The IRV-Disease has reached my town.
⸘Howdy‽
The article is here:
http://petaluma360.com/news/9331748-181/ranked-choice-voting-gains-traction
You need not read it because it says nothing new. I shall post again later today about a way to make the ranked-choice crowd happy with Score-Voting.
¡Peace!
--
“⸘Ŭalabio‽” <Walabio@MacOSX.Com>
Skype:
Walabio
An IntactWiki:
http://intactwiki.org
“You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts.”
——
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
I think voting reform activists in the US should welcome IRV and push to
make sure that there are
no abominable "details" like restricted ranking or eliminating
all-at-once all but the top two candidates.
Voters must be able to strictly rank from the top however many
candidates they wish, and the eliminations
must be one-at-a-time.
In my judgement this is better than Approval (or something
strategically equivalent that uses ratings ballots
with more than 2 slots) because it doesn't have any annoying defection
incentive and properly meets
"Mutual Relative Majority".
If you are a fan of the Condorcet criterion, then I think it is fine to
modify IRV by before each elimination
we check for a Condorcet winner (among the so far remaining candidates)
and when we find one we stop
and declare that candidate the winner.
If you want something more simple then I think Condorcet//Approval is
acceptable.
Voters simply rank the candidates they approve. Equal-ranking should
preferably be allowed.
A candidate that pairwise beats all the others wins. If there is no such
candidate then the most approved candidate
wins.
A bit better, but equivalent in 3-candidate elections and harder to
explain, are Smith//Approval and (one of
my favourites) Max Covered Approval.
Chris Benham
On 4/03/2019 5:48 am, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
⸘Howdy‽
The article is here:
http://petaluma360.com/news/9331748-181/ranked-choice-voting-gains-traction
You need not read it because it says nothing new. I shall post again later today about a way to make the ranked-choice crowd happy with Score-Voting.
¡Peace!
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The IRV-Disease has reached my town.
From: "Chris Benham" cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
Date: Mon, March 4, 2019 7:41 am
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
I think voting reform activists in the US should welcome IRV and push to
make sure that there are
no abominable "details" like restricted ranking or eliminating
all-at-once all but the top two candidates.
i dunno what that means.
Voters must be able to strictly rank from the top however many
candidates they wish, and the eliminations
must be one-at-a-time.
then you need tougher ballot access restrictions. SF had more than a dozen candidates but only 3 levels of ranking. i think that it is reasonable for the law to assign a fixed number of ranking levels, but it should be more than 3. then the number of signatures required to get a
candidate's name on the ballot should be increased high enough that typically the number of candidates is no more than the number of ranking levels. in Burlington Vermont, we had 5 levels and rarely more than 5 candidates on the ballot for mayor.
In my judgement this is better than Approval (or something
strategically equivalent that uses ratings ballots
with more than 2 slots) because it doesn't have any annoying defection
incentive and properly meets
"Mutual Relative Majority".
the problem with both Approval and Score Voting is that the voter must make a tactical decision about how high to score (or whether to approve) their second-choice. it is inherently flawed in that manner.
If you are a fan of the Condorcet criterion, then I think it is fine to
modify IRV by before each elimination
we check for a Condorcet winner (among the so far remaining candidates)
and when we find one we stop
and declare that candidate the winner.
one way to do this is STV-BTR ("Bottom Two Runoff"). so it's just like IRV, except when a candidate needs to be eliminated, it is not simply the guy on the bottom (of first-choice votes), the two bottom candidates are runoff
against each other, counting only how voters rank them relative to each other (like in the IRV final round), only the winner of that Bottom Runoff advances to the next round. this STV-BTR is Condorcet compliant.
If you want something more simple then I think Condorcet//Approval is
acceptable.
Voters simply rank the candidates they approve. Equal-ranking should
preferably be allowed.
Yes!
A candidate that pairwise beats all the others wins. If there is no such
candidate then the most approved candidate wins.
in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate? all unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot. is any candidate that is ranked at all "approved"? that would change and
complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.
