Even under IUACUA conditions, Approval would be fine for choosing the party or candidate. It's only for making particular action-decisions or maybe policy choices, that D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp would be importantly better. Michael Ossipoff On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 6:08 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > It seems that if we normalize the disutilities, then we lose the > advantages of D2, D3, and Rawls over D1, since a voter can cube her own > utilities to get her ratings for example. If we don't normalize them then > the dishonest voter who can make up the biggest disutility wins. Of > course, under IUACUA conditions this manipulation would not happen. > > On Chiastic Approval, it shares with Bucklin that ratings strictly above > and strictly below the level x, can be moved around without affecting the > result, i.e. it is not sensitive to ratings away from the "approval cutoff" > found by the method. > > An example where Chiastic Approval gives a different result from MJ or > ordinary Bucklin is the one we considered earlier in a different context: > > 40: A1, B1, D.9, C0 > 35: B1, C1, D.9, A0 > 25: A1, C1, D.9, B0 > > Chiastic Approval sets x at .9 or 90 percent, since more than 90 percent > of the ballots rate D at ninety percent. > > Candidate D has 100 percent approval with this approval cutoff, and > candidate B comes in second with 75 percent approval with this cutoff. > > Bucklin chooses 100 percent as the approval cutoff, since that is the > highest median score. Candidate B has the highest approval (75 percent) > while candidate D has zero approval relative to this cutoff. > > > On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 2:17 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> . >> I neglected to add this: >> >> Rawls said that it's best to minimize the greatest disutility, the >> disutililty for the person who has the greatest disutility. I agree. >> >> Lets say that, as a method, that's called "Rawls method", or "Rawls". >> >> In Forest's example, Rawls chooses candidate D. >> >> If we had honest, legitimate elections, and an IUACUA electorate, then >> Rawls would be my 1st choice for the voting-system. But if Rawls isn't >> feasible, then I'd suggest one of the other IUACUA methods that I described. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> > >