JQ
Jameson Quinn
Sat, Oct 22, 2016 10:24 PM
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less and
supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further reduces
the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less and
supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further reduces
the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
JQ
Jameson Quinn
Sun, Oct 23, 2016 1:52 PM
Here's a new definition of SARA
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Support_Accept_Reject_Abstain_voting:
Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) voting is very similar to Majority
Acceptable Score voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Acceptable_Score_voting, which
is the graded Bucklin http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Graded_Bucklin method
which uses 3 grade levels http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3_grade_levelsand
breaks median ties using Score voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Score_voting. SARA works as follows:
-
Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of "support"
and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200 points.
-
"Support" helps a candidate the most, "reject" hurts the most.
"Accept" helps less than support, and is good for helping a second-rate
candidate beat a third-rate one. "Abstain" helps a candidate avoid
elimination in step 3 but hurts them in steps 2 and 4; it's good for a
second-rate candidate when there's a first-rate one who can beat them, or
for a candidate you're not sure about.
-
Eliminate any candidates with under 50 points.
-
50 points would be the score of a candidate supported by 1/4 or
accepted by 1/2. Anything less than that probably indicates a
lesser-known
candidate who got a lot of 'abstains'; eliminating them here ensures they
won't be the only candidate remaining after step 3.
-
Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves
nobody.
-
If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority.
-
Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.
-
This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.
...
This does not pass the CD criterion; in the scenario (expressed as
Support>Accept>Abstain>Reject)
28: A>>B>C
27: B>>>AC (honest is B>>A>C)
45: C>>>AB
... the truncation by the B voters successfully elects B.
However, it does avoid a slippery slope. That is to say, in the above
scenario, even though A leads B by just one vote, a mere two strategic B
voters cannot elect B by truncating:
28: A>>B>C
2: B>>>AC
25: B>>A>C
45: C>>>AB
A wins, even though B would win with the analogous truncation in score or
Approval.
I think that this "no slippery slope" property is sufficient to give good
CD performance in the real world. If you assume that most other voters in
your faction will not be trying CD strategy, there is no incentive to try
it yourself, so the ball never gets rolling.
On the other hand, it can avoid center squeeze:
28: A>>B>C
27: B>>A>C
3: C>B>>A
42: C>>>AB
B, the CW, correctly wins.
If I'm right that this kind of system avoids CD strategy, the only
effective cognitive burden of this method is the decision between "accept"
and "abstain". You should "accept" a lesser evil against a greater evil;
you should "abstain" if you think that your favorite can win. This is, I
think, the minimum possible cognitive burden for a method that does well on
both CD and center squeeze; and it's distilled to its purest form.
2016-10-22 18:24 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com:
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
Here's a new definition of SARA
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Support_Accept_Reject_Abstain_voting>:
Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) voting is very similar to Majority
Acceptable Score voting
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Acceptable_Score_voting>, which
is the graded Bucklin <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Graded_Bucklin> method
which uses 3 grade levels <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3_grade_levels>and
breaks median ties using Score voting
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Score_voting>. SARA works as follows:
1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of "support"
and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200 points.*
- *"Support" helps a candidate the most, "reject" hurts the most.
"Accept" helps less than support, and is good for helping a second-rate
candidate beat a third-rate one. "Abstain" helps a candidate avoid
elimination in step 3 but hurts them in steps 2 and 4; it's good for a
second-rate candidate when there's a first-rate one who can beat them, or
for a candidate you're not sure about.*
2. *Eliminate any candidates with under 50 points.*
- *50 points would be the score of a candidate supported by 1/4 or
accepted by 1/2. Anything less than that probably indicates a
lesser-known
candidate who got a lot of 'abstains'; eliminating them here ensures they
won't be the only candidate remaining after step 3.*
3. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves
nobody.*
- *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority.*
4. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
- *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*
*...*
This does not pass the CD criterion; in the scenario (expressed as
Support>Accept>Abstain>Reject)
28: A>>B>C
27: B>>>AC (honest is B>>A>C)
45: C>>>AB
... the truncation by the B voters successfully elects B.
