say that Approval’s equal-givaway,
amounting to an abstention between Favorite & Lesser-Evil, is better than
RCV’s favorite-burial…but not if you have an electorate that won’t do the
burial !!!

…

Approval & STAR encourage Mr. Timid to do giveaway. RCV encourages
everyone to be frank, honest, ambitious, hopeful !!!

…

…because, as I said, that won’t be a problem, because an electorate that
has enacted RCV didn’t do so because they want & intend to vote a
hold-you-nose lesser-evil over their favorite (They can & do do that now,
in Plurality). If they enact RCV it’s because they want & intend to
sincerely rank the candidates, expressing & fully-supporting their favorite.

…

…& so THEY WILL DO SO !!!

…

So don’t worry about LO2E strategy in RCV voting.

…

Anti-RCVists often say that RCV doesn’t really honor majority.

…

But, as I’ve been saying, though RCV doesn’t meet the Condorcet
Criterion, it meets the Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC).  Let me state
an improved & expanded definition of MMC:

…

MMC:

…

If there are 1 or more sets of candidates such that a majority of the
voters prefer the candidates of that set to everyone outside the set, then
the winner should come from such a set.

…

(Then it goes without saying that, when there’s a Mutual-Majority
(defined below) the winner will come from that Mutual-Majority.)

…

[end of MMC definition]

…

A majority who all prefer some set of candidates to everyone outside
that set, I call an Agreeing-Majority.

…

A majority who all prefer the same set of candidates to everyone
outside that set, I call a  Mutual-Majority.

…

(Arguably a weaker definition of a Mutual-Majority would do: A majority
who all prefer all of their favorites to everyone outside the set of all
their favorites.)

…

When there are 1 or more Agreeing-Majorities, RCV always elects the
candidate of the largest faction of  an Agreeing-Majority.

…

i.e. under those conditions, RCV always elects the favorite of an
Agreeing-Majority.

…

RCV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the
Mutual-Majority.

…

i.e. RCV always elects the favorite of the Mutual-Majority.

…

That candidate isn’t an unpopular extremist, but instead has strong
genuine majority coalition support, as defined above.

…

[quote]

I just think you're incorrect about FairVote.

[/quote]

…

I didn’t say anything about FairVote.

…

Whether you like FairVote or not, that has no bearing on the merits of
RCV.

…

FairVote, from the start, has insisted on offering the traditional RCV.
We should respect that choice. RCV has about a century of precedent in
Australia & Ireland. Proposing a traditional method with long precedent is
a valid practical choice, & one that we should respect.

…

…& that proposal has been enormously successful, & is sweeping this
country. Maybe its century of traditional precedent has something to do
with its success.

…

When RCV was  initially being adopted, of course there were no
computers, & so Condorcet’s complete pairwise-count would be infeasible in
a large election. Sure, the Sequential-Pairwise (SP) pairwise-count only
needs about twice as much vote-counting as RCV.

…

(Approval, Score, STAR & RCV all need roughly the same amount of
vote-counting (they all vary greatly), & SP needs about twice as much.)

…

Maybe people didn’t want twice as much vote-counting. Or maybe they were
afraid that SP would be rejected because of its Pareto violation (which I
consider irrelevant, just like MinMax’s Condorcet-Loser violation).

…

Then there’s Coombs, which I guess would have about the same amount of
vote-counting as RCV. But maybe they didn’t like Coombs because things
could get ridiculous, like when I nominate Dracula in the primary, so that
we can bury the Democrat under Dracula.

…

…but of course there are worse things than ridiculous.  Maybe we
haven’t been fair to Coombs.

…

As I said, I prefer Condorcet, in its best versions, but it’s RCV that
has the activist movement, big well-funded national organization,
lobbyists, experienced & active campaign-managers, & big successes all
around this country.

…

…with (I’ve read) on the order of 60 municipalities & 2 states having
adopted RCV.

…

If RCV, & not Condorcet, is succeeding, we Condorcetists have nothing to
complain about. When the RCVists were doing the work, we weren’t out there
enacting anything.  Don’t blame the RCVists for that..

…

We should acknowledge, commend & appreciate what the RCV organization
has accomplished.

…

[quote]

RCV is already poorly understood.

[/quote]

…

RCV is enormously popular with progressives & progressive organizations
& parties, such as the GPUSA, the U.S. Greens.  …because they
understand that rank-balloting will allow them to express all of their
preferences among the candidates.

…

…& because they’ve been correctly informed that RCV has genuine strong
majority properties, when it coalesces the Mutual-Majority.  ..even if
they haven’t heard about the details of those properties.

…

As for RCV’s definition, RCV can be defined very briefly, in one
sentence:

…

Repeatedly eliminate the candidate who tops fewest rankings, till
someone tops most of them.

…

[end of brief RCV definition]

…

[quote]

When I moved to San Francisco in 2011, I expected to grudgingly like
voting in RCV elections, and I expected to enjoy ranking my choices  What
I found instead was that very few people here understand how votes are
counted

[/quote]

…

They would if they heard RCV’s brief definition.

…

[quote]

, and many folks in my lefty political tribe here take great pride in
their ignorance of math and the inner workings of their electoral system,
trusting that the powers-that-be will count things correctly.

[/quote]

…

…& they’re right, when the method is RCV.  (…& likewise would be, with
a good Condorcet version too.)

…

[quote]

As "exhibit A", I will point to the recent clown show in Alameda County
(i.e. just a few miles east of me, on the other side of a puddle known as
the "San Francisco Bay"):

…

https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Alameda-County-admits-tallying-error-in-17682520.php

…

It would seem that they had been counting RCV elections wrong for
DECADES, and only noticed the problem in 2022.  Simplicity and precinct
summability matters.

[/quote]

…

RCV’s brief definition is simple. RCV is simple, natural & obvious.

…

There’s a lot of mis-statement about “Precinct-Summability”, &
questionable-ness about what “Precinct Summability” is supposed to mean..

…

Plurality, Approval & Score:

…

Candidates’ vote totals are summed in each precinct & sent to a central
count-place, where there’s a central tabulation.

…

STAR:

…

Same, at first. Then the central counting place determines the two top
scorers, & then presumably sends that information to the precincts, which
still have the rankings, & the precincts each total the pairwise votes for
each of the finalists over the other, & they all send that back to the
central location, where the results are summed & the final winner reported.

…

Condorcet:

…

Each precinct counts the preference votes for A over B, & for B over A,
for each of the N(N-1)/2 pairs {A,B}.  …& those totals are sent in to
the central location, where the winner is determined according to the rules
of whatever Condorcet version is being used.

…

RCV:

…

Each precinct counts the top-count score of each candidate, & sends that
in to the central location.

…

The central location totals that count for each candidate, to determine
which has lowest top-score, & sends that information back to the precincts.

…

Each precinct eliminates that candidate from its rankings, & repeats the
first line above.

…

Repeat till the central location finds that one candidate tops most of
the rankings.

Notice something similar about those?  Every one of those procedures
requires counts at the precincts, & also at the central location, &
communication between the two.

…

How is RCV different?  It does such a procedure a number of times.
That’s it. That’s the difference.

…

So it’s questionable regarding what is this “Precinct Summability” that
Plurailty, Approval, Score, STAR & Condorcet all have, but RCV allegedly
doesn’t have.

…

The same security measures, precautions & audits can be done with RCV as
with any of the other methods whose procedures are described above.

…

[quote]

[quote]

Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has
proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect.

[/quote]

…

This I will agree with. That is why I've hopped on the approval voting
bandwagon for single-winner reform.

[/quote]

…

That’s a bit hasty. Undeniably some of the pairwise-count
Condorcet-compliant methods thwart &/or deter offensive strategy so well
that it won’t be a problem, & the election of the sincere-CW will virtually
always be elected.

…

There’s the argument that there are so many good Condorcet versions that
choosing between them is prohibitively problematic, preventing the adoption
of any of them.

…

No, several of the best versions can be offered to a proposal-committee,
& it can discuss & evaluate them & then choose a proposal.

…

…& there are a few obviously simplest proposals, making the choice a lot
less complicated & difficult than antii-Condorcetists claim:

…

MinMax:

…

Elect the candidate whose greatest defeat is the least.

…

(…implying the election of an unbeaten candidate when there is one ( as
there nearly always is) ).

…

Condorcet//Approval:

…

Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. If no one is
pairwise-unbeaten, then elect the most approved candidate.

…

Majority-Defeat Disquaification//Approval (MDDA):

…

Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. Elect any
unbeaten candidate. If there are none, then every majority pairwise-beaten
candidate is disqualified, & the un-disqualified candidate with most
approvals is elected.

…

(I’ve added a Condorcet-winner electing clause, because I now feel that
Condorcet’s failure-betrayal scenario is so rare & unpredictable as to be
irrelevant to strategy.)

…

Sequential-Pairwise:

…

Order the candidates in a list such that the ones topping more rankings
are listed below the ones topping fewer rankings.

…

Find the pairwise-winner among the top 2 candidates in the ordering.
Then find the pairwise winner between that winner & the next candidate down
the list.  Condtinue until you’ve found the winner of the then-current
winner & the last candidate in the list. S/he wins.

I’d offer those 4 simple pairwise-count versions.

…

I’d also offer Approval, in case the jurisdiction either couldn’t
afford, or didn’t want to spend for, rank-balloting equipment & software.

…

I’d also offer RCV & STAR, because some proposal-committee members might
prefer them.

…

I’d personally propose & justify the choice of a Pairwise-Count, with
RCV as next choice, & of course Approval if rank-balloting is infeasible or
rejected.

…

If there were a ranked vote in the proposal committee, of course my
ranking would be:

…

1. Some ordering of the above-listed four Pairwise-Count methods

…

2. RCV

…

3. Approval if ranked-balloting is infeasible or rejected.

Yes, I like Approval. Under different conditions, normal conditions, it
would be my suggestion, though STAR would then be okay too.

…

But our voting-conditions are anything but normal.

…

We always have a sleazy & corrupt POS “lesser”-evil, & a
dramatically-horrifying greater-evil.  (…& some better candidates who,
our media insist, are unwinnable, minor, not-serious, candidates.)

…

We’re constantly told that the greater evil is the only bad result, & so
we have to support the “lesser-evil” against the greater-evil (…& against
our favorite).

…

Always.

…

It’s always this same discouraging, dismal & hopeless situation.

…

That isn’t normal.  It certainly isn’t natural.

…

So yes, I’d suggest Approval under normal conditions. But our highly,
bizarrely, abnormal & unnatural conditions require special methods to deal
with the (allegedly) hard choice between genuinely-wanted outcomes, &
odious dismal regrettable & deplorable “lesser” evils.

…

For these conditions, we need something more powerfully-discriminating:
a rank-method, to let everyone vote all their preferences among as many
candidates as they want to.  …to elicit & count genuine favoriteness  immediately.

…

(…not after several election-cycles, because a lot of harm can be done
in 4 years or 8 years.)

…

It’s like when, in The Godfather, Michael says to his attorney:

…

“No, you’re a peacetime consiglieri, but right now we need a wartime
consiglieri.”

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info