CB
Chris Benham
Tue, Apr 9, 2024 2:36 PM
It has been recently claimed here that STAR is better than Hare, and
that the promoters of STAR have been much
more honest than the US promoters of Hare (aka IRV or RCV).
I strongly disagree.
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will have strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely be a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
to CLC).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivate by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by the not-so-deep
minded, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the
third candidate is actually competitive,vote-splitting remains a
serious issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169sand
RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and
general election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each
candidate individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when
voters are able to show equal preference, vote-splitting can be
eliminated. All voting methods which do this pass theEqual Vote
Criterion https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion,
including STAR Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
(and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
votes supporting
the turkey against their favourite.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
Hare.
Chris
It has been recently claimed here that STAR is better than Hare, and
that the promoters of STAR have been much
more honest than the US promoters of Hare (aka IRV or RCV).
I strongly disagree.
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will have strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely be a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
to CLC).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivate by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by the not-so-deep
minded, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the
> third candidate is actually competitive,vote-splitting remains a
> serious issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s>and
> RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and
> general election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each
> candidate individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when
> voters are able to show equal preference, vote-splitting can be
> eliminated. All voting methods which do this pass theEqual Vote
> Criterion <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>,
> including STAR Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
> The Equal Vote Criterion orEquality Criterion
> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote>is avoting method criterion
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion>which requires
> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is
> as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which
> pass the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibitvote-splitting
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting>or the "Spoiler Effect,"
> ensuring that every vote can cast anequally weighted vote
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the
> Equal Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
(and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
votes supporting
the turkey against their favourite.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
>
> Why STAR Voting?
>
> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>
> *
>
> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
> incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>
> *
>
> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
> worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>
> *
>
> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
> race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
Hare.
Chris
F
fdpk69p6uq@snkmail.com
Tue, Apr 9, 2024 7:02 PM
(This kind of hostility and condescending tone is why I don't participate
much on this mailing list, even as a pseudonym.)
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute the
suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of Hare.
STAR has substantially better Social Utility Efficiency and Condorcet
Efficiency than Hare, which, to people like me, are more important than
other criteria.
I don't believe people generally want to vote strategically; they are
just forced to because systems like FPTP are so bad. So STAR failing to
meet one or two binary strategy-resistance criteria doesn't seem like an
important real-world problem to me. I don't think voters generally have
the knowledge or desire to exploit them, but I'm open to hearing about
realistic scenarios in which it performs worse than other systems.
I don't know about the motivations of the inventors of STAR, but my
motivations for supporting STAR are better representation, reducing
polarization, and breaking the two-party system, which I don't believe Hare
accomplishes.
Hare's elimination process means it doesn't count all preferences expressed
by the voters, and suffers from the same vote-splitting as FPTP, resulting
in undemocratic outcomes and perpetuating the problems that I would like to
fix (spoiler effect, center-squeeze, two-party system, polarization). I
don't think we should throw away some voters' preferences in order to make
the ballots easier to count.
(This kind of hostility and condescending tone is why I don't participate
much on this mailing list, even as a pseudonym.)
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute the
> suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of Hare.
STAR has substantially better Social Utility Efficiency and Condorcet
Efficiency than Hare, which, to people like me, are more important than
other criteria.
I don't believe people generally *want* to vote strategically; they are
just forced to because systems like FPTP are so bad. So STAR failing to
meet one or two binary strategy-resistance criteria doesn't seem like an
important real-world problem to me. I don't think voters generally have
the knowledge or desire to exploit them, but I'm open to hearing about
realistic scenarios in which it performs worse than other systems.
I don't know about the motivations of the inventors of STAR, but my
motivations for supporting STAR are better representation, reducing
polarization, and breaking the two-party system, which I don't believe Hare
accomplishes.
Hare's elimination process means it doesn't count all preferences expressed
by the voters, and suffers from the same vote-splitting as FPTP, resulting
in undemocratic outcomes and perpetuating the problems that I would like to
fix (spoiler effect, center-squeeze, two-party system, polarization). I
don't think we should throw away some voters' preferences in order to make
the ballots easier to count.
CB
Chris Benham
Wed, Apr 10, 2024 12:31 AM
(This is a re-send with a few typos and omissions fixed. I was tired
when I sent it the first time.)
It has been recently claimed here that STAR is better than Hare, and
that the promoters of STAR have been much
more honest than the US promoters of Hare (aka IRV or RCV).
I strongly disagree.