A bit better, but equivalent in 3-candidate elections and harder to
explain, are Smith//Approval and (one of
my favourites) Max Covered Approval.
i still think that Tideman RP using margins is the simplest meaningful method that elects the same candidate that Schulze (based on margins) elects when there are 3 in the Smith set.
both the rules and meaning for marking the ballots (Ranking Candidate A above Candidate B only means that if the election were held between only those two candidates, your vote is for Candidate A) and the decision algorithm (If more voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A over Candidate B
than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected)m should be simple for everyone to understand. as simple as possible.
i still see no advantage of any method that is not Condorcet compliant over one that is.
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Robert,
I am strongly of the view that voters should be allowed to bullet-vote
or rank every single candidate or anything in between.
(For IRV and my suggested IRV-Condorcet hybrid I am opposed to allowing
above-bottom equal-ranking without a relatively complicated mechanism
I invented.)
i think that it is reasonable for the law to assign a fixed number of
ranking levels, but it should be more than 3.
What is "reasonable" about it? There is no such restriction in
elections for the President of Ireland or seats in
the legislature of the Australian state of New South Wales and other places.
"..eliminating all-at-once all but the top two candidates."
i dunno what that means.
In other words I support the Alternative Vote and not what is called the
"Contingent Vote" or "Top-Two IRV".
The contingent vote differs from thealternative vote
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_votingwhich allows for
many rounds of counting, eliminating only one weakest candidate each
round.
in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate? all
unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot. is any
candidate that is ranked at all "approved"?
Yes.
that would change and complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.
Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly) "complicate".
Allowing voters to rank among unapproved
candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot more
complicated.
i still see no advantage of any method that is not Condorcet compliant
over one that is.
All Condorcet methods are vulnerable to Burial strategy and fail the
Favorite Betrayal Criterion.
As has been pointed out to you on this list before, Margins is
especially vulnerable to Burial.
Suppose sincere is:
46 A
44 B
10 C
I hope we are clear that if everyone bullet-votes like this then A is
the Condorcet (and every other
type of) winner.
Supposing this scenario is accurately reflected in the pre-election
polls, and so the B voters (perhaps
following advice from their party) decide "It looks like we are going to
lose to A, maybe something good
will happen if we rank C" and so the votes cast are:
46 A
44 B>C
10 C
A>B 46-44 (margin=2) B>C 44-10 (margin=34) C>A 54-46 (margin=8)
Now Margins elects B, rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy.
I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this scenario. Even
assuming that all the votes are sincere,
B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and
positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten
by A.)
IRV and the IRV-Condorcet method I like elects A.
The Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval methods I like elect C. The
B voters "approved" C and they got C.
If you think it is "reasonable" to restrict the number of "ranking
levels" and you want to allow voters to equal-rank
and presumably also skip ranking levels, then in my book you are talking
about ratings rather than rankings
and you have something that stuffs up IRV or anything similar.
But it is fine for Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval or Smith//Top
Ratings and several other voting methods
I like.
Chris Benham
On 5/03/2019 10:02 am, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The IRV-Disease has reached my town.
From: "Chris Benham" cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
Date: Mon, March 4, 2019 7:41 am
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
I think voting reform activists in the US should welcome IRV and push to
make sure that there are
no abominable "details" like restricted ranking or eliminating
all-at-once all but the top two candidates.
i dunno what that means.
Voters must be able to strictly rank from the top however many
candidates they wish, and the eliminations
must be one-at-a-time.
then you need tougher ballot access restrictions. SF had more than a
dozen candidates but only 3 levels of ranking. i think that it is
reasonable for the law to assign a fixed number of ranking levels, but
it should be more than 3. then the number of signatures required to
get a candidate's name on the ballot should be increased high enough
that typically the number of candidates is no more than the number
of ranking levels. in Burlington Vermont, we had 5 levels and rarely
more than 5 candidates on the ballot for mayor.
In my judgement this is better than Approval (or something
strategically equivalent that uses ratings ballots
with more than 2 slots) because it doesn't have any annoying defection
incentive and properly meets
"Mutual Relative Majority".
the problem with both Approval and Score Voting is that the voter must
make a tactical decision about how high to score (or whether to
approve) their second-choice. it is inherently flawed in that manner.
If you are a fan of the Condorcet criterion, then I think it is fine to
modify IRV by before each elimination
we check for a Condorcet winner (among the so far remaining candidates)
and when we find one we stop
and declare that candidate the winner.
one way to do this is STV-BTR ("Bottom Two Runoff"). so it's just
like IRV, except when a candidate needs to be eliminated, it is not
simply the guy on the bottom (of first-choice votes), the two bottom
candidates are runoff against each other, counting only how voters
rank them relative to each other (like in the IRV final round), only
the winner of that Bottom Runoff advances to the next round. this
STV-BTR is Condorcet compliant.
If you want something more simple then I think Condorcet//Approval is
acceptable.
Voters simply rank the candidates they approve. Equal-ranking should
preferably be allowed.
Yes!
A candidate that pairwise beats all the others wins. If there is no such
candidate then the most approved candidate wins.
in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate? all
unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot. is any
candidate that is ranked at all "approved"? that would change and
complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.
A bit better, but equivalent in 3-candidate elections and harder to
explain, are Smith//Approval and (one of
my favourites) Max Covered Approval.
i still think that Tideman RP using margins is the simplest meaningful
method that elects the same candidate that Schulze (based on margins)
elects when there are 3 in the Smith set.
both the rules and meaning for marking the ballots (Ranking Candidate
A above Candidate B only means that if the election were held between
only those two candidates, your vote is for Candidate A) and the
decision algorithm (If more voters mark their ballots preferring
Candidate A over Candidate B than the number of voters marking their
ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected)m should be
simple for everyone to understand. as simple as possible.
i still see no advantage of any method that is not Condorcet compliant
over one that is.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
Chris Benham wrote:
If you are a fan of the Condorcet criterion, then I think it is fine
to modify IRV by before each elimination
we check for a Condorcet winner (among the so far remaining
candidates) and when we find one we stop
and declare that candidate the winner.
This is one of the algorithms supported by CIVS, the one called
"Condorcet-IRV" though to my understanding it was originally proposed by
Thomas Hill.
-- Andrew
On 05 Mar 2019, at 07:45, Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au [ApprovalVoting] ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com wrote:
Robert,
in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate? all unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot. is any candidate that is ranked at all "approved"?
Yes.
that would change and complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.
Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly) "complicate". Allowing voters to rank among unapproved
candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot more complicated.
One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than with strategic voting.
First preferences could be as follows.
30: far-left
21: left
19: right
30: far-right
If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left, the natural approval limit would be between the left wing and right wing parties. We would get mostly votes that rank only left wing or only right wing candidates. And the winner would be with good probability the far-left candidate, not the expected Condorcet winner (left).
The problem with "implicit approval cutoff after the ranked candidates" is that voters would be encouraged not to rank all the major candidates. Not good for Condorcet. That would remove some important information. In this example the sincere Condorcet winner could not be identified anymore.
46 A
44 B>C
10 C
A>B 46-44 (margin=2) B>C 44-10 (margin=34) C>A 54-46 (margin=8)
Now Margins elects B, rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy.
I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this scenario. Even assuming that all the votes are sincere,
B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten
by A.)
Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval cutoff after the ranked candidates. What if the votes are sincere and there is no implicit approval cutoff?
Juho
P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong.
P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, or to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them with the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal, but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be much better than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all.
i am not on the other two lists, so i can't post to them.
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The IRV-Disease has reached my town.
From: "Chris Benham" cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
Date: Mon, March 4, 2019 9:45 pm
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc: ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com
"robert bristow-johnson" rbj@audioimagination.com
I am strongly of the view that voters should be allowed to bullet-vote
or rank every single candidate or anything in between.
