The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 1:02 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
but voters can skew that information quantitatively and, if they want to
be tactical, insincerely.
...and even when everyone votes tactically, rated systems still
outperform ranked systems.
http://electology.org/sites/default/files/comparing_voting_m
ethods_simplicity_group_satisfaction.png
https://electology.github.io/vse-sim/vse.html
"Tactical Score Voting may be, in practice, more likely to elect a
Condorcet winner (when one exists) than real Condorcet methods."
https://electology.org/tactical-voting-basics
if i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only
sorta like B over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what
disparate degree we like our candidates.
Yes, it absolutely should. That's the fundamental flaw in ranked ballots:
preference rankings can't be meaningfully compared between individuals. If
there are 2 voters and 2 candidates, and the ballots are:
1: A > B
2: B > A
you can't tell who the winner should be, but if their true feelings are
- loves A and hates B
- loves B and likes A
the obviously correct winner is A.
The goal of a voting system is to choose the candidate who best represents
the population / whose opinions are closest to the centroid of the
population's opinions / who, winning, would maximize the happiness of the
population. Ranked ballots destroy information that's needed to find this
winner.
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 8:35 AM, Brian Olson wrote:
I don't favor raw Score summation. It's strategy prone. For choices where
my honest vote might be [1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0] I should probably
vote strategically [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0].
... in which case it devolves into Approval Voting, which... is still
pretty good.
Anyway, this is only your optimal strategy if you know exactly what
everyone else is voting. In reality, polls have uncertainty (e.g. November
2016), and ratings ballots allow you to hedge your bets based on the
likelihood of different outcomes.
And if you don't like that and the varying vote power depending on how you
vote: I have a system for you!
"Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR)
Do you think this has a benefit over SRV/STAR?
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 12:09 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
No, we should not make the voters cook up that information. all we should
ask the voters is "whom do you prefer A or B?" and "if you can't get your
favorite, whom is your next preference?"
Utility information is the information that's naturally in voters' brains.
Ranking ballots force them to "quantize" it into discrete steps which
distort the underlying reality. If a voter's true feelings are:
A: Love
B: Like
C: Hate
D: Hate
E: Hate
F: Hate
G: Hate
a ranking ballot forces them to vote something like
A: 1
B: 2
C: 3
D: 4
E: 5
F: 6
G: 7
amplifying small preferences into large ones and making it look like they
approve of C 5/7ths as much as they approve of A. When you combine this
across many voters, C is going to get much more power than they actually
deserve.
"The majority judgement experiment proves that the model on which the
theory of social choice and voting is based is simply not true: voters do
not have preference lists of candidates in their minds. Moreover, forcing
voters to establish preference lists only leads to inconsistencies,
impossibilities and incompatibilities." https://hal.archives-ouvertes.
fr/hal-00243076
"Thus, the discrimination forced by rankings lessened the validity of
rankings among participants who did not freely differentiate between
values. In other words, our findings indicate that ratings may have more
predictive validity than rankings, perhaps because the latter force
participants to sometimes make unimportant and/or inconsequential (and
hence invalid) distinctions between similarly regarded values. ... value
ranking forces people to make distinctions that they would not otherwise
make" http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15324834basp1802_4
"cardinal (utility-based) preferences are embedded into the space of
ordinal preferences. This often gives rise to a distortion in the
preferences, and hence in the social welfare of the outcome."
http://procaccia.info/papers/distortion.cia06.pdf
no reason to use that over Condorcet (with a simple method to deal with
cycles, ranked-pairs is still a lot easier to explain than Schulze and they
pick the same winner if there are 3 in the Smith set, so let's use the
simpler method)
Condorcet systems are too complicated for real-life use in governmental
elections, and much simpler cardinal systems produce the same or better
outcomes in practice.
(Though the goal should be to find the most-approved Utilitarian Winner,
not the most-preferred Condorcet Winner, but they are the same in most
cases. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406815000518)
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 2:28 PM, Richard Lung wrote:
I also have found it hard to believe that Score voting and Approval voting
are taken seriously.
and I find it hard to believe that people are still seriously arguing about
which ranked, majoritarian voting methods meet which mathematical criteria,
when rated utilitarian voting methods exist, and are accepted to work just
fine in every other context in which they are used.
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
From: fdpk69p6uq@snkmail.com
Date: Fri, June 23, 2017 9:57 pm
To: election-methods@electorama.com
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 1:02 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
but voters can skew that information quantitatively and, if they want to
be tactical, insincerely.
