> > Because it's so brief, let me state the conditional(u) option, for > Approval, and for Bucklin: > > Approval: > > If a ballot conditionally approves a candidate, then it gives an approval > to that candidate only if that vote-receiving candidate has more > unconditional approvals than does any candidate unconditionally approved by > that ballot. > > I don't see the purpose of the qualifier "vote-receiving;" It seems to me that if a candidate has more (unconditional) approvals than some other candidate, then it is ipso facto "vote-receiving." It could also be called TopMiddleBottom. Voters mark candidates Top, Middle, or Bottom., with default Bottom. In the first round count, ballots contribute support only to their Top rated candidates. Then if (on some ballot) a Middle rated candidate has a better chance of winning (according to the first round totals) than any candidate that is Top rated by that ballot, then that ballot promotes that candidate to Top status for the purposes of the final count. In other words, the Middle mark is a fall-back or conditional approval mark.

Hi Forest-- By "vote-receiving", I just wanted that to refer to the candidate who's being considered for receiving the conditional vote. Jameson has just demonstrated that my Conditional Approval fails FBC. Most likely, that means that my Conditional(u) Bucklin fails FBC too. Now, hopefully your proposal, &/or Chris's Unconditional Bucklin passes FBC. I've just now found your posting. I hope that your method or Chris's meets FBC. Michael Ossipoff On Sat, Nov 5, 2016 at 6:56 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > > >> Because it's so brief, let me state the conditional(u) option, for >> Approval, and for Bucklin: >> >> Approval: >> >> If a ballot conditionally approves a candidate, then it gives an approval >> to that candidate only if that vote-receiving candidate has more >> unconditional approvals than does any candidate unconditionally approved >> by >> that ballot. >> >> > I don't see the purpose of the qualifier "vote-receiving;" It seems to me > that if a candidate has more (unconditional) approvals than some other > candidate, then it is ipso facto "vote-receiving." > > > It could also be called TopMiddleBottom. > > Voters mark candidates Top, Middle, or Bottom., with default Bottom. > > In the first round count, ballots contribute support only to their Top > rated candidates. Then if (on some ballot) a Middle rated candidate has a > better chance of winning (according to the first round totals) than any > candidate that is Top rated by that ballot, then that ballot promotes that > candidate to Top status for the purposes of the final count. > > In other words, the Middle mark is a fall-back or conditional approval > mark. > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >

     Because it's so brief, let me state the conditional(u) option, for
     Approval, and for Bucklin:

     Approval:

     If a ballot conditionally approves a candidate, then it gives
     an approval
     to that candidate only if that vote-receiving candidate has more
     unconditional approvals than does any candidate
     unconditionally approved by
     that ballot.


 I don't see the purpose of the qualifier "vote-receiving;" It
 seems to me that if a candidate has more (unconditional) approvals
 than some other candidate, then it is ipso facto "vote-receiving."


 It could also be called TopMiddleBottom.

 Voters mark candidates Top, Middle, or Bottom., with default Bottom.

 In the first round count, ballots contribute support only to their
 Top rated candidates. Then if (on some ballot) a Middle rated
 candidate has a better chance of winning (according to the first
 round totals) than any candidate that is Top rated by that ballot,
 then that ballot promotes that candidate to Top status for the
 purposes of the final count.

 In other words, the Middle mark is a fall-back or conditional
 approval mark.


 ----
 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
 list info

The example I just posted of "IBIFA with an anti-defection device" failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both Mike's suggested "Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested "TopMiddleBottom". 20: F=C >>B 07: F > C=B (or, for the sake of Forest's method suggestion, F >> C=B) 25: B 48: W All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C >> B voters change their rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom then the winner changes to B. Chris Benham On 11/6/2016 12:10 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > Hi Forest-- > > By "vote-receiving", I just wanted that to refer to the candidate > who's being considered for receiving the conditional vote. > > Jameson has just demonstrated that my Conditional Approval fails FBC. > > Most likely, that means that my Conditional(u) Bucklin fails FBC too. > > Now, hopefully your proposal, &/or Chris's Unconditional Bucklin > passes FBC. > > I've just now found your posting. I hope that your method or Chris's > meets FBC. > > Michael Ossipoff > > > On Sat, Nov 5, 2016 at 6:56 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu > <mailto:fsimmons@pcc.edu>> wrote: > > > > Because it's so brief, let me state the conditional(u) option, for > Approval, and for Bucklin: > > Approval: > > If a ballot conditionally approves a candidate, then it gives > an approval > to that candidate only if that vote-receiving candidate has more > unconditional approvals than does any candidate > unconditionally approved by > that ballot. > > > I don't see the purpose of the qualifier "vote-receiving;" It > seems to me that if a candidate has more (unconditional) approvals > than some other candidate, then it is ipso facto "vote-receiving." > > > It could also be called TopMiddleBottom. > > Voters mark candidates Top, Middle, or Bottom., with default Bottom. > > In the first round count, ballots contribute support only to their > Top rated candidates. Then if (on some ballot) a Middle rated > candidate has a better chance of winning (according to the first > round totals) than any candidate that is Top rated by that ballot, > then that ballot promotes that candidate to Top status for the > purposes of the final count. > > In other words, the Middle mark is a fall-back or conditional > approval mark. > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for > list info > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com> > Version: 2016.0.7859 / Virus Database: 4664/13354 - Release Date: 11/05/16 >

Ok, thanks, Chris, for settling that matter. I guess we have to reluctantly give up Conditional Bucklin. But it would have been strategically great! Now, here's a question on a related topic: Say I arrive at the polling-place late. Before I arrive X is winning. I show up & plump for X, and that causes X to lose. ...is that worse than if I raise X in my ranking, and that causes X to lose? If so, why? It seems to me that the latter is worse than the former. I if show up late and plump for X, I'm doing two things: I'm adding a ballot, and I'm voting that ballot in a way that clearly should favor X. If i angrily complain, "Hey, how come, when I arrived and plumped for X, that made X lose??!" ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the effect would have been exacsly the same." But you can't say anything like to to explain why X lost when I raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. So plainly violating Mono-Raise is worse than violating Mono-Add-Plump. Michael Ossipoff On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 10:27 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: > The example I just posted of "IBIFA with an anti-defection device" > failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both Mike's suggested > "Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested "TopMiddleBottom". > > 20: F=C >>B > 07: F > C=B (or, for the sake of Forest's method suggestion, F >> C=B) > 25: B > 48: W > > All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C >> B voters change > their rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom > then the winner changes to B. > > Chris Benham > > > > On 11/6/2016 12:10 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > > Hi Forest-- > > By "vote-receiving", I just wanted that to refer to the candidate who's > being considered for receiving the conditional vote. > > Jameson has just demonstrated that my Conditional Approval fails FBC. > > Most likely, that means that my Conditional(u) Bucklin fails FBC too. > > Now, hopefully your proposal, &/or Chris's Unconditional Bucklin passes > FBC. > > I've just now found your posting. I hope that your method or Chris's meets > FBC. > > Michael Ossipoff > > > On Sat, Nov 5, 2016 at 6:56 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote: > >> >> >>> Because it's so brief, let me state the conditional(u) option, for >>> Approval, and for Bucklin: >>> >>> Approval: >>> >>> If a ballot conditionally approves a candidate, then it gives an approval >>> to that candidate only if that vote-receiving candidate has more >>> unconditional approvals than does any candidate unconditionally approved >>> by >>> that ballot. >>> >>> >> I don't see the purpose of the qualifier "vote-receiving;" It seems to me >> that if a candidate has more (unconditional) approvals than some other >> candidate, then it is ipso facto "vote-receiving." >> >> >> It could also be called TopMiddleBottom. >> >> Voters mark candidates Top, Middle, or Bottom., with default Bottom. >> >> In the first round count, ballots contribute support only to their Top >> rated candidates. Then if (on some ballot) a Middle rated candidate has a >> better chance of winning (according to the first round totals) than any >> candidate that is Top rated by that ballot, then that ballot promotes that >> candidate to Top status for the purposes of the final count. >> >> In other words, the Middle mark is a fall-back or conditional approval >> mark. >> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >> > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > > > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2016.0.7859 / Virus Database: 4664/13354 - Release Date: 11/05/16 > > >