However, it does avoid a slippery slope. That is to say, in the above
scenario, even though A leads B by just one vote, a mere two strategic B
voters cannot elect B by truncating:
28: A>>B>C
2: B>>>AC
25: B>>A>C
45: C>>>AB
A wins, even though B would win with the analogous truncation in score or
Approval.
I think that this "no slippery slope" property is sufficient to give good
CD performance in the real world. If you assume that most other voters in
your faction will not be trying CD strategy, there is no incentive to try
it yourself, so the ball never gets rolling.
On the other hand, it can avoid center squeeze:
28: A>>B>C
27: B>>A>C
3: C>B>>A
42: C>>>AB
B, the CW, correctly wins.
If I'm right that this kind of system avoids CD strategy, the only
effective cognitive burden of this method is the decision between "accept"
and "abstain". You should "accept" a lesser evil against a greater evil;
you should "abstain" if you think that your favorite can win. This is, I
think, the minimum possible cognitive burden for a method that does well on
both CD and center squeeze; and it's distilled to its purest form.
2016-10-22 18:24 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com>:
> Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
>
>
> - Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
> Default is abstain.
> - Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
> and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
> eliminate all who aren't.
> - Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
> each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
>
>
> This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
> reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Sun, Oct 23, 2016 2:05 PM
Could you give a brief, precise definition of center squeeze?
Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 22, 2016 3:24 PM, "Jameson Quinn" jameson.quinn@gmail.com wrote:
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Could you give a brief, precise definition of center squeeze?
Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 22, 2016 3:24 PM, "Jameson Quinn" <jameson.quinn@gmail.com> wrote:
> Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
>
>
> - Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
> Default is abstain.
> - Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
> and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
> eliminate all who aren't.
> - Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
> each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
>
>
> This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
> reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
JQ
Jameson Quinn
Sun, Oct 23, 2016 3:20 PM
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the plurality
loser. There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the
level of strategy necessary for the CW to win:
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not. But
even if the do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom. The defensive strategies that work are
for the weaker wing to give the CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to
give the stronger wing near-bottom score.
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But under
SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer; the strategy is
effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the CW faction
cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy backfire here is
not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy has some chance of
winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic backfire is a good thing
if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if it actually occurs.
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
counteract SHOS.
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not defensively
plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to protect them
from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW is only barely
a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a successful defense in
this case. However, I think that very tightly-balanced situations like this
are not a large concern.)
2016-10-23 10:05 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com:
Could you give a brief, precise definition of center squeeze?
Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 22, 2016 3:24 PM, "Jameson Quinn" jameson.quinn@gmail.com wrote:
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the plurality
loser. There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the
level of strategy necessary for the CW to win:
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not. But
even if the do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom. The defensive strategies that work are
for the weaker wing to give the CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to
give the stronger wing near-bottom score.
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But under
SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer; the strategy is
effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the CW faction
cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy backfire here is
not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy has some chance of
winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic backfire is a good thing
if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if it actually occurs.
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
counteract SHOS.
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not defensively
plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to protect them
from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW is only barely
a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a successful defense in
this case. However, I think that very tightly-balanced situations like this
are not a large concern.)
2016-10-23 10:05 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>:
> Could you give a brief, precise definition of center squeeze?
>
> Michael Ossipoff
> On Oct 22, 2016 3:24 PM, "Jameson Quinn" <jameson.quinn@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
>>
>>
>> - Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
>> Default is abstain.
>> - Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
>> and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
>> eliminate all who aren't.
>> - Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
>> each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
>>
>>
>> This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
>> reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Mon, Oct 24, 2016 6:17 PM
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle Cws
has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or burial
vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more favorable to
finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
and Woodall.
