Clarity on principles Dear EM list, If a thing needs doing, there is no point in complaining about it being hard. This was a point made by Winston Churchill. The US Constitution could not ban an election system, not invented till the next century. At least, those who introduced a quota-preferential bill to Congress apparently didn’t think so. And what the cities could do, surely the federal government also could. State-level suppression of local autonomy in introducing proportional representation, notably Massachusetts state banning other cities, in the state, than Cambridge from using STV/PR, was not a constitutional decision, but only so far as brute force could go, by way of arbitrary self-will without principles. Therefore, the way forward is a principled one. My advice, such as it is, to any electoral reform proposal, as that made by Forest, is that it needs to be clear on the principles on which it operates, so that politicians can be clear to the public, on the kind of election they are being offered. The incorporation of the Borda method in a recommendation involves the first recognition (by Laplace) that lesser preferences count less. This was in direct contradiction to the systematic elimination count offered by Condorcet. The advantage of this pioneering debate was that it offered a clear choice between all-inclusive weighted preference count and exclusive unweighted preference count. Only the former offers the Laplacerequirement to count preference order of importance. One problem I had was that weighted Condorcet pairing, counting each margin of victory, was about as accurate as Borda method, as one could tell by inspection, even of a very narrow contest. I have now come to the conclusion that weighted Condorcet pairing is effectively (on average) a weighted preference order count, first required by Laplace. Each voters preference is not suitably weighted by order of importance. Instead, the lack of weighted orders of preference for each voter is made up for, firstly by the fact that all the votes (at any order of choice) are equally or indiscriminately treated in this manner, but, on average, a collective order of preference emerges, in the margins of victory for each candidate pairing. However, what might be called Condorcet implicit preference weighting has its limitations. It does not reflect personal orders of preference for personal representation. And it changes with who votes in the electorate. Never the less, weighted Condorcet pairing, to some extent vindicates (collectively) weighted order of preference. But in doing so, it reinforces the case against unweighted elimination counts. Hence weighted Condorcet pairing may be approximately as accurate as the Borda count, both in principle and in practise for the single member case. An advantage of a Binomial count, a rational count for the exclusion, equally as well as the election, of candidates, is that it can apply to single-member as well as multi-member constituencies. (I.e. a binomial count offers the consistency of a general theory of elections.) The necessary practical consideration is thatall the preferences (including abstentions) are counted, so it is known how much the voters wish to elect or exclude the candidates. The consideration of principle is to introduce and uphold the law of conservation of (preferential) information. Regards, Richard Lung.

Richard— I must confess that it isn’t entirely clear what you’re talking about. I didn’t say that the Constitution explicitly bans PR. I said that it’s requirements would make nonsense of any attempt at PR in national government. As for your Condorcet vs Borda issue, perhaps you aren’t aware that CTE & Duncan ( like MinMax(wv) & CW,Approval) are Condorcet methods. They use Borda as part of their mechanism to disqualify the buriers’ candidate in order to deter burial strategy. On Sun, Oct 15, 2023 at 09:06 Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> wrote: > > Clarity on principles > > > > Dear EM list, > > > > If a thing needs doing, there is no point in complaining about it being > hard. This was a point made by Winston Churchill. > > The US Constitution could not ban an election system, not invented till > the next century. > > At least, those who introduced a quota-preferential bill to Congress > apparently didn’t think so. And what the cities could do, surely the > federal government also could. > > State-level suppression of local autonomy in introducing proportional > representation, notably Massachusetts state banning other cities, in the > state, than Cambridge from using STV/PR, was not a constitutional decision, > but only so far as brute force could go, by way of arbitrary self-will > without principles. > > Therefore, the way forward is a principled one. My advice, such as it is, > to any electoral reform proposal, as that made by Forest, is that it needs > to be clear on the principles on which it operates, so that politicians can > be clear to the public, on the kind of election they are being offered. > > The incorporation of the Borda method in a recommendation involves the > first recognition (by Laplace) that lesser preferences count less. > > This was in direct contradiction to the systematic elimination count > offered by Condorcet. The advantage of this pioneering debate was that it > offered a clear choice between all-inclusive weighted preference count and > exclusive unweighted preference count. Only the former offers the Laplace > requirement to count preference order of importance. > > One problem I had was that weighted Condorcet pairing, counting each > margin of victory, was about as accurate as Borda method, as one could tell > by inspection, even of a very narrow contest. > > I have now come to the conclusion that weighted Condorcet pairing is > effectively (on average) a weighted preference order