Fine.�
�
i think that it is reasonable for the law to assign a fixed number of
ranking levels, but it should be more than 3.
What is "reasonable" about it?�
finite amount of real-estate on the paper ballot.
The contingent vote differs from the alternative vote
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_votingwhich allows for
many rounds of counting, eliminating only one weakest candidate each
round.
in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate?� all
unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot.� is any
candidate that is ranked at all "approved"?
Yes.
that would change and complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.
Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly) "complicate".
Allowing voters to rank among unapproved
candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot more
complicated.
it adds rules.� without this addition rank/approval thing, the rules of tabulation are simpler.
i still see no advantage of any method that is not Condorcet compliant
over one that is.
All Condorcet methods are vulnerable to Burial strategy and fail the
Favorite Betrayal Criterion.
yeah, but if a CW exists and, for whatever reason, you do not elect the CW (as what happened to us in Burlington in 2009), you are electing a candidate when more of us marked our ballots that we preferred someone else.� that's hardly
democratic.
As has been pointed out to you on this list before, Margins is
especially vulnerable to Burial.
yes it has been pointed out to me.� with anecdotes.� with "suppose this..."
Suppose sincere is:
46 A
44 B
10 C
I hope we are clear that if everyone bullet-votes like this then A is
the Condorcet (and every other
type of) winner.
Supposing this scenario is accurately reflected in the pre-election
polls, and so the B voters (perhaps
following advice from their party) decide "It looks like we are going to
lose to A, maybe something good
will happen if we rank C" and so the votes cast are:
46 A
44 B>C
10 C
A>B 46-44 (margin=2)���� B>C 44-10 (margin=34)�� C>A 54-46 (margin=8)
Now Margins elects B,� rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy.
yup it's the impossible Arrow.
how would we differentiate that scenario with 44 B>C that was strategic from the same exact set of ballots cast that are sincere?� if it's sincere, then B should
win.
but it's a good example of how, if the election was close and you could convince enough B voters to vote tactically, that it rewards Burial.� but it's still a contrived example.
maybe Winning Votes is better than Margins.� i dunno.
I can't tolerate any method
that elects B in this scenario. Even
assuming that all the votes are sincere,
B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and
positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten�by A.)
but only very closely beaten by A where it appears that otherwise voters more strongly prefer B over C and C over A.� if the vote is sincere, it looks to me that A is barely a plurality winner.
IRV and the IRV-Condorcet method I like elects A.
is that IRV-Condorcet the same as STV-BTR?
The Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval methods I like elect C.� The
B voters "approved" C and they got C.
looks weak to me (a lot more voters prefer B to C).� i think you would have some pitchforks in the street if you gave that election to C.
�
If you think it is "reasonable" to restrict the number of
"ranking
levels" and you want to allow voters to equal-rank
and presumably also skip ranking levels, then in my book you are talking
about ratings rather than rankings
No.� If it's scoring (or "rating"), the voter must tactically decide how much they will score their second choice.� It doesn't make a difference in ranking.� And every voter's voting power should be equal.
and you have something that stuffs up IRV or anything similar.
dunno what that means, either.
But it is fine for Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval or Smith//Top
Ratings and several other voting methods�I like.
I just want it so that when A is compared to B, that everyone who weighs in on that choice have an equal say (that's One-Person-One-Vote).
And, excepting a cycle (which is an "impossible" mess), I just want it that if
more voters mark their ballots preferring A to B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then B is not elected.
Them's are my dogma.� And eliminating obvious tactical burdens from voters follows close behind to this dogma.� Simplicity in voting and tabulation
comes next.
--
r b-j� � � � � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
�
�
�
�
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] [ApprovalVoting] Re: The IRV-Disease has reached my town.
From: "Juho Laatu" juho.laatu@gmail.com
Date: Tue, March 5, 2019 12:12 am
To: "EM" election-methods@lists.electorama.com
P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong.
i can't take any credit for proposing that.� i dunno who thought of it first.� wasn't me.
the thing that i sorta don't like about it is that it
is still IRV and not strictly precinct-summable.� otherwise it's okay, i guess.� and we could still precinct-sum each defeat pair as a check on the election if there is a CW.� But it would be necessary that a physical instrument representing each ballot be transferred from the
precinct to the central tabulation location to tally the election and determine the winner.� if transparency is salient, then STV-BTR is still more like IRV and less like Condorcet.
P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, or to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them with the idea of ranking all
100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal, but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be much better than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all.----
�
the problem is, in 2010, when the IRV opponents were gearing up their rhetoric in Burlington, they falsely claimed there was "voter disenfranchisement" with IRV in Burlington.� because they read some propaganda that pointed to real disenfranchisement in San
Francisco for voters that didn't realize who the race was really gonna end up between.� these "disenfranchised" voters marked their ballots 1,2,3 and none of those candidates were in the IRV final round.� they had no say in who was ultimately elected.� and, like plurality,
they would have to guess who is likely to win and vote insincerely for the major candidate that they dislike the least.
in Burlington, we had 5 candidates and 5 ranking levels.� i think 5 or 6 levels is enough and we should make our ballot access laws tough enough to approximately limit
the number of candidates on the ballot to that number.� maybe there's enough room on the ballot for 8 or 9 levels, but i don't think we would need them.
--
r b-j� � � � � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
�
�
�
�
On 05 Mar 2019, at 10:56, robert bristow-johnson rbj@audioimagination.com wrote:
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] [ApprovalVoting] Re: The IRV-Disease has reached my town.
From: "Juho Laatu" juho.laatu@gmail.com
Date: Tue, March 5, 2019 12:12 am
To: "EM" election-methods@lists.electorama.com
P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong.
i can't take any credit for proposing that. i dunno who thought of it first. wasn't me.
the thing that i sorta don't like about it is that it is still IRV and not strictly precinct-summable. otherwise it's okay, i guess. and we could still precinct-sum each defeat pair as a check on the election if there is a CW. But it would be necessary that a physical instrument representing each ballot be transferred from the precinct to the central tabulation location to tally the election and determine the winner. if transparency is salient, then STV-BTR is still more like IRV and less like Condorcet.
Precinct-summability could be the next evolutionary step (in an IRV oriented society) after the basic idea of STV-BTR has been accepted.
P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, or to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them with the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal, but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be much better than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all.----
the problem is, in 2010, when the IRV opponents were gearing up their rhetoric in Burlington, they falsely claimed there was "voter disenfranchisement" with IRV in Burlington. because they read some propaganda that pointed to real disenfranchisement in San Francisco for voters that didn't realize who the race was really gonna end up between. these "disenfranchised" voters marked their ballots 1,2,3 and none of those candidates were in the IRV final round. they had no say in who was ultimately elected. and, like plurality, they would have to guess who is likely to win and vote insincerely for the major candidate that they dislike the least.
in Burlington, we had 5 candidates and 5 ranking levels. i think 5 or 6 levels is enough and we should make our ballot access laws tough enough to approximately limit the number of candidates on the ballot to that number. maybe there's enough room on the ballot for 8 or 9 levels, but i don't think we would need them.
There may be many kind of elections, with different number of candidates, with or without reliable polls beforehand, and voters may be different. One should take all this into account when planning an ideal election method for each society, and their different elections. Where I live, we could have some 200 candidates in the parliamentary elections. The system might evolve towards STV or something like that. Most people would not like to rank all the candidates anyway. Having all the candidates named on the ballot paper would be tedious too. The best idea might be to continue the tradition of writing the number of the favourite candidate on the (blank) ballot sheet, and allow voters to write more than one number on that ballot sheet. But how many numbers should one allow? 200 sounds excessive. And what if people just want to vote for their favourite party? Maybe one should have some inheritance rules that allow the party to inherit the vote when all the listed candidates have been eliminated. This example is a proportional election, and that complicates things a bit. But my point is just that there are different societies with different traditions, different preferences, different needs and different elections, and we just need to take that into account, and adapt to whatever the real-life situation is.