You wrote:
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
strategy necessary for the CW to win:
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
(You wrote):
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter of
which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years or
so.
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing among
your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
(You wrote):
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
(You wrote):
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above, &
in earlier posts.
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But under
SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail, depending
on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't win.
(You wrote):
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the
CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable. ...especially
with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting the
best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank sincerely,
and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the election
of someone in your bottom-set.
(You wrote):
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on Bucklin
strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the lack of
CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
Could you give a brief, precise definition of center squeeze?
Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 22, 2016 3:24 PM, "Jameson Quinn" jameson.quinn@gmail.com wrote:
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less and
supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for each
"accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn" <jameson.quinn@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle Cws
has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or burial
vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more favorable to
finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
and Woodall.
You wrote:
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
strategy necessary for the CW to win:
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
(You wrote):
>
> -In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter of
which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years or
so.
> -In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing _among_
your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
(You wrote):
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
(You wrote):
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above, &
in earlier posts.
> -In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But under
SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail, depending
on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't win.
(You wrote):
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the
CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable. ...especially
with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting the
best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
> -In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank sincerely,
and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the election
of someone in your bottom-set.
(You wrote):
> -In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on Bucklin
strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the lack of
CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
> 2016-10-23 10:05 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>:
>>
>> Could you give a brief, precise definition of center squeeze?
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>> On Oct 22, 2016 3:24 PM, "Jameson Quinn" <jameson.quinn@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
>>>
>>> Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
>>> Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less and
supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
>>> Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for each
"accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
>>>
>>> This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
>>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
>>
>
C
C.Benham
Tue, Oct 25, 2016 4:40 PM
On 10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
(Jameson wrote):
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he
does in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a
strategy problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
A couple of somewhat relevant questions:
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by
definition. But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still
wins. ...the right answer in such a method.
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
Jameson wrote:
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are
acceptable, eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points
wins.
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y
that is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do
nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.
Chris Benham
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive
strategy needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a
middle Cws has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or
burial vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more
favorable to finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a
distinction about that except that it's part of the problem-examples
in IRV, Benham, and Woodall.
You wrote:
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level
of strategy necessary for the CW to win:
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side
can't take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter
burial by mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
(You wrote):
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even
under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere
favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a
matter of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30
years or so.
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different
result.
But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if
that were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't,
because electing from your top-set is usually more important than
electing the best particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing
among your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a
majority who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason
for voters in Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid
approving past the expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower
your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past
the CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having
a social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
(You wrote):
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he
does in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a
strategy problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
(You wrote):
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the
CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing
near-bottom score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's
voters should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated
above, & in earlier posts.
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs
doesn't win.
(You wrote):
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if
the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a
strategy backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because
the strategy has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes
attempted. Strategic backfire is a good thing if it discourages the
strategy, but a bad thing if it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting
the best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on
Bucklin, because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir
voters don't plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to
deter burial, because the would-be buriers don't have better
information than the defenders have.
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively
plump to counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result
in the election of someone in your bottom-set.
(You wrote):
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW
to protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If
the CW is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top
for a successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on
Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh
the lack of CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
On 10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
> choosing socially better.
>
> (Jameson wrote):
>
> But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
> "semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
> truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
>
> (endquote)
>
> In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
>
> In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
> Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he
> does in general pairwise-count methods.
>
> The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
> best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a
> strategy problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
>
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
A couple of somewhat relevant questions:
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
> Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by
> definition. But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
>
> Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still
> wins. ...the right answer in such a method.
>
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
Jameson wrote:
> Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
>
> * Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
> Default is abstain.
> * Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
> and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are
> acceptable, eliminate all who aren't.
> * Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
> each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points
> wins.
>
>
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y
that is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do
nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.
Chris Benham
>
> On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn" <jameson.quinn@gmail.com
> <mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >
> > Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
> plurality loser.