count, first required > by Laplace. > > Each voters preference is not suitably weighted by order of importance. > Instead, the lack of weighted orders of preference for each voter is made > up for, firstly by the fact that all the votes (at any order of choice) are > equally or indiscriminately treated in this manner, but, on average, a > collective order of preference emerges, in the margins of victory for each > candidate pairing. > > However, what might be called Condorcet implicit preference weighting has > its limitations. It does not reflect personal orders of preference for > personal representation. And it changes with who votes in the electorate. > > Never the less, weighted Condorcet pairing, to some extent vindicates > (collectively) weighted order of preference. But in doing so, it reinforces > the case against unweighted elimination counts. Hence weighted Condorcet > pairing may be approximately as accurate as the Borda count, both in > principle and in practise for the single member case. > > An advantage of a Binomial count, a rational count for the exclusion, > equally as well as the election, of candidates, is that it can apply to > single-member as well as multi-member constituencies. (I.e. a binomial > count offers the consistency of a general theory of elections.) The > necessary practical consideration is that all the preferences (including > abstentions) are counted, so it is known how much the voters wish to elect > or exclude the candidates. The consideration of principle is to introduce > and uphold the law of conservation of (preferential) information. > > Regards, > > Richard Lung. > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

But I guess that Congress could enact a House so big that even the smallest state proportionally qualifies for a seat…but that doesn’t really help, because we still have to have a Senate in which each state has exactly 2 seats. So, national PR would remain nonsense. On Sun, Oct 15, 2023 at 12:41 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Richard— > > I must confess that it isn’t entirely clear what you’re talking about. > > I didn’t say that the Constitution explicitly bans PR. > > I said that it’s requirements would make nonsense of any attempt at PR in > national government. > > As for your Condorcet vs Borda issue, perhaps you aren’t aware that CTE & > Duncan ( like MinMax(wv) & CW,Approval) are Condorcet methods. They use > Borda as part of their mechanism to disqualify the buriers’ candidate in > order to deter burial strategy. > > On Sun, Oct 15, 2023 at 09:06 Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> > wrote: > >> >> Clarity on principles >> >> >> >> Dear EM list, >> >> >> >> If a thing needs doing, there is no point in complaining about it being >> hard. This was a point made by Winston Churchill. >> >> The US Constitution could not ban an election system, not invented till >> the next century. >> >> At least, those who introduced a quota-preferential bill to Congress >> apparently didn’t think so. And what the cities could do, surely the >> federal government also could. >> >> State-level suppression of local autonomy in introducing proportional >> representation, notably Massachusetts state banning other cities, in the >> state, than Cambridge from using STV/PR, was not a constitutional decision, >> but only so far as brute force could go, by way of arbitrary self-will >> without principles. >> >> Therefore, the way forward is a principled one. My advice, such as it is, >> to any electoral reform proposal, as that made by Forest, is that it needs >> to be clear on the principles on which it operates, so that politicians can >> be clear to the public, on the kind of election they are being offered. >> >> The incorporation of the Borda method in a recommendation involves the >> first recognition (by Laplace) that lesser preferences count less. >> >> This was in direct contradiction to the systematic elimination count >> offered by Condorcet. The advantage of this pioneering debate was that it >> offered a clear choice between all-inclusive weighted preference count and >> exclusive unweighted preference count. Only the former offers the Laplace >> requirement to count preference order of importance. >> >> One problem I had was that weighted Condorcet pairing, counting each >> margin of victory, was about as accurate as Borda method, as one could tell >> by inspection, even of a very narrow contest. >> >> I have now come to the conclusion that weighted Condorcet pairing is >> effectively (on average) a weighted preference order count, first required >> by Laplace. >> >> Each voters preference is not suitably weighted by order of importance. >> Instead, the lack of weighted orders of preference for each voter is made >> up for, firstly by the fact that all the votes (at any order of choice) are >> equally or indiscriminately treated in this manner, but, on average, a >> collective order of preference emerges, in the margins of victory for each >> candidate pairing. >> >> However, what might be called Condorcet implicit preference weighting has >> its limitations. It does not reflect personal orders of preference for >> personal representation. And it changes with who votes in the electorate. >> >> Never the less, weighted Condorcet pairing, to some extent vindicates >> (collectively) weighted order of preference. But in doing so, it reinforces >> the case against unweighted elimination counts. Hence weighted Condorcet >> pairing may be approximately as accurate as the Borda count, both in >> principle and in practise for the single member case. >> >> An advantage of a Binomial count, a rational count for the exclusion, >> equally as well as the election, of candidates, is that it can apply to >> single-member as well as multi-member constituencies. (I.e. a binomial >> count offers the consistency of a general theory of elections.) The >> necessary practical consideration is that all the preferences >> (including abstentions) are counted, so it is known how much the voters >> wish to elect or exclude the candidates. The consideration of principle is >> to introduce and uphold the law of conservation of (preferential) >> information. >> >> Regards, >> >> Richard Lung. >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >

Incidentally, of course Congress would never make such an effort. For some reason 🤩our “leaders” would never make such an effort, because, for some reason, they don’t like PR. …which was why Bill Clinton fired his cabinet-member for mentioning PR, because, he said, PR it antidocratic. :-) …more generally, similarly, N. Dakota legislature canceled the initiative enactment of Approval Voting, & outlawed Approval & rank balloting, saying that they did so to protect the rights of the people who had tried to get the right to express Yes/No ratings on more than 1 candidate & have them counted. On Sun, Oct 15, 2023 at 13:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > But I guess that Congress could enact a House so big that even the > smallest state proportionally qualifies for a seat…but that doesn’t really > help, because we still have to have a Senate in which each state has > exactly 2 seats. > > So, national PR would remain nonsense. > > On Sun, Oct 15, 2023 at 12:41 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Richard— >> >> I must confess that it isn’t entirely clear what you’re talking about. >> >> I didn’t say that the Constitution explicitly bans PR. >> >> I said that it’s requirements would make nonsense of any attempt at PR in >> national government. >> >> As for your Condorcet vs Borda issue, perhaps you aren’t aware that CTE & >> Duncan ( like MinMax(wv) & CW,Approval) are Condorcet methods. They use >> Borda as part of their mechanism to disqualify the buriers’ candidate in >> order to deter burial strategy. >> >> On Sun, Oct 15, 2023 at 09:06 Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> Clarity on principles >>> >>> >>> >>> Dear EM list, >>> >>> >>> >>> If a thing needs doing, there is no point in complaining about it being >>> hard. This was a point made by Winston Churchill. >>> >>> The US Constitution could not ban an election system, not invented till >>> the next century. >>> >>> At least, those who introduced a quota-preferential bill to Congress >>> apparently didn’t think so. And what the cities could do, surely the >>> federal government also could. >>> >>> State-level suppression of local autonomy in introducing proportional >>> representation, notably Massachusetts state banning other cities, in the >>> state, than Cambridge from using STV/PR, was not a constitutional decision, >>> but only so far as brute force could go, by way of arbitrary self-will >>> without principles. >>> >>> Therefore, the way forward is a principled one. My advice, such as it >>> is, to any electoral reform proposal, as that made by Forest, is that it >>> needs to be clear on the principles on which it operates, so that >>> politicians can be clear to the public, on the kind of election they are >>> being offered. >>> >>> The incorporation of the Borda method in a recommendation involves the >>> first recognition (by Laplace) that lesser preferences count less. >>> >>> This was in direct contradiction to the systematic elimination count >>> offered by Condorcet. The advantage of this pioneering debate was that it >>> offered a clear choice between all-inclusive weighted preference count and >>> exclusive unweighted preference count. Only the former offers the >>> Laplace requirement to count preference order of importance. >>> >>> One problem I had was that weighted Condorcet pairing, counting each >>> margin of victory, was about as accurate as Borda method, as one could tell >>> by inspection, even of a very narrow contest. >>> >>> I have now come to the conclusion that weighted Condorcet pairing is >>> effectively (on average) a weighted preference order count, first required >>> by Laplace. >>> >>> Each voters preference is not suitably weighted by order of importance. >>> Instead, the lack of weighted orders of preference for each voter is made >>> up for, firstly by the fact that all the votes (at any order of choice) are >>> equally or indiscriminately treated in this manner, but, on average, a >>> collective order of preference emerges, in the margins of victory for each >>> candidate pairing. >>> >>> However, what might be called Condorcet implicit preference weighting >>> has its limitations. It does not reflect personal orders of preference for >>> personal representation. And it changes with who votes in the electorate. >>> >>> Never the less, weighted Condorcet pairing, to some extent vindicates >>> (collectively) weighted order of preference. But in doing so, it reinforces >>> the case against unweighted elimination counts. Hence weighted Condorcet >>> pairing may be approximately as accurate as the Borda count, both in >>> principle and in practise for the single member case. >>> >>> An advantage of a Binomial count, a rational count for the exclusion, >>> equally as well as the election, of candidates, is that it can apply to >>> single-member as well as multi-member constituencies. (I.e. a binomial >>> count offers the consistency of a general theory of elections.) The >>> necessary practical consideration is that all the preferences >>> (including abstentions) are counted, so it is known how much the voters >>> wish to elect or exclude the candidates. The consideration of principle is >>> to introduce and uphold the law of conservation of (preferential) >>> information. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Richard Lung. >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >>