The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
On 06/22/2017 08:30 AM, Richard Lung wrote:
The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections that
there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the impossibility
supposition.
That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of a
consistently derived right election result.
If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to judge
that there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard by
which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic consistency.
It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as the
electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election result,
because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as a
progressive pursuit.
I don't think that's quite right. Impossibility proofs like Arrow's
generally say something along this vein:
-
Here are some properties that it seems reasonable that all voting
methods should have (IIA etc for Arrow; strategy resistance and
determinism for Gibbard). -
But as long as the method is of a certain form (ordinal for Arrow,
pretty much every method for Gibbard), it's impossible to have all of these. -
Thus we're in a bind, because we'd like to have all of them.
It is then possible to construct subsets that you can have: e.g.
dictatorship gives you all the properties in Arrow's theorem except for
non-dictatorship; random pair gives you all the properties except
determinism, and so on).
You could measure any given election against the measures, even though
it's impossible to attain all of them. For instance, to measure how
strategy resistant a given method is for a given election, you could
determine how many ways there are for voters in favor of some party X to
alter their votes so that X wins instead of whoever won. The fact that
it's impossible to make a method completely resistant to strategy
doesn't make it impossible to measure how far the system is from
attaining (impossible) perfection.
In a similar vein for something like Bayesian Regret, no method would
have a BR of zero, and so no method can attain perfection. But the
actual BR might still be of interest.
The trick, if there is one, is in that the impossibility proofs don't
specify in detail what a hypothetical perfect method would look like,
only some properties it should reasonably satisfy; and then as long as
it's possible to show that the properties can't all be satisfied, we
know that there can't be a perfect system.
There is one way that "there is no objective trade-off" is correct,
however. Suppose we have two methods:
A is very vulnerable to voter strategy (compromising, burial) but not to
candidate strategy (cloning);
B is the other way around.
Which one is the better method? If we can't have both, then that depends
on the situation. There's a boundary beyond which you can't improve some
quality without giving up some other quality, but which point to pick
along that boundary depends on the context, or what the use the method
is being put to.
No doubt you are safe in not thinking that is quite right.
An electoral system that does not get beyond majority counting, even if
it employs ranked choice, (as characterised of Arrow theorem in
Democracy and New Technology, by Iain McClean) is never going to achieve
anything like satisfactory representation. It is a hang-over of
monarchism, the notion that democracy is about winners and losers.
Democracy and science are about consensus.
Richard Lung.
On 05/07/2017 00:47, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 06/22/2017 08:30 AM, Richard Lung wrote:
The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections that
there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the impossibility
supposition.
That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of a
consistently derived right election result.
If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to judge
that there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard by
which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic consistency.
It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as the
electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election result,
because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as a
progressive pursuit.
I don't think that's quite right. Impossibility proofs like Arrow's
generally say something along this vein:
-
Here are some properties that it seems reasonable that all voting
methods should have (IIA etc for Arrow; strategy resistance and
determinism for Gibbard). -
But as long as the method is of a certain form (ordinal for Arrow,
pretty much every method for Gibbard), it's impossible to have all of
these. -
Thus we're in a bind, because we'd like to have all of them.
It is then possible to construct subsets that you can have: e.g.
dictatorship gives you all the properties in Arrow's theorem except
for non-dictatorship; random pair gives you all the properties except
determinism, and so on).
You could measure any given election against the measures, even though
it's impossible to attain all of them. For instance, to measure how
strategy resistant a given method is for a given election, you could
determine how many ways there are for voters in favor of some party X
to alter their votes so that X wins instead of whoever won. The fact
that it's impossible to make a method completely resistant to strategy
doesn't make it impossible to measure how far the system is from
attaining (impossible) perfection.
In a similar vein for something like Bayesian Regret, no method would
have a BR of zero, and so no method can attain perfection. But the
actual BR might still be of interest.
The trick, if there is one, is in that the impossibility proofs don't
specify in detail what a hypothetical perfect method would look like,
only some properties it should reasonably satisfy; and then as long as
it's possible to show that the properties can't all be satisfied, we
know that there can't be a perfect system.
There is one way that "there is no objective trade-off" is correct,
however. Suppose we have two methods:
A is very vulnerable to voter strategy (compromising, burial) but not
to candidate strategy (cloning);
B is the other way around.
Which one is the better method? If we can't have both, then that
depends on the situation. There's a boundary beyond which you can't
improve some quality without giving up some other quality, but which
point to pick along that boundary depends on the context, or what the
use the method is being put to.
--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books in epub format:
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
From: "Richard Lung" voting@ukscientists.com
Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 3:46 am
To: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" km_elmet@t-online.de
Cc: "EM" election-methods@lists.electorama.com
No doubt you are safe in not thinking that is quite right.
An electoral system that does not get beyond majority counting, even if
it employs ranked choice, (as characterised of Arrow theorem in
Democracy and New Technology, by Iain McClean) is never going to achieve
anything like satisfactory representation. It is a hang-over of
monarchism, the notion that democracy is about winners and losers.
Democracy and science are about consensus.
democracy is about social choices somehow made or shared with the people who are enfranchised stakeholders (like citizens or eligible permanent residents). �so somehow we get all 120 million Americans in some virtual room and decide, with
some algorithm that is a function of each voter's choice, a winner is chosen in such a way that best expresses the will of these voters.
�
Richard, we know you are a cheerleader for IRV and that's fine. �Have you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and later
repealed IRV?
--
r b-j � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
From: "Richard Lung" voting@ukscientists.com
Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 3:46 am
To: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" km_elmet@t-online.de
Cc: "EM" election-methods@lists.electorama.com
No doubt you are safe in not thinking that is quite right.
An electoral system that does not get beyond majority counting, even if
it employs ranked choice, (as characterised of Arrow theorem in
Democracy and New Technology, by Iain McClean) is never going to achieve
anything like satisfactory representation. It is a hang-over of
monarchism, the notion that democracy is about winners and losers.
Democracy and science are about consensus.
democracy is about social choices somehow made or shared with the people who are enfranchised stakeholders (like citizens or eligible permanent residents). �so somehow we get all 120 million Americans in some virtual room and decide, with
some algorithm that is a function of each voter's choice, a winner is chosen in such a way that best expresses the will of these voters.
�
Richard, we know you are a cheerleader for IRV and that's fine. �Have you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and later
repealed IRV?
--
r b-j � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
On 7/5/2017 3:06 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Have you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and
later repealed IRV?
= = = = =
[KB] Other than Burlington VT, there were New York City, Ann Arbor MI,
and Hopkins MN, to name three. In all of the latter, the repeal was
political, not based on substance or policy.
- Ken Bearman, Minneapolis MN
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
From: "Ken B" kbearman@isd.net
Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 10:56 am
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
On 7/5/2017 3:06 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Have you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and
later repealed IRV?
= = = = =
[KB] Other than Burlington VT, there were New York City, Ann Arbor MI,
and Hopkins MN, to name three. In all of the latter, the repeal was
political, not based on substance or policy.
�
well, it's always political if it's about policy. �that's sorta common root word.
again, my point, that FairVote seems to not want to consider, is that every time IRV (however it's called, and FairVote's name change does not change the flawed mechanics) fails to elect the
Condorcet winner, there is trouble that reflects poorly on voting system reform and ranked-choice voting and even more so with the mislabeling of IRV to RCV.
that's why i am sorta pissed at FV and Rob Richie for advocating a name change for superficial marketing reasons, rather than
advocating fixing the product they are selling for the purpose of voting system reform.
IRV fails and people will blame the ranked ballot. �It will take at least generation (i think at least 20 years and we're only 8 years in) for enough people to forget, for the problems with FPTP to
rear their heads again, and enough new voters will suggest RCV to fix the problems that FPTP demonstrated. �we'll need another election where the minority GOP wins because of a split vote between the two liberal parties � in Vermont, about 32 months ago, we had an election for Governor
that had a questionable outcome where it was the GOP that was screwed. �https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vermont_gubernatorial_election,_2014#Results_5�
but that was still not enough to motivate a call for reform. �i am sorta resigned that FPTP will be with us forever, due partly
to the failure of IRV in 2009.
--
r b-j � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Some little misunderstanding here. I have never, in over 40 years
supported IRV, much less cheered for it, as could even be grasped from
the message you quote. And so have never taken any particular interest
in its adoption or discarding. Ranked choice or preference voting is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for a scientific and democratic
election system.
Richard |Lung.
On 05/07/2017 09:06, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility
theorems paradox.
From: "Richard Lung" voting@ukscientists.com
Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 3:46 am
To: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" km_elmet@t-online.de
Cc: "EM" election-methods@lists.electorama.com
No doubt you are safe in not thinking that is quite right.
An electoral system that does not get beyond majority counting, even if
it employs ranked choice, (as characterised of Arrow theorem in
Democracy and New Technology, by Iain McClean) is never going to achieve
anything like satisfactory representation. It is a hang-over of
monarchism, the notion that democracy is about winners and losers.
Democracy and science are about consensus.
democracy is about social choices somehow made or shared with the
people who are enfranchised stakeholders (like citizens or eligible
permanent residents). so somehow we get all 120 million Americans in
some virtual room and decide, with some algorithm that is a function
of each voter's choice, a winner is chosen in such a way that best
expresses the will of these voters.
Richard, we know you are a cheerleader for IRV and that's fine. Have
you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and later
repealed IRV?
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttp://electorama.com/em for list info
--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books in epub format:
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
�
my sincere and profuse apologies, Richard.
i read your posts wrong and perhaps conflated someone else's words with yours.
I am sorry, Richard. �i hope my retraction here suffices to correct the record.
bestest regards,
robert
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
From: "Richard Lung" voting@ukscientists.com
Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 2:14 pm
Cc: "EM" election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Some little misunderstanding here. I have never, in over 40 years
supported IRV, much less cheered for it, as could even be grasped from
the message you quote. And so have never taken any particular interest
in its adoption or discarding. Ranked choice or preference voting is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for a scientific and democratic
election system.
Richard |Lung.
On 05/07/2017 09:06, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility
theorems paradox.
From: "Richard Lung" voting@ukscientists.com
Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 3:46 am
To: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" km_elmet@t-online.de
No doubt you are safe in not thinking that is quite right.
An electoral system that does not get beyond majority counting, even if
it employs ranked choice, (as characterised of Arrow theorem in
Democracy and New Technology, by Iain McClean) is never going to achieve
anything like satisfactory representation. It is a hang-over of
monarchism, the notion that democracy is about winners and losers.
Democracy and science are about consensus.
democracy is about social choices somehow made or shared with the
people who are enfranchised stakeholders (like citizens or eligible
permanent residents). so somehow we get all 120 million Americans in
some virtual room and decide, with some algorithm that is a function
of each voter's choice, a winner is chosen in such a way that best
expresses the will of these voters.
Richard, we know you are a cheerleader for IRV and that's fine. Have
you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and later
repealed IRV?
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttp://electorama.com/em for list info
--
Richard Lung.
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
E-books in epub format:
--
�
r b-j � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
�
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."