 The example I just posted of  "IBIFA with an anti-defection
 device"  failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both Mike's suggested
 "Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested "TopMiddleBottom".

 20: F=C >>B
 07: F > C=B   (or, for the sake of Forest's method suggestion, F

 25: B
 48: W

 All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C >> B voters
 change their rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom
 then the winner changes to B.

 Chris Benham

On 11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, > thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that > you voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, > and the effect would have been exacsly the same." "Someone" could /say/ that, but it wouldn't make any sense. > But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I > raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more > favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. Increasing the turnout is generally regarded as a good thing. If the method used was one of the mono-raise failing methods I like (such as IRV and Benham), I would say: "Unfortunately it isn't possible for voting methods to have every desirable property (because some of those properties are mutually incompatible), and this method economises by not meeting mono-raise. You were unlucky to be stung by that failure." But generally speaking people care most about their favourites, and IRV meets not only mono-add-plump but also mono-add-top. It's true that after the election some of losing candidate X's supporters could complain "If we hadn't top-ranked X, then X would have won" but that is unlikely to be noticed and of course isn't true of all (or anything like all) of X's supporters. So the X supporters as a whole could complain "If we had been well informed and coordinated we could have used a mixed strategy (with not all of us voting the same way) and elected X." But if voters accept the method as fair and legitimate then that "complaint" won't be taken seriously or get much sympathy. Just as no quasi-intelligent device should be so "stupid" as to be confused by the very simple and spectacular MMPO failure example, neither should it be confused by the very very simple mono-add-plump scenario. What (arguably) desirable properties (or criterion compliances) are incompatible with meeting Mono-add-Plump? Chris Benham > Ok, thanks, Chris, for settling that matter. I guess we have to > reluctantly give up Conditional Bucklin. > > But it would have been strategically great! > > Now, here's a question on a related topic: > > Say I arrive at the polling-place late. Before I arrive X is winning. > I show up & plump for X, and that causes X to lose. > > > ...is that worse than if I raise X in my ranking, and that causes X to > lose? > > If so, why? > > It seems to me that the latter is worse than the former. > > I if show up late and plump for X, I'm doing two things: I'm adding a > ballot, and I'm voting that ballot in a way that clearly should favor X. > > If i angrily complain, "Hey, how come, when I arrived and plumped for > X, that made X lose??!" > > ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, > thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that > you voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, > and the effect would have been exacsly the same." > > But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I > raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more > favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. > > So plainly violating Mono-Raise is worse than violating Mono-Add-Plump. > > Michael Ossipoff > > > > On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 10:27 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au > <mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au>> wrote: > > The example I just posted of "IBIFA with an anti-defection > device" failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both Mike's suggested > "Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested "TopMiddleBottom". > > 20: F=C >>B > 07: F > C=B (or, for the sake of Forest's method suggestion, F > >> C=B) > 25: B > 48: W > > All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C >> B voters > change their rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom > then the winner changes to B. > > Chris Benham > > >

On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 11:24 PM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: > On 11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > > ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, > thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you > voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the > effect would have been exacsly the same." > > > "Someone" could *say* that, but it wouldn't make any sense. > But how so? > > But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I > raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more > favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. > > > Increasing the turnout is generally regarded as a good thing. If the > method used was one of the mono-raise failing methods I like (such as IRV > and Benham), I would say: > > "Unfortunately it isn't possible for voting methods to have every > desirable property (because some of those properties are mutually > incompatible), and this method economises > by not meeting mono-raise. > Exactly. The more properties, important desirable ones, a method provides, the more of a cost there is, in terms of "embarrassment criteria", "could-look-bad". So it's a matter of what you're getting in terms of the "could-look-bad", and whether that could-look-bad could be bad in a practical way. As you suggested, MMPO's "Hitler-with-2-votes" would be bad news, and, as you suggested, is more than a "look-bad". But the Mono-Raise failure of Benham, Woodall & IRV is only a could-look-bad. It never bothered me, and never stopped me from saying good thins about those methods. Likewise the lesser look-bad of MDDTR, when it fails Mono-Add-Plump. MDDTR meets FBC & CD, and it has wv-like strategy. ...the same advantages that MMPO has. ...at the cost of Mono-Add-Plump. You like IRV, Benham & Woodall. Lots of people here love IRV. I don't reject those methods, though they aren't my main proposals, because of FBC, and the fact that there's nothing the CWs's voters can do to protects hir from losing, and the fact that Benham & Woodall are pairwise-count methods very vulnerable to pairwise-count offensive strategy, and innocent, nonstrategic truncation. If you aren't majority-favored, the elimination of the CWs is disadvantages for you. But, in Bucklin, sometimes it might not be known who the CWs is, and s/he might not defenseiveliy plump, and so s/he (& you too) lose anyway, even though it isn't IRV. I don't know that the Bucklin failure that I just described will be rarer than the IRV failure that I just described. And IRV brings some big advantages for people who are majority-favored...MMC, CD, LNHa, LNHe. If your candidate is big enough to eliminate the CW, then s/he's big enough that s/he's fairly well-known, and that CW's voters would know something about hir, and would be unlikely to reject hir & transfer the other way when s/he's close enough to what you want that you'd prefer to elect hir. So I don't reject IRV--I just don't emphasize it as a proposal. Anyway, as I said, lots of people here love IRV, and its Mono-Raise failure doesn't seem to hurt its popularity. You like IRV, and its Mono-Raise failure doesn't put you off from it. I agree with you on that. And, for the same reason, we needn't & shouldn't be put off by MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump failure. > > But generally speaking people care most about their favourites > True. > , and IRV meets not only mono-add-plump but also mono-add-top. It's true > that after the election > some of losing candidate X's supporters could complain "If we hadn't > top-ranked X, then X would have won" but that is unlikely to be noticed and > of course isn't > true of all (or anything like all) of X's supporters. So the X supporters > as a whole could complain "If we had been well informed and coordinated we > could have > used a mixed strategy (with not all of us voting the same way) and elected > X." > > But if voters accept the method as fair and legitimate then that > "complaint" won't be taken seriously or get much sympathy. > ...as with MDDTR. > > Just as no quasi-intelligent device should be so "stupid" as to be > confused by the very simple and spectacular MMPO failure example, neither > should it be > confused by the very very simple mono-add-plump scenario. > ...or the fact that in IRV you can make someone lose by ranking them higher? > > What (arguably) desirable properties (or criterion compliances) are > incompatible with meeting Mono-add-Plump? > FBC, CD, & wv-like strategy are evidently require failing Mono-Add-Plump, or having MMPO's Hitler-with-2-votes problem. With MDDTR, the price of FBC, CD & wv-like strategy is Mono-Add-Plump. That's a very small price, arguably less than IRV's Mono-Raise failure (though I note that you mentioned that Mono-Add-Plump is about a favorite). Michael Ossipoff > > Chris Benham > > > Ok, thanks, Chris, for settling that matter. I guess we have to > reluctantly give up Conditional Bucklin. > > But it would have been strategically great! > > Now, here's a question on a related topic: > > Say I arrive at the polling-place late. Before I arrive X is winning. I > show up & plump for X, and that causes X to lose. > > > ...is that worse than if I raise X in my ranking, and that causes X to > lose? > > If so, why? > > It seems to me that the latter is worse than the former. > > I if show up late and plump for X, I'm doing two things: I'm adding a > ballot, and I'm voting that ballot in a way that clearly should favor X. > > If i angrily complain, "Hey, how come, when I arrived and plumped for X, > that made X lose??!" > > ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, > thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you > voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the > effect would have been exacsly the same." > > But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I > raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more > favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. > > So plainly violating Mono-Raise is worse than violating Mono-Add-Plump. > > Michael Ossipoff > > > > On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 10:27 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: > >> The example I just posted of "IBIFA with an anti-defection device" >> failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both Mike's suggested >> "Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested "TopMiddleBottom". >> >> 20: F=C >>B >> 07: F > C=B (or, for the sake of Forest's method suggestion, F >> C=B) >> 25: B >> 48: W >> >> All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C >> B voters change >> their rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom >> then the winner changes to B. >> >> Chris Benham >> >> >> >> >

Chris-- You suggested that Mono-Add-Plump failure is worse than Mono-Raise failure because people care more about their favorites, and because Mono-Raise failure is simpler. 1. Caring about favorites: a) So you're saying that Mono-Raise failure can't happen when someone sincerely moves their favorite to top?: IRV: 31: A 2: B>A (sincere is A) 29: B>C 30: C>A 1st round totals: A = 31 B = 29 + 2 = 31 C = 30 C is eliminated & transferss to A Now A has a 61 majority and wins. But then the 2 B>A voters decide to sincerely raise A to top: 33: A 29: B 30: C B gets eliminated, and transfers to C. Now C has a 59 majority and wins. b) You care about favorite? What about when you need to rank Comprmise over favorite to keep worst from winning? We're all familiar with that. In Burlington, the Republicans didn't do that, and their failure to favorite-bury elected their last choice. Yes, this isn't a monotonicity failure, but you used caring about Favorite as an advantage of IRV's Mono-Raise failure over MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump failure. But obviously IRV has a bigger problem for Favorite. ...the reason why IRV was repealed in Burlington. So please, let's not use caring about Favorite as a reason to prefer IRV with its Mono-Raise failure & its favorite-burial need, to MDDTR's Mono-Add Plump failure. 2. Simplicity: What could be simpler than your need, in IRV, to bury your favorite to help Compromise beat Worst: Sincere: 40: C 25: B>C 35: A>B A voters vote sincerely, and B, the CWv, gets eliminated & transfers to C. C wins because the A voters didn't favorite-bury. Strategic: 40: C 25: B>C 35: B>A (sincere is A>B) Now B wins. That's as simple as it gets. Let's not say that MDDTR's look-bad criterion-failurle is simpler than IRV's serious favorite-burial need. Yes, I'm talking about a problem that isn't a monotonicity problem. But its at least as simple as MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump problem, and is worse because it's a practical strategy problem that makes people need to favorite-bury. Michael Ossipoff By sincerely raising A to top, you made A lose. On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 2:48 AM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 11:24 PM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: > >> On 11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >> >> ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, >> thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you >> voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the >> effect would have been exacsly the same." >> >> >> "Someone" could *say* that, but it wouldn't make any sense. >> > > But how so? > > >> >> But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I >> raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more >> favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. >> >> >> Increasing the turnout is generally regarded as a good thing. If the >> method used was one of the mono-raise failing methods I like (such as IRV >> and Benham), I would say: >> >> "Unfortunately it isn't possible for voting methods to have every >> desirable property (because some of those properties are mutually >> incompatible), and this method economises >> by not meeting mono-raise. >> > > Exactly. The more properties, important desirable ones, a method provides, > the more of a cost there is, in terms of "embarrassment criteria", > "could-look-bad". > > So it's a matter of what you're getting in terms of the "could-look-bad", > and whether that could-look-bad could be bad in a practical way. As you > suggested, MMPO's "Hitler-with-2-votes" would be bad news, and, as you > suggested, is more than a "look-bad". > > But the Mono-Raise failure of Benham, Woodall & IRV is only a > could-look-bad. It never bothered me, and never stopped me from saying good > thins about those methods. > > Likewise the lesser look-bad of MDDTR, when it fails Mono-Add-Plump. > > MDDTR meets FBC & CD, and it has wv-like strategy. > > ...the same advantages that MMPO has. > > ...at the cost of Mono-Add-Plump. > > You like IRV, Benham & Woodall. Lots of people here love IRV. I don't > reject those methods, though they aren't my main proposals, because of FBC, > and the fact that there's nothing the CWs's voters can do to protects hir > from losing, and the fact that Benham & Woodall are pairwise-count methods > very vulnerable to pairwise-count offensive strategy, and innocent, > nonstrategic truncation. > > If you aren't majority-favored, the elimination of the CWs is > disadvantages for you. But, in Bucklin, sometimes it might not be known who > the CWs is, and s/he might not defenseiveliy plump, and so s/he (& you too) > lose anyway, even though it isn't IRV. I don't know that the Bucklin > failure that I just described will be rarer than the IRV failure that I > just described. And IRV brings some big advantages for people who are > majority-favored...MMC, CD, LNHa, LNHe. > > If your candidate is big enough to eliminate the CW, then s/he's big > enough that s/he's fairly well-known, and that CW's voters would know > something about hir, and would be unlikely to reject hir & transfer the > other way when s/he's close enough to what you want that you'd prefer to > elect hir. > > So I don't reject IRV--I just don't emphasize it as a proposal. > > Anyway, as I said, lots of people here love IRV, and its Mono-Raise > failure doesn't seem to hurt its popularity. You like IRV, and its > Mono-Raise failure doesn't put you off from it. I agree with you on that. > > And, for the same reason, we needn't & shouldn't be put off by MDDTR's > Mono-Add-Plump failure. > > > >> >> But generally speaking people care most about their favourites >> > > True. > > >> , and IRV meets not only mono-add-plump but also mono-add-top. It's true >> that after the election >> some of losing candidate X's supporters could complain "If we hadn't >> top-ranked X, then X would have won" but that is unlikely to be noticed and >> of course isn't >> true of all (or anything like all) of X's supporters. So the X >> supporters as a whole could complain "If we had been well informed and >> coordinated we could have >> used a mixed strategy (with not all of us voting the same way) and >> elected X." >> >> But if voters accept the method as fair and legitimate then that >> "complaint" won't be taken seriously or get much sympathy. >> > > ...as with MDDTR. > > >> >> Just as no quasi-intelligent device should be so "stupid" as to be >> confused by the very simple and spectacular MMPO failure example, neither >> should it be >> confused by the very very simple mono-add-plump scenario. >> > > ...or the fact that in IRV you can make someone lose by ranking them > higher? > > >> >> What (arguably) desirable properties (or criterion compliances) are >> incompatible with meeting Mono-add-Plump? >> > > FBC, CD, & wv-like strategy are evidently require failing Mono-Add-Plump, > or having MMPO's Hitler-with-2-votes problem. > > With MDDTR, the price of FBC, CD & wv-like strategy is Mono-Add-Plump. > That's a very small price, arguably less than IRV's Mono-Raise failure > (though I note that you mentioned that Mono-Add-Plump is about a favorite). > > Michael Ossipoff > >> >> Chris Benham >> >> >> Ok, thanks, Chris, for settling that matter. I guess we have to >> reluctantly give up Conditional Bucklin. >> >> But it would have been strategically great! >> >> Now, here's a question on a related topic: >> >> Say I arrive at the polling-place late. Before I arrive X is winning. I >> show up & plump for X, and that causes X to lose. >> >> >> ...is that worse than if I raise X in my ranking, and that causes X to >> lose? >> >> If so, why? >> >> It seems to me that the latter is worse than the former. >> >> I if show up late and plump for X, I'm doing two things: I'm adding a >> ballot, and I'm voting that ballot in a way that clearly should favor X. >> >> If i angrily complain, "Hey, how come, when I arrived and plumped for X, >> that made X lose??!" >> >> ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, >> thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you >> voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the >> effect would have been exacsly the same." >> >> But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I >> raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more >> favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. >> >> So plainly violating Mono-Raise is worse than violating Mono-Add-Plump. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> >> >> >> On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 10:27 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >> >>> The example I just posted of "IBIFA with an anti-defection device" >>> failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both Mike's suggested >>> "Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested "TopMiddleBottom". >>> >>> 20: F=C >>B >>> 07: F > C=B (or, for the sake of Forest's method suggestion, F >> C=B) >>> 25: B >>> 48: W >>> >>> All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C >> B voters change >>> their rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom >>> then the winner changes to B. >>> >>> Chris Benham >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >

I should re-state the definition of MDDTR, because we haven't discussed it for a while. Ii don't know who introuced MDDTR. Who introduced it? MDDTR stands for Majority Defeat Disqualification, Top Ratings. MDDTR: Voters can rank as many or as few candidates as they want to. Equal rankings allowed. 1. Disqualify any candidate who has a majority pairwise defeat, unless everyone has one. 2. The winner is the un-disqualified candidate top-ranked by the most voters. [end of definition] MDDTR meets FBC & CD, an has wv-like stratgy. The cost for that is that MDDTR fails Mono-Add-Plump. I've discussed what that is no worse than IRV's failure of Mono-Raise. If IRV can be popular in spite of Mono-Raise failure, and its favorite-burial need, then MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump failure shouldn't have its importance & badness exaggerated. IRV is popular here. Then there's no reason why MDDTR couldn't or shouldn't be at least as popular. Michael Ossipoff On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > > Chris-- > > You suggested that Mono-Add-Plump failure is worse than Mono-Raise failure > because people care more about their favorites, and because Mono-Raise > failure is simpler. > > 1. Caring about favorites: > > a) So you're saying that Mono-Raise failure can't happen when someone > sincerely moves their favorite to top?: > > IRV: > > 31: A > 2: B>A (sincere is A) > 29: B>C > 30: C>A > > 1st round totals: > > A = 31 > B = 29 + 2 = 31 > C = 30 > > C is eliminated & transferss to A > > Now A has a 61 majority and wins. > > But then the 2 B>A voters decide to sincerely raise A to top: > > 33: A > 29: B > 30: C > > B gets eliminated, and transfers to C. > > Now C has a 59 majority and wins. > > b) You care about favorite? What about when you need to rank Comprmise > over favorite to keep worst from winning? We're all familiar with that. In > Burlington, the Republicans didn't do that, and their failure to > favorite-bury elected their last choice. > > Yes, this isn't a monotonicity failure, but you used caring about Favorite > as an advantage of IRV's Mono-Raise failure over MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump > failure. But obviously IRV has a bigger problem for Favorite. ...the reason > why IRV was repealed in Burlington. > > So please, let's not use caring about Favorite as a reason to prefer IRV > with its Mono-Raise failure > & its favorite-burial need, to MDDTR's Mono-Add Plump failure. > > 2. Simplicity: > > What could be simpler than your need, in IRV, to bury your favorite to > help Compromise beat Worst: > > Sincere: > > 40: C > 25: B>C > 35: A>B > > A voters vote sincerely, and B, the CWv, gets eliminated & transfers to C. > C wins because the A voters didn't favorite-bury. > > Strategic: > > 40: C > 25: B>C > 35: B>A (sincere is A>B) > > Now B wins. > > That's as simple as it gets. Let's not say that MDDTR's look-bad > criterion-failurle is simpler than IRV's serious favorite-burial need. > > Yes, I'm talking about a problem that isn't a monotonicity problem. But > its at least as simple as MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump problem, and is worse > because it's a practical strategy problem that makes people need to > favorite-bury. > > Michael Ossipoff > > > By sincerely raising A to top, you made A lose. > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 2:48 AM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 11:24 PM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >> >>> On 11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >>> >>> ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, >>> thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you >>> voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the >>> effect would have been exacsly the same." >>> >>> >>> "Someone" could *say* that, but it wouldn't make any sense. >>> >> >> But how so? >> >> >>> >>> But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I >>> raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more >>> favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. >>> >>> >>> Increasing the turnout is generally regarded as a good thing. If the >>> method used was one of the mono-raise failing methods I like (such as IRV >>> and Benham), I would say: >>> >>> "Unfortunately it isn't possible for voting methods to have every >>> desirable property (because some of those properties are mutually >>> incompatible), and this method economises >>> by not meeting mono-raise. >>> >> >> Exactly. The more properties, important desirable ones, a method >> provides, the more of a cost there is, in terms of "embarrassment >> criteria", "could-look-bad". >> >> So it's a matter of what you're getting in terms of the "could-look-bad", >> and whether that could-look-bad could be bad in a practical way. As you >> suggested, MMPO's "Hitler-with-2-votes" would be bad news, and, as you >> suggested, is more than a "look-bad". >> >> But the Mono-Raise failure of Benham, Woodall & IRV is only a >> could-look-bad. It never bothered me, and never stopped me from saying good >> thins about those methods. >> >> Likewise the lesser look-bad of MDDTR, when it fails Mono-Add-Plump. >> >> MDDTR meets FBC & CD, and it has wv-like strategy. >> >> ...the same advantages that MMPO has. >> >> ...at the cost of Mono-Add-Plump. >> >> You like IRV, Benham & Woodall. Lots of people here love IRV. I don't >> reject those methods, though they aren't my main proposals, because of FBC, >> and the fact that there's nothing the CWs's voters can do to protects hir >> from losing, and the fact that Benham & Woodall are pairwise-count methods >> very vulnerable to pairwise-count offensive strategy, and innocent, >> nonstrategic truncation. >> >> If you aren't majority-favored, the elimination of the CWs is >> disadvantages for you. But, in Bucklin, sometimes it might not be known who >> the CWs is, and s/he might not defenseiveliy plump, and so s/he (& you too) >> lose anyway, even though it isn't IRV. I don't know that the Bucklin >> failure that I just described will be rarer than the IRV failure that I >> just described. And IRV brings some big advantages for people who are >> majority-favored...MMC, CD, LNHa, LNHe. >> >> If your candidate is big enough to eliminate the CW, then s/he's big >> enough that s/he's fairly well-known, and that CW's voters would know >> something about hir, and would be unlikely to reject hir & transfer the >> other way when s/he's close enough to what you want that you'd prefer to >> elect hir. >> >> So I don't reject IRV--I just don't emphasize it as a proposal. >> >> Anyway, as I said, lots of people here love IRV, and its Mono-Raise >> failure doesn't seem to hurt its popularity. You like IRV, and its >> Mono-Raise failure doesn't put you off from it. I agree with you on that. >> >> And, for the same reason, we needn't & shouldn't be put off by MDDTR's >> Mono-Add-Plump failure. >> >> >> >>> >>> But generally speaking people care most about their favourites >>> >> >> True. >> >> >>> , and IRV meets not only mono-add-plump but also mono-add-top. It's true >>> that after the election >>> some of losing candidate X's supporters could complain "If we hadn't >>> top-ranked X, then X would have won" but that is unlikely to be noticed and >>> of course isn't >>> true of all (or anything like all) of X's supporters. So the X >>> supporters as a whole could complain "If we had been well informed and >>> coordinated we could have >>> used a mixed strategy (with not all of us voting the same way) and >>> elected X." >>> >>> But if voters accept the method as fair and legitimate then that >>> "complaint" won't be taken seriously or get much sympathy. >>> >> >> ...as with MDDTR. >> >> >>> >>> Just as no quasi-intelligent device should be so "stupid" as to be >>> confused by the very simple and spectacular MMPO failure example, neither >>> should it be >>> confused by the very very simple mono-add-plump scenario. >>> >> >> ...or the fact that in IRV you can make someone lose by ranking them >> higher? >> >> >>> >>> What (arguably) desirable properties (or criterion compliances) are >>> incompatible with meeting Mono-add-Plump? >>> >> >> FBC, CD, & wv-like strategy are evidently require failing Mono-Add-Plump, >> or having MMPO's Hitler-with-2-votes problem. >> >> With MDDTR, the price of FBC, CD & wv-like strategy is Mono-Add-Plump. >> That's a very small price, arguably less than IRV's Mono-Raise failure >> (though I note that you mentioned that Mono-Add-Plump is about a favorite). >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> >>> >>> Chris Benham >>> >>> >>> Ok, thanks, Chris, for settling that matter. I guess we have to >>> reluctantly give up Conditional Bucklin. >>> >>> But it would have been strategically great! >>> >>> Now, here's a question on a related topic: >>> >>> Say I arrive at the polling-place late. Before I arrive X is winning. I >>> show up & plump for X, and that causes X to lose. >>> >>> >>> ...is that worse than if I raise X in my ranking, and that causes X to >>> lose? >>> >>> If so, why? >>> >>> It seems to me that the latter is worse than the former. >>> >>> I if show up late and plump for X, I'm doing two things: I'm adding a >>> ballot, and I'm voting that ballot in a way that clearly should favor X. >>> >>> If i angrily complain, "Hey, how come, when I arrived and plumped for X, >>> that made X lose??!" >>> >>> ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, >>> thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you >>> voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the >>> effect would have been exacsly the same." >>> >>> But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I >>> raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more >>> favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. >>> >>> So plainly violating Mono-Raise is worse than violating Mono-Add-Plump. >>> >>> Michael Ossipoff >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 10:27 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >>> >>>> The example I just posted of "IBIFA with an anti-defection device" >>>> failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both Mike's suggested >>>> "Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested "TopMiddleBottom". >>>> >>>> 20: F=C >>B >>>> 07: F > C=B (or, for the sake of Forest's method suggestion, F >> C=B) >>>> 25: B >>>> 48: W >>>> >>>> All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C >> B voters >>>> change their rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom >>>> then the winner changes to B. >>>> >>>> Chris Benham >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >

Chris, would your IBIFA interpretation of majority further improve MDDTR, by keeping its FBC & CD, while avoiding the (unimportant) Mono-Add-Plump failure? Michael Ossipoff On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:44 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > I should re-state the definition of MDDTR, because we haven't discussed it > for a while. > > Ii don't know who introuced MDDTR. Who introduced it? > > MDDTR stands for Majority Defeat Disqualification, Top Ratings. > > MDDTR: > > Voters can rank as many or as few candidates as they want to. > > Equal rankings allowed. > > 1. Disqualify any candidate who has a majority pairwise defeat, unless > everyone has one. > > 2. The winner is the un-disqualified candidate top-ranked by the most > voters. > > [end of definition] > > MDDTR meets FBC & CD, an has wv-like stratgy. > > The cost for that is that MDDTR fails Mono-Add-Plump. I've discussed what > that is no worse than IRV's failure of Mono-Raise. If IRV can be popular in > spite of Mono-Raise failure, and its favorite-burial need, then MDDTR's > Mono-Add-Plump failure shouldn't have its importance & badness exaggerated. > > IRV is popular here. Then there's no reason why MDDTR couldn't or > shouldn't be at least as popular. > > Michael Ossipoff > > > > On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> >> Chris-- >> >> You suggested that Mono-Add-Plump failure is worse than Mono-Raise >> failure because people care more about their favorites, and because >> Mono-Raise failure is simpler. >> >> 1. Caring about favorites: >> >> a) So you're saying that Mono-Raise failure can't happen when someone >> sincerely moves their favorite to top?: >> >> IRV: >> >> 31: A >> 2: B>A (sincere is A) >> 29: B>C >> 30: C>A >> >> 1st round totals: >> >> A = 31 >> B = 29 + 2 = 31 >> C = 30 >> >> C is eliminated & transferss to A >> >> Now A has a 61 majority and wins. >> >> But then the 2 B>A voters decide to sincerely raise A to top: >> >> 33: A >> 29: B >> 30: C >> >> B gets eliminated, and transfers to C. >> >> Now C has a 59 majority and wins. >> >> b) You care about favorite? What about when you need to rank Comprmise >> over favorite to keep worst from winning? We're all familiar with that. In >> Burlington, the Republicans didn't do that, and their failure to >> favorite-bury elected their last choice. >> >> Yes, this isn't a monotonicity failure, but you used caring about >> Favorite as an advantage of IRV's Mono-Raise failure over MDDTR's >> Mono-Add-Plump failure. But obviously IRV has a bigger problem for >> Favorite. ...the reason why IRV was repealed in Burlington. >> >> So please, let's not use caring about Favorite as a reason to prefer IRV >> with its Mono-Raise failure >> & its favorite-burial need, to MDDTR's Mono-Add Plump failure. >> >> 2. Simplicity: >> >> What could be simpler than your need, in IRV, to bury your favorite to >> help Compromise beat Worst: >> >> Sincere: >> >> 40: C >> 25: B>C >> 35: A>B >> >> A voters vote sincerely, and B, the CWv, gets eliminated & transfers to >> C. C wins because the A voters didn't favorite-bury. >> >> Strategic: >> >> 40: C >> 25: B>C >> 35: B>A (sincere is A>B) >> >> Now B wins. >> >> That's as simple as it gets. Let's not say that MDDTR's look-bad >> criterion-failurle is simpler than IRV's serious favorite-burial need. >> >> Yes, I'm talking about a problem that isn't a monotonicity problem. But >> its at least as simple as MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump problem, and is worse >> because it's a practical strategy problem that makes people need to >> favorite-bury. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> >> >> By sincerely raising A to top, you made A lose. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 2:48 AM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 11:24 PM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >>> >>>> On 11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >>>> >>>> ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, >>>> thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you >>>> voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the >>>> effect would have been exacsly the same." >>>> >>>> >>>> "Someone" could *say* that, but it wouldn't make any sense. >>>> >>> >>> But how so? >>> >>> >>>> >>>> But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I >>>> raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more >>>> favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. >>>> >>>> >>>> Increasing the turnout is generally regarded as a good thing. If the >>>> method used was one of the mono-raise failing methods I like (such as IRV >>>> and Benham), I would say: >>>> >>>> "Unfortunately it isn't possible for voting methods to have every >>>> desirable property (because some of those properties are mutually >>>> incompatible), and this method economises >>>> by not meeting mono-raise. >>>> >>> >>> Exactly. The more properties, important desirable ones, a method >>> provides, the more of a cost there is, in terms of "embarrassment >>> criteria", "could-look-bad". >>> >>> So it's a matter of what you're getting in terms of the >>> "could-look-bad", and whether that could-look-bad could be bad in a >>> practical way. As you suggested, MMPO's "Hitler-with-2-votes" would be bad >>> news, and, as you suggested, is more than a "look-bad". >>> >>> But the Mono-Raise failure of Benham, Woodall & IRV is only a >>> could-look-bad. It never bothered me, and never stopped me from saying good >>> thins about those methods. >>> >>> Likewise the lesser look-bad of MDDTR, when it fails Mono-Add-Plump. >>> >>> MDDTR meets FBC & CD, and it has wv-like strategy. >>> >>> ...the same advantages that MMPO has. >>> >>> ...at the cost of Mono-Add-Plump. >>> >>> You like IRV, Benham & Woodall. Lots of people here love IRV. I don't >>> reject those methods, though they aren't my main proposals, because of FBC, >>> and the fact that there's nothing the CWs's voters can do to protects hir >>> from losing, and the fact that Benham & Woodall are pairwise-count methods >>> very vulnerable to pairwise-count offensive strategy, and innocent, >>> nonstrategic truncation. >>> >>> If you aren't majority-favored, the elimination of the CWs is >>> disadvantages for you. But, in Bucklin, sometimes it might not be known who >>> the CWs is, and s/he might not defenseiveliy plump, and so s/he (& you too) >>> lose anyway, even though it isn't IRV. I don't know that the Bucklin >>> failure that I just described will be rarer than the IRV failure that I >>> just described. And IRV brings some big advantages for people who are >>> majority-favored...MMC, CD, LNHa, LNHe. >>> >>> If your candidate is big enough to eliminate the CW, then s/he's big >>> enough that s/he's fairly well-known, and that CW's voters would know >>> something about hir, and would be unlikely to reject hir & transfer the >>> other way when s/he's close enough to what you want that you'd prefer to >>> elect hir. >>> >>> So I don't reject IRV--I just don't emphasize it as a proposal. >>> >>> Anyway, as I said, lots of people here love IRV, and its Mono-Raise >>> failure doesn't seem to hurt its popularity. You like IRV, and its >>> Mono-Raise failure doesn't put you off from it. I agree with you on that. >>> >>> And, for the same reason, we needn't & shouldn't be put off by MDDTR's >>> Mono-Add-Plump failure. >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> But generally speaking people care most about their favourites >>>> >>> >>> True. >>> >>> >>>> , and IRV meets not only mono-add-plump but also mono-add-top. It's >>>> true that after the election >>>> some of losing candidate X's supporters could complain "If we hadn't >>>> top-ranked X, then X would have won" but that is unlikely to be noticed and >>>> of course isn't >>>> true of all (or anything like all) of X's supporters. So the X >>>> supporters as a whole could complain "If we had been well informed and >>>> coordinated we could have >>>> used a mixed strategy (with not all of us voting the same way) and >>>> elected X." >>>> >>>> But if voters accept the method as fair and legitimate then that >>>> "complaint" won't be taken seriously or get much sympathy. >>>> >>> >>> ...as with MDDTR. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Just as no quasi-intelligent device should be so "stupid" as to be >>>> confused by the very simple and spectacular MMPO failure example, neither >>>> should it be >>>> confused by the very very simple mono-add-plump scenario. >>>> >>> >>> ...or the fact that in IRV you can make someone lose by ranking them >>> higher? >>> >>> >>>> >>>> What (arguably) desirable properties (or criterion compliances) are >>>> incompatible with meeting Mono-add-Plump? >>>> >>> >>> FBC, CD, & wv-like strategy are evidently require failing >>> Mono-Add-Plump, or having MMPO's Hitler-with-2-votes problem. >>> >>> With MDDTR, the price of FBC, CD & wv-like strategy is Mono-Add-Plump. >>> That's a very small price, arguably less than IRV's Mono-Raise failure >>> (though I note that you mentioned that Mono-Add-Plump is about a favorite). >>> >>> Michael Ossipoff >>> >>>> >>>> Chris Benham >>>> >>>> >>>> Ok, thanks, Chris, for settling that matter. I guess we have to >>>> reluctantly give up Conditional Bucklin. >>>> >>>> But it would have been strategically great! >>>> >>>> Now, here's a question on a related topic: >>>> >>>> Say I arrive at the polling-place late. Before I arrive X is winning. I >>>> show up & plump for X, and that causes X to lose. >>>> >>>> >>>> ...is that worse than if I raise X in my ranking, and that causes X to >>>> lose? >>>> >>>> If so, why? >>>> >>>> It seems to me that the latter is worse than the former. >>>> >>>> I if show up late and plump for X, I'm doing two things: I'm adding a >>>> ballot, and I'm voting that ballot in a way that clearly should favor X. >>>> >>>> If i angrily complain, "Hey, how come, when I arrived and plumped for >>>> X, that made X lose??!" >>>> >>>> ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, >>>> thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you >>>> voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the >>>> effect would have been exacsly the same." >>>> >>>> But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I >>>> raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more >>>> favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. >>>> >>>> So plainly violating Mono-Raise is worse than violating Mono-Add-Plump. >>>> >>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 10:27 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >>>> >>>>> The example I just posted of "IBIFA with an anti-defection device" >>>>> failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both Mike's suggested >>>>> "Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested "TopMiddleBottom". >>>>> >>>>> 20: F=C >>B >>>>> 07: F > C=B (or, for the sake of Forest's method suggestion, F >> >>>>> C=B) >>>>> 25: B >>>>> 48: W >>>>> >>>>> All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C >> B voters >>>>> change their rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom >>>>> then the winner changes to B. >>>>> >>>>> Chris Benham >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >

In my IRV Mono-Raise failure example: When I said: 33: A 29: B 30: C II meant: 33: A 29: B>C 30: C>A Michael Ossipoff On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Chris, would your IBIFA interpretation of majority further improve MDDTR, > by keeping its FBC & CD, while avoiding the (unimportant) Mono-Add-Plump > failure? > > Michael Ossipoff > > On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:44 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> I should re-state the definition of MDDTR, because we haven't discussed >> it for a while. >> >> Ii don't know who introuced MDDTR. Who introduced it? >> >> MDDTR stands for Majority Defeat Disqualification, Top Ratings. >> >> MDDTR: >> >> Voters can rank as many or as few candidates as they want to. >> >> Equal rankings allowed. >> >> 1. Disqualify any candidate who has a majority pairwise defeat, unless >> everyone has one. >> >> 2. The winner is the un-disqualified candidate top-ranked by the most >> voters. >> >> [end of definition] >> >> MDDTR meets FBC & CD, an has wv-like stratgy. >> >> The cost for that is that MDDTR fails Mono-Add-Plump. I've discussed what >> that is no worse than IRV's failure of Mono-Raise. If IRV can be popular in >> spite of Mono-Raise failure, and its favorite-burial need, then MDDTR's >> Mono-Add-Plump failure shouldn't have its importance & badness exaggerated. >> >> IRV is popular here. Then there's no reason why MDDTR couldn't or >> shouldn't be at least as popular. >> >> Michael Ossipoff >> >> >> >> On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> Chris-- >>> >>> You suggested that Mono-Add-Plump failure is worse than Mono-Raise >>> failure because people care more about their favorites, and because >>> Mono-Raise failure is simpler. >>> >>> 1. Caring about favorites: >>> >>> a) So you're saying that Mono-Raise failure can't happen when someone >>> sincerely moves their favorite to top?: >>> >>> IRV: >>> >>> 31: A >>> 2: B>A (sincere is A) >>> 29: B>C >>> 30: C>A >>> >>> 1st round totals: >>> >>> A = 31 >>> B = 29 + 2 = 31 >>> C = 30 >>> >>> C is eliminated & transferss to A >>> >>> Now A has a 61 majority and wins. >>> >>> But then the 2 B>A voters decide to sincerely raise A to top: >>> >>> 33: A >>> 29: B >>> 30: C >>> >>> B gets eliminated, and transfers to C. >>> >>> Now C has a 59 majority and wins. >>> >>> b) You care about favorite? What about when you need to rank Comprmise >>> over favorite to keep worst from winning? We're all familiar with that. In >>> Burlington, the Republicans didn't do that, and their failure to >>> favorite-bury elected their last choice. >>> >>> Yes, this isn't a monotonicity failure, but you used caring about >>> Favorite as an advantage of IRV's Mono-Raise failure over MDDTR's >>> Mono-Add-Plump failure. But obviously IRV has a bigger problem for >>> Favorite. ...the reason why IRV was repealed in Burlington. >>> >>> So please, let's not use caring about Favorite as a reason to prefer IRV >>> with its Mono-Raise failure >>> & its favorite-burial need, to MDDTR's Mono-Add Plump failure. >>> >>> 2. Simplicity: >>> >>> What could be simpler than your need, in IRV, to bury your favorite to >>> help Compromise beat Worst: >>> >>> Sincere: >>> >>> 40: C >>> 25: B>C >>> 35: A>B >>> >>> A voters vote sincerely, and B, the CWv, gets eliminated & transfers to >>> C. C wins because the A voters didn't favorite-bury. >>> >>> Strategic: >>> >>> 40: C >>> 25: B>C >>> 35: B>A (sincere is A>B) >>> >>> Now B wins. >>> >>> That's as simple as it gets. Let's not say that MDDTR's look-bad >>> criterion-failurle is simpler than IRV's serious favorite-burial need. >>> >>> Yes, I'm talking about a problem that isn't a monotonicity problem. But >>> its at least as simple as MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump problem, and is worse >>> because it's a practical strategy problem that makes people need to >>> favorite-bury. >>> >>> Michael Ossipoff >>> >>> >>> By sincerely raising A to top, you made A lose. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 2:48 AM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com >>> > wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 11:24 PM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >>>>> >>>>> ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, >>>>> thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you >>>>> voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the >>>>> effect would have been exacsly the same." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "Someone" could *say* that, but it wouldn't make any sense. >>>>> >>>> >>>> But how so? >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I >>>>> raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more >>>>> favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Increasing the turnout is generally regarded as a good thing. If the >>>>> method used was one of the mono-raise failing methods I like (such as IRV >>>>> and Benham), I would say: >>>>> >>>>> "Unfortunately it isn't possible for voting methods to have every >>>>> desirable property (because some of those properties are mutually >>>>> incompatible), and this method economises >>>>> by not meeting mono-raise. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Exactly. The more properties, important desirable ones, a method >>>> provides, the more of a cost there is, in terms of "embarrassment >>>> criteria", "could-look-bad". >>>> >>>> So it's a matter of what you're getting in terms of the >>>> "could-look-bad", and whether that could-look-bad could be bad in a >>>> practical way. As you suggested, MMPO's "Hitler-with-2-votes" would be bad >>>> news, and, as you suggested, is more than a "look-bad". >>>> >>>> But the Mono-Raise failure of Benham, Woodall & IRV is only a >>>> could-look-bad. It never bothered me, and never stopped me from saying good >>>> thins about those methods. >>>> >>>> Likewise the lesser look-bad of MDDTR, when it fails Mono-Add-Plump. >>>> >>>> MDDTR meets FBC & CD, and it has wv-like strategy. >>>> >>>> ...the same advantages that MMPO has. >>>> >>>> ...at the cost of Mono-Add-Plump. >>>> >>>> You like IRV, Benham & Woodall. Lots of people here love IRV. I don't >>>> reject those methods, though they aren't my main proposals, because of FBC, >>>> and the fact that there's nothing the CWs's voters can do to protects hir >>>> from losing, and the fact that Benham & Woodall are pairwise-count methods >>>> very vulnerable to pairwise-count offensive strategy, and innocent, >>>> nonstrategic truncation. >>>> >>>> If you aren't majority-favored, the elimination of the CWs is >>>> disadvantages for you. But, in Bucklin, sometimes it might not be known who >>>> the CWs is, and s/he might not defenseiveliy plump, and so s/he (& you too) >>>> lose anyway, even though it isn't IRV. I don't know that the Bucklin >>>> failure that I just described will be rarer than the IRV failure that I >>>> just described. And IRV brings some big advantages for people who are >>>> majority-favored...MMC, CD, LNHa, LNHe. >>>> >>>> If your candidate is big enough to eliminate the CW, then s/he's big >>>> enough that s/he's fairly well-known, and that CW's voters would know >>>> something about hir, and would be unlikely to reject hir & transfer the >>>> other way when s/he's close enough to what you want that you'd prefer to >>>> elect hir. >>>> >>>> So I don't reject IRV--I just don't emphasize it as a proposal. >>>> >>>> Anyway, as I said, lots of people here love IRV, and its Mono-Raise >>>> failure doesn't seem to hurt its popularity. You like IRV, and its >>>> Mono-Raise failure doesn't put you off from it. I agree with you on that. >>>> >>>> And, for the same reason, we needn't & shouldn't be put off by MDDTR's >>>> Mono-Add-Plump failure. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> But generally speaking people care most about their favourites >>>>> >>>> >>>> True. >>>> >>>> >>>>> , and IRV meets not only mono-add-plump but also mono-add-top. It's >>>>> true that after the election >>>>> some of losing candidate X's supporters could complain "If we hadn't >>>>> top-ranked X, then X would have won" but that is unlikely to be noticed and >>>>> of course isn't >>>>> true of all (or anything like all) of X's supporters. So the X >>>>> supporters as a whole could complain "If we had been well informed and >>>>> coordinated we could have >>>>> used a mixed strategy (with not all of us voting the same way) and >>>>> elected X." >>>>> >>>>> But if voters accept the method as fair and legitimate then that >>>>> "complaint" won't be taken seriously or get much sympathy. >>>>> >>>> >>>> ...as with MDDTR. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Just as no quasi-intelligent device should be so "stupid" as to be >>>>> confused by the very simple and spectacular MMPO failure example, neither >>>>> should it be >>>>> confused by the very very simple mono-add-plump scenario. >>>>> >>>> >>>> ...or the fact that in IRV you can make someone lose by ranking them >>>> higher? >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> What (arguably) desirable properties (or criterion compliances) are >>>>> incompatible with meeting Mono-add-Plump? >>>>> >>>> >>>> FBC, CD, & wv-like strategy are evidently require failing >>>> Mono-Add-Plump, or having MMPO's Hitler-with-2-votes problem. >>>> >>>> With MDDTR, the price of FBC, CD & wv-like strategy is Mono-Add-Plump. >>>> That's a very small price, arguably less than IRV's Mono-Raise failure >>>> (though I note that you mentioned that Mono-Add-Plump is about a favorite). >>>> >>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Chris Benham >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Ok, thanks, Chris, for settling that matter. I guess we have to >>>>> reluctantly give up Conditional Bucklin. >>>>> >>>>> But it would have been strategically great! >>>>> >>>>> Now, here's a question on a related topic: >>>>> >>>>> Say I arrive at the polling-place late. Before I arrive X is winning. >>>>> I show up & plump for X, and that causes X to lose. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ...is that worse than if I raise X in my ranking, and that causes X to >>>>> lose? >>>>> >>>>> If so, why? >>>>> >>>>> It seems to me that the latter is worse than the former. >>>>> >>>>> I if show up late and plump for X, I'm doing two things: I'm adding a >>>>> ballot, and I'm voting that ballot in a way that clearly should favor X. >>>>> >>>>> If i angrily complain, "Hey, how come, when I arrived and plumped for >>>>> X, that made X lose??!" >>>>> >>>>> ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, >>>>> thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you >>>>> voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the >>>>> effect would have been exacsly the same." >>>>> >>>>> But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I >>>>> raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more >>>>> favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing. >>>>> >>>>> So plainly violating Mono-Raise is worse than violating >>>>> Mono-Add-Plump. >>>>> >>>>> Michael Ossipoff >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 10:27 AM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> The example I just posted of "IBIFA with an anti-defection device" >>>>>> failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both Mike's suggested >>>>>> "Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested "TopMiddleBottom". >>>>>> >>>>>> 20: F=C >>B >>>>>> 07: F > C=B (or, for the sake of Forest's method suggestion, F >> >>>>>> C=B) >>>>>> 25: B >>>>>> 48: W >>>>>> >>>>>> All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C >> B voters >>>>>> change their rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom >>>>>> then the winner changes to B. >>>>>> >>>>>> Chris Benham >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >