wv autodeterence obtains with bigger faction-size differences too.
Chris—
As you suggested, I tested wv Condorcet with greater faction-size disparity.
Instead of placing the faction-sizes as closely as possible, this time I
spaced them from eachother by a factor of 3/2.
That’s about as much disparity as possible without giving someone a
majority.
The relative faction-sizes were 4, 6, & 9.
Of course that could mean 40, 60, & 90…etc.
The result was the same: Burial’ backfire was 10 times more likely than its
success.
Nothing like that has been said for any other Condorcet-complying method.
Mike O.,
One or two examples might be interesting.
Say there is a defensive strategy that those who prefer the sincere CW
to the favourite of would-be buriers can employ and it will be effective
if all of them use it.
I think it would be interesting to know how well this works in different
methods when those voters don't all use it. In other words, for some
given method, how high does the proportion of voters who prefer the
sincere CW to the BF using the defensive strategy have to be for it to work?
Chris B.
On 4/05/2024 7:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Chris—
As you suggested, I tested wv Condorcet with greater faction-size
disparity.
Instead of placing the faction-sizes as closely as possible, this time
I spaced them from eachother by a factor of 3/2.
That’s about as much disparity as possible without giving someone a
majority.
The relative faction-sizes were 4, 6, & 9.
Of course that could mean 40, 60, & 90…etc.
The result was the same: Burial’ backfire was 10 times more likely
than its success.
Nothing like that has been said for any other Condorcet-complying method.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
On Sat, May 4, 2024 at 02:41 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:
Mike O.,
One or two examples might be interesting.
Of course, & In the morning (or early afternoon) I’ll post some examples
from the 48-case test.
It’s late ⏰ in my timezone. The only reason I’m up now is because I
stayed-up inadvisably-late. But tomorrow I’ll post those examples.
Say there is a defensive strategy that those who prefer the sincere CW
to the favourite of would-be buriers can employ and it will be effective
if all of them use it.
Yes. There is, because the wv Condorcet methods meet Minimal-Defense.
Don’t rank anyone you don’t like. If the CW’s voters don’t, then no one
that they don’t like will be able to take-away the CW’s win via burial (…&
offensive truncation by one faction won’t work anyway.) …& if anyone
attempts such a burial, it will backfire.
I think it would be interesting to know how well this works in different
methods when those voters don't all use it. In other words, for some
given method, how high does the proportion of voters who prefer the
sincere CW to the BF using the defensive strategy have to be for it to
work?
I don’t know the details, but yes, it’s definitely a problem….or would be,
without autodeterence.
It’s the reason why the wv Condorcet methods’ autodeterence is so important.
Without autodeterence, if I can’t count on enough CW voters using
defensive-truncation, then they might let an Unacceptable win by burial.
I consider the merit-difference between Acceptables to be incomparably
greater than any merit differences among the Acceptables or among the
Unacceptables. Therefore not electing an Unacceptable is, for me, is what
matters in the election.
That means fully & maximally protecting the Acceptables.
So, just in case the CW voters don’t protect their candidate, I must try my
best to.
To do my best to not help buriers make an Acceptable pairbeat the CW, I
must not rank any of them over the likely CW. I must rank all of the
Acceptables together in 1st place.
But what if insufficiently many people do that? It will be ineffective. So,
again, I can’t count on that.
So I must, instead, rank the Acceptables in order of how likely they are to
be the CW. …so that I’m doing my best to try to actively-oppose any
burial-attempt.
That likely will mean burying my favorite.
(In fact, of course it’s even worse with a Condorcet method that doesn’t
even meet Minimal-Deterrence at all—which is why I say that such methods
share IRV’s serious FBC-failure…for very similar reason.)
But, with autodeterence, even without defensive-strategy use, burial is
well-deterred.
…& so no defensive strategy is really needed. We have no need to do other
than rank sincerely. That fulfills the promise of Condorcet.
…& the ideal of rank-methods.
…&, in fact, the very ideal of perfection for voting-systems.
I’m not saying that I wouldn’t do defensive-truncation anyway—as part of
maximal defense of the acceptables.
But, if I really like some Acceptables better than others, I wouldn’t
consider it necessary to not rank them in order of preference. Due to the
autodeterence, it would be safe to benefit from the full Condorcet promise.
…if I feel sufficiently strongly about the merit-differences among the
Acceptables.
I should have mentioned that, not only might the CW-voters not protect hir,
but, also, their idea of what they like or is acceptable might be different
from mine—like when Jill’s other preferrers vote for Joe. :-(
Chris B.
On 4/05/2024 7:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Chris—
As you suggested, I tested wv Condorcet with greater faction-size
disparity.
Instead of placing the faction-sizes as closely as possible, this time
I spaced them from eachother by a factor of 3/2.
That’s about as much disparity as possible without giving someone a
majority.
The relative faction-sizes were 4, 6, & 9.
Of course that could mean 40, 60, & 90…etc.
The result was the same: Burial’ backfire was 10 times more likely
than its success.
Nothing like that has been said for any other Condorcet-complying method.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
Typo:
That paragraph should start:
“ I consider the merit-difference between Acceptables & Unacceptables …”
On Sat, May 4, 2024 at 04:20 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
On Sat, May 4, 2024 at 02:41 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:
Mike O.,
One or two examples might be interesting.
Of course, & In the morning (or early afternoon) I’ll post some examples
from the 48-case test.
It’s late ⏰ in my timezone. The only reason I’m up now is because I
stayed-up inadvisably-late. But tomorrow I’ll post those examples.
Say there is a defensive strategy that those who prefer the sincere CW
to the favourite of would-be buriers can employ and it will be effective
if all of them use it.
Yes. There is, because the wv Condorcet methods meet Minimal-Defense.
Don’t rank anyone you don’t like. If the CW’s voters don’t, then no one
that they don’t like will be able to take-away the CW’s win via burial (…&
offensive truncation by one faction won’t work anyway.) …& if anyone
attempts such a burial, it will backfire.
I think it would be interesting to know how well this works in different
methods when those voters don't all use it. In other words, for some
given method, how high does the proportion of voters who prefer the
sincere CW to the BF using the defensive strategy have to be for it to
work?
I don’t know the details, but yes, it’s definitely a problem….or would be,
without autodeterence.
It’s the reason why the wv Condorcet methods’ autodeterence is so
important.
Without autodeterence, if I can’t count on enough CW voters using
defensive-truncation, then they might let an Unacceptable win by burial.
I consider the merit-difference between Acceptables to be incomparably
greater than any merit differences among the Acceptables or among the
Unacceptables. Therefore not electing an Unacceptable is, for me, is what
matters in the election.
That means fully & maximally protecting the Acceptables.
So, just in case the CW voters don’t protect their candidate, I must try
my best to.
To do my best to not help buriers make an Acceptable pairbeat the CW, I
must not rank any of them over the likely CW. I must rank all of the
Acceptables together in 1st place.
But what if insufficiently many people do that? It will be ineffective.
So, again, I can’t count on that.
So I must, instead, rank the Acceptables in order of how likely they are
to be the CW. …so that I’m doing my best to try to actively-oppose any
burial-attempt.
That likely will mean burying my favorite.
(In fact, of course it’s even worse with a Condorcet method that doesn’t
even meet Minimal-Deterrence at all—which is why I say that such methods
share IRV’s serious FBC-failure…for very similar reason.)
But, with autodeterence, even without defensive-strategy use, burial is
well-deterred.
…& so no defensive strategy is really needed. We have no need to do other
than rank sincerely. That fulfills the promise of Condorcet.
…& the ideal of rank-methods.
…&, in fact, the very ideal of perfection for voting-systems.
I’m not saying that I wouldn’t do defensive-truncation anyway—as part of
maximal defense of the acceptables.
But, if I really like some Acceptables better than others, I wouldn’t
consider it necessary to not rank them in order of preference. Due to the
autodeterence, it would be safe to benefit from the full Condorcet promise.
…if I feel sufficiently strongly about the merit-differences among the
Acceptables.
I should have mentioned that, not only might the CW-voters not protect
hir, but, also, their idea of what they like or is acceptable might be
different from mine—like when Jill’s other preferrers vote for Joe. :-(
Chris B.
On 4/05/2024 7:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Chris—
As you suggested, I tested wv Condorcet with greater faction-size
disparity.
Instead of placing the faction-sizes as closely as possible, this time
I spaced them from eachother by a factor of 3/2.
That’s about as much disparity as possible without giving someone a
majority.
The relative faction-sizes were 4, 6, & 9.
Of course that could mean 40, 60, & 90…etc.
The result was the same: Burial’ backfire was 10 times more likely
than its success.
Nothing like that has been said for any other Condorcet-complying
method.
info