Juho
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Juho,
46 A
44 B>C
10 C
A>B 46-44 (margin=2)���� B>C 44-10 (margin=34)�� C>A 54-46 (margin=8)
Now Margins elects B,� rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy.
I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this scenario. Even
assuming that all the votes are sincere,
B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and
positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten
by A.)
Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval cutoff after
the ranked candidates. What if the votes are sincere and there is no
implicit approval cutoff?
No, I'm only "assuming" that positional information is more meaningful
than which candidate is "closer" to being the Condorcet winner
according to Margins or which candidate needs the fewest additional
bullet-votes to become the CW.
Given that Margins is very vulnerable to Burial strategy the argument
that it's worth putting up with that because with sincere votes B
in this scenario is the best (or a good or even acceptable) candidate is
.. what??
Or to put it another way, assuming the votes are sincere, you arguments
against electing A or C are what?
One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than with strategic
voting.
First preferences could be as follows.
30: far-left
21: left
19: right
30: far-right
If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left, the natural
approval limit would be between the left wing and right wing parties.
We would get mostly votes that rank only left wing or only right wing
candidates. And the winner would be with good probability the far-left
candidate, not the expected Condorcet winner (left).
That doesn't bother me much because (a) far-left may be higher "Social
Utility" than left and (b) probably enough right voters would
be aware that the result is unlikely to be decided by Approval and so
they would not be taking a huge risk by sincerely ranking left
over far-left.
But having said that, Smith//Approval using ballots that� allow voters
to rank among candidates they don't approve would not be
in my book too bad (and much better than Margins).
P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot
of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong.
That method doesn't have good criterion compliances. It's just a gimmick
to smuggle Condorcet compliance past IRV enthusiasts.
The alternative of just checking for a CW (among remaining candidates)
before each elimination is much better.
P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked
candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very
high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, or
to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them with
the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal,
but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be much better
than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all.
Limiting the number of candidates the voter is allowed to rank makes no
sense. What has happened to your concern
about "removing information" on who the sincere/ "expected" CW is?
There would be nothing "frightening" about ranking all the candidates if
doing so is purely optional. But voters who wish
to vote a full ranking should be allowed to.
Chris� Benham
On 5/03/2019 6:42 pm, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 05 Mar 2019, at 07:45, Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au [ApprovalVoting]
<ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com
mailto:ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Robert,
in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate?� all
unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot.� is any
candidate that is ranked at all "approved"?
Yes.
that would change and complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.
Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly) "complicate".
Allowing voters to rank among unapproved
candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot
more complicated.
One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than with strategic
voting.
First preferences could be as follows.
30: far-left
21: left
19: right
30: far-right
If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left, the natural
approval limit would be between the left wing and right wing parties.
We would get mostly votes that rank only left wing or only right wing
candidates. And the winner would be with good probability the far-left
candidate, not the expected Condorcet winner (left).
The problem with "implicit approval cutoff after the ranked
candidates" is that voters would be encouraged not to rank all the
major candidates. Not good for Condorcet. That would remove some
important information. In this example the sincere Condorcet winner
could not be identified anymore.
46 A
44 B>C
10 C
A>B 46-44 (margin=2)���� B>C 44-10 (margin=34)�� C>A 54-46 (margin=8)
Now Margins elects B,� rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy.
I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this scenario. Even
assuming that all the votes are sincere,
B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and
positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten
by A.)
Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval cutoff after
the ranked candidates. What if the votes are sincere and there is no
implicit approval cutoff?
Juho
P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot
of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong.
P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked
candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very
high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, or
to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them with
the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal,
but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be much better
than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all.
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