...and even when everyone votes tactically, rated systems still
outperform ranked systems.
i don't believe it. �and simulations will not persuade me.
ethods_simplicity_group_satisfaction.png
"Tactical Score Voting may be, in practice, more likely to elect a
Condorcet winner (when one exists) than real Condorcet methods."
yeah, i've heard that one before (perhaps even from Warren, whom i respect). �
as if the Anglicans will out-Catholic the Catholics.
if i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only
sorta like B over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what
disparate degree we like our candidates.
Yes, it absolutely should.
�
that is a fundamental value statement that stands in opposition of the core democratic value that every person's vote should count equally.
known as "One-person-one-vote".
That's the fundamental flaw in ranked ballots:
preference rankings can't be meaningfully compared between individuals. If
there are 2 voters and 2 candidates, and the ballots are:
1: A > B
2: B > A
you can't tell who the winner should be, but if their true feelings are
- loves A and hates B
- loves B and likes A
the obviously correct winner is A.
no, if voter 1 prefers A and voter 2 prefers B, the two voters have equal franchise in a governmental election in a democracy. �we must not pigeon-hole voter 2 and ask them to reflect on the strength of their preference so that when the say
"oh, i only sorta like B over A a little", then the bossy, pushy, entitled voter 1 gets their way and voter 2 will start to resent being vulnerable and honest about things and will learn to be more polemic about things in the future. �that's the problem with elections gone bad (like
Burlington Vermont's IRV of 2009), when voters realize they've been punished for how they voted, there is voter regret and cynicism and people are literally encouraged to be more polarized.
The goal of a voting system is to choose the candidate who best represents
the population / whose opinions are closest to the centroid of the
population's opinions
no. �the goal of a voting system in a democracy is to determine, reflect, and implement the will of the majority of citizens, all with equal franchise. �letting a minority rule sets up all sorts of incentive for strategic voting.
/ who, winning,
would maximize the happiness of the
population. Ranked ballots destroy information that's needed to find this
winner.
consider a two-candidate election. �it's just between A and B.
i don't think you'll get any mileage for the idea that B should be elected when more voters prefer A.
Condorcet is the only natural way to extend the principle of equal franchise to each voter and
their preferences to a multi-candidate, single-winner election.
we do not want to trouble voters with a perceived need to vote tactically (because they know their opponents will vote tactically and they don't wanna be chumps). we don't even to trouble voters to fairly rate candidates.
�all we should ask them is "who do you wanna win?" �and then "if you can't get that candidate you want to win, then whom else would you want to win?" �it should be simple and fair.
--
r b-j � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Given the possibility of a Condorcet paradox, the will of the majority becomes an incoherent notion. If A is preferred by a majority to B, then in a two-candidate election, then A should win under a majority system. But introduce candidate C, and B could end up winning, even though by majority logic, A is a better candidate than B.
Obviously you know all about Condorcet paradoxes, but if you think that the majority criterion is some sort of absolute, then you are left with no option but to say that in some elections, A is a better winner than B, B a better winner than C, and C a better winner than A. And this makes no sense.
You can also end up with winners hardly anyone wants. If there are two polarising candidates each with strong support and a complete unknown, you could have the following ballots:
49 voters: A>C>B49 voters: B>C>A2 voters: C>A>B
It could be that the score ballots (out of 10) would be:
49: A=10, C=1, B=049: B=10, C=1, A=02: C=2, A=1, B=0
C is the Condorcet winner.
There's no way I'd accept that a C victory is the best result because of blind adherence to some sort of majority principle under all circumstances. This is not to say that Condorcet methods are necessarily bad, but just that there are elections when they would produce what I would consider to be the wrong result. And in this situation, very wrong.
Toby
From: robert bristow-johnson <rbj@audioimagination.com>
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Sent: Saturday, 24 June 2017, 3:52
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
no. the goal of a voting system in a democracy is to determine, reflect, and implement the will of the majority of citizens, all with equal franchise. letting a minority rule sets up all sorts of incentive for strategic voting.
> i don't believe it. and simulations will not persuade me.
Sure, simulations aren't real humans. Opinions stuck in opposition, someone
ought to do a proper psychology experiment. Devise a methodology, do a
test, get people to {rank, rate} {5,10, 20} things in a subject they {know
well, know poorly} and figure out the quality of information gotten out of
people, and ask them how they felt about how much work they had to do to
put into this.
If people can rate 5 things they barely know about well enough, great.
Maybe people can tolerate rating 20 things for topics they know well, but
for more vague subjects ranking 10 things or more is easier on their
minds.
That's just my guess of about how it might go.
Then maybe the question would be how do we think actual elections will go?
Single seat elections will usually have 2-5 candidates? (but some rare
times 20+ ?)
Multi seat elections will have 5-20 candidates or more?
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
From: "Toby Pereira" tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk
Date: Sat, June 24, 2017 2:10 pm
To: "rbj@audioimagination.com" rbj@audioimagination.com
"election-methods@electorama.com" election-methods@electorama.com
Given the possibility of a Condorcet paradox, the will of the majority�becomes an incoherent notion. If A is preferred by a majority to B, then in a two-candidate election, then A should win under a�majority system. But introduce candidate C, and B could end up winning, even though by
majority logic, A is a better candidate than B.
Obviously you know all about Condorcet paradoxes, but if you think that the majority criterion is some sort of absolute, then you are left with no option but to say that in some elections, A is a better winner than B, B a better winner than C, and C a better winner than A. And this makes no
sense.
of course a cycle is a paradox. �i am also convinced that cycles will be rare. �but they could happen on a rare occasion and we need rules set down in advance for how to deal with that contingency.
You can also end up with winners hardly anyone wants. If there are two polarising candidates each with strong support and a complete unknown, you could have the following ballots:
49�voters: A>C>B
49 voters: B>C>A
2 voters: C>A>B
It could be that the score ballots (out of 10) would be:
49: A=10, C=1, B=0
49: B=10, C=1, A=0
2: C=2, A=1, B=0
big unrealistic assumptions made here (more likely the 2 voters on the bottom will jack their C preference up to 10 rather than throw away their vote - this is why i am unpersuaded by simulations or hypotheticals dreamed up like this). �how do voters know how to quantify the degree of their
preference?
C is the Condorcet winner.
as he/she/ should be (ignoring the hypothesized ratings and looking at just the rankings). �it's exaggerated, but this is very similar to the Burlington 2009 election that had a clear Condorcet winner whom was not elected with IRV. �lot's of people,
both Republican on the right and Progressive on the left, felt that the Democrat candidate was an acceptable compromise candidate (and marked their ballots as such) and many (but not enough) Democrats preferred the Democrat candidate over the other two.
There's no way I'd accept that a C victory is the best result because of blind adherence to some sort of majority principle under all circumstances.
why not? �51% think that C is better than B and 51% think that C is better than A. �
it's a close election, but even if it's close, we still award the victory to the candidate most preferred, even if preferred by a small margin.
This is not to say that Condorcet methods are necessarily bad, but just that there are elections when they would produce what I would consider to
be the wrong result.
so will IRV. �so will FPTP. �so do multi-winner elections picking the highest "vote-getters".
i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about.
And in this situation, very wrong.
nope.
--
r b-j � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
"i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about."
At least he recognised the necessity of ranked choices.
Simply from the point of view of scientific measurement, there is no
question that both order (in the vote) and proportion (in the count) are
essential to an accurate electoral system. They are indeed essential in
the arts and sciences and civilised society in general. (Of which
politics is but dubiously a part.)
Richard Lung.
On 25/06/2017 00:12, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility
theorems paradox.
From: "Toby Pereira" tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk
Date: Sat, June 24, 2017 2:10 pm
To: "rbj@audioimagination.com" rbj@audioimagination.com
"election-methods@electorama.com" election-methods@electorama.com
Given the possibility of a Condorcet paradox, the will of the
majority becomes an incoherent notion. If A is preferred by a majority
to B, then in a two-candidate election, then A should win under
a majority system. But introduce candidate C, and B could end up
winning, even though by majority logic, A is a better candidate than B.
Obviously you know all about Condorcet paradoxes, but if you think
that the majority criterion is some sort of absolute, then you are
left with no option but to say that in some elections, A is a better
winner than B, B a better winner than C, and C a better winner than A.
And this makes no sense.
of course a cycle is a paradox. i am also convinced that cycles will
be rare. but they could happen on a rare occasion and we need rules
set down in advance for how to deal with that contingency.
You can also end up with winners hardly anyone wants. If there are
two polarising candidates each with strong support and a complete
unknown, you could have the following ballots:
49 voters: A>C>B
49 voters: B>C>A
2 voters: C>A>B
It could be that the score ballots (out of 10) would be:
49: A=10, C=1, B=0
49: B=10, C=1, A=0
2: C=2, A=1, B=0
big unrealistic assumptions made here (more likely the 2 voters on the
bottom will jack their C preference up to 10 rather than throw away
their vote - this is why i am unpersuaded by simulations or
hypotheticals dreamed up like this). how do voters know how to
quantify the degree of their preference?
C is the Condorcet winner.
as he/she/ should be (ignoring the hypothesized ratings and looking at
just the rankings). it's exaggerated, but this is very similar to the
Burlington 2009 election that had a clear Condorcet winner whom was
not elected with IRV. lot's of people, both Republican on the right
and Progressive on the left, felt that the Democrat candidate was an
acceptable compromise candidate (and marked their ballots as such) and
many (but not enough) Democrats preferred the Democrat candidate over
the other two.
There's no way I'd accept that a C victory is the best result
because of blind adherence to some sort of majority principle under
all circumstances.
why not? 51% think that C is better than B and 51% think that C is
better than A.
it's a close election, but even if it's close, we still award the
victory to the candidate most preferred, even if preferred by a small
margin.
This is not to say that Condorcet methods are necessarily bad, but
just that there are elections when they would produce what I would
consider to be the wrong result.
so will IRV. so will FPTP. so do multi-winner elections picking the
highest "vote-getters".
i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about.
And in this situation, very wrong.
nope.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttp://electorama.com/em for list info
--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books in epub format:
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
The score ballots I gave were what the voters see as their honest ballots, not necessarily what they'd actually give. Sorry if that wasn't clear. So with that in mind, you can see that the Condorcet winner (C) is a complete nobody. It could be that most voters have very little idea who C is, but just put them ahead of their less preferred of the two main candidates because they have an "anyone but" mentality about them. So yes, electing C would be bad in this case.
I'm also aware that there are situations where other election methods give poor results. This wasn't an attack on Condorcet methods or a case for any particular method over any other. It was an attack on the view that the majority principle should be viewed as some sort of absolute that follows directly from "one person one vote".
Toby
From: robert bristow-johnson <rbj@audioimagination.com>
To: "election-methods@electorama.com" election-methods@electorama.com
Sent: Sunday, 25 June 2017, 0:12
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
From: "Toby Pereira" tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk
Date: Sat, June 24, 2017 2:10 pm
To: "rbj@audioimagination.com" rbj@audioimagination.com
"election-methods@electorama.com" election-methods@electorama.com
Given the possibility of a Condorcet paradox, the will of the majority becomes an incoherent notion. If A is preferred by a majority to B, then in a two-candidate election, then A should win under a majority system. But introduce candidate C, and B could end up winning, even though bymajority logic, A is a better candidate than B.
Obviously you know all about Condorcet paradoxes, but if you think that the majority criterion is some sort of absolute, then you are left with no option but to say that in some elections, A is a better winner than B, B a better winner than C, and C a better winner than A. And this makes nosense.of course a cycle is a paradox. i am also convinced that cycles will be rare. but they could happen on a rare occasion and we need rules set down in advance for how to deal with that contingency.
You can also end up with winners hardly anyone wants. If there are two polarising candidates each with strong support and a complete unknown, you could have the following ballots:
49 voters: A>C>B
49 voters: B>C>A
2 voters: C>A>B
It could be that the score ballots (out of 10) would be:
49: A=10, C=1, B=0
49: B=10, C=1, A=0
2: C=2, A=1, B=0
big unrealistic assumptions made here (more likely the 2 voters on the bottom will jack their C preference up to 10 rather than throw away their vote - this is why i am unpersuaded by simulations or hypotheticals dreamed up like this). how do voters know how to quantify the degree of theirpreference?
C is the Condorcet winner.as he/she/ should be (ignoring the hypothesized ratings and looking at just the rankings). it's exaggerated, but this is very similar to the Burlington 2009 election that had a clear Condorcet winner whom was not elected with IRV. lot's of people,both Republican on the right and Progressive on the left, felt that the Democrat candidate was an acceptable compromise candidate (and marked their ballots as such) and many (but not enough) Democrats preferred the Democrat candidate over the other two.
