1. Re: Rank Codes (Richard Lung)
2. Re: Rank Codes (Juho Laatu)

On Sun, Feb 14, 2021 at 4:02 PM < election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: > Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to > election-methods@lists.electorama.com > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com > > You can reach the person managing the list at > election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Rank Codes (Richard Lung) > 2. Re: Rank Codes (Juho Laatu) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2021 09:40:25 +0000 > From: Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> > To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de>, Forest Simmons > <fsimmons@pcc.edu>, EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> > Subject: Re: [EM] Rank Codes > Message-ID: <b3c4f076-e906-00fc-e96d-3525fa36430b@ukscientists.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed > > > In 2007, STV was introduced to Scottish local elections, on the same day > as AMS for the Scottish Parliament, which had already been used in a > previous election. Despite these disadvantages to STV, its spoilage was > 2%, whereas for AMS something like twice that spoilage. There was an > enquiry into the latter. > > Enid Lakeman, in How Democracies Vote, goes into this issue of STV > spoilage, in considerable detail, to anyone concerned about it. > > I think it was Mr Woodall, who investigated Meek STV to ensure it was > convergent. And this consideration applies to FAB STV. This is ensured > by the fact that it is a statistical count. It uses four averages, FA, > as the title says, and they all center the result to the most > representative candidates. I would like to point out, tho, that Binomial > STV is a different kind of count to the rest of the world of elections, > uninomial elections. With FAB STV, the last preferences count as much > against candidates, as first preferences count for them. This would > induce different voting behavior in an informed electorate of this > greater power to their vote. > > Richard Lung. > > > On 13/02/2021 16:15, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > > On 13/02/2021 03.29, Forest Simmons wrote: > >> It pains me to see all of the ranked ballot proposals that unnecessarily > >> limit preferences to three or four alternatives because of ignorance of > >> simple higher resolution ballots that can be easily marked and read (by > >> hand or by machine) without ambiguity or confusion from poorly formed > >> characters, stray marks, etc. > > I have an impression that the problem is not real, but imagined: that > > it's possible to do unlimited ranked ballots in practice without much > > difficulty. Otherwise, the jurisdictions that currently use STV would > > have encountered the problem and dealt with it already. > > > > So the problem is more one of perception: it seems obvious that unclear > > ballots are going to be hard to read, regardless of whether they > > actually will. And so, as a precautionary measure, the method gets > > limited to a few ranks. > > > > (There may also be technology-specific limitations, e.g. the > > jurisdiction in question uses mechanical voting machines that can't be > > adapted to more than this many ranks.) > > > >> A method that allows only three or four candidates to be ranked cannot > >> satisfy clone independence ... the only indispensable justification for > >> scrapping First Past the Post Plurality. And (beyond that) it > >> exacerbates the biggest IRV/STV/RCV defect, the high likelihood that > >> one's choices will be completely exhausted before the final rounds > >> unless you rank lesser evils at the expense of alternatives you like > >> better, because of ranking limitations that highlight the effect of > >> premature eliminations. > >> > >> It is alleged that because of ambiguous handwriting and lack of room for > >> more than a few "bubbles," only a handful of distinct ranks can be > allowed. > >> > >> But what if each bubble has a different value?: > >> > >> [8]? ?[4]? ?[2]? ?[1] > >> > >> The rank of a candidate is the sum of its darkened bubble values ... a > >> number between zero and fifteen. > > I think these would confuse quite a few voters. > > > > I'd probably just go with ordinary numbers and be fairly confident it's > > going to work out. But if the problem is indeed one of perception, then > > just saying "don't sweat it" isn't going to convince anyone who's sure > > there will be problems. > > > > Perhaps a study on ballot rejection rates would help provide evidence > > that it works well most of the time? I seem to recall reading on > > Reddit's EndFPTP forum that ballot spoilage rates are about the same for > > FPTP and STV. > > > >> Suppose that there are to be 26 candidates, then instead of indicating > >> their relative ranks with mere numbers, you can order them with standard > >> alpha numeric code words ... Alpha1, Bravo2, Charlie3, Delta4, Echo5, > >> Foxtrot6, ... Victor22, Whiskey23, Xray24, Yankee25, Zulu26. So the > >> military already solved the ambiguity/ "noisy channel" commuunication > >> problem in the early days of Morse code. > >> > >> These 26 code words cannot be confused with each other no matter how > >> illegible the hand writing. > > Of the two suggestions, I think I prefer this one. You could make this a > > minimal change by saying that a voter may use either ordinary numbers or > > codewords, so that voters who want to be extra sure that their ballots > > will be counted properly can use the codewords, while others may opt out > > if they think it's not worth the hassle. > > > >> These suggestions are intended for absentee and other mail-in ballots > >> ... electronic voting machines should allow in person voters to drag the > >> names into a list in any order, and then print out paper copies for > >> voter and precinct receipts. > > I'd prefer voting machines to be "Expensive Pencils" where the voter can > > input preferences and have a paper ballot printed out, and where that > > paper ballot is what gets counted. A voting machine is opaque; a > > printout is not. > > > > To mitigate chain voting, the machine could show the printout behind > > glass and deposit it directly into either the trash or the ballot box > > depending on the voter's choice. In addition, such a scheme would keep > > fingerprints and DNA off the ballot paper. > > ---- > > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2021 14:42:52 +0200 > From: Juho Laatu <juho.laatu@gmail.com> > To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> > Subject: Re: [EM] Rank Codes > Message-ID: <E4B715EB-6698-4730-9863-0AD50070F535@gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > I think I'm pretty much a pragmatist in your terms. In typical large > elections it doesn't really matter if instead of voting A=B there would be > a 50% chance that the vote will be read by computer as A>B, and 50% chance > for A<B. In practical terms that is the same as voting A=B (comparable to > flipping a coin). However from a pragmatic point of view it could be a > problem if people would get irritated because of their inability to vote > exactly A=B. > > There might be ways to go around this "irritation", like drawing an X at > one of the "smaller boxes" separetad by the light lines that I mentioned. > That X would be interpreted as an exact value (unlike other marks). But > this sounds already too complicated to be worth it. If people want to use > exact ties, it might be better to split the long boxes into 100 small > narrow (2 mm) boxes that would then correspond to some exact > rankings/ratings. With these ballots you might at some point run out of > ability to rank A>B, and be forced to rank A=B. So (from pragmatic point of > view) there will be tradeoffs, of one or another kind. > > My pragmatism gives also leeway in handling the various criteria (e.g. > strategy related). Since I have learned that no method is strategy free, it > doesn't make sense to me to meet some important criteria 100%, and then > ignore some others that are not met 100%. I see all these criteria as > pragmatic criteria in the sense that it is enough to eliminate each major > risk in practice, but not necessarily 100% in theory. The best method might > be one that intentionally does not meet any of the important criteria 100%. > That could make it possible to meet as many important criteria as possible > well enough, and thereby weaken the worst remaining vulnerability as much > as possible. > > BR, Juho > > > > On 14. Feb 2021, at 11.31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> > wrote: > > > > On 14/02/2021 10.20, Juho Laatu wrote: > >> Just a thought. > >> > >> One simple technique that allows voters to use almost infinite number > >> of different ranks would be to use one long box next to the name of > >> each candidate. Voters would draw a mark in the box (or leave it > >> unmarked). Marks towards the left side of the long box would be > >> considered "good", and marks towards the right side of the box "less > >> good". The ballots would be read by computers that would seek for a > >> mark in each box, and assign a numeric preference value depending on > >> the position of the mark in the box. There would be some additional > >> perpendicular light lines across the boxes to help making the order > >> of the candidates accurate. > > I've been thinking about such an interface for an Expensive Pencil too; > > it would make it very easy to gather rated information. It would be more > > noisy than a deliberate ratings system because it's hard to get a > > pixel-perfect line going, but if there are enough voters, then perhaps > > there's some rated analog of the Condorcet Jury theorem that would imply > > that the effect of that noise goes to zero as the number of voters > > approaches infinity. > > > > However, there's one problem: the voters can't easily equal-rank under > > such a scheme. Therefore, no method passes FBC unless it also passes > > Strong FBC, which is an extremely hard criterion to pass. Pragmatists > > may not care (e.g. Schulze has very low favorite-betrayal rates under > > the impartial culture distribution anyway), but it's annoying if you'd > > like your method to unambiguously pass. > > > > -km > > > > ------------------------------ > > Subject: Digest Footer > > _______________________________________________ > Election-Methods mailing list > Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > > ------------------------------ > > End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 199, Issue 10 > ************************************************* > -- *The information contained in this transmission is privileged * *and confidential information and intended only for the use * *of the individual or entity named as the recipient. If the reader * *is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any * *dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication * *is strictly prohibited. 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