On 11/02/2016 11:46 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
Vote score ballots.
For each ballot B the method is used recursively to determine what the
average scores of the candidates would be if that ballot were not
included in the election. Then the scores of ballot B are adjusted to
B' so that if it (B') were averaged in (as one additional ballot,
weighted accordingly) it would improve the previous averages (towards
the ratings of ballot B) as much as possible.
The final ratings arre the average scores of the respective adjusted
ballots.
This method is almost surely intractable computationally, but it has the
spiit of XA. I believe that for a large diverse collection of Score
ballots XA would give an excellent approximation to the result of this
recursive method.
This sounds similar to an exhaustive version of SARVO-Range, except that
your DSV method is based on XA rather than on Approval.
It only takes individual strategy into account, not organized strategy.
I guess that for organized strategy, you'd need to find the strong Nash
equilibrium, ESS or something like it.
On 11/02/2016 11:46 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Vote score ballots.
>
> For each ballot B the method is used recursively to determine what the
> average scores of the candidates would be if that ballot were not
> included in the election. Then the scores of ballot B are adjusted to
> B' so that if it (B') were averaged in (as one additional ballot,
> weighted accordingly) it would improve the previous averages (towards
> the ratings of ballot B) as much as possible.
>
> The final ratings arre the average scores of the respective adjusted
> ballots.
>
> This method is almost surely intractable computationally, but it has the
> spiit of XA. I believe that for a large diverse collection of Score
> ballots XA would give an excellent approximation to the result of this
> recursive method.
This sounds similar to an exhaustive version of SARVO-Range, except that
your DSV method is based on XA rather than on Approval.
It only takes individual strategy into account, not organized strategy.
I guess that for organized strategy, you'd need to find the strong Nash
equilibrium, ESS or something like it.