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the
third candidate is actually competitive,vote-splitting remains a
serious issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169sand
RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and
general election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each
candidate individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when
voters are able to show equal preference, vote-splitting can be
eliminated. All voting methods which do this pass theEqual Vote
Criterion https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion,
including STAR Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
(and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
votes supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR
badly fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
(This is a re-send with a few typos and omissions fixed. I was tired
when I sent it the first time.)
It has been recently claimed here that STAR is better than Hare, and
that the promoters of STAR have been much
more honest than the US promoters of Hare (aka IRV or RCV).
I strongly disagree.
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the
> third candidate is actually competitive,vote-splitting remains a
> serious issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s>and
> RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and
> general election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each
> candidate individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when
> voters are able to show equal preference, vote-splitting can be
> eliminated. All voting methods which do this pass theEqual Vote
> Criterion <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>,
> including STAR Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
> The Equal Vote Criterion orEquality Criterion
> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote>is avoting method criterion
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion>which requires
> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is
> as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which
> pass the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibitvote-splitting
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting>or the "Spoiler Effect,"
> ensuring that every vote can cast anequally weighted vote
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the
> Equal Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
(and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
votes supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR
badly fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
>
> Why STAR Voting?
>
> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>
> *
>
> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
> incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>
> *
>
> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
> worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>
> *
>
> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
> race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Wed, Apr 10, 2024 7:34 PM
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for the
sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a candidate
deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an intermediate
point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with the
absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
& count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more complicated
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency & Social-Utility
(SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including the loss of FBC
compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more likely
a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according to
CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep thinkers,
the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of preference
has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third candidate
is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious issue
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV only offers
a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general election with
Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent vote-splitting.
As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate individually,
when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to show equal
preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods which do
this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR Voting
https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which requires that
a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler Effect,"
ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
(and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore> Bush
preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their sincere
favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to be
a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that case
then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
<https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the race.
<https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute the
suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the Condorcet
methods.
Chris
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for the
sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a candidate
deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an intermediate
point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with the
absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
& count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more complicated
> and less fair.
>
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency & Social-Utility
(SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including the loss of FBC
compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>
> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
> Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more likely
> a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>
> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
> the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according to
> CLC here).
>
> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
> seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
> motivated by three priorities:
>
> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>
> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>
> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep thinkers,
> the method be as bad as possible.
>
> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>
> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of preference
> has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third candidate
> is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious issue
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV only offers
> a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general election with
> Choose-One Plurality voting.
>
> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent vote-splitting.
> As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate individually,
> when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to show equal
> preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods which do
> this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR Voting
> <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>
>
> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>
> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires that
> a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler Effect,"
> ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>
> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
> Vote Criterion.
>
>
> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>
> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
> (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>
> 49 Bush
> 24 Gore
> 27 Nader>Gore
>
> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>
> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore> Bush
> preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
> the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their sincere
> favorite below equal-top.
>
> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>
> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to be
> a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
> to Push-over.
>
> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that case
> then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
> favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
> might
> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>
> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
> supporting
> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
> likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
>
> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
> fails FBC.
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>
> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>
> Why STAR Voting?
>
> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>
> -
>
> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
> <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
> -
>
> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
> case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
> -
>
> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the race.
> <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>
>
> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute the
> suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of Hare.
>
> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the Condorcet
> methods.
>
> Chris
>
>
>
CL
Closed Limelike Curves
Wed, Apr 10, 2024 8:55 PM
Chris: by "more accurate" I meant higher Condorcet-efficiency (although
personally I prefer Score or utilitarian winners to Condorcet winners).
You're completely correct that STAR's criterion compliance is abysmal. All
of these would be huge problems if STAR were a traditional method and would
lead me to scrap it. But STAR's not supposed to be a traditional method;
the goal is just to add more choice to score. The reason STAR is better
than Hare in practice is because:
- Cloning every candidate turns STAR into score.
- The optimal strategy for STAR is to always nominate candidates in pairs
(to make sure both runoff slots are locked-up).
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher. Right
now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race; on a simple
left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly enthusiastic about
an 82-year old president. (Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other
candidate in the race...) With STAR, every voter has at least two
candidates they consider tolerable.
I think of STAR as just reversing the primary-then-general order: we have a
general election to choose the best party (the score round), and then a
"primary" where we pick the best nominee by a simple majority.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for the
sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a candidate
deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an intermediate
point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
& count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more complicated
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep thinkers,
the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of preference
has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third candidate
is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious issue
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV only offers
a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general election with
Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent vote-splitting.
As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate individually,
when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to show equal
preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods which do
this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR Voting
https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which requires
that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler Effect,"
ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
(and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
<https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
Chris: by "more accurate" I meant higher Condorcet-efficiency (although
personally I prefer Score or utilitarian winners to Condorcet winners).
You're completely correct that STAR's criterion compliance is abysmal. All
of these would be huge problems if STAR were a traditional method and would
lead me to scrap it. But STAR's not supposed to be a traditional method;
the goal is just to add more choice to score. The reason STAR is better
than Hare in practice is because:
1. Cloning every candidate turns STAR into score.
2. The optimal strategy for STAR is to always nominate candidates in pairs
(to make sure both runoff slots are locked-up).
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher. Right
now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race; on a simple
left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly enthusiastic about
an 82-year old president. (Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other
candidate in the race...) With STAR, every voter has at least two
candidates they consider tolerable.
I think of STAR as just reversing the primary-then-general order: we have a
general election to choose the best party (the score round), and then a
"primary" where we pick the best nominee by a simple majority.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
> [quote]
> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for the
> sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
> [/quote]
>
> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>
> The right use of Score:
>
> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>
> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a candidate
> deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an intermediate
> point-rating.
>
> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>
> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique unarbitrariness.
>
> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
> the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
> greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
> & count-fraud vulnerability.
>
> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more complicated
>> and less fair.
>>
> More complicated, yes.
>
> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
> insist on one.
>
> …likewise Score.
>
> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
> the loss of FBC compliance.
>
> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>
> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>
> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
> security.
>
> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>
> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>
>
>>
>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
>> Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>
>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
>> the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
>> to CLC here).
>>
>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
>> seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>> motivated by three priorities:
>>
>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>
>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>
>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep thinkers,
>> the method be as bad as possible.
>>
>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>
>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of preference
>> has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third candidate
>> is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious issue
>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV only offers
>> a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general election with
>> Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>
>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent vote-splitting.
>> As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate individually,
>> when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to show equal
>> preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods which do
>> this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR Voting
>> <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>
>>
>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>
>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler Effect,"
>> ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>
>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>> Vote Criterion.
>>
>>
>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>
>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
>> (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>
>> 49 Bush
>> 24 Gore
>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>
>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>
>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
>> the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>
>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>
>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
>> be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
>> to Push-over.
>>
>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
>> favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>> might
>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>
>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>> supporting
>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
>> likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
>>
>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>> fails FBC.
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>
>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>
>> Why STAR Voting?
>>
>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>
>> -
>>
>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
>> <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>> -
>>
>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
>> case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>> -
>>
>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>> race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>
>>
>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
>> the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
>> Hare.
>>
>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>> Condorcet methods.
>>
>> Chris
>>
>>
>> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Wed, Apr 10, 2024 10:02 PM
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the ballot
in all states.
…& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
(candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
Williamson’s platform?
on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
months?
Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the race...
You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for the
sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a candidate
deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an intermediate
point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
& count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV only
offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general election
with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent vote-splitting.
As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate individually,
when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to show equal
preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods which do
this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which requires
that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler Effect,"
ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
(and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
<https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 13:55 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
> opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
>
Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the ballot
in all states.
…& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
>
What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
(candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
Williamson’s platform?
on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
> enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
>
But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
months?
Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the race...
>
You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
> tolerable.
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>>
>> [quote]
>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for the
>> sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>> [/quote]
>>
>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>
>> The right use of Score:
>>
>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>
>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a candidate
>> deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an intermediate
>> point-rating.
>>
>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>
>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique unarbitrariness.
>>
>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
>> the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
>> greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
>> & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>
>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>
>> More complicated, yes.
>>
>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>> insist on one.
>>
>> …likewise Score.
>>
>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>
>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>
>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>
>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
>> security.
>>
>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>
>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
>>> Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
>>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>
>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated in
>>> the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
>>> to CLC here).
>>>
>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
>>> seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>
>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>
>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>
>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>
>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>
>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV only
>>> offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general election
>>> with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>
>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent vote-splitting.
>>> As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate individually,
>>> when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to show equal
>>> preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods which do
>>> this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>
>>>
>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>
>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler Effect,"
>>> ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>
>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>
>>>
>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>
>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
>>> (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>
>>> 49 Bush
>>> 24 Gore
>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>
>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>
>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
>>> the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>
>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>
>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
>>> be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
>>> to Push-over.
>>>
>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on you
>>> favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>> might
>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>
>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>> supporting
>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
>>> likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
>>>
>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>> fails FBC.
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>
>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>
>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>
>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>
>>> -
>>>
>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
>>> <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>> -
>>>
>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
>>> case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>> -
>>>
>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>>> race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
>>> the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
>>> Hare.
>>>
>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>
>>> Chris
>>>
>>>
>>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
MG
Michael Garman
Wed, Apr 10, 2024 10:10 PM
Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
ballot in all states.
She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
claims.
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 12:05 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the ballot
in all states.
…& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
(candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
Williamson’s platform?
on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
months?
Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the race...
You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
intermediate point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
& count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV
only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which requires
that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler Effect,"
ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
(and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
<https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
>> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
ballot in all states.
She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
>> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
Her stance on Ukraine.
>> Marianne Williamson
Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
claims.
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 12:05 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 13:55 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
> As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
>> opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
>>
>
> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the ballot
> in all states.
>
> …& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
>
> Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
>>
>
> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
> (candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
> Williamson’s platform?
>
> on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
>> enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
>>
>
> But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
> months?
>
> Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the race...
>>
>
> You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
>
> ) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
>> tolerable.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> [quote]
>>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>> [/quote]
>>>
>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>
>>> The right use of Score:
>>>
>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>
>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>
>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>
>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>
>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
>>> the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
>>> greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
>>> & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>
>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>
>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>
>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>> insist on one.
>>>
>>> …likewise Score.
>>>
>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>
>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>
>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>
>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
>>> security.
>>>
>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>
>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
>>>> Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
>>>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>
>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
>>>> in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high" according
>>>> to CLC here).
>>>>
>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
>>>> seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>
>>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>>
>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>
>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>
>>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>
>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>
>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>
>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler Effect,"
>>>> ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>
>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>
>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
>>>> (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>
>>>> 49 Bush
>>>> 24 Gore
>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>
>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>
>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite). If
>>>> the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>
>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>
>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
>>>> be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>
>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>> might
>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>
>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>> supporting
>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
>>>> likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
>>>>
>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>> fails FBC.
>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>
>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>
>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>
>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>
>>>> -
>>>>
>>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
>>>> <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>> -
>>>>
>>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
>>>> case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>> -
>>>>
>>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>>>> race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
>>>> the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
>>>> Hare.
>>>>
>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>
>>>> Chris
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Wed, Apr 10, 2024 11:13 PM
Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
ballot in all states.
She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
claims.
Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the ballot
in all states.
…& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
(candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
Williamson’s platform?
on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
months?
Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the race...
You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
intermediate point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
& count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
according to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV
only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which requires
that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler Effect,"
ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
(more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
<https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 15:10 Michael Garman <michael.garman@rankthevote.us>
wrote:
>
> >> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
> ballot in all states.
>
> She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
>
> >> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
>
> Her stance on Ukraine.
>
> >> Marianne Williamson
>
> Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
> claims.
>
Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 12:05 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 13:55 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>> As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
>>> opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
>>>
>>
>> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the ballot
>> in all states.
>>
>> …& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
>>
>> Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
>>>
>>
>> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
>> (candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
>> Williamson’s platform?
>>
>> on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
>>> enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
>>>
>>
>> But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
>> months?
>>
>> Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the race...
>>>
>>
>> You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
>>
>> ) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
>>> tolerable.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> [quote]
>>>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>> [/quote]
>>>>
>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>
>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>
>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>
>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>
>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>
>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>
>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
>>>> the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
>>>> greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
>>>> & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>
>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>
>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>
>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>>> insist on one.
>>>>
>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>
>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>
>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>
>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>
>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
>>>> security.
>>>>
>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>
>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>> Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
>>>>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>
>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
>>>>> in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>
>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
>>>>> seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>
>>>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>>>
>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>
>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>
>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>
>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>
>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>
>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>>>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>>>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>>>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler Effect,"
>>>>> ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>
>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>>>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>
>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>
>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>
>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>>>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
>>>>> If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>
>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>>>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
>>>>> to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>
>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>>>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>>> might
>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>
>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>>> supporting
>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>
>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>
>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>
>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>
>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>
>>>>> -
>>>>>
>>>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
>>>>> <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>> -
>>>>>
>>>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>> worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>> -
>>>>>
>>>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>>>>> race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
>>>>> the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
>>>>> Hare.
>>>>>
>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
MG
Michael Garman
Wed, Apr 10, 2024 11:33 PM
Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
ballot in all states.
She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
claims.
Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
ballot in all states.
…& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
(candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
Williamson’s platform?
on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
months?
Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the race...
