Remember the "strongest pair" winner method? The thing that side-tracked me was trying to guarantee Smith efficiency in a simple way that would not scare away the innumerate. I think I may have a solution to that challenge. Here's my presentation idea: In the context of single winner deterministic elections, when we have a candidate that is preferred by a majority of the participating voters over any competing candidate ... basic majority rule principles suggest electing that candidate as a matter of policy. But what about the one-in-a-hundred possibility of non-existence of such a candidate? In that case, almost certainly there will be at least one pair of candidates such that no other candidate defeats both of them. Such a pair is called a covering pair. It seems reasonable to elect the pairwise winner of the strongest defeat covering pair. One possible measure of defeat strength is winner's pairwise support (wv): x ABC (sincere is ACB) y BCA Z CAB Assume z<min(x,y) B beats C with strength x+y=n-z, where n is the total number of ballots x+y+z. This is the strongest defeat. B wins thereby making the A faction burial of C backfire. There may be a better choice of defeat strength ... we'll have to experiment. Note the simplicity of getting ISDA without mentioning Smith! Suggestions? -Forest