>
> So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive
> strategy needed to protect the CWs's win.
>
> Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a
> middle Cws has the smallest faction.
>
> And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or
> burial vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more
> favorable to finding vulnerability.
>
> But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a
> distinction about that except that it's part of the problem-examples
> in IRV, Benham, and Woodall.
>
> You wrote:
>
> There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level
> of strategy necessary for the CW to win:
>
> (endquote)
>
> Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side
> can't take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter
> burial by mere plumping.
>
> No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
> methods with wv strategy.
>
> As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
> pairwise-count methods.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> >
> > -In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even
> under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere
> favorite.
>
> (endquote)
>
> Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a
> matter of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
>
> That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
> majority-favored.
>
> If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
> mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
>
> Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30
> years or so.
>
> > -In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
> "honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
>
> (endquote)
>
> Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
> Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.
>
> Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
>
> Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different
> result.
>
> But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:
>
> Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if
> that were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't,
> because electing from your top-set is usually more important than
> electing the best particular individual candidate you can.
>
> CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing
> _among_ your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
>
> (But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
>
> If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
> important thing.
>
> Approve (only) your top-set.
>
> (More about that in my post yesterday)
>
> But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a
> majority who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason
> for voters in Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid
> approving past the expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower
> your Pt.
>
> When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past
> the CWse.
>
> Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having
> a social agreement to that effect.
>
> What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
> "semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
> truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
>
> (endquote)
>
> In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
>
> In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
> Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he
> does in general pairwise-count methods.
>
> The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
> best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a
> strategy problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the
> CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing
> near-bottom score.
>
> (endquote)
>
> Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
> obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's
> voters should plump.
>
> But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated
> above, & in earlier posts.
>
> > -In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
> under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
>
> No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
> ...the right answer in such a method.
>
> With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
> depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs
> doesn't win.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> ; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if
> the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a
> strategy backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because
> the strategy has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes
> attempted. Strategic backfire is a good thing if it discourages the
> strategy, but a bad thing if it actually occurs.
>
> Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
> ...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
>
> But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting
> the best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on
> Bucklin, because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir
> voters don't plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to
> deter burial, because the would-be buriers don't have better
> information than the defenders have.
>
> > -In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively
> plump to counteract SHOS.
>
> Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
> sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result
> in the election of someone in your bottom-set.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> > -In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
> defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW
> to protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If
> the CW is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top
> for a successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
> tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
>
> (endquote)
>
> That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on
> Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh
> the lack of CD enough to compete with the best methods.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Tue, Oct 25, 2016 6:28 PM
(Replying farther down, after &&&&&&&&&&&&&&...)
Chris quotes Jameson & me:
On Oct 25, 2016 9:40 AM, "C.Benham" cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
On 10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
(Jameson wrote):
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
(You wrote):
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
(endquote)
Good point. Because Approval is a good method, then how can it be bad to
choose the Approval winner among the Smith-set?
Fine, but by sincere Approval's standard, is Smith//Approval as good as
just using Approval? Obviously not.
Approval, not Smith//Approval, elects the candidate in the most people's
top-set, when people vote the optimal strategy of approving (only) their
top-set.
Smith//Approval of course elects the CWv if there is one, instead of the
Approval winner.
Anyway, of course, if a ranking method is chosen, it's because the choice
is based on different goals or considerations:
Maybe people want to choose among their top-set, maybe assuming
(incorrectly) that that won't increase the probability of electing from
their bottom-set.
Maybe, due to overcompromising tendency, or rivalry among similar parties,
voters need rankings, to avoid or mitigate their resulting voting-errors.
...justifying a rank method.
If a method meets MMC, and if a voter is majority-favored (MF), then s/he
can rank sincerely, & if hir mutual majority do so too, then the winner
will be in hir top-set.
In other words, s/he can choose among hir top-set in complete safety.
Smith//Approval & IRV meet MMC, and so they both offer that guarantee to a
MF voter.
So far, so good.
But wait...What if you aren't MF?
Then in Smith//Approval, what does it take to try to protect your top-set?
The CWs is likely to be in many top-sets, likely in yours. Good rank
methods have som protection for the CWs.
In an FBC method like Bucklin, you can effectively vote, Aporoval-style.
Top-voting one top-set member won't hurt another one.
In Smith//Approval, that's not so.
In methods with wv strategy, a CW's win isn't lost by truncation from one
side.
...& burial should be deterred if the CWs's voters plump.
...& if burial is done anyway, then that hands the win to the opposite
wing. If that's your wing, then that's better than the CWs.
Smith//Approval doesn't have wv strategy.
Bucklin, & wv- strategy methods, but not Smith//Approval, let the CWs's
voters protect the CWs by plumping.
By Approval standards, Smith//Approval isn't as good as Approval.
By ranking method goals & considerations, it isn't as good as Bucklin or
wv- strategy methods.
I don't know the answers to the 2 questions below. Replying farther down.
A couple of somewhat relevant questions:
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
See above.
Michael Ossipoff
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
Jameson wrote:
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less and
supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for each
"accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or
burial vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more
favorable to finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a
distinction about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in
IRV, Benham, and Woodall.
You wrote:
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
strategy necessary for the CW to win:
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even
under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere
favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different
But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing
among your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
(You wrote):
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
(You wrote):
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the
CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing
near-bottom score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated
above, & in earlier posts.
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.
(You wrote):
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if
the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting
the best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on
Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the
lack of CD enough to compete with the best methods.
(Replying farther down, after &&&&&&&&&&&&&&...)
Chris quotes Jameson & me:
On Oct 25, 2016 9:40 AM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
>
> On 10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
>>
>> (Jameson wrote):
>>
>> But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
>>
>> (endquote)
>>
>> In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
>>
>> In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
>>
>> The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
>
>
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
(You wrote):
> Mike,
>
> Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
(endquote)
Good point. Because Approval is a good method, then how can it be bad to
choose the Approval winner among the Smith-set?
Fine, but by sincere Approval's standard, is Smith//Approval as good as
just using Approval? Obviously not.
Approval, not Smith//Approval, elects the candidate in the most people's
top-set, when people vote the optimal strategy of approving (only) their
top-set.
Smith//Approval of course elects the CWv if there is one, instead of the
Approval winner.
Anyway, of course, if a ranking method is chosen, it's because the choice
is based on different goals or considerations:
Maybe people want to choose _among_ their top-set, maybe assuming
(incorrectly) that that won't increase the probability of electing from
their bottom-set.
Maybe, due to overcompromising tendency, or rivalry among similar parties,
voters need rankings, to avoid or mitigate their resulting voting-errors.
...justifying a rank method.
If a method meets MMC, and if a voter is majority-favored (MF), then s/he
can rank sincerely, & if hir mutual majority do so too, then the winner
will be in hir top-set.
In other words, s/he can choose among hir top-set in complete safety.
Smith//Approval & IRV meet MMC, and so they both offer that guarantee to a
MF voter.
So far, so good.
But wait...What if you aren't MF?
Then in Smith//Approval, what does it take to try to protect your top-set?
The CWs is likely to be in many top-sets, likely in yours. Good rank
methods have som protection for the CWs.
In an FBC method like Bucklin, you can effectively vote, Aporoval-style.
Top-voting one top-set member won't hurt another one.
In Smith//Approval, that's not so.
In methods with wv strategy, a CW's win isn't lost by truncation from one
side.
...& burial should be deterred if the CWs's voters plump.
...& if burial is done anyway, then that hands the win to the opposite
wing. If that's your wing, then that's better than the CWs.
Smith//Approval doesn't have wv strategy.
Bucklin, & wv- strategy methods, but not Smith//Approval, let the CWs's
voters protect the CWs by plumping.
By Approval standards, Smith//Approval isn't as good as Approval.
By ranking method goals & considerations, it isn't as good as Bucklin or
wv- strategy methods.
I don't know the answers to the 2 questions below. Replying farther down.
>
> A couple of somewhat relevant questions:
>
> (1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
>
> (2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
>
> And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
See above.
Michael Ossipoff
>
>> Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
>>
>> Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
>
>
> But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
>
>
> Jameson wrote:
>
>> Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
>>
>> Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
>> Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less and
supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
>> Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for each
"accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
>>
> I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
>
> With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
>
> Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
> but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>>
>> On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn" <jameson.quinn@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
>>
>> So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
>>
>> Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.
>>
>> And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or
burial vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more
favorable to finding vulnerability.
>>
>> But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a
distinction about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in
IRV, Benham, and Woodall.
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
strategy necessary for the CW to win:
>>
>> (endquote)
>>
>> Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.
>>
>> No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
>>
>> As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
>>
>> (You wrote):
>>
>> >
>> > -In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even
under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere
favorite.
>>
>> (endquote)
>>
>> Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
>>
>> That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
>>
>> If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
>>
>> Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
or so.
>>
>> > -In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
>>
>> (endquote)
>>
>> Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.
>>
>> Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
>>
>> Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different
result.
>>
>> But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:
>>
>> Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
>>
>> CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing
_among_ your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
>>
>> (But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
>>
>> If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
>>
>> Approve (only) your top-set.
>>
>> (More about that in my post yesterday)
>>
>> But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
>>
>> When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.
>>
>> Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.
>>
>> What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
>>
>> (You wrote):
>>
>> But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
>>
>> (endquote)
>>
>> In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
>>
>> In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
>>
>> The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
>>
>> (You wrote):
>>
>> The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the
CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing
near-bottom score.
>>
>> (endquote)
>>
>> Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
>>
>> But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated
above, & in earlier posts.
>>
>> > -In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
>>
>> No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.
>>
>> With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.
>>
>> (You wrote):
>>
>> ; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if
the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
>>
>> Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
>>
>> But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting
the best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
>>
>> > -In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump
to counteract SHOS.
>>
>> Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.
>>
>> (You wrote):
>>
>> > -In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
>>
>> (endquote)
>>
>> That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on
Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the
lack of CD enough to compete with the best methods.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Tue, Oct 25, 2016 6:51 PM
Ok, maybe you're right, & maybe, among Smith methods, Smith//Approval does
the best, in terms of choosing from the most top-sets.
In fact maybe, compared to other rank methods in general, it does best by
that standard.
I was comparing it to other rank-methods by a standard based on CWs (only
indirectly related to top-sets), ignoring the Approval in Smith//Approval.
Thanks for pointing that out. ...pointing out something I'd missed.
Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 25, 2016 9:40 AM, "C.Benham" cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
On 10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
(Jameson wrote):
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
A couple of somewhat relevant questions:
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
Jameson wrote:
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.
Chris Benham
On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn" jameson.quinn@gmail.com wrote:
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or burial
vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more favorable to
finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
and Woodall.
You wrote:
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
strategy necessary for the CW to win:
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
(You wrote):
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
or so.
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing among
your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
(You wrote):
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
(You wrote):
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above,
& in earlier posts.
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.
(You wrote):
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the
CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting the
best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.
(You wrote):
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on Bucklin
strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the lack of
CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Ok, maybe you're right, & maybe, among Smith methods, Smith//Approval does
the best, in terms of choosing from the most top-sets.
In fact maybe, compared to other rank methods in general, it does best by
that standard.
I was comparing it to other rank-methods by a standard based on CWs (only
indirectly related to top-sets), ignoring the Approval in Smith//Approval.
Thanks for pointing that out. ...pointing out something I'd missed.
Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 25, 2016 9:40 AM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
> On 10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
> choosing socially better.
>
> (Jameson wrote):
>
> But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
> "semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
> truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
>
> (endquote)
>
> In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
>
> In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
> Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
> in general pairwise-count methods.
>
> The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
> particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
> problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
>
>
> Mike,
>
> Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
> Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
>
> A couple of somewhat relevant questions:
>
> (1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
> smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
>
> (2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
>
> And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
>
> Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
> But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
>
> Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
> ...the right answer in such a method.
>
>
> But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
>
> Jameson wrote:
>
> Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
>
>
> - Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
> Default is abstain.
> - Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
> and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
> eliminate all who aren't.
> - Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
> each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
>
>
> I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
> "25%" figure looks arbitrary.
>
> With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
> Mono-add-Plump.
>
> Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
> is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
> but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
> longer eliminated and wins.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
> On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn" <jameson.quinn@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
> plurality loser.
>
> So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
> needed to protect the CWs's win.
>
> Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
> Cws has the smallest faction.
>
> And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or burial
> vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more favorable to
> finding vulnerability.
>
> But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
> about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
> and Woodall.
>
> You wrote:
>
> There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
> strategy necessary for the CW to win:
>
> (endquote)
>
> Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
> take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
> mere plumping.
>
> No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
> methods with wv strategy.
>
> As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
> pairwise-count methods.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> >
> > -In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
> honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.
>
> (endquote)
>
> Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
> of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
>
> That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
> majority-favored.
>
> If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
> mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
>
> Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
> or so.
>
> > -In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
> "honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
>
> (endquote)
>
> Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
> it's choosing socially better.
>
> Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
>
> Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
>
> But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:
>
> Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
> were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
> electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
> particular individual candidate you can.
>
> CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing _among_
> your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
>
> (But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
>
> If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
> important thing.
>
> Approve (only) your top-set.
>
> (More about that in my post yesterday)
>
> But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
> who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
> Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
> expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
>
> When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
> CWse.
>
> Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
> social agreement to that effect.
>
> What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
> "semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
> truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
>
> (endquote)
>
> In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
>
> In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
> Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
> in general pairwise-count methods.
>
> The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
> particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
> problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
> near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
> score.
>
> (endquote)
>
> Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
> obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
> should plump.
>
> But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above,
> & in earlier posts.
>
> > -In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
> under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
>
> No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
> right answer in such a method.
>
> With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
> depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
> win.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> ; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the
> CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
> backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
> has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
> backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
> it actually occurs.
>
> Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
> ...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
>
> But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting the
> best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
> because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
> plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
> the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
>
> > -In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
> counteract SHOS.
>
> Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
> sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
> election of someone in your bottom-set.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> > -In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
> defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
> protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
> is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
> successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
> tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
>
> (endquote)
>
> That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on Bucklin
> strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the lack of
> CD enough to compete with the best methods.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Tue, Oct 25, 2016 6:55 PM
But MMPO's Weak CD remains as an advantage, because the chicken dilemma can
be a nuisance in Approval.
So MMPO isn't completely ruled out.
Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 25, 2016 9:40 AM, "C.Benham" cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
On 10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
(Jameson wrote):
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
A couple of somewhat relevant questions:
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
Jameson wrote:
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.
Chris Benham
On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn" jameson.quinn@gmail.com wrote:
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or burial
vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more favorable to
finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
and Woodall.
You wrote:
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
strategy necessary for the CW to win:
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
(You wrote):
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
or so.
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing among
your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
(You wrote):
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
(You wrote):
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above,
& in earlier posts.
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.
(You wrote):
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the
CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting the
best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.
(You wrote):
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on Bucklin
strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the lack of
CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
But MMPO's Weak CD remains as an advantage, because the chicken dilemma can
be a nuisance in Approval.
So MMPO isn't completely ruled out.
Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 25, 2016 9:40 AM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
> On 10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
> choosing socially better.