You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
intermediate point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
(somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
count-fraud security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
according to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV
only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which requires
that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler
Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
(more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
of Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
>> Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
So close! I was talking about her vaccine skepticism.
Michael J. Garman | he/him
Digital & Campus Organizer | Rank the Vote
Book a meeting with me! <https://calendly.com/michael-j-garman>
(401) 644-4108 | michael.garman@rankthevote.us
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:13 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 15:10 Michael Garman <
> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:
>
>>
>> >> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
>> ballot in all states.
>>
>> She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
>>
>> >> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
>>
>> Her stance on Ukraine.
>>
>> >> Marianne Williamson
>>
>> Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
>> claims.
>>
>
> Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 12:05 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 13:55 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>> As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
>>>> opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
>>> ballot in all states.
>>>
>>> …& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
>>>
>>> Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
>>>>
>>>
>>> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
>>> (candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
>>> Williamson’s platform?
>>>
>>> on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
>>>> enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
>>>>
>>>
>>> But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
>>> months?
>>>
>>> Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the race...
>>>>
>>>
>>> You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
>>>
>>> ) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
>>>> tolerable.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> [quote]
>>>>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>
>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>
>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>
>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>
>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>
>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>
>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>
>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>
>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>
>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>
>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>>>> insist on one.
>>>>>
>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>
>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>
>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
>>>>>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
>>>>>> in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
>>>>>> It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>>>>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>>>>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>>>>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>>>>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>>>>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
>>>>>> If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>>>>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
>>>>>> to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>>>>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>>>> might
>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>>>> supporting
>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>> incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>> -
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>> worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>> -
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>>>>>> race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Wed, Apr 10, 2024 11:35 PM
Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
So close! I was talking about her vaccine skepticism.
I hadn’t heard about that. But I can accept a policy that I disagree with
if it’s part of a platform that I otherwise like.
Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
ballot in all states.
She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
claims.
Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
ballot in all states.
…& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
(candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
Williamson’s platform?
on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
months?
Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the
You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
[quote]
Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
[/quote]
If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
The right use of Score:
Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
…with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
intermediate point-rating.
Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.
Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
(somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.
More complicated, yes.
I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
insist on one.
…likewise Score.
It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
the loss of FBC compliance.
But STAR is better than Hare because:
It retains some amount Score’s merit.
It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
count-fraud security.
It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
(automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
according to CLC here).
But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
motivated by three priorities:
(1) the method isn't Hare,
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
issue https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s and RCV
only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion, including STAR
Voting https://www.starvoting.us/star,...
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote is a voting method criterion
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion which
requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting or the "Spoiler
Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote.
Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
Vote Criterion.
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore
Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
vulnerable
to Push-over.
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
your
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
might
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
supporting
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
(more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
STAR.
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
fails FBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
From https://www.starvoting.org/
Why STAR Voting?
Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
-
Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
-
Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
-
Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
of Hare.
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.
Chris
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 16:33 Michael Garman <michael.garman@rankthevote.us>
wrote:
> >> Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
>
> So close! I was talking about her vaccine skepticism.
>
I hadn’t heard about that. But I can accept a policy that I disagree with
if it’s part of a platform that I otherwise like.
>
> Michael J. Garman | he/him
>
> Digital & Campus Organizer | Rank the Vote
>
> Book a meeting with me! <https://calendly.com/michael-j-garman>
>
> (401) 644-4108 | michael.garman@rankthevote.us
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:13 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 15:10 Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> >> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
>>> ballot in all states.
>>>
>>> She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
>>>
>>> >> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
>>>
>>> Her stance on Ukraine.
>>>
>>> >> Marianne Williamson
>>>
>>> Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
>>> claims.
>>>
>>
>> Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 12:05 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 13:55 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
>>>>> opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
>>>> ballot in all states.
>>>>
>>>> …& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
>>>>
>>>> Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
>>>> (candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
>>>> Williamson’s platform?
>>>>
>>>> on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
>>>>> enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
>>>> months?
>>>>
>>>> Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the
>>>>> race...
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
>>>>
>>>> ) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
>>>>> tolerable.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [quote]
>>>>>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>>>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>>>>> insist on one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much more
>>>>>>> likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
>>>>>>> (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
>>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
>>>>>>> It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by not-so-deep
>>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and general
>>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which
>>>>>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
>>>>>>> is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
>>>>>>> and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
>>>>>>> Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
>>>>>>> If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
>>>>>>> Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
>>>>>>> to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is much more
>>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
>>>>>>> that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>>>>> might
>>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>>>>> supporting
>>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>>>> Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>> incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>>> worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
>>>>>>> the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
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>>>>
>>>