There's no way I'd accept that a C victory is the best result because of blind adherence to some sort of majority principle under all circumstances.why not? 51% think that C is better than B and 51% think that C is better than A.
it's a close election, but even if it's close, we still award the victory to the candidate most preferred, even if preferred by a small margin.>This is not to say that Condorcet methods are necessarily bad, but just that there are elections when they would produce what I would consider tobe the wrong result.so will IRV. so will FPTP. so do multi-winner elections picking the highest "vote-getters".i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about.
And in this situation, very wrong.nope.
--r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com"Imagination is more important than knowledge."----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 10:52 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...and even when everyone votes tactically, rated systems still
outperform ranked systems.
i don't believe it. and simulations will not persuade me.
Well, what would it take to persuade you, then? I linked to studies of
real people, too.
that is a fundamental value statement
Sure
that stands in opposition of the core democratic value that every person's
vote should count equally.
known as "One-person-one-vote".
No, your "one vote" is your ballot of information about how you feel about
the candidates, and it has just as much weight as everyone else's.
People use the same argument to campaign against ranked-choice systems, you
know.
http://www.lifezette.com/polizette/one-man-one-vote-under-assault-in-maine/
and voter 2 will start to resent being vulnerable and honest about things
and will learn to be more polemic about things in the future.
Voter 2 will be happy with the results of the election, since they only
sorta liked B over A a little, anyway.
that's the problem with elections gone bad (like Burlington Vermont's IRV
of 2009), when voters realize they've been punished for how they voted,
there is voter regret and cynicism and people are literally encouraged to
be more polarized.
Yes, and utilitarian voting systems reduce polarization by choosing
moderate candidates that have high approval ratings across the entire
electorate.
Majoritarian systems choose polarizing candidates who have the support of a
majority, even if the minority hates them.
no. the goal of a voting system in a democracy is to determine, reflect,
and implement the will of the majority of citizens, all with equal
franchise. letting a minority rule sets up all sorts of incentive for
strategic voting.
Of course we should not let minorities rule over majorities, but we should
not let majorities rule over minorities, either. Majoritarianism is a form
of tyranny, "might makes right". Single-winner elections should choose the
candidate who is the best representative of everyone, not just a stronger
faction.
consider a two-candidate election. it's just between A and B.
i don't think you'll get any mileage for the idea that B should be elected
when more voters prefer A.
If the electorate would be happier with B winning, then B should be the
winner, even if a greater number of voters prefer A. The preferences are
unequal in strength; arbitrarily assigning equal weight to them is invalid.
"Suppose you and a pair of friends are looking to order a pizza. You, and
one friend, really like mushrooms, and prefer them over all other vegetable
options, but you both also really, really like pepperoni. Your other friend
also really likes mushrooms, and prefers them over all other options, but
they're also vegetarian. What one topping should you get?
Clearly the answer is mushrooms, and there is no group of friends worth
calling themselves such who would conclude otherwise. It's so obvious that
it hardly seems worth calling attention to. So why is it, that if we put
this decision up to a vote, do so many election methods, which are
otherwise seen as perfectly reasonable methods, fail? Plurality, top-two
runoffs, instant runoff voting, all variations of Condorcet's method, even
Bucklin voting; all of them, incorrectly, choose pepperoni."
https://leastevil.blogspot.com/2012/03/tyranny-of-majority-weak-preferences.html
We need to stop thinking in terms of "who gets to push around whom", and
start thinking in terms of "what's the best choice for everyone".
On Sat, Jun 24, 2017 at 6:15 PM, Brian Olson wrote:
Sure, simulations aren't real humans. Opinions stuck in opposition,
someone ought to do a proper psychology experiment. Devise a methodology,
do a test, get people to {rank, rate} {5,10, 20} things in a subject they
{know well, know poorly} and figure out the quality of information gotten
out of people, and ask them how they felt about how much work they had to
do to put into this.
Well, psychologists do experiments on human opinion regularly. When they
use a ranked-choice system, they call it an "ipsative" measure. When a
score-based system (the Likert scale), they call it a "normative" measure.
It's understood that rankings cannot meaningfully be compared between
individuals; only ratings can.
"In summary, one may state that scores originally obtained as ipsative
measures may legitimately be employed only for purposes of intraindividual
comparisons. Normative measures may be employed for either interindividual
or intraindividual comparisons."
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1971-01501-001
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Likert_scale
I also linked to some studies earlier, showing improved predictive validity
of ratings over rankings. Ranked-choice ballots tend to be biased by the
order in which the choices are presented, demonstrating that not all of the
forced rankings are meaningful.
"Early Krosnick research ("Maximizing Questionnaire Quality", 1999) saw
ranking questions as having greater predictive validity, but a number of
studies since, include his own later research, show rating questions as
having greater validity (Krosnick, Thomas, and Shaeffer, 2003; Maio, Roese,
Seligman, Katz, 1996)."
http://blog.verint.com/ranking-questions-vs-rating-questions
On Sat, Jun 24, 2017 at 7:12 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about.
Well, after mathematically proving that all ranked-choice voting systems
are flawed, Arrow became a fan of score voting, and evaluating voting
systems by their actual outcomes. :)
*CES: Do you have any particular preferences or ideas as far as how voting
methods should be evaluated in the future? Or, do you think there are
certain things we should look at in trying to figure out what voting
methods we should push?*
Dr. Arrow: Well, I’m a little inclined to think that score systems where
you categorize in maybe three or four classes probably (in spite of what I
said about manipulation) is probably the best. And that is to look at the
outcomes and see if everybody says, “well, that seems intuitively a
reasonable outcome given the inputs.” And some of these studies have been
made. In France, [Michel] Balinski has done some studies of this kind which
seem to give some support to these scoring methods.
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
From: fdpk69p6uq@snkmail.com
Date: Fri, June 30, 2017 10:21 pm
To: election-methods@electorama.com
recalling:
if i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only>>>> sorta like B over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what
disparate degree we like our candidates.
Yes, it absolutely should.
�
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 10:52 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
that is a fundamental value statement
that stands in opposition of the core democratic value that every person's
vote should count equally.
known as "One-person-one-vote".
No, your "one vote" is your ballot of information about how you feel about
the candidates, and it has just as much weight as everyone else's.
not when the voter finds out that expressing their "true feelings" about the candidates reduces that voter's effectiveness to elect the candidate he/she prefers.
People use the same argument to campaign against ranked-choice systems, you
know.
people can use all sorts of arguments. �doesn't say that the arguments are valid.
�
and voter 2 will start to resent being vulnerable and honest about things
and will learn to be more polemic about things in the future.
Voter 2 will be happy with the results of the election, since they only
sorta liked B over A a little, anyway.
no, Voter 2 will find out that they didn't get the candidate they preferred solely because the other voter was more polarized and got their preference solely because of that polarization.
you are giving Voter 2 a reason (and a burden) for
them to vote tactically to prevent their franchise from being diluted. �Voter 2 (and all of the other voters) will have to think long and hard how highly they want to rate Candidate A (their second choice).
that's the problem with elections gone bad (like Burlington Vermont's IRV
of 2009), when voters realize they've been punished for how they voted,
there is voter regret and cynicism and people are literally encouraged to
be more polarized.
Yes, and utilitarian voting systems reduce polarization by choosing
moderate candidates that have high approval ratings across the entire
electorate.
Majoritarian systems choose polarizing candidates who have the support of a
majority, even if the minority hates them.
no. the goal of a voting system in a democracy is to determine, reflect,
and implement the will of the majority of citizens, all with equal
franchise. letting a minority rule sets up all sorts of incentive for
strategic voting.
Of course we should not let minorities rule over majorities, but we should
not let majorities rule over minorities, either.
�
there is a difference between "rule" and "rights". �in a democracy, we do let majorities rule, but limit that rule with a well-established foundation of rights for everyone including the minority.
but it's solely the majority that gets to decide who is elected to office.
Majoritarianism is a form�of tyranny, "might makes right".
no, tyranny and "might makes right" equates power with "right". �but the issue is "who rules"? �tyranny does not equate "majority" with "who rules".
�but democracies do.
�
Single-winner elections should choose the
candidate who is the best representative of everyone, not just a stronger
faction.
the name we normally use for that "stronger faction" is the majority of the electorate.
consider a two-candidate election. it's just between A and B.
i don't think you'll get any mileage for the idea that B should be elected
when more voters prefer A.
If the electorate would be happier with B winning, then B should be the
winner, even if a greater number of voters prefer A.
this is the most silly, self-contradicting statement you've made so far.
in a two-candidate race, if more voters prefer A to B, then candidate B should not be elected.
The preferences are�unequal in
strength;
and that means the marked ballots were unequal in strength. �no one wants the strength of their vote diluted. �everyone wants as much franchise as any other.
arbitrarily assigning equal weight to them is invalid.
it is not arbitrary to assign every voters'
vote equal strength. �it's a very old principle of equality of franchise.
�
"Suppose you and a pair of friends are looking to order a pizza. You, and
one friend, really like mushrooms, and prefer them over all other vegetable
options, but you both also really, really like pepperoni. Your other friend
also really likes mushrooms, and prefers them over all other options, but
they're also vegetarian. What one topping should you get?
it's not a governmental election. �in life people negotiate and make compromises and self-sacrifice (for the common good) all the time. �but in a democracy, we are all given equal
�
what's gonna
happen with score-voting in governmental elections where the stakes are high is that the polemic supporters and activists will know to max out the effectiveness of their vote (for their candidate) by maxing out their score for their candidate. �the chumps that are told "oh, you can mark
your preferences to whatever degree your heart desires" will find out that they are chumps and that their voice was diluted for marking their ballots sincerely. �they will not repeat that mistake in the following elections. �when everyone (or nearly everyone) bullet rates their
favorite with a "10" and the scores are added, the result is the same as Plurality but scaled up by 10.
the voter is in the polls to represent their own political interests. �not someone else's political interests. �Score voting and Approval voting are fundamentally
flawed (for contentious high-stakes governmental elections) because these systems present to the voter an immediate problem for them to decide how they will score (or how they will approve) their second choice and possibly their third choice. �but ranked ballots don't have that
problem.
�
--
r b-j � � � � � � � � �rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
On 07/01/2017 04:21 AM, fdpk69p6uq@snkmail.com wrote:
Of course we should not let minorities rule over majorities, but we
should not let majorities rule over minorities, either. Majoritarianism
is a form of tyranny, "might makes right". Single-winner elections
should choose the candidate who is the best representative of
everyone, not just a stronger faction.
Has that actually happened? I often see Range advocates say that
following the rule of majority leads to a tyranny of the majority, but
I've not often seen that happen in reality.
For that matter, were tyranny of the majority true, democracy itself
should degenerate into a system where the 51% plunders the 49%, but that
rarely happens either. So something must be going on to keep the
worst-case analysis from coming to fruition.
There have, of course, been times where a larger group has oppressed a
smaller one, as I imagine RangeVoting's "kill the jews" example is
supposed to bring to mind. But in both Nazi Germany and racist states in
the US, it's not too much of a stretch to imagine that the people doing
the oppressing would feel righteous enough about it to vote Approval-style.
Well, psychologists do experiments on human opinion regularly. When
they use a ranked-choice system, they call it an "ipsative" measure.
When a score-based system (the Likert scale), they call it a "normative"
measure. It's understood that rankings cannot meaningfully be compared
between individuals; only ratings can.
"In summary, one may state that scores originally obtained as ipsative
measures may legitimately be employed only for purposes of
intraindividual comparisons. Normative measures may be employed for
either interindividual or intraindividual comparisons."
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1971-01501-001
But note also, from the same Wikipedia page:
"Whether individual Likert items can be considered as interval-level
data, or whether they should be treated as ordered-categorical data is
the subject of considerable disagreement in the literature,[10][11] with
strong convictions on what are the most applicable methods. This
disagreement can be traced back, in many respects, to the extent to
which Likert items are interpreted as being ordinal data."
That is to say, it's not clear whether the Likert scale is a Range scale
or an MJ scale.
Well, after mathematically proving that all ranked-choice voting systems
are flawed, Arrow became a fan of score voting, and evaluating voting
systems by their actual outcomes. :)
*CES: Do you have any particular preferences or ideas as far as how
voting methods should be evaluated in the future? Or, do you think
there are certain things we should look at in trying to figure out
what voting methods we should push?*
Dr. Arrow: Well, I’m a little inclined to think that score systems
where you categorize in maybe three or four classes probably (in
spite of what I said about manipulation) is probably the best. And
that is to look at the outcomes and see if everybody says, “well,
that seems intuitively a reasonable outcome given the inputs.” And
some of these studies have been made. In France, [Michel] Balinski
has done some studies of this kind which seem to give some support
to these scoring methods.
The method Balinski was experimenting with was MJ, not Range, and "three
or four classes" sounds more like MJ than Range. Unlike Range, MJ passes
Majority. So it's not evident that this statement supports not letting
the majority rule.