>
> (Jameson wrote):
>
> But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
> "semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
> truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
>
> (endquote)
>
> In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
>
> In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
> Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
> in general pairwise-count methods.
>
> The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
> particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
> problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
>
>
> Mike,
>
> Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
> Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
>
> A couple of somewhat relevant questions:
>
> (1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
> smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
>
> (2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
>
> And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
>
> Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
> But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
>
> Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
> ...the right answer in such a method.
>
>
> But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
>
> Jameson wrote:
>
> Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
>
>
> - Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
> Default is abstain.
> - Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
> and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
> eliminate all who aren't.
> - Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
> each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
>
>
> I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
> "25%" figure looks arbitrary.
>
> With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
> Mono-add-Plump.
>
> Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
> is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
> but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
> longer eliminated and wins.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
> On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn" <jameson.quinn@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
> plurality loser.
>
> So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
> needed to protect the CWs's win.
>
> Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
> Cws has the smallest faction.
>
> And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or burial
> vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more favorable to
> finding vulnerability.
>
> But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
> about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
> and Woodall.
>
> You wrote:
>
> There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
> strategy necessary for the CW to win:
>
> (endquote)
>
> Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
> take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
> mere plumping.
>
> No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
> methods with wv strategy.
>
> As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
> pairwise-count methods.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> >
> > -In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
> honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.
>
> (endquote)
>
> Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
> of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
>
> That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
> majority-favored.
>
> If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
> mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
>
> Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
> or so.
>
> > -In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
> "honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
>
> (endquote)
>
> Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
> it's choosing socially better.
>
> Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
>
> Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
>
> But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:
>
> Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
> were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
> electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
> particular individual candidate you can.
>
> CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing _among_
> your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
>
> (But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
>
> If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
> important thing.
>
> Approve (only) your top-set.
>
> (More about that in my post yesterday)
>
> But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
> who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
> Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
> expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
>
> When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
> CWse.
>
> Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
> social agreement to that effect.
>
> What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
> "semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
> truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
>
> (endquote)
>
> In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
>
> In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
> Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
> in general pairwise-count methods.
>
> The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
> particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
> problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
> near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
> score.
>
> (endquote)
>
> Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
> obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
> should plump.
>
> But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above,
> & in earlier posts.
>
> > -In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
> under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
>
> No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
> right answer in such a method.
>
> With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
> depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
> win.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> ; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the
> CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
> backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
> has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
> backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
> it actually occurs.
>
> Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
> ...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
>
> But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting the
> best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
> because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
> plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
> the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
>
> > -In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
> counteract SHOS.
>
> Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
> sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
> election of someone in your bottom-set.
>
> (You wrote):
>
> > -In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
> defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
> protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
> is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
> successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
> tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
>
> (endquote)
>
> That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on Bucklin
> strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the lack of
> CD enough to compete with the best methods.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
JQ
Jameson Quinn
Tue, Oct 25, 2016 8:07 PM
I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes in
outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
"more than 50 points".
Here's the latest wording, in 3 steps:
Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) works as follows:
-
Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of "support"
and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200 points.
-
"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them),
"reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for
the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you
want to help
them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with
them but are
hoping for somebody better.
-
Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves no
candidates with over 50 points.
-
If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate
who couldn't
at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a
majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville
voters in the
example below).
-
Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.
-
This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.
2016-10-22 18:24 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com:
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes in
outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
"more than 50 points".
Here's the latest wording, in 3 steps:
Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) works as follows:
1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of "support"
and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200 points.*
- *"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them),
"reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for
the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you
want to help
them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with
them but are
hoping for somebody better.*
2. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves no
candidates with over 50 points.*
- *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate
who couldn't
at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a
majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville
voters in the
example below).*
3. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
- *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*
2016-10-22 18:24 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com>:
> Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
>
>
> - Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
> Default is abstain.
> - Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
> and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
> eliminate all who aren't.
> - Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
> each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
>
>
> This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
> reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
>
