Hi CLC,

Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com a écrit :

Does "Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW needs to have a majority over every other
candidate? Or is this mutual majority?

As someone who feels bare Condorcet is not sufficient and possibly not necessary, I
feel like I am meant to vote for option one, but if I'm reading it right, then
option one isn't actually offering enough...

I picture single-winner elections as having a hypothetical median voter that the
candidates are trying to appeal to, and when you have a majority-strength pairwise
contest, I expect that the median voter is there on the winning side. It certainly
seems more likely than not.

The second option doesn't offer Smith, but if it did, I would note that Smith is a
poor guarantee of quality. Here's a 1025-voter election where a 2-vote candidate is
in the Smith set (along with all other candidates):

2: A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
1: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
2: C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
4: D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
8: E>F>G>H>I>J>K
16: F>G>H>I>J>K
32: G>H>I>J>K
64: H>I>J>K
128: I>J>K
256: J>K
512: K

While this is not realistic, I do think it is realistic that a candidate of limited
interest to most voters would sometimes manage to pairwise defeat a more viable
candidate. And we should be ready to interpret this as noise.

Kevin
votingmethods.net

On 2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:

That was phrased a bit oddly in the context of the rest of your post,
but I understand you to be saying "the worst method that passes Smith
may still be pretty bad", not necessarily that proposed methods passing
Smith are actually bad. Is that right?

-km

Does "Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW needs to have a majority over every
othercandidate?

Yes: a CW needs more than 50% of the vote, including tied ranks, to defeat
every other candidate. This version of Condorcet is compatible with FBC.

On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de
wrote:

Hi Kristofer,

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de a écrit :

Yes, what happened there is I wanted to talk about what exactly is assured by the
second option. But if it only offers Condorcet, it's clear that its worst would be
pretty bad, with no need to say it. So I tried to hypothetically improve that
offering to argue that it is still dubious.

Kevin
votingmethods.net

On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:02 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:

I guess a lot of CWs wouldn’t be getting elected.

The best Condorcet methods don’t importantly fail FBC. A sincere CW can
only lose by offensive strategy, & the better Condorcet methods well-deter
offensive strategy. No need for any defensive strategy.

Was it you who once said that people would try offensive strategy? The
whole point of strategy is action based on an analysis of what the result
will be. It’s a strategist’s business to find that out first.

Anyway when it’s noticed to usually backfire…

There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but public
proposals have to be as simple as possible. Few methods proposed here are
simple enough for public proposal.

On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:50 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

In that case I say forget about FBC methods other than Approval. I came
to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated FBC methods need to
use Kevin's  "Tied at the Top Rule" mechanism.

There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet compliance,
but none that I discern for strict FBC compliance.  I would think most
voters would satisfied with the massive reduction in Compromise
incentive compared to FPP afforded by properly implemented IRV, let
alone the still greater reduction we get from Condorcet.

In general FBC is much more slippery and "expensive" (in terms of being
compatible with other criteria) than Condorcet.  I went off my own
"Irrelevant-Ballot Independent Fall-back Approval" idea (which isn't
"very simple") when Kevin showed that it fails Woodall's Plurality
criterion.

And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods that fail
Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings methods and this
"Majority-Condorcet" idea.

You have an apparent "majority Condorcet" winner, and then a few extra
ballots that vote for nobody are found and then the winner changes
because the "majority" threshold goes up. Absurd and potentially
embarrassing.

Chris B.

On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

Yes, there’s no need for an FBC-complying method more complicated than
Approval.

The best Condorcet versions don’t really give any
favorite-burial-incentive, though they don’t strictly pass FBC. They really
don’t require any defensive strategy…the ideal of voting-systems.

But most ranked-methods, including Condorcet other than a few classes of
it, have a big serious FBC-failure that I consider prohibitive.

I could accept it in Hare, if people wouldn’t bury their favoriteunder a
lesser-evil—& they might well not…if they know & like what they’re getting
when they enact it. …which obviously isn’t the case when it’s fraudulently
sold to them.

But otherwise (when Hare is all that’s currently up for enactment this
year, where I reside) I’d be willing to accept Hare’s top-end
favorite-burial defensive-strategy, though I wouldn’t like it…if people
wouldn’t use it to protect an evil.

…but not when it’s being dishonesty misrepresented to voters.

On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 05:00 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

Hi Chris, thanks for your response!

I came to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated FBC methods need

Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer with this poll: do
tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank mechanisms, have substantial support on
this email list? (ICT is a similar, but not-quite-working, attempt at
satisfying Minimal Defense as well.)

There's a major IRV-repeal effort underway in Alaska at the moment because
they had one (!) election with a favorite-betrayal incentive. I'm also not
aware of any movements for strict relative-majority Condorcet compliance.
The organization that comes closest is EVC (with their Copeland//Borda
proposal), but even they're not very purist about it.

And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods that fail

I fully agree with you that this is a big problem for median ratings. A
voter who shows up and says they think all the candidates are bad isn't
provide any new information about the relative quality of the candidates.

However, I don't think an all-equal ballot is providing no information in
every situation. As an example, say we had a system like approval, but with
a 50% threshold for election (and elections with <50% support for the
winner resulting in reopening nominations). Then, a fully-blank ballot is a
way for voters to meaningfully express their preference for somebody
else, other
than the current crop of candidates.

Something similar applies to the tied-at-the-top rule: a voter who ties two
candidates is saying they want these two candidates to be compared using
the tiebreaking mechanism, rather than the relative-Condorcet mechanism.

On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 5:00 